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One common reason why traders blow up is because of poor position sizing. In other words, how much do you bet on a trade. You can be right on direction 60% of the time and still lose everything if you size your positions poorly. One oversized trade can wipe...

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Nithin Kamath

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59,213 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад •via X (Twitter)

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The pod shops measure risk in factors and volatility. A manager who's compounded ~20% a year defines risk completely differently: Sean D. Emory explains: "Pods think about risk as factors and volatility. I'm in the old-school camp." "Risk isn't a stock price going up and down." "Risk is permanent loss of capital. It's the fundamentals of the business." "We break it into the six M's: management, market, market share, margins, multiple expansion, margin of safety." "You won't find us in overly levered names a left-field shock could kill overnight." "Get that right, and time is on your side."
1:55

The pod shops measure risk in factors and volatility. A manager who's compounded ~20% a year defines risk completely differently: Sean D. Emory explains: "Pods think about risk as factors and volatility. I'm in the old-school camp." "Risk isn't a stock price going up and down." "Risk is permanent loss of capital. It's the fundamentals of the business." "We break it into the six M's: management, market, market share, margins, multiple expansion, margin of safety." "You won't find us in overly levered names a left-field shock could kill overnight." "Get that right, and time is on your side."

Ethan Kho

16,354 просмотров • 1 месяц назад

Elon Musk just told you why caution kills more companies than risk ever has. Musk: “One of the approaches we did take was to proceed at risk with temporary permits.” Hundreds of millions in concrete before the final signature exists. Knowing the full downside. Musk: “Your long-term permit could be denied, in which case you have to stop everything.” Tear it all down. Back to dirt. Every board on Earth calls that unacceptable. Musk calls it cheaper than the alternative. Musk: “Most companies are not willing to take the risk of the temporary permit, and then the risk of having to stop and tear down.” They think they are avoiding risk. They are selecting one. Waiting is not neutral. Waiting is a position. A bet that the market holds, the team stays, and momentum outlasts a system designed to outlast you. It never does. No one says no. The calendar says it for them. Not rejection. Erosion. Musk saw it for what it was. He chose the risk you can see over the risk you cannot. Gigafactories rose in months while the rest of the industry waited on the meeting about the permit. The gap was never resources. It was the willingness to see that waiting is not free. It is the most expensive decision in business. Because it is the only one nobody knows they are making.
0:35

Elon Musk just told you why caution kills more companies than risk ever has. Musk: “One of the approaches we did take was to proceed at risk with temporary permits.” Hundreds of millions in concrete before the final signature exists. Knowing the full downside. Musk: “Your long-term permit could be denied, in which case you have to stop everything.” Tear it all down. Back to dirt. Every board on Earth calls that unacceptable. Musk calls it cheaper than the alternative. Musk: “Most companies are not willing to take the risk of the temporary permit, and then the risk of having to stop and tear down.” They think they are avoiding risk. They are selecting one. Waiting is not neutral. Waiting is a position. A bet that the market holds, the team stays, and momentum outlasts a system designed to outlast you. It never does. No one says no. The calendar says it for them. Not rejection. Erosion. Musk saw it for what it was. He chose the risk you can see over the risk you cannot. Gigafactories rose in months while the rest of the industry waited on the meeting about the permit. The gap was never resources. It was the willingness to see that waiting is not free. It is the most expensive decision in business. Because it is the only one nobody knows they are making.

Dustin

18,985 просмотров • 28 дней назад

The Onion Theory of Risk by Marc Andreessen: "I think the single biggest thing entrepreneurs are missing, both on fundraising and how they run their companies, is the relationship between risk and cash. The relationship between risk and raising cash, and then the relationship between risk and spending cash. So I've always been a fan of something that Andy Ratcliffe taught me years ago, which he called the onion theory of risk. Um, which basically is, you can think about a startup like on day one, um, as having every conceivable kind of risk, right? And you can basically just make a list of the risks. And so you've got, you know, founding team risk. You know, do the founders, are the founders gonna be able to work together? Do you have the right founders? You're gonna have product risk. You know, can you build a product? You'll have technical risk, right? Which is maybe you need a machine learning breakthrough or something to make it work. Are you gonna be able to do that? Um, you'll have, you know, launch risk. Will the launch go well? You'll have, you know, market acceptance risk. You'll have revenue risk. A big risk you get into in a lot of businesses that have a sales force is, can you actually sell the product for enough money to actually pay for the cost of sale? So you have the cost of sale risk. If you're a consumer product, you'll have a viral growth risk. Well, you get the thing of viral growth. And so, a startup at the very beginning is basically just this long list of risks. And then the way that I always think about running a startup is also the way I think about raising money, which is it's a process of peeling away layers of risk as you go. And so you raise seed money in order to peel away the first two or three risks. The founding team risk, the product risk, and maybe the initial launch risk. You raise the A round to peel away the next level of product risk. Maybe you peel away some recruiting risk because you get your full engineering team built. Maybe you peel away some customer risk because you get your first five beta customers. And so basically the way to think about it is you're peeling away risk as you go. You're peeling away risk by achieving milestones. And then as you achieve milestones, you're both making progress in your business, and you're justifying raising more capital. And so you come in, and you pitch somebody like us, and you say you're raising a B round. The best way to do that with us is you say, okay, I raised a seed round, I achieved these milestones, I eliminated these risks. I raised the A round, I achieved these milestones, and I eliminated these risks. Now I'm gonna raise a B round. Here are my milestones, here are my risks. And then by the time I go to raise a seed round, here's the state that I'll be in. And then you calibrate the amount of money that you raise to spend to the risks that you're pulling out of the business. And I go through all this, in a sense this sounds kind of obvious, but I go through all this because it's a systematic way to think about how the money gets raised and deployed. As compared to so much of what's happening, especially these days, which is just, my God, let me go raise as much money as I can. Let me go build the fancy offices, let me go hire as many people as I can, and just kind of hope for the best."
2:21

The Onion Theory of Risk by Marc Andreessen: "I think the single biggest thing entrepreneurs are missing, both on fundraising and how they run their companies, is the relationship between risk and cash. The relationship between risk and raising cash, and then the relationship between risk and spending cash. So I've always been a fan of something that Andy Ratcliffe taught me years ago, which he called the onion theory of risk. Um, which basically is, you can think about a startup like on day one, um, as having every conceivable kind of risk, right? And you can basically just make a list of the risks. And so you've got, you know, founding team risk. You know, do the founders, are the founders gonna be able to work together? Do you have the right founders? You're gonna have product risk. You know, can you build a product? You'll have technical risk, right? Which is maybe you need a machine learning breakthrough or something to make it work. Are you gonna be able to do that? Um, you'll have, you know, launch risk. Will the launch go well? You'll have, you know, market acceptance risk. You'll have revenue risk. A big risk you get into in a lot of businesses that have a sales force is, can you actually sell the product for enough money to actually pay for the cost of sale? So you have the cost of sale risk. If you're a consumer product, you'll have a viral growth risk. Well, you get the thing of viral growth. And so, a startup at the very beginning is basically just this long list of risks. And then the way that I always think about running a startup is also the way I think about raising money, which is it's a process of peeling away layers of risk as you go. And so you raise seed money in order to peel away the first two or three risks. The founding team risk, the product risk, and maybe the initial launch risk. You raise the A round to peel away the next level of product risk. Maybe you peel away some recruiting risk because you get your full engineering team built. Maybe you peel away some customer risk because you get your first five beta customers. And so basically the way to think about it is you're peeling away risk as you go. You're peeling away risk by achieving milestones. And then as you achieve milestones, you're both making progress in your business, and you're justifying raising more capital. And so you come in, and you pitch somebody like us, and you say you're raising a B round. The best way to do that with us is you say, okay, I raised a seed round, I achieved these milestones, I eliminated these risks. I raised the A round, I achieved these milestones, and I eliminated these risks. Now I'm gonna raise a B round. Here are my milestones, here are my risks. And then by the time I go to raise a seed round, here's the state that I'll be in. And then you calibrate the amount of money that you raise to spend to the risks that you're pulling out of the business. And I go through all this, in a sense this sounds kind of obvious, but I go through all this because it's a systematic way to think about how the money gets raised and deployed. As compared to so much of what's happening, especially these days, which is just, my God, let me go raise as much money as I can. Let me go build the fancy offices, let me go hire as many people as I can, and just kind of hope for the best."

Founder Mode

106,870 просмотров • 6 месяцев назад

Peter Thiel and David Sacks were going to write a book about PayPal. Elon Musk’s chapter was titled “The Man Who Knew Nothing About Risk.” The PayPal Mafia. The sharpest venture minds of a generation. People who had built with Musk. Watched him operate up close. They thought he was out of his mind. Thiel: “When Elon was building both Tesla and SpaceX in the 2000s, people thought he was just really, really crazy.” This was not the press misunderstanding a founder. This was his own people. And they were not wrong by accident. They were wrong by design. Because the framework everyone uses to calculate risk is built on one assumption. That the laws governing what is possible are fixed. Musk did not share that assumption. Thiel figured that out later. Thiel: “If one of the two companies had succeeded, you would say, well, maybe he still got really lucky. But when two out of two companies that people thought were completely harebrained both succeed, you have to reassess.” One success is luck. Two is a different kind of intelligence entirely. Musk was simultaneously trying to privatize space and electrify transportation. Two industries with the most entrenched players on Earth. Two that had eaten billions in failed attempts. Two that governments spent decades trying to move and couldn’t. He did both. At the same time. Nearly went bankrupt doing it. And came out the other side owning both. That is not luck. That is not even genius. That is a different relationship with reality itself. The conventional risk model measures one thing. The probability of losing what you already have. Capital at risk. Downside scenarios. Protect the position. Musk was running a different equation entirely. He was calculating the cost of not trying. The risk of building a reusable rocket and failing is a rounding error. The risk of humanity remaining trapped on a single planet forever is not. The conventional investor sees a 90% chance of losing everything and calls it irrational. Musk saw a 100% chance of civilizational stagnation if no one moved and called that the real risk. The math was never wrong. The lens was just incomprehensibly larger. Thiel: “Somehow the rest of us are too risk-averse, or there’s something about risk he knows that we don’t.” That is Peter Thiel. One of the most ruthless, clear-eyed thinkers in venture capital history admitting the model broke. Not that Musk got lucky. That the rest of them were running a flawed framework and didn’t know it. That should keep you up at night. Because if the PayPal Mafia had the wrong model, the question is not whether Musk is exceptional. The question is how many other things the conventional framework is catastrophically wrong about right now. How many ideas getting buried today look obvious in ten years. How many founders are being told they don’t understand risk when they are the only ones who do. The chapter never got written. The man it was supposed to warn us about built two of the most important companies in human history instead. They are still writing the explanation. He already moved on to the next impossible thing.
0:55

Peter Thiel and David Sacks were going to write a book about PayPal. Elon Musk’s chapter was titled “The Man Who Knew Nothing About Risk.” The PayPal Mafia. The sharpest venture minds of a generation. People who had built with Musk. Watched him operate up close. They thought he was out of his mind. Thiel: “When Elon was building both Tesla and SpaceX in the 2000s, people thought he was just really, really crazy.” This was not the press misunderstanding a founder. This was his own people. And they were not wrong by accident. They were wrong by design. Because the framework everyone uses to calculate risk is built on one assumption. That the laws governing what is possible are fixed. Musk did not share that assumption. Thiel figured that out later. Thiel: “If one of the two companies had succeeded, you would say, well, maybe he still got really lucky. But when two out of two companies that people thought were completely harebrained both succeed, you have to reassess.” One success is luck. Two is a different kind of intelligence entirely. Musk was simultaneously trying to privatize space and electrify transportation. Two industries with the most entrenched players on Earth. Two that had eaten billions in failed attempts. Two that governments spent decades trying to move and couldn’t. He did both. At the same time. Nearly went bankrupt doing it. And came out the other side owning both. That is not luck. That is not even genius. That is a different relationship with reality itself. The conventional risk model measures one thing. The probability of losing what you already have. Capital at risk. Downside scenarios. Protect the position. Musk was running a different equation entirely. He was calculating the cost of not trying. The risk of building a reusable rocket and failing is a rounding error. The risk of humanity remaining trapped on a single planet forever is not. The conventional investor sees a 90% chance of losing everything and calls it irrational. Musk saw a 100% chance of civilizational stagnation if no one moved and called that the real risk. The math was never wrong. The lens was just incomprehensibly larger. Thiel: “Somehow the rest of us are too risk-averse, or there’s something about risk he knows that we don’t.” That is Peter Thiel. One of the most ruthless, clear-eyed thinkers in venture capital history admitting the model broke. Not that Musk got lucky. That the rest of them were running a flawed framework and didn’t know it. That should keep you up at night. Because if the PayPal Mafia had the wrong model, the question is not whether Musk is exceptional. The question is how many other things the conventional framework is catastrophically wrong about right now. How many ideas getting buried today look obvious in ten years. How many founders are being told they don’t understand risk when they are the only ones who do. The chapter never got written. The man it was supposed to warn us about built two of the most important companies in human history instead. They are still writing the explanation. He already moved on to the next impossible thing.

Dustin

49,454 просмотров • 3 месяцев назад

Chamath's CDS Bet: Outlining Major Corporate Debt Default Risks "With all of the tariffs, the one thing that we haven't sufficiently talked about is there is a tremendous amount of corporate debt that supports these businesses today." "And you would say, 'Well, if long-term rates go down, there's no real risk.'" "But the tariff picture actually impacts revenues." "And the problem with that is that there's a lot of companies that have debt covenants tied to revenue and EBITDA." "And so this is what I spoke about at the beginning of January, which is, the one risk that is uncontrollable, is what happens to corporate debt and could we see a wave of defaults and a wave of action?" On our 2025 predictions show in January, Chamath Palihapitiya picked credit default swaps as his best-performing asset this year, calling it a long-shot with major upside: " I would be long CDS. I'm buying insurance using credit default swaps. I think that there is a small chance of some volatility next year. I hope it doesn't happen. I hope that this trade loses money. But if it hits, it will be the best-performing asset of 2025." Fast-forward to April: " It has hit. For every billion dollars of risk you would've put on, would have cost you ~$1M, and that million dollars would've made you ~$7M in about three months." "Why is this important? The CDS actually represents the structural risk in the United States corporate economy." "So when you see these spreads blowing out, this is actually a very important warning sign." "This is what was the canary in the coal mine for the Great Financial Crisis." "The tariff picture and the recession picture will get played out in this chart." "And I think it's something that folks can and should probably pay tremendous attention to."
1:32

Chamath's CDS Bet: Outlining Major Corporate Debt Default Risks "With all of the tariffs, the one thing that we haven't sufficiently talked about is there is a tremendous amount of corporate debt that supports these businesses today." "And you would say, 'Well, if long-term rates go down, there's no real risk.'" "But the tariff picture actually impacts revenues." "And the problem with that is that there's a lot of companies that have debt covenants tied to revenue and EBITDA." "And so this is what I spoke about at the beginning of January, which is, the one risk that is uncontrollable, is what happens to corporate debt and could we see a wave of defaults and a wave of action?" On our 2025 predictions show in January, Chamath Palihapitiya picked credit default swaps as his best-performing asset this year, calling it a long-shot with major upside: " I would be long CDS. I'm buying insurance using credit default swaps. I think that there is a small chance of some volatility next year. I hope it doesn't happen. I hope that this trade loses money. But if it hits, it will be the best-performing asset of 2025." Fast-forward to April: " It has hit. For every billion dollars of risk you would've put on, would have cost you ~$1M, and that million dollars would've made you ~$7M in about three months." "Why is this important? The CDS actually represents the structural risk in the United States corporate economy." "So when you see these spreads blowing out, this is actually a very important warning sign." "This is what was the canary in the coal mine for the Great Financial Crisis." "The tariff picture and the recession picture will get played out in this chart." "And I think it's something that folks can and should probably pay tremendous attention to."

The All-In Podcast

1,102,601 просмотров • 1 год назад

Qullamaggie on Why You Shouldn’t Take Low Quality Trades With Smaller Size “One more thing that’s really important: why you shouldn’t size down. You know, just to trade some good setup on an illiquid stock or a stock that is too illiquid for your account size. What you do is condition your brain to trade with smaller positions and smaller risk numbers. And when you get a good opportunity, like a big opportunity on a more liquid stock, you won’t have the confidence to take the correct size because you’ve spent a bunch of time conditioning your brain to trade smaller for no reason other reason than you can sit on your two hands and wait for a more liquid opportunity. You need to get out of the game and out of this mentality. You have to trade everything all the time; that’s not how trading works. Yes, in the past 12 months, it has worked like that, but once this main trend ends, you don’t know when it will end. It is going to end, and there are going to be slimmer opportunities.”
1:00

Qullamaggie on Why You Shouldn’t Take Low Quality Trades With Smaller Size “One more thing that’s really important: why you shouldn’t size down. You know, just to trade some good setup on an illiquid stock or a stock that is too illiquid for your account size. What you do is condition your brain to trade with smaller positions and smaller risk numbers. And when you get a good opportunity, like a big opportunity on a more liquid stock, you won’t have the confidence to take the correct size because you’ve spent a bunch of time conditioning your brain to trade smaller for no reason other reason than you can sit on your two hands and wait for a more liquid opportunity. You need to get out of the game and out of this mentality. You have to trade everything all the time; that’s not how trading works. Yes, in the past 12 months, it has worked like that, but once this main trend ends, you don’t know when it will end. It is going to end, and there are going to be slimmer opportunities.”

Lone

19,808 просмотров • 5 месяцев назад

Slow down. Read what real traders are saying: Our student results speak for themselves — consistent growth, clarity, and full independence. It’s not your strategy — it’s your ability to align the market environment and volatility condition and turn the right system, measured move and risk profile on. You’ll learn how to: • Know when to engage • Size correctly for volatility • Match risk profile to measured move expectancy • Keep your account alive long enough to compound 3 months for $100 includes: • OHLC Probability Engine – Intraday candle outcome modeling • HOD/LOD Scenario Tracker – Stat-based market context overlays • Time-Range Sequencer – Real-time session and volatility structuring • Monte Carlo Risk Suite – Trade modeling and position sizing engine • Decision Journal System – Trade review and probabilistic scoring tools We don’t cherry-pick trades or showcase payouts from one of hundreds of hidden prop accounts. We trade live — show all account, all execution, every day. Wins and losses. No magic. Just process. Our goal is to give you a complete, independent foundation — so by the end of three months, you no longer rely on anyone but your process, your decision making and your risk management. Sign up at Austin Clark Trades Dont Lie
1:48

Slow down. Read what real traders are saying: Our student results speak for themselves — consistent growth, clarity, and full independence. It’s not your strategy — it’s your ability to align the market environment and volatility condition and turn the right system, measured move and risk profile on. You’ll learn how to: • Know when to engage • Size correctly for volatility • Match risk profile to measured move expectancy • Keep your account alive long enough to compound 3 months for $100 includes: • OHLC Probability Engine – Intraday candle outcome modeling • HOD/LOD Scenario Tracker – Stat-based market context overlays • Time-Range Sequencer – Real-time session and volatility structuring • Monte Carlo Risk Suite – Trade modeling and position sizing engine • Decision Journal System – Trade review and probabilistic scoring tools We don’t cherry-pick trades or showcase payouts from one of hundreds of hidden prop accounts. We trade live — show all account, all execution, every day. Wins and losses. No magic. Just process. Our goal is to give you a complete, independent foundation — so by the end of three months, you no longer rely on anyone but your process, your decision making and your risk management. Sign up at Austin Clark Trades Dont Lie

The Daily Profiler

17,803 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

Chamath’s 2026 IPO Advice: Get Public Fast or Get Left Behind Jason: “ What are your thoughts here on the flurry of potential IPOs?” Chamath: “I think that we have a bit of a risk problem. If you think about appetite as equivalent to a person at a Thanksgiving dinner, when you first come in and you see all of this stuff, it's so plentiful, your eyes are bigger than your stomach. And I think in a moment like that, you want to be the one that is consumed first. And I think the risk increases when you are at the tail end because the risk is that the diners will run out of space.” Jason: “Plate fills up. Yeah.” Chamath: “And if you use that analogy, I think the reason why people's plates will get full is probably twofold and maybe threefold. The first and most important thing is there's enough tactical event risk that people generally want to be risk off and have more margin of safety. We have a lot of these really important financial moments tied to this concept of AGI, ASI. We have a real pricing problem. If AGI is real, the durability of most companies is slim to none. If AGI is not real, then the fundraising capacity of these companies that are now raising hundreds of billions of dollars needs to get questioned and inspected thoroughly. History will sort out which one is right, but both cannot be right. So in that vein, I don't think we're going to have this “blockbuster” stream of IPOs. I think what happens is SpaceX is going to get out. They're going to do great, and then maybe the next one does good to great, then the next one will do good, and then the appetite runs out because you just can't absorb, incrementally, trillions of dollars of new demand. And if you think about it, where is it going to come from? Is it going to come from the sidelines? I don't know, I think it's more of a reallocation exercise. But if you look at the S&P, well, most people are now defensively moving away from these kinds of things, towards the things that are more protected, what the industry calls HALO, right? Those things trade for zero today. You could buy hundreds of millions of dollars a year of cashflow for 2-5x right now in the stock market. And so why are you going to go way out on the risk curve and buy something at 200x revenue, let alone earnings? I'm more in the camp of, I think it's good to be first, it’s pretty decent to be second, but if I were you, I would get the heck out, and get public, and get your money, and fortify your balance sheet ASAP, because I think the risk builds the further down the IPO chain you're in.”
2:34

Chamath’s 2026 IPO Advice: Get Public Fast or Get Left Behind Jason: “ What are your thoughts here on the flurry of potential IPOs?” Chamath: “I think that we have a bit of a risk problem. If you think about appetite as equivalent to a person at a Thanksgiving dinner, when you first come in and you see all of this stuff, it's so plentiful, your eyes are bigger than your stomach. And I think in a moment like that, you want to be the one that is consumed first. And I think the risk increases when you are at the tail end because the risk is that the diners will run out of space.” Jason: “Plate fills up. Yeah.” Chamath: “And if you use that analogy, I think the reason why people's plates will get full is probably twofold and maybe threefold. The first and most important thing is there's enough tactical event risk that people generally want to be risk off and have more margin of safety. We have a lot of these really important financial moments tied to this concept of AGI, ASI. We have a real pricing problem. If AGI is real, the durability of most companies is slim to none. If AGI is not real, then the fundraising capacity of these companies that are now raising hundreds of billions of dollars needs to get questioned and inspected thoroughly. History will sort out which one is right, but both cannot be right. So in that vein, I don't think we're going to have this “blockbuster” stream of IPOs. I think what happens is SpaceX is going to get out. They're going to do great, and then maybe the next one does good to great, then the next one will do good, and then the appetite runs out because you just can't absorb, incrementally, trillions of dollars of new demand. And if you think about it, where is it going to come from? Is it going to come from the sidelines? I don't know, I think it's more of a reallocation exercise. But if you look at the S&P, well, most people are now defensively moving away from these kinds of things, towards the things that are more protected, what the industry calls HALO, right? Those things trade for zero today. You could buy hundreds of millions of dollars a year of cashflow for 2-5x right now in the stock market. And so why are you going to go way out on the risk curve and buy something at 200x revenue, let alone earnings? I'm more in the camp of, I think it's good to be first, it’s pretty decent to be second, but if I were you, I would get the heck out, and get public, and get your money, and fortify your balance sheet ASAP, because I think the risk builds the further down the IPO chain you're in.”

The All-In Podcast

61,917 просмотров • 3 месяцев назад

Marc Andreessen explains the “Onion Theory of Risk” “I think the single-biggest thing entrepreneurs are missing — both on fundraising and how they run their companies — is the relationship between risk and cash. I’ve always been a fan of something Andy Rachleff taught me years ago. He calls it the ‘Onion Theory of Risk.’” You can think of a day 1 startup as having every conceivable kind of risk: founding team risk, product risk, technical risk, market acceptance risk, revenue risk, cost of sales risk, viral growth risk, etc. A startup is basically just a long list of risks, and as Marc explains: "The way I think about running a startup is the way I think about raising money. It's a process of peeling away layers of risk as you go." You raise seed money to peel away the first two or three risks (e.g. founding team risk, product risk, initial launch risk). You raise the Series A round to peel away the next layer of risks (e.g. recruiting risk, customer risk, revenue risk, cost of sales risk) And so on. Basically, you're peeling away risk as you're achieving milestones. And as you achieve milestones, you're both: making progress on your business and justifying raising more capital. So in terms of fundraising, you should be calibrating the amount money you're raising to the risks you need to pull out of your business for you to raise your next round. For example, if you're raising your Series A round, the best way to do that is to say to investors: "I raised a seed round then achieved ____ milestones and eliminated ____ risks. Now I'm going to raise $ X for the Series A to achieve ____ milestones and eliminate ____ risks. This will get the company to ____ state for the Series B round. " This seems fairly obvious, but as Marc points out, it's a much more systematic way of going about things versus just raising as much money as possible, renting fancy offices, and hiring as many people as you can to grow as fast as you can. The more money you raise, the more you dilute your ownership stake in your business so it pays to be thoughtful. Raise the capital you will need to achieve the milestones and eliminate the risks required for your next financing round. It also probably makes sense to give yourself some margin as safety because things never go exactly as planned in startup land. Video source: Y Combinator (2014)
2:10

Marc Andreessen explains the “Onion Theory of Risk” “I think the single-biggest thing entrepreneurs are missing — both on fundraising and how they run their companies — is the relationship between risk and cash. I’ve always been a fan of something Andy Rachleff taught me years ago. He calls it the ‘Onion Theory of Risk.’” You can think of a day 1 startup as having every conceivable kind of risk: founding team risk, product risk, technical risk, market acceptance risk, revenue risk, cost of sales risk, viral growth risk, etc. A startup is basically just a long list of risks, and as Marc explains: "The way I think about running a startup is the way I think about raising money. It's a process of peeling away layers of risk as you go." You raise seed money to peel away the first two or three risks (e.g. founding team risk, product risk, initial launch risk). You raise the Series A round to peel away the next layer of risks (e.g. recruiting risk, customer risk, revenue risk, cost of sales risk) And so on. Basically, you're peeling away risk as you're achieving milestones. And as you achieve milestones, you're both: making progress on your business and justifying raising more capital. So in terms of fundraising, you should be calibrating the amount money you're raising to the risks you need to pull out of your business for you to raise your next round. For example, if you're raising your Series A round, the best way to do that is to say to investors: "I raised a seed round then achieved ____ milestones and eliminated ____ risks. Now I'm going to raise $ X for the Series A to achieve ____ milestones and eliminate ____ risks. This will get the company to ____ state for the Series B round. " This seems fairly obvious, but as Marc points out, it's a much more systematic way of going about things versus just raising as much money as possible, renting fancy offices, and hiring as many people as you can to grow as fast as you can. The more money you raise, the more you dilute your ownership stake in your business so it pays to be thoughtful. Raise the capital you will need to achieve the milestones and eliminate the risks required for your next financing round. It also probably makes sense to give yourself some margin as safety because things never go exactly as planned in startup land. Video source: Y Combinator (2014)

Startup Archive

63,274 просмотров • 1 год назад

Rune Christensen, Co-Founder of Sky (Sky), on USDS, STUSDS, and risk tiers in DeFi "Lindy, like stablecoin product with a really really reasonable rate of return" "right now it's at 3.75%, which is actually 10 points above SOFR" "a lot of people dunking on DeFi for not being able to beat TradFi, but USDS does in fact still beat TradFi and is very much highly risk optimized" "with Sky you can also use a product like STUSDS, which is a higher risk token that still has this link to the US dollar" "you can actually go even more high risk and buy something like SPK, which is a completely volatile governance token of one of the Sky agents" "STUSDS, because it's a risk token and it's explicitly marketed as risk capital, it's for advanced users because it has higher risk" "it's not just a stablecoin that is designed to protect you above everything else" "with STUSDS it's also about being able to offer a higher rate of return" "one of the consequences of this is that it can have its liquidity, its one to one liquidity with USDS frozen"
1:20

Rune Christensen, Co-Founder of Sky (Sky), on USDS, STUSDS, and risk tiers in DeFi "Lindy, like stablecoin product with a really really reasonable rate of return" "right now it's at 3.75%, which is actually 10 points above SOFR" "a lot of people dunking on DeFi for not being able to beat TradFi, but USDS does in fact still beat TradFi and is very much highly risk optimized" "with Sky you can also use a product like STUSDS, which is a higher risk token that still has this link to the US dollar" "you can actually go even more high risk and buy something like SPK, which is a completely volatile governance token of one of the Sky agents" "STUSDS, because it's a risk token and it's explicitly marketed as risk capital, it's for advanced users because it has higher risk" "it's not just a stablecoin that is designed to protect you above everything else" "with STUSDS it's also about being able to offer a higher rate of return" "one of the consequences of this is that it can have its liquidity, its one to one liquidity with USDS frozen"

Frontliner 💯

75,006 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад

Q: Should startups always raise as much money as possible? In the clip below, Marc Andreessen shares a framework that Benchmark co-founder Andy Rachleff taught him called "The Onion Theory of Risk". You can think of a day 1 startup as having every conceivable kind of risk: founding team risk, product risk, technical risk, market acceptance risk, revenue risk, cost of sales risk, viral growth risk, etc. A startup is basically just a long list of risks, and as Marc explains: "The way I think about running a startup is the way I think about raising money. It's a process of peeling away layers of risk as you go." You raise seed money to peel away the first two or three risks (e.g. founding team risk, product risk, initial launch risk). You raise the Series A round to peel away the next layer of risks (e.g. recruiting risk, customer risk, revenue risk, cost of sales risk) And so on. Basically, you're peeling away risk as you're achieving milestones. And as you achieve milestones, you're both: making progress on your business and justifying raising more capital. So in terms of fundraising, you should be calibrating the amount of money you're raising to the risks you need to pull out of your business for you to raise your next round. For example, if you're raising your Series A round, the best way to do that is to say to investors: "I raised a seed round then achieved ____ milestones and eliminated ____ risks. Now I'm going to raise $X for the Series A to achieve ____ milestones and eliminate ____ risks. This will get the company to ____ state for the Series B round. " This seems fairly obvious, but as Marc points out, it's a much more systematic way of going about things versus just raising as much money as possible, renting fancy offices, and hiring as many people as you can to grow as fast as you can. The more money you raise, the more you dilute your ownership stake in your business so it pays to be thoughtful. Raise the capital you will need to achieve the milestones and eliminate the risks required for your next financing round. It also probably makes sense to give yourself some margin as safety because things never go exactly as planned in startup land. Follow Startup Archive for more tactical startup advice!
2:21

Q: Should startups always raise as much money as possible? In the clip below, Marc Andreessen shares a framework that Benchmark co-founder Andy Rachleff taught him called "The Onion Theory of Risk". You can think of a day 1 startup as having every conceivable kind of risk: founding team risk, product risk, technical risk, market acceptance risk, revenue risk, cost of sales risk, viral growth risk, etc. A startup is basically just a long list of risks, and as Marc explains: "The way I think about running a startup is the way I think about raising money. It's a process of peeling away layers of risk as you go." You raise seed money to peel away the first two or three risks (e.g. founding team risk, product risk, initial launch risk). You raise the Series A round to peel away the next layer of risks (e.g. recruiting risk, customer risk, revenue risk, cost of sales risk) And so on. Basically, you're peeling away risk as you're achieving milestones. And as you achieve milestones, you're both: making progress on your business and justifying raising more capital. So in terms of fundraising, you should be calibrating the amount of money you're raising to the risks you need to pull out of your business for you to raise your next round. For example, if you're raising your Series A round, the best way to do that is to say to investors: "I raised a seed round then achieved ____ milestones and eliminated ____ risks. Now I'm going to raise $X for the Series A to achieve ____ milestones and eliminate ____ risks. This will get the company to ____ state for the Series B round. " This seems fairly obvious, but as Marc points out, it's a much more systematic way of going about things versus just raising as much money as possible, renting fancy offices, and hiring as many people as you can to grow as fast as you can. The more money you raise, the more you dilute your ownership stake in your business so it pays to be thoughtful. Raise the capital you will need to achieve the milestones and eliminate the risks required for your next financing round. It also probably makes sense to give yourself some margin as safety because things never go exactly as planned in startup land. Follow Startup Archive for more tactical startup advice!

Startup Archive

178,597 просмотров • 2 лет назад

Q: Should startups always raise as much money as possible? In the clip below, Marc Andreessen shares a framework that Benchmark co-founder Andy Rachleff taught him called "The Onion Theory of Risk". You can think of a day 1 startup as having every conceivable kind of risk: founding team risk, product risk, technical risk, market acceptance risk, revenue risk, cost of sales risk, viral growth risk, etc. A startup is basically just a long list of risks, and as Marc explains: "The way I think about running a startup is the way I think about raising money. It's a process of peeling away layers of risk as you go." You raise seed money to peel away the first two or three risks (e.g. founding team risk, product risk, initial launch risk). You raise the Series A round to peel away the next layer of risks (e.g. recruiting risk, customer risk, revenue risk, cost of sales risk) And so on. Basically, you're peeling away risk as you're achieving milestones. And as you achieve milestones, you're both: making progress on your business and justifying raising more capital. So in terms of fundraising, you should be calibrating the amount money you're raising to the risks you need to pull out of your business for you to raise your next round. For example, if you're raising your Series A round, the best way to do that is to say to investors: "I raised a seed round then achieved ____ milestones and eliminated ____ risks. Now I'm going to raise $X for the Series A to achieve ____ milestones and eliminate ____ risks. This will get the company to ____ state for the Series B round. " This seems fairly obvious, but as Marc points out, it's a much more systematic way of going about things versus just raising as much money as possible, renting fancy offices, and hiring as many people as you can to grow as fast as you can. The more money you raise, the more you dilute your ownership stake in your business so it pays to be thoughtful. Raise the capital you will need to achieve the milestones and eliminate the risks required for your next financing round. It also probably makes sense to give yourself some margin as safety because things never go exactly as planned in startup land.
2:21

Q: Should startups always raise as much money as possible? In the clip below, Marc Andreessen shares a framework that Benchmark co-founder Andy Rachleff taught him called "The Onion Theory of Risk". You can think of a day 1 startup as having every conceivable kind of risk: founding team risk, product risk, technical risk, market acceptance risk, revenue risk, cost of sales risk, viral growth risk, etc. A startup is basically just a long list of risks, and as Marc explains: "The way I think about running a startup is the way I think about raising money. It's a process of peeling away layers of risk as you go." You raise seed money to peel away the first two or three risks (e.g. founding team risk, product risk, initial launch risk). You raise the Series A round to peel away the next layer of risks (e.g. recruiting risk, customer risk, revenue risk, cost of sales risk) And so on. Basically, you're peeling away risk as you're achieving milestones. And as you achieve milestones, you're both: making progress on your business and justifying raising more capital. So in terms of fundraising, you should be calibrating the amount money you're raising to the risks you need to pull out of your business for you to raise your next round. For example, if you're raising your Series A round, the best way to do that is to say to investors: "I raised a seed round then achieved ____ milestones and eliminated ____ risks. Now I'm going to raise $X for the Series A to achieve ____ milestones and eliminate ____ risks. This will get the company to ____ state for the Series B round. " This seems fairly obvious, but as Marc points out, it's a much more systematic way of going about things versus just raising as much money as possible, renting fancy offices, and hiring as many people as you can to grow as fast as you can. The more money you raise, the more you dilute your ownership stake in your business so it pays to be thoughtful. Raise the capital you will need to achieve the milestones and eliminate the risks required for your next financing round. It also probably makes sense to give yourself some margin as safety because things never go exactly as planned in startup land.

Michael McGuiness

735,635 просмотров • 3 лет назад

"I would love to see him derisk his position right now even at a loss because the risk you are taking off the table is the worst kind, the catastrophic risk" Tillman on why Saylor needs to take money off the table before Wall Street decides to find his breaking point for him "He could sell enough to get five years of reserves built up and still have an exceptionally risk laden percentage of placement" "If he does that I think he is bulletproof. If he does not, the big boys will test how solvent he is and where that breaking point is. And that may be the very catalyst that drives people down to find out where the breaking point is for him and the products he has created"
1:19

"I would love to see him derisk his position right now even at a loss because the risk you are taking off the table is the worst kind, the catastrophic risk" Tillman on why Saylor needs to take money off the table before Wall Street decides to find his breaking point for him "He could sell enough to get five years of reserves built up and still have an exceptionally risk laden percentage of placement" "If he does that I think he is bulletproof. If he does not, the big boys will test how solvent he is and where that breaking point is. And that may be the very catalyst that drives people down to find out where the breaking point is for him and the products he has created"

The Wolf Of All Streets

29,760 просмотров • 12 дней назад

“There was never any talk of the risk.” Peter Schiff is just lying at this point. The risk of $STRC was always obvious: it is preferred equity issued by a Bitcoin Treasury Company. Saylor said it clearly: if Bitcoin goes down long term or forever, that is the risk. And what are we seeing now? Bitcoin under pressure. Liquidity rotated into AI and IPOs. Maximum fear. STRC down. That is not some hidden scandal. That is risk premium repricing. Strategy does not magically control STRC’s market price. They can adjust the dividend rate, but the market prices the risk of Bitcoin and Strategy’s ability to keep paying dividends. And when Bitcoin starts going up again, what do you think happens? The same risk premium reprices in the other direction. If you buy preferred equity in a Bitcoin company, you are making one core assumption: Bitcoin goes up over the long term. That was never hidden.
0:42

“There was never any talk of the risk.” Peter Schiff is just lying at this point. The risk of $STRC was always obvious: it is preferred equity issued by a Bitcoin Treasury Company. Saylor said it clearly: if Bitcoin goes down long term or forever, that is the risk. And what are we seeing now? Bitcoin under pressure. Liquidity rotated into AI and IPOs. Maximum fear. STRC down. That is not some hidden scandal. That is risk premium repricing. Strategy does not magically control STRC’s market price. They can adjust the dividend rate, but the market prices the risk of Bitcoin and Strategy’s ability to keep paying dividends. And when Bitcoin starts going up again, what do you think happens? The same risk premium reprices in the other direction. If you buy preferred equity in a Bitcoin company, you are making one core assumption: Bitcoin goes up over the long term. That was never hidden.

Alex 👽

21,150 просмотров • 22 дней назад

Today The Arena rolls out the next evolution of social trading! Introducing Copy Trading Here’s how it works 👇 Automatically copy any trader of Arena perps on Hyperliquid. Check the sentiment around the trader based on their recent trades and pledge a certain amount to copy trade them. Determine how much you want to pledge to copy a specific trader. When the trader puts in the trade, we calculate what percentage of their total portfolio is on the line and we mirror that percentage based on the funds you’ve pledged. Each time the trader initiates a trade, funds will automatically be deployed to copy the trade. Even if it’s the middle of the night and you’re fast asleep, never miss another profitable trade! For example, if you pledge $1,000 to copy a trader and they put 5% of their portfolio on a trade, $50 will be automatically deployed on the same trade. Traders earn fees from their copy traders after each profitable trade. The only action that will not be copied is adding additional margin, but we will still give the copy traders the option to manually add more margin very soon. If you’re a profitable trader, gain a following and get rewarded for making others money. If you are not a profitable trader, level up today by copying some of the best traders on a transparent leaderboard. Earn more, trade less. Only on The Arena ⚔️
0:29

Today The Arena rolls out the next evolution of social trading! Introducing Copy Trading Here’s how it works 👇 Automatically copy any trader of Arena perps on Hyperliquid. Check the sentiment around the trader based on their recent trades and pledge a certain amount to copy trade them. Determine how much you want to pledge to copy a specific trader. When the trader puts in the trade, we calculate what percentage of their total portfolio is on the line and we mirror that percentage based on the funds you’ve pledged. Each time the trader initiates a trade, funds will automatically be deployed to copy the trade. Even if it’s the middle of the night and you’re fast asleep, never miss another profitable trade! For example, if you pledge $1,000 to copy a trader and they put 5% of their portfolio on a trade, $50 will be automatically deployed on the same trade. Traders earn fees from their copy traders after each profitable trade. The only action that will not be copied is adding additional margin, but we will still give the copy traders the option to manually add more margin very soon. If you’re a profitable trader, gain a following and get rewarded for making others money. If you are not a profitable trader, level up today by copying some of the best traders on a transparent leaderboard. Earn more, trade less. Only on The Arena ⚔️

The Arena ⚔️

13,290 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад

Chamath Palihapitiya says President Trump has been “way more right than wrong” and explained why Trump’s stance on Iran ultimately won him over. Palihapitiya said Trump’s unwavering position against a nuclear-armed was about preventing the one scenario that could threaten civilization itself. PALIHAPITIYA: “On the broad based things that he did, I think that he has been way more right than wrong.” SORKIN: “Where do you land on the war in Iran?” PALIHAPITIYA: “The most important thing that got me to see his point of view is he was completely binary on there can not be nuclear war.” “And what’s so interesting about, you know, like Warren Buffett in that last segment, who, by the way, should give all of his money if he wants to give it away to Trump Accounts…” “If you ask Buffett, Buffett would also say the same thing. He and Munger used to say in their letters, there’s only one risk for humanity: nuclear war.” “And so when you have a madman country that is attempting to destabilize the ability for all of us just to live our lives, I think he was pulled into a situation he didn’t want to be in because he believed strongly in no nuclear weapons.” “I support that because I think everybody is forgetting the chaos that that kind of thing can create in the world.” Chamath Palihapitiya
1:02

Chamath Palihapitiya says President Trump has been “way more right than wrong” and explained why Trump’s stance on Iran ultimately won him over. Palihapitiya said Trump’s unwavering position against a nuclear-armed was about preventing the one scenario that could threaten civilization itself. PALIHAPITIYA: “On the broad based things that he did, I think that he has been way more right than wrong.” SORKIN: “Where do you land on the war in Iran?” PALIHAPITIYA: “The most important thing that got me to see his point of view is he was completely binary on there can not be nuclear war.” “And what’s so interesting about, you know, like Warren Buffett in that last segment, who, by the way, should give all of his money if he wants to give it away to Trump Accounts…” “If you ask Buffett, Buffett would also say the same thing. He and Munger used to say in their letters, there’s only one risk for humanity: nuclear war.” “And so when you have a madman country that is attempting to destabilize the ability for all of us just to live our lives, I think he was pulled into a situation he didn’t want to be in because he believed strongly in no nuclear weapons.” “I support that because I think everybody is forgetting the chaos that that kind of thing can create in the world.” Chamath Palihapitiya

Overton

76,178 просмотров • 5 дней назад

Probably the best take I have heard on why there is so much fear around software exposure in private equity and credit because of AI From David Sacks "Historically we only had two good exits for software businesses. One was IPO. The other was M&A. Then these big private equity shops came along and gave us a third potential exit. You would sell to them and then they would raise the capital based on one third equity and two third debt. So it was debt financed buyouts. It is something that has been around in the non technology part of the economy for a long time but was a relatively new entrant in the world of technology. And the reason for that is if you have debt financed a purchase, you need to have very stable cash flows. Because if you miss and you cant pay your interest on the debt, you will lose all your equity because the debt holders will foreclose. It was belief for a long time that software did have predictable cash flows, at least for the mature businesses."
5:06

Probably the best take I have heard on why there is so much fear around software exposure in private equity and credit because of AI From David Sacks "Historically we only had two good exits for software businesses. One was IPO. The other was M&A. Then these big private equity shops came along and gave us a third potential exit. You would sell to them and then they would raise the capital based on one third equity and two third debt. So it was debt financed buyouts. It is something that has been around in the non technology part of the economy for a long time but was a relatively new entrant in the world of technology. And the reason for that is if you have debt financed a purchase, you need to have very stable cash flows. Because if you miss and you cant pay your interest on the debt, you will lose all your equity because the debt holders will foreclose. It was belief for a long time that software did have predictable cash flows, at least for the mature businesses."

Boring_Business

402,529 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад

David Sacks: The Decades-Long Bipartisan Consensus on Free Trade was a Mistake David Sacks on E223: "We've had a bipartisan consensus in Washington for decades that unfettered free trade is a good thing." "No matter how big our trade deficits got, no matter how rich and powerful China got, no matter how unfair the trade practices got, no matter how many millions of our jobs in factories got exported overseas, this has been the bipartisan consensus in Washington." "And Larry, you're right that it started before the Clinton administration, and the George W. Bush administration definitely accelerated it." "But there has absolutely been a bipartisan consensus in Washington that this sort of unfettered free trade policy was good for the country." "Now, how do you change that? You can nitpick this and you can make all the process objections you want, but Donald Trump has changed the conversation." "He was one of the few people, one the few public figures in America who was right about this." "That throwing open our markets to these foreign products without thinking about the consequences was a mistake." "I think most people today would say he was right about this."
1:05

David Sacks: The Decades-Long Bipartisan Consensus on Free Trade was a Mistake David Sacks on E223: "We've had a bipartisan consensus in Washington for decades that unfettered free trade is a good thing." "No matter how big our trade deficits got, no matter how rich and powerful China got, no matter how unfair the trade practices got, no matter how many millions of our jobs in factories got exported overseas, this has been the bipartisan consensus in Washington." "And Larry, you're right that it started before the Clinton administration, and the George W. Bush administration definitely accelerated it." "But there has absolutely been a bipartisan consensus in Washington that this sort of unfettered free trade policy was good for the country." "Now, how do you change that? You can nitpick this and you can make all the process objections you want, but Donald Trump has changed the conversation." "He was one of the few people, one the few public figures in America who was right about this." "That throwing open our markets to these foreign products without thinking about the consequences was a mistake." "I think most people today would say he was right about this."

The All-In Podcast

126,225 просмотров • 1 год назад