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The backasswards, Bedouin Emirate cowards couldn’t even handle one Iranian bombing campaign and already capitulated! After Iran attacked Abu Dhabi's economic zone yesterday, the UAE has changed its tone and is now calling for a diplomatic agreement! The UAE has seemingly changed its stance regarding the Iran war. Just...

410,399 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce •via X (Twitter)

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🇮🇷🇺🇸 Iran's latest attack struck U.S military facilities in Kuwait and the UAE, but the timing may be more important than the attack itself. The previous U.S-Iran exchange had effectively stopped. Washington decided not to retaliate against Iran's last barrage and reports suggest Trump’s team is actively trying to avoid another major escalation before the midterms. Iran attacked again anyway. And to understand why, look at what Washington is doing behind the scenes. The U.S is intensifying its economic campaign against Tehran, reportedly instructing embassies around the world to pressure governments to cut Iranian trade, with countries, companies and individuals potentially threatened with sanctions or a loss of access to the dollar system. Meanwhile, the UAE has become an important partner in Washington's attempt to keep oil moving through Hormuz and tighten the economic screws on Iran. Then Iran hits U.S-linked military infrastructure in the UAE and Kuwait. That makes these strikes look less like retaliation for something America already did and more like a warning about what comes next: If Washington turns the Gulf into the infrastructure for an economic war against Iran, Tehran may turn that same infrastructure into the battlefield. And that creates a serious problem for Trump's apparent pivot from military war to economic war. Sanctions were supposed to provide a way of squeezing Iran without another major exchange of missiles. Iran may be signalling that it doesn't intend to let America separate the two. Brandon Weichert

Mario Nawfal

340,144 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce

My interview CNN International with Becky Anderson 1. Netanyahu’s visit to the UAE Netanyahu’s visit to the UAE is important, Yes the visit was initially kept quiet, and there was no immediate public display of the meeting. One possible explanation is that Abu Dhabi does not want to become part of Israel’s election campaign or provide Netanyahu with images that could be used for domestic political purposes. What is more revealing is the composition of the Israeli delegation. Netanyahu was accompanied by the Mossad director and the national security adviser, among other senior security officials, and Israeli reporting indicates that Iran was a central topic of discussion. That makes sense given the dilemma facing Abu Dhabi. The UAE must decide how strongly it wants to support efforts to restore some form of accommodation with Tehran and reduce regional tensions, while simultaneously preparing for the possibility that diplomacy fails and confrontation with Iran intensifies again. 2. Iran’s proposal and the Strait of Hormuz The situation around the Strait of Hormuz remains extremely fragile. Iran’s latest proposal does not fundamentally abandon Tehran’s established red lines. What has changed is the timetable: Iran is offering to accelerate both the reopening of the Strait and negotiation over the nuclear file. From Tehran’s perspective, this creates something close to a win-win scenario. If President Trump accepts the proposal, Iran can return to an arrangement that it believes protects important Iranian interests while reducing immediate economic and military pressure. If Washington rejects it, Tehran can argue, both domestically and internationally, that Iran offered a diplomatic off-ramp and that the United States refused it. That could then become Tehran’s political justification for another round of escalation. The Iranian message would essentially be: We offered diplomacy, Washington rejected it, and therefore we have no alternative but to increase the pressure and escalate. 3. Netanyahu, Iran, and Israel’s election campaign There is also a domestic Israeli dimension that should not be ignored. Netanyahu has a clear political incentive to focus the national conversation on securit, and particularly on what Israel accomplished against Iran and the so-called Axis of Resistance after October 7, rather than exclusively on the failures that preceded October 7. But Israel’s strategic challenges today extend well beyond Iran. The continuing violence and instability in the West Bank, including attacks by Israeli extremists, and the diplomatic scenes surrounding Netanyahu’s appearance at the United Nations illustrate the broader challenges Israel faces internationally and in the Palestinian arena. Iran is therefore both a genuine and serious security challenge and an issue on which Netanyahu can emphasize Israeli military achievements. The Palestinian issue, Israel’s growing diplomatic difficulties, and the debate over responsibility for October 7 are politically much more complicated terrain for him. There is also an interesting contradiction in Netanyahu’s political messaging. Today, he warned that Israel has indications that its enemies may try to attack the country ahead of the election. But it raises an important question when placed alongside another central theme of Netanyahu’s campaign: his argument that Israel’s enemies want to see him defeated and replaced by his political opponents. If that is really their objective, why would they deliberately attack Israel immediately before an election? #IranWar‌

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

21,930 görüntüleme • 7 gün önce

"I think the UAE is probably the most interesting case because it has shifted significantly along the continuum. At the beginning of the war, Oman was on one side, taking a very clear position: neutrality, diplomacy, and the view that negotiation was the only viable way forward. At the other end of the spectrum was the UAE, which at the time was talking about defiance and projecting strength. Its posture was centred on coercion and deterrence. Now, however, the UAE appears to have moved. It has reportedly pulled $3 billion from Pakistan as punishment for Islamabad taking a more conciliatory approach towards Iran. At the same time, Abu Dhabi now seems to have come around to embracing the MOU and the wider diplomatic process, including support for Qatari efforts. What is particularly interesting is that there are clearly tensions within Abu Dhabi, and also between Abu Dhabi and the northern Emirates, over how to deal with Iran. MBZ’s position has been one of defiance, strength, and deterrence, rather than entanglement and engagement. Then you have Tahnoun, who has suddenly reappeared on the surface. He had been largely absent from public view for months, but has now returned to lead on this policy issue. Tahnoun’s strategic mindset has always been built around entanglement and weaponised interdependence through commercial networks. This approach shaped the UAE’s earlier policy: allowing the IRGC to do business in the UAE in the expectation that, in return, the UAE would not be attacked. That equation clearly did not ultimately deliver the desired outcome. Nonetheless, there was no obvious alternative. Tahnoun’s argument appears to have been that the UAE cannot win this militarily. Israel is not going to win the war on behalf of the UAE, because Israel cannot win the war for itself. The United States does not want an all-out war. The GCC partners around the UAE do not want a war either. As a result, Abu Dhabi has little choice but to come to the negotiating table. It therefore seems that Tahnoun has won this internal debate, at least for now, over MBZ’s earlier and more assertive approach. The underlying calculation appears to be that a united GCC position may ultimately serve the UAE’s national interest far better than a situation in which everyone pulls in different directions"

Dr Andreas Krieg

174,453 görüntüleme • 3 ay önce