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🚨 PRIVATE CREDIT TOOK OVER WHERE BANKS BACKED OUT Edward Dowd: post-2008 rules didn’t kill risky lending, they moved it. Banks pulled back. Demand stayed. Private credit stepped in with higher rates and risk. Opaque deals. No pricing. Big spreads. This isn’t just yield. It’s a fee machine.

27,204 görüntüleme • 4 ay önce •via X (Twitter)

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The financial system is creating the same risk patterns that caused the 2008 crisis—just in a different market. Private credit is that market. It's grown to $1 trillion in loans made by hedge funds and asset managers instead of regulated banks. Here's how it works: → Banks lend money to hedge funds. → Hedge funds use that capital to make risky loans. → Banks claim they have no direct exposure to the borrowers. But the risk doesn't disappear. The loans bypass traditional banking oversight, but the funding still originates from the regulated banking system. When private credit deals go bad, the losses flow back to banks through their hedge fund lending relationships. We're already seeing cracks. BlackRock lost 19% of their private credit fund in one quarter. Subprime auto loans are defaulting at accelerating rates. Overleveraged companies are filing bankruptcy. Nobody's watching the full picture. No transparency requirements mean regulators can't see the scope of interconnected exposures. No one knows which banks are most exposed through which hedge fund relationships. When private credit markets seize up, the connected banks will face losses just like they did with subprime mortgages. The legal framework for "bail-ins" already exists—allowing governments to access depositor funds to recapitalize banks rather than using taxpayer bailouts. This explains why diversification matters. When credit markets experience stress, assets outside the banking system—like precious metals—historically maintain value independent of financial institution health. The pattern repeats: Risk transfer, regulatory gaps, interconnected exposures, and inevitable systemic stress when the cycle reverses. -- This is just scratching the surface of the brewing financial crisis. In a 45-minute video, I also covered: • Why mining stocks give 3-5x leverage to gold price moves (costs stay fixed, profits multiply) • How CME margin hikes force leveraged traders to sell and crash prices •The US has legal framework for bail-ins (Orderly Liquidation Authority) Just comment "CRISIS" and I'll DM you the full video.

Felix Prehn 🐶

19,085 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce

Private credit just hit the brakes, and the numbers are not subtle. New US direct lending issuance fell from about $74.6 billion in the first quarter to about $44.8 billion in the three months ending May, according to PitchBook. That is a massive slowdown in a single quarter. Private equity-backed borrowing dropped to about $28.5 billion. Lending tied to leveraged buyouts fell to about $15.2 billion. This is the private credit engine losing speed at the exact moment it needs confidence. And the reasons are not a mystery. Fundraising is still well below its peak. Redemption requests are elevated and still climbing. Investors are scrutinizing loan quality. And borrowers are stuck in a flat, gone-bad economy. For years private credit took market share because it was fast and certain. It could finance deals when the banks and the syndicated markets could not, because everyone assumed the economy would be good forever. That assumption is breaking. Now these funds are preserving liquidity and stretching to get deals done. So they have far less appetite to finance private equity at aggressive valuations. And that is where private equity gets pulled in. It ran on the leverage that private credit provided, and that engine is reversing. Here is the standoff. Private equity firms will not sell assets at lower prices, because that means admitting yesterday's marks were too high. Buyers will not pay peak multiples in a higher-rate, slower-growth world. Lenders will not underwrite the old assumptions. Investors do not want more money locked up. So the whole machine slows, grinds to a halt, and starts to reverse. One guy called it constipation.

Jeffrey P. Snider

18,048 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce

Why The Shadow Banking System Could Trigger The Next Major Crisis Please ❤️like, bookmark🔖, and 🔁share with fellow investors In this Short video, Danielle Danielle DiMartino Booth and Adam Taggart discuss why the shadow banking system—not traditional banks—could become the source of the next major financial crisis. * Private credit may have disappeared from the headlines, but that doesn't mean the risks have disappeared with it. In this discussion, the focus shifts beyond private credit itself to the much larger theme—the shadow banking system—and why it could become the next major source of financial instability. * Companies have raised a record $251 billion through equity sales in the first half of the year. That surge has also drawn renewed attention to private equity, which sits at the center of the private credit ecosystem. The concern isn't simply the size of private credit—it's whether the underlying private asset valuations are realistic. * A key issue is the feedback loop between private and public markets. Many public companies own private investments, and gains from those holdings can boost reported earnings. If those private assets are being valued too aggressively, investors have to ask whether the "E" in the P/E ratio is as solid as it appears. Inflated valuations can support stronger earnings, higher stock prices, and more capital raising, creating a cycle that works well until confidence begins to crack. * Although fears around private credit have faded in recent months, Danielle argues that the market has simply moved into an "acceptance phase," not a resolution phase. The structural problems remain, but investors have largely stopped talking about them. * Meanwhile, non-bank financial institutions now control roughly $258 trillion in assets, representing more than half of global financial assets and exceeding the size of the traditional regulated banking system. Unlike banks, these institutions operate with far less transparency and oversight, making it much harder to assess the true level of risk. * At the same time, higher interest rates continue to pressure borrowers. Public company bankruptcies are already running about 40% higher than a year ago, suggesting financial stress is building. If publicly traded companies are struggling under today's financing conditions, the health of private companies—where financial information is far less accessible—remains a major unknown. * Danielle rates concern about private markets at roughly a 7–8 out of 10 now. The combination of opaque valuations, rising bankruptcies, higher-for-longer interest rates, and the enormous size of the shadow banking system creates a meaningful systemic risk. While this doesn't guarantee another financial crisis, it highlights an area that many investors may be underestimating simply because it has faded from the daily news cycle. #privatecredit #privateequity 💡 Get access to my notes with the key takeaways from this interview with Danielle Danielle DiMartino Booth by visiting my Substack (link below) ⬇️

Thoughtful Money®

15,115 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce

Something strange is happening in markets, and almost nobody is watching it. US stocks are surging. Tech is euphoric. Semiconductors are going vertical. The party is back on. Except in Hong Kong. The Hang Seng is falling hard, going the opposite direction. That matters, because Hong Kong is the money gateway into China and across Asia. Money flows through it when people believe in China, when trade is strong, when dollars are easy. So ask the uncomfortable question. What is Hong Kong seeing that everyone else is ignoring? The answer is in China's credit markets. For new credit, bonds have now passed bank loans for the first time. About 30% of the credit stock in May, a record. The official spin is modernization. China moving from property to a high-tech, capital-markets future. It sounds reassuring. It is not. Here is what they leave out. Bank lending creates money. A loan makes a new deposit, new purchasing power, on the spot. Bond issuance does not. Someone buys the bond with savings that already exist. It just moves money around. So bonds can only cushion the fall. They cannot replace the credit that banks are no longer creating. And the banks are pulling back for a reason. A slow-motion credit crisis. As many as 100 million consumers struggling to service their debt. Bad household loans up 21% to a record 2.2 trillion yuan. Nearly 11% of adults behind on payments. Now ask who is issuing all these bonds. Not companies expanding. The government, borrowing to paper over the gap. That is not modernization. Heavy government issuance means the private sector is too scared to borrow, so the state steps in. That is desperation. We have seen this movie. Post-2008 US and Europe. Banks retreated, bonds backstopped, and the economy got the silent depression anyway. That is what Hong Kong is pricing. Not a recovery. Bonds are not the sign China solved its problems. They are the sign the banks can no longer carry them.

Jeffrey P. Snider

30,043 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce

Out now - my interview w/ world's largest in CLO equity (Collateralized Loan Obligations), Thomas Majewski, on: - "Private credit" is assuming some of the CLO world's riskiest loans - "Phone was lighting up" in September as banks rushed to offload credit risk to non-bank credit funds to meet capital requirements (this "regulatory capital relief market" is similar to credit default swap but employs a different instrument, the credit-linked note) - Private credit could be part golden age, part "biggest bubble in world" (I prompted him, not his original words). - CLOs are a "better bank" because there has "never been a run on them", and because "corporate America pays its bills," the senior corporate loans that make up CLOs are very unlike the subprime mortgages that made up CLO's problem cousin, the CDO, the structure that led to 2008. - He is quite clear that, in his *personal* opinion CLO equity offers the best risk/reward compared to other tranches. However, when it comes to private credit and BDCs (business development companies), there's a compelling case for being senior (i.e. lending to BDCs, rather than being an owner/equityholder) - The credit reality is worse than news, at least when it comes to senior loans. There were a grand total of 0 defaults in September. If the most predicted recession in history actually comes, he believes that **with due time**, CLO equity tranches will perform well because of they will be able to use par dollars to buy up discounted loans, as they did during 2008 Great Financial Crisis All of the above is my own paraphrasing of the interview, for exact quotes see the interview. It also comes with this official disclaimer: "any past performance discussed in this presentation is not indicative of, or a guarantee of, future performance." Enjoy 🔥

Jack Farley

172,341 görüntüleme • 2 yıl önce

"Constipated." That is the word now being used for the private credit market. And it is exactly what this looks like. The private credit story is changing. For months it was framed as a liquidity problem. Investors trying to pull their money out. That is still a huge problem. BlackRock just had a couple of funds suffering big runs. But there is a bigger one. It is no longer just the investors who want out. It is the investors outside who no longer want in. And that is the much bigger story. Because the private credit boom was built on flows. Constant inflows from wealth managers, pensions, insurance companies, and the general public. That is how big it got. The machine has to keep moving. Money comes in. Loans get made. Funds grow. Redemptions get handled. Managers collect their fees. Everyone pretends it is calm because the marks are smooth and the exits are limited. Now the machine is reversing. Reuters reported US direct lending issuance in the three months ending May was down roughly 40% from the first quarter. Issuance to private-equity-backed borrowers dropped nearly 37%. Volume tied to leveraged buyouts fell about 34%. So this is no longer just a redemption story. The exits are clogged. New money is hesitant. Sellers will not cut prices, and buyers will not pay yesterday's valuations. Credit funds are handling redemptions. Leveraged loans are showing strain. And publicly traded BDCs are not rebounding, even as the broader market soars. So the question is no longer whether investors are still withdrawing. They are, and it is accelerating. It is not about the people inside who want out. It is about the people outside who no longer want in. That is the bigger problem. It pushes us deeper into stage two, and the odds of stage three go up from here.

Jeffrey P. Snider

24,551 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce

In August, President Trump signed an executive order titled "Democratizing Access to Alternative Assets for 401(k) Investors." The order directs regulators to make it easier for your retirement savings to flow into private credit, private equity, and other "alternative" assets. The Department of Labor quickly rescinded Biden-era guidance that had discouraged these investments in retirement plans. Apollo. Blackstone. Goldman Sachs. State Street. They're all racing to launch private credit products for your 401(k). But here's the problem: Private credit is showing cracks at the exact moment they want to open it up to retail investors. Just this week, BlackRock TCP Capital - one of the largest publicly traded private credit funds - plunged 17% after disclosing a 19% writedown on its net asset value. The biggest drop in almost six years. This is BlackRock. The world's largest asset manager. $14T in assets. If they're taking hits like this, what chance does your 401k have? Let me walk you through what's actually happening in this market... Private credit has ballooned to over $2T in assets. For years, it was the domain of sophisticated institutional investors - pension funds, endowments, insurance companies. These investors have teams of analysts, lawyers, and risk managers to evaluate complex deals. Your average 401k participant doesn't have any of that. And the timing couldn't be worse. The IMF's 2025 Financial Stability Report found that 40% of private credit borrowers now have NEGATIVE free cash flow. That's up from 25% in 2021. Goldman Sachs data shows 15% of borrowers can no longer generate enough cash to fully cover their interest payments. UBS forecasts that private credit defaults could climb by 3 percentage points in 2026 - outpacing leveraged loans and high-yield bonds. Meanwhile, payment-in-kind loans - where struggling borrowers defer interest by adding it to their debt balance - have surged from 7.4% in 2021 to over 11% today. When a company can't pay interest in cash, that's not a sign of health. It's a sign of stress being disguised. Then came September's wake-up call: Auto parts maker First Brands collapsed with $8B in off-balance-sheet financing that wasn't properly disclosed to lenders. Subprime auto lender Tricolor imploded amid allegations it pledged the same loans as collateral to multiple creditors. Both received clean audits shortly before they cratered. First Brands' term loans went from 90 cents on the dollar to under 15 cents in weeks. JPMorgan's Jamie Dimon put it bluntly: "When you see one cockroach, there are probably more." Here's what makes this dangerous: Private credit is lightly regulated, less transparent, and difficult to value accurately. The managers making the loans are often the same ones valuing them. They have every incentive to delay recognizing problems. The DOJ has already issued warnings about "creative" marks and questionable valuation practices. Banks aren't insulated either. They've lent over $2.2T to non-bank financial institutions. When problems surface in private credit, banks feel it too. And now they want to put this in YOUR retirement account. The pitch is that private credit offers "higher returns" and "diversification." But the data doesn't support the sales pitch: Recent research shows pension funds increasing exposure to private markets have actually seen depressed returns compared to simple stock and bond portfolios. The 50 largest US pension funds averaged just 7.4% returns over the past decade. A basic 60/40 portfolio beat many of them. The real beneficiaries are fund managers charging 2% fees on assets that can't be easily valued or sold. My view really hasn't changed: AVOID PRIVATE CREDIT When sophisticated institutional investors start pulling back - and they are - the last thing you want to do is rush in. Stay in liquid, transparent, low-cost investments for your retirement. Don't be the exit liquidity.

George Noble

932,848 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce

ASWATH DAMODARAN: PRIVATE CREDIT IS THE NEXT CRISIS. His framing starts with a question that nobody in the boom is asking. Who exactly are the lenders writing the checks to fund all these AI data centers? Shale oil companies borrowed heavily when oil was at $120 a barrel and got crushed when prices fell to $60. The same pattern is forming today in compute infrastructure, and the people putting up the capital are getting almost no scrutiny. Damodaran does not see private credit as the sophisticated, intelligent alternative the marketing has positioned it as. He sees it as sheep. Every fund is chasing the same deals, the same sectors, and the same yield premiums that allegedly justify the structure. Intelligence in his view has been confused with confidence, and confidence in this corner of finance has compounded into something far more dangerous than the participants realize. His broader point is that hedge funds, private equity, and private credit have all followed the same destructive arc. Each one began as a genuinely good niche business solving a real problem. Hedge funds 30 years ago produced positive alpha, beating passive investing by 3 to 5 percent annually. Today they look like expensive mutual funds, underperforming passive by roughly 1.5 percent. Private equity started as a focused, disciplined strategy for a small set of operators and has grown into a sprawling category that now struggles to deliver the returns that justified its emergence. Private credit had a legitimate original purpose, which was lending to borrowers that banks structurally could not serve. What killed each of these businesses was the same disease. Overreach. A $200 billion niche business gets sold as a $20 trillion opportunity. When that scaling happens, sloppiness follows, bad actors enter the space, and the average quality of every participant deteriorates. The original alpha disappears not because the strategy stopped working, but because too much money chased too few good deals. The danger with private credit is far more severe than the parallel problems in private equity and hedge funds. Equity investors take their losses and move on. Lending businesses, when they overreach, take others down with them. Banks. Pensions. Insurance companies. Sovereign wealth funds. The systemic linkages run far deeper than most participants understand, and the social costs of a real default cycle in private credit would extend well beyond the funds themselves. Damodaran's warning is essentially that the industry is repeating the exact mistake that produced every previous credit crisis. Take a good idea, scale it past its natural capacity, attract bad actors with the promise of easy returns, and wait for the inevitable cycle that exposes how much of the underwriting was never serious in the first place. Aswath Damodaran Fixed + Floating - The Credit Podcast

Lumida Wealth Management

109,440 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce