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Strategy is now more like a Bitcoin hedge fund than a passive accumulator. Globally there’s ~10 hedge funds with an AUM above $50B, so there’s an extremely limited amount of money managers even capable of running this much size. Considering Strategy is already in the hole with an unrealized...

34,665 просмотров • 14 дней назад •via X (Twitter)

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Leaving Citadel & launching a $1B AI hedge fund — how Renee Yao built NeoIvy Capital from scratch Renee Yao walked away from two of the most elite hedge funds on Wall Street — Citadel & Millennium — and built a quant fund on a fundamentally different model: modern AI instead of human-powered alpha generation. The result: $1B+ in regulatory AUM, uncorrelated returns through COVID, & a fund Business Insider named one of the top transforming investing in North America. We cover: - Why large multi-manager quant firms rely on massive global researcher headcounts — & why Renee saw that as a model worth disrupting - The 3 barriers to entry in AI-driven quant — & why legacy sequential infrastructure can be a disadvantage compared to modern parallel distributed systems - How NeoIvy's self-evolving models adapted in real time during the March 2020 crash — while traditional quant managers had a nightmare month - The difference between beta returns, factor returns & pure alpha — & why size is the enemy of true idiosyncratic returns - Why the "black box" reputation of quant funds has been the #1 fundraising obstacle - How a 4-year-old girl visiting her uncle's room-sized supercomputer in China set the foundation for all of this - The edge/breadth/constraint framework from Grinold & Kahn — & how it shaped Renee's thinking on diversification - Renee's raw advice on staying disciplined when everyone around you is chasing beta in a bull market Transcript: 00:00 Intro 01:14 Renee Yao’s journey to founding Neo Ivy 02:28 Joining Citadel after the financial crisis 04:13 Hedge fund diversification and breadth of edge 04:45 Why Neo Ivy trades with AI strategies 07:50 How self-learning AI adapts to markets 09:40 Causation vs correlation in AI hedge funds 10:33 Barriers to entry for AI hedge funds 14:47 Risks of crowded factor bets explained 16:39 Why big funds struggle with AI talent 17:29 From PM at Citadel to hedge fund founder 18:47 Challenges of launching a quant hedge fund 20:25 Biggest constraint for AI hedge fund startups 22:08 How AI hedge funds adapted during COVID 24:04 Modern AI tools used in quant trading 25:13 Building hedge fund infrastructure from scratch 26:26 Career advice for aspiring quants and traders 28:55 Adapting career goals to changing job markets 31:57 Life lessons from trading and risk management 32:51 Staying disciplined while running a hedge fund 34:38 Obsession and belief in AI hedge funds 35:41 Closing thoughts on hedge funds and life

Ethan Kho

138,224 просмотров • 5 месяцев назад

🚨 BITCOIN IS BEING MANIPULATED, AND I HAVE PROOF MICHAEL SAYLOR BEGINS SELLING $BTC Man who said "you do not sell your Bitcoin" is now selling Bitcoin Market reacts with immediate panic selling: $BTC < $62K Let that sink in Strategy holds 843,738 BTC - purchased for $63.87 billion at an average price of $75,700 per coin That's the largest corporate Bitcoin position in history And for years, Saylor repeated same thing over and over: Never sell. Never waver. Never flinch Then on an earnings call in May 2026, he said this: "We will probably sell some Bitcoin to fund a dividend - just to inoculate market" That single sentence broke a 5-year religion Here's what changed Strategy now carries $1.5B in annual preferred-stock dividend obligations Those dividends have to be paid in cash Bitcoin doesn't pay dividends So Saylor faces a choice: dilute shareholders with new equity, take on more debt or sell some BTC He chose door number three And there's more Company is sitting on $2.2 billion in unrealized tax benefits tied to high-cost-basis Bitcoin Selective sales could harvest those benefits - legally reducing their tax bill while offloading coins at the same time This isn't panic. This is optimization But here's what the market isn't pricing in Strategy owns approximately 4% of all Bitcoin that will ever exist If they become a consistent seller - even of small amounts - bid structure for BTC changes permanently Every fund, every ETF, every HODLer built their thesis on one assumption: Saylor is a buyer. Always That assumption just died The only time Strategy sold Bitcoin before this was December 2022 - 704 BTC for $11.8 million, purely for a tax loss This time the motivation is structural. Recurring. Tied to obligations that don't go away Watch the Coinbase Prime wallet Watch the 8-K filings The first real sale won't be announced - it'll be discovered I've been tracking institutional Bitcoin flows for years When the signal turns, I post it here first Turn on notifications. You'll want to be early on this one

Simba

65,952 просмотров • 1 месяц назад

People Are Learning Red Lobster Didn’t Go Bankrupt Because Of Endless Shrimp, They Were Attacked By Wall Street For Their Land Here’s the full story “The only reason Red Lobster's going into bankruptcy is because a hedge fund wanted them to go into bankruptcy.” “The media will never stop covering for hedge funds while making it seem like every problem is the fault of the American people. Like, I'd be willing to bet you think Red Lobster went into bankruptcy because of endless shrimp. You know, the endless shrimp promotion they had. Because that's what the media's told you. They've been telling you repeatedly that the reason Red Lobster went into bankruptcy was that they had the endless shrimp combo and the greedy American people just took advantage of it. That's not what happened. No, what happened was a hedge fund bought Red Lobster and as a condition of the sale, they made therm split up their land and their restaurants. Because up until that point, Red Lobster actually owned all of the land that their restaurants were located on. And then once they made them split that up, the hedge funds made the leases on that land so expensive that the Red Lobsters couldn't possibly continue to operate. So Red Lobster had to keep trying new and new things to try to make enough money to pay these leases. And it was never enough to be able to afford what the hedge fund wanted to charge them. So now they're going into bankruptcy. But the media is not talking about that and the American people were the problem. That Red Lobster made terrible marketing decisions and the American people took advantage of it. But make no mistake, the only reason Red Lobster's going into bankruptcy is because a hedge fund wanted them to go into bankruptcy. They wanted to put Red Lobster out of business so they could take the land that the Red Lobsters were on. Because Red Lobster has some amazing locations across the United States. And now the hedge fund is going to be able to sell off all the little pieces of Red Lobster, completely shutting them down and just have the land all to themselves. And look, I don't like that hedge funds are allowed to do that. Investors are allowed to f*ck over another company. But what shouldn't be happening is the media being complicit and trying to hide that fact. It's not just the hedge funds, it's not just the government, it's also the media. Absolutely f*cking nobody is on our side. Absolutely nobody is giving us the true facts except for each other.”

Wall Street Apes

2,190,580 просмотров • 2 лет назад

HOW RETAIL INVESTORS CAUSED THE WORLD’S BEST-PERFORMING HEDGE FUND TO CRASH 50% IN JUST TWO WEEKS! $OPEN $OKLO $BTQ $GME $IONQ $RGTI $PLTR $BBAI $QUBT $ACHR $JOBY Michael Barton - a trader from Coatue, arguably the top-performing hedge fund today with $70B under management - was recently interviewed on Molly O’Shea ’s YouTube channel. The insights were wild: - “Before I worked at Coatue, I worked at Melvin Capital.” Yes, the hedge fund that shorted $GME. - “We went from the best-performing hedge fund in the world… to down 50% in two weeks.” Retail traders forced one of the most sophisticated funds on the planet into a historic drawdown! - “We underestimated how powerful Retail could be. When they focus all their energy on a single stock. You’re seeing the same thing now with Opendoor.” - “Investing has changed - we track everything, how often stocks are mentioned on Reddit, Twitter, internet trends… all of it.” What this really means: 1. Retail is now a legitimate force in the markets. When retail traders concentrate on specific sectors or tickers - like Quantum or Nuclear plays right now -hedge funds ride the wave up… and then short it on the way down. 2. You’re being tracked. Every major retail community - unusual_whales , zerohedge , WallStreetBets, all the trending Reddit stock groups - hedge funds scrape and analyze all of your posts. They front-run Retail sentiment and monetize it. 3. Don’t be left holding the bag. A lot of “timely” news articles that come out during hype cycles? Often funded or influenced by the same players who need exit liquidity after riding the move up with Retail. Retail piles in at the top, hedge funds exit - then short - and Retail capitulates while moving on to the next hype wave. 4. Know what you’re buying. Is it a real business with long-term fundamentals? Or just a momentum-driven hype play that hedge funds are exploiting? Don’t be the one left holding the bag. Full video linked in the comments.

Common Sense Investor (CSI)

140,629 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

BREAKING: Bill Ackman just IPO'd his hedge fund. He targeted $25 billion two years ago. He raised $5 billion yesterday. And the retail investors he spent two years courting on X didn't show up. Here's what actually happened, and why it matters for every investor who thinks following a famous name is a strategy. Wednesday, April 29. Bill Ackman rang the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange. Two listed entities hit the market. Pershing Square USA (PSUS), the closed-end fund. Pershing Square Inc. (PS), the asset manager. PSUS priced at $50 a share. It opened at $42. It closed at $40.90. Down 18% on debut. One of the most famous hedge fund managers on the planet went public, and his fund lost nearly a fifth of its value in a single trading session. Now look at how the money actually came in. Of the $5 billion raised, $2.8 billion came from a private placement. Family offices took 30% of that. Pension funds took 25%. Insurance companies took 22%. Ultra-high-net-worth investors took 12%. Institutional investors accounted for over 85% of total orders. The remaining $2.2 billion came from a public offering of 44 million PSUS shares. Some of that was retail. Most of it was not. Ackman has 2 million followers on X. He spent two years marketing this fund as a way for regular people to access hedge fund returns at $50 a share. He even said it on CNBC the morning of the IPO: "Hedge funds are sort of known for managing money for rich people. And now we have the opportunity for someone with $50, could be a long-term shareholder. Usually, the retail gets cut massively back, the institutions are favored. We did the opposite." The retail audience he was talking to didn't believe him. The institutions did. Two years ago, the original target was $25 billion. Yesterday, the final number was $5 billion. That's an 80% downsize. This is one of the most watched investors in the world. He gets booked on every major financial network. He posts daily to millions of followers. He has been pitching this exact deal since 2024. And the deal still came in 80% smaller than planned. Here's the part nobody is connecting: The retail audience for hedge fund products is fundamentally different from the retail audience for personality content. Ackman built a following by being loud on X. Loud on takeovers. Loud on politics. Loud on universities. Loud on ETFs. Loud on macro calls. Followers love that. They follow. They reply. They retweet. But following someone is free. Wiring money into their closed-end fund at NAV with no performance fees and a fee structure most retail investors can't even read is an entirely different decision. The market just made that distinction for him. Now zoom out, because this is the structural lesson. The $2.8 billion private placement was wrapped up before retail even saw the deal. Family offices. Pension funds. Insurance companies. Sovereign wealth. These are the buyers who get the call before the IPO is announced. They get the term sheet. They negotiate. They commit. By the time the public sees the listing on a Wednesday morning, the institutions have already locked in their allocation. The retail investor sees the same news, gets the same prospectus, and reads the same ticker. Different game. Same name on the door. And then PSUS opened down 16% and closed down 18%. Every retail buyer who put in $50 at the IPO price was sitting on a $9 paper loss before lunch. The institutions had locked in better terms in the private placement. Same fund. Same manager. Two completely different starting positions. This is how the structure of capital markets actually works. Every. Single. Time. The brochure says democratization. The cap table says the institutions got there first. This is the same lesson the Blue Owl and BlackRock private credit stories taught us last year. When a famous money manager opens a vehicle to retail, the fine print and the fee structure and the timing of the allocation all favor the people who already have access. You can have a manager with no performance fee, with bonus shares attached, with two million social followers, and a stage on CNBC. The math of who gets in first and at what price is still the math. So what does this mean for you? It means a famous name on the cover is not a strategy. It means following an investor on X is not the same as being invested with them. It means the retail audience for entertaining finance content is enormous, and the retail audience for actually deploying capital into a complex product is not. The wealthy don't pay famous investors for personality. They build systems that don't depend on a single human being having a good year, or a good fund debut, or a good narrative on social media. Ackman's reputation got him on the front page. It didn't get the stock above its IPO price. The math always catches up. The personality doesn't change the math. Boring? Yes. Effective when a $25 billion vision becomes a $5 billion raise that opens down 18%? Also yes. This is exactly why we built Surmount. Automated, rules-based investment strategies. Built for the retail investor who doesn't want to bet a portfolio on whether a famous fund manager has a good debut:
5:01

Sensitive content

BREAKING: Bill Ackman just IPO'd his hedge fund. He targeted $25 billion two years ago. He raised $5 billion yesterday. And the retail investors he spent two years courting on X didn't show up. Here's what actually happened, and why it matters for every investor who thinks following a famous name is a strategy. Wednesday, April 29. Bill Ackman rang the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange. Two listed entities hit the market. Pershing Square USA (PSUS), the closed-end fund. Pershing Square Inc. (PS), the asset manager. PSUS priced at $50 a share. It opened at $42. It closed at $40.90. Down 18% on debut. One of the most famous hedge fund managers on the planet went public, and his fund lost nearly a fifth of its value in a single trading session. Now look at how the money actually came in. Of the $5 billion raised, $2.8 billion came from a private placement. Family offices took 30% of that. Pension funds took 25%. Insurance companies took 22%. Ultra-high-net-worth investors took 12%. Institutional investors accounted for over 85% of total orders. The remaining $2.2 billion came from a public offering of 44 million PSUS shares. Some of that was retail. Most of it was not. Ackman has 2 million followers on X. He spent two years marketing this fund as a way for regular people to access hedge fund returns at $50 a share. He even said it on CNBC the morning of the IPO: "Hedge funds are sort of known for managing money for rich people. And now we have the opportunity for someone with $50, could be a long-term shareholder. Usually, the retail gets cut massively back, the institutions are favored. We did the opposite." The retail audience he was talking to didn't believe him. The institutions did. Two years ago, the original target was $25 billion. Yesterday, the final number was $5 billion. That's an 80% downsize. This is one of the most watched investors in the world. He gets booked on every major financial network. He posts daily to millions of followers. He has been pitching this exact deal since 2024. And the deal still came in 80% smaller than planned. Here's the part nobody is connecting: The retail audience for hedge fund products is fundamentally different from the retail audience for personality content. Ackman built a following by being loud on X. Loud on takeovers. Loud on politics. Loud on universities. Loud on ETFs. Loud on macro calls. Followers love that. They follow. They reply. They retweet. But following someone is free. Wiring money into their closed-end fund at NAV with no performance fees and a fee structure most retail investors can't even read is an entirely different decision. The market just made that distinction for him. Now zoom out, because this is the structural lesson. The $2.8 billion private placement was wrapped up before retail even saw the deal. Family offices. Pension funds. Insurance companies. Sovereign wealth. These are the buyers who get the call before the IPO is announced. They get the term sheet. They negotiate. They commit. By the time the public sees the listing on a Wednesday morning, the institutions have already locked in their allocation. The retail investor sees the same news, gets the same prospectus, and reads the same ticker. Different game. Same name on the door. And then PSUS opened down 16% and closed down 18%. Every retail buyer who put in $50 at the IPO price was sitting on a $9 paper loss before lunch. The institutions had locked in better terms in the private placement. Same fund. Same manager. Two completely different starting positions. This is how the structure of capital markets actually works. Every. Single. Time. The brochure says democratization. The cap table says the institutions got there first. This is the same lesson the Blue Owl and BlackRock private credit stories taught us last year. When a famous money manager opens a vehicle to retail, the fine print and the fee structure and the timing of the allocation all favor the people who already have access. You can have a manager with no performance fee, with bonus shares attached, with two million social followers, and a stage on CNBC. The math of who gets in first and at what price is still the math. So what does this mean for you? It means a famous name on the cover is not a strategy. It means following an investor on X is not the same as being invested with them. It means the retail audience for entertaining finance content is enormous, and the retail audience for actually deploying capital into a complex product is not. The wealthy don't pay famous investors for personality. They build systems that don't depend on a single human being having a good year, or a good fund debut, or a good narrative on social media. Ackman's reputation got him on the front page. It didn't get the stock above its IPO price. The math always catches up. The personality doesn't change the math. Boring? Yes. Effective when a $25 billion vision becomes a $5 billion raise that opens down 18%? Also yes. This is exactly why we built Surmount. Automated, rules-based investment strategies. Built for the retail investor who doesn't want to bet a portfolio on whether a famous fund manager has a good debut:

Logan Weaver

220,648 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад

🚨 BREAKING: MICHAEL SAYLOR BEGINS SELLING $BTC Man who said "you do not sell your Bitcoin" is now selling Bitcoin Market reacts with immediate panic selling: $BTC < $72K Let that sink in Strategy holds 843,738 BTC - purchased for $63.87 billion at an average price of $75,700 per coin That's the largest corporate Bitcoin position in history And for years, Saylor repeated same thing over and over: Never sell. Never waver. Never flinch Then on an earnings call in May 2026, he said this: "We will probably sell some Bitcoin to fund a dividend - just to inoculate market" That single sentence broke a 5-year religion Here's what changed Strategy now carries $1.5B in annual preferred-stock dividend obligations Those dividends have to be paid in cash Bitcoin doesn't pay dividends So Saylor faces a choice: dilute shareholders with new equity, take on more debt or sell some BTC He chose door number three And there's more Company is sitting on $2.2 billion in unrealized tax benefits tied to high-cost-basis Bitcoin Selective sales could harvest those benefits - legally reducing their tax bill while offloading coins at the same time This isn't panic. This is optimization But here's what the market isn't pricing in Strategy owns approximately 4% of all Bitcoin that will ever exist If they become a consistent seller - even of small amounts - bid structure for BTC changes permanently Every fund, every ETF, every HODLer built their thesis on one assumption: Saylor is a buyer. Always That assumption just died The only time Strategy sold Bitcoin before this was December 2022 - 704 BTC for $11.8 million, purely for a tax loss This time the motivation is structural. Recurring. Tied to obligations that don't go away Watch the Coinbase Prime wallet Watch the 8-K filings The first real sale won't be announced - it'll be discovered I've been tracking institutional Bitcoin flows for years When the signal turns, I post it here first Turn on notifications. You'll want to be early on this one

Aralez 🐕

320,648 просмотров • 1 месяц назад

Chamath: “Private equity in general is totally hosed.” 🏢🚨 “I think the history of this is important.” “There was a long standing belief that the best way to generate the best risk adjusted return was to have what's called a 60/40 allocation. 60% to bonds and 40% to equities.” “Over many years, especially when we artificially suppressed rates at zero, a lot of people started to move their allocations away from 60/40 and they started to make more and more investments further out on the risk curve.” “The biggest beneficiaries of that were venture capital, private equity, and hedge funds.” “The thing with private equity is that because rates were zero, they had an infinite amount of borrowing capacity at very little downside to them, and so they were able to manufacture returns much faster than venture capital and hedge funds could.” “So as a result, you had an initial group of people that were defining the asset class, making a ton of money, and then you had all these fast followers that said, ‘Well, if they're doing it, I can do it too.’” “But then always what happens is then you have this flood of laggards that just flood the zone.” “And it's these laggards that make it very difficult to generate returns because they start overpaying for assets, they start mismanaging and under managing the assets that they do own.” “That created a lot of competition, and so that's why you see this hockey stick graph.” “And when you see that kind of graph, it doesn't matter what asset class it is. The returns go to zero.” “And so we've seen this in venture capital. We've seen this in hedge funds. And we're now going to see this in private equity.”

The All-In Podcast

800,205 просмотров • 9 месяцев назад