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The Engine Start Levers or Fuel Cut off switches (different name, same switches) control the fuel and ignition for the engines. The 787 shares the same switches and very similar logic to the Boeing 737 Max. The switches have been designed in such a way that they require a... very deliberate movement in order for them to move from one position to another. They’re also placed in such a position (below the thrust levers) so that it’s very unlikely that they’ll be knocked. But even if they were, the spring force and detent would prevent them from moving unintentionally. When we move the start levers from the “Run” or “Idle” position, to “Cutoff”, an electrical signal is sent to move the fuel valves from open to close. The engine ignitors are also then de-powered. This stops the supply and ignition of fuel and the engine spools down. Pilots are trained from day one to only touch those switches in flight when called for by a non normal checklist, such as an engine fire or failure. When a fuel switch has to be moved to cutoff in flight, we adhere to a very strict procedure… Pilot monitoring will place their hand on the switch of the damaged engine and both visually and audibly confirm with Pilot flying that the correct fuel switch has been selected. Only after both pilots have confirmed that the correct switch has been selected, will pilot monitoring move that switch to the cutoff position. As an additional layer of safety, some aircraft types only allow the switch to be moved to cutoff in flight if the thrust levers are in the closed or idle position. Do you think that this design feature should be implemented in all aircraft? 📸 by ig/airlinepilotperformanceshow more

aircraftmaintenancengineer

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149,946 views • 11 months ago •via X (Twitter)

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11 Comments

Jim Y 887811 months ago

If the preliminary report is accurate, both fuel switches went to Cutoff within .10 of second. I understand the FMS can cycle them to Cutoff if the FMS senses something unusual. Didn't this happen to Nippon Airlines 787 while on a taxi way in 2013? The pilots were surprised when both engines shut down. Was this software glitch ever resolved?

MuchosNachos11 months ago

Why not have some electronic measure preventing the fuel from being cut off during take off, with weight of wheels and Gear Down and low altitude. The riskiest part of a flight is Take Off and Landing.

aircraftmaintenancengineer11 months ago

You have a good point

Mobile Scanner1 year ago

Scan any documents, convert images into text, PDF files, etc. 👍

Michel Moore11 months ago

Interesting it took the pilots about four seconds to cycle each switch after the engines rolled back on the Air India Flight. It takes less than two seconds under normal circumstances to move the levers. Also take not that the data recorder only records the electrical status of the switches and not the physical.

Eric11 months ago

One doesn’t just bump them down. I have operated thousands of them. It takes deliberate action.

Sovereign Jet Brokerage11 months ago

Great breakdown. Always appreciated how Boeing designs those levers with deliberate resistance — one of those small but critical safeguards that earns its keep in high-stakes scenarios.

John G11 months ago

Probably. A similar situation to the crash where in the 90's where the 757 did not, at the time, have a safety measure which undeployed the speed brakes with the throttles go past some amount (like 70-90%)

PLANES OF LEGEND ✈️11 months ago

Except that...

williepete11 months ago

Yea, just one of these is enough

Joe San Diego11 months ago

Fuel switches had nothing to do with the Air India crash. Mental health caused the crash…

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Fuel control switches for the engines of an Air India flight that crashed last month were moved from the “run” to the “cutoff” position moments before impact, starving both engines of fuel, a preliminary investigation report said.

Fuel control switches for the engines of an Air India flight that crashed last month were moved from the “run” to the “cutoff” position moments before impact, starving both engines of fuel, a preliminary investigation report said.

The Associated Press

76,649 views • 11 months ago

VIDEO | Veteran pilot Sharath Panicker reacts to the preliminary AAIB report on Air India AI 171 crash. He says, "the fuel control switches were discovered in the run position. There’s no reason for any pilot to move those switches during the critical phase of flight. At that point, both pilots would have been fully engaged, hands on controls, focused on stabilising the aircraft. The switches would typically only be moved after an engine failure above 400 feet, once the aircraft is stable. Based on the current information, I don’t believe this was a deliberate act by the pilot...” (Full video available on PTI Videos -

VIDEO | Veteran pilot Sharath Panicker reacts to the preliminary AAIB report on Air India AI 171 crash. He says, "the fuel control switches were discovered in the run position. There’s no reason for any pilot to move those switches during the critical phase of flight. At that point, both pilots would have been fully engaged, hands on controls, focused on stabilising the aircraft. The switches would typically only be moved after an engine failure above 400 feet, once the aircraft is stable. Based on the current information, I don’t believe this was a deliberate act by the pilot...” (Full video available on PTI Videos -

Press Trust of India

35,825 views • 11 months ago

A preventable tragedy On This Day in 1967: Stockport air disaster (England). A British Midland C-4 [G-ALHG] crashes in Stockport, 72 of 84 aboard die. On a go-around, crew lost control after 2 engines failed. Investigation traced the issues to a known - but never addressed - design issue in the fuel system. More details here by ASN (video is from British Pathé) PROBABLE CAUSE: "The immediate cause of the accident was loss of power of both engines on the starboard side, resulting in control problems which prevented the pilot from maintaining height on the available power with one propeller windmilling. The loss of power of the first engine was due to fuel starvation due to inadvertent fuel transfer in flight. The loss of power of the second engine was due either to fuel starvation resulting from inadvertent fuel transfer in flight or to misidentification by the crew of which engine had failed followed by failure to restore power in time to the engine misidentified as having failed. Contributory causes of the accident were: (a) The design of the fuel valves and location in the cockpit of their actuating levers, so that a failure by the pilot correctly to position the lever by an amount so small as to be easy to do and difficult to recognize would result in inadvertent fuel transfer on a scale sufficient to involve the risk after a long flight of a tank expected to contain sufficient fuel being in fact empty. (b) Failure of those responsible for the design of the fuel system or the fuel valves to warn users that failure by a small amount to place the actuating levers in the proper position would result in inadvertent fuel transfer on a scale involving this risk after a long flight. (c) Failure of British Midland's air crew or engineers to recognize the possibility of inadvertent fuel transfer in the air from the evidence available in previous incidents in flight and contained in the fuel logs. (d) Failure of other operators of Argonauts who had learned by experience of the possibility of inadvertent fuel transfer in flight to inform the Air Registration Board, the Directorate of Flight Safety of the Board of Trade or its predecessors, or the United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee of the facts which they had learned so that these might be communicated to other operators of Argonauts and other aircraft equipped with similar systems and fuel cocks."

A preventable tragedy On This Day in 1967: Stockport air disaster (England). A British Midland C-4 [G-ALHG] crashes in Stockport, 72 of 84 aboard die. On a go-around, crew lost control after 2 engines failed. Investigation traced the issues to a known - but never addressed - design issue in the fuel system. More details here by ASN (video is from British Pathé) PROBABLE CAUSE: "The immediate cause of the accident was loss of power of both engines on the starboard side, resulting in control problems which prevented the pilot from maintaining height on the available power with one propeller windmilling. The loss of power of the first engine was due to fuel starvation due to inadvertent fuel transfer in flight. The loss of power of the second engine was due either to fuel starvation resulting from inadvertent fuel transfer in flight or to misidentification by the crew of which engine had failed followed by failure to restore power in time to the engine misidentified as having failed. Contributory causes of the accident were: (a) The design of the fuel valves and location in the cockpit of their actuating levers, so that a failure by the pilot correctly to position the lever by an amount so small as to be easy to do and difficult to recognize would result in inadvertent fuel transfer on a scale sufficient to involve the risk after a long flight of a tank expected to contain sufficient fuel being in fact empty. (b) Failure of those responsible for the design of the fuel system or the fuel valves to warn users that failure by a small amount to place the actuating levers in the proper position would result in inadvertent fuel transfer on a scale involving this risk after a long flight. (c) Failure of British Midland's air crew or engineers to recognize the possibility of inadvertent fuel transfer in the air from the evidence available in previous incidents in flight and contained in the fuel logs. (d) Failure of other operators of Argonauts who had learned by experience of the possibility of inadvertent fuel transfer in flight to inform the Air Registration Board, the Directorate of Flight Safety of the Board of Trade or its predecessors, or the United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee of the facts which they had learned so that these might be communicated to other operators of Argonauts and other aircraft equipped with similar systems and fuel cocks."

Francisco Cunha

23,888 views • 25 days ago

#WATCH | Delhi: On an Air India Boeing 787 Dreamliner grounded after pilots reported a possible defect in the fuel control switch, Former Flight Operations Inspector with DGCA, Captain Prashant Dhalla says, "Yet again the Boeing 787 has come into the limelight. It is horrific. We were just trying to analyse the preliminary report of the Boeing 787 Air India crash on 12th June. Lately till yesterday, we got to know that another Boeing 787 in the pilot defect report, which is part of the technical log book of the aircraft, the pilot in command has given a noting which is in black and white, which clearly states that the fuel control switch, which is one of the most essential switches in the Boeing 787, has faltered, has misbehaved and it is quite appalling as an aviator that the same switch was part of an inquiry report which led to the Air India crash. We must understand that this fuel control switch is guarded by the manufacturer, has misbehaved. In this particular instance, the operator, the regulator and the manufacturer, all three of them have to introspect. The country cannot take this lightly..."

#WATCH | Delhi: On an Air India Boeing 787 Dreamliner grounded after pilots reported a possible defect in the fuel control switch, Former Flight Operations Inspector with DGCA, Captain Prashant Dhalla says, "Yet again the Boeing 787 has come into the limelight. It is horrific. We were just trying to analyse the preliminary report of the Boeing 787 Air India crash on 12th June. Lately till yesterday, we got to know that another Boeing 787 in the pilot defect report, which is part of the technical log book of the aircraft, the pilot in command has given a noting which is in black and white, which clearly states that the fuel control switch, which is one of the most essential switches in the Boeing 787, has faltered, has misbehaved and it is quite appalling as an aviator that the same switch was part of an inquiry report which led to the Air India crash. We must understand that this fuel control switch is guarded by the manufacturer, has misbehaved. In this particular instance, the operator, the regulator and the manufacturer, all three of them have to introspect. The country cannot take this lightly..."

ANI

30,468 views • 4 months ago

CORRECTION: A report depicted confusion in the cockpit shortly before an Air India jetliner crashed, after the plane's engine fuel cutoff switches flipped and starved the engines of fuel. We are deleting a post containing incorrect information in the video

CORRECTION: A report depicted confusion in the cockpit shortly before an Air India jetliner crashed, after the plane's engine fuel cutoff switches flipped and starved the engines of fuel. We are deleting a post containing incorrect information in the video

Reuters

68,963 views • 11 months ago

#WATCH | Delhi: As Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) releases its preliminary report on the Air India plane crash, Commercial Pilot & BJP Leader Rajiv Pratap Rudy says, "It's a preliminary report. In the first stage report, the government is coming out with the facts of what happened inside the aircraft. The facts are there that the aircraft ran up to a speed that is required for takeoff, which is called the rotation speed. It lifted from the ground. It went up to the speed of 180 knots, which is a good acceleration speed. And possibly after that, technically, 2 or 3 things have happened. One is the deployment of RAT, which has happened, and the second is that the APU, auxiliary power unit, has started operations. This automatically happens in an aircraft when there is a twin-engine failure. So this, as indicated in the report, has happened, and both the initial stages of APU have started, and the RAT has deployed, so it indicates the engine failure has taken... When you start losing the aircraft, the pilot monitoring the situation immediately puts the fuel switch control off and on. After the crash, both switches were found on..."

#WATCH | Delhi: As Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) releases its preliminary report on the Air India plane crash, Commercial Pilot & BJP Leader Rajiv Pratap Rudy says, "It's a preliminary report. In the first stage report, the government is coming out with the facts of what happened inside the aircraft. The facts are there that the aircraft ran up to a speed that is required for takeoff, which is called the rotation speed. It lifted from the ground. It went up to the speed of 180 knots, which is a good acceleration speed. And possibly after that, technically, 2 or 3 things have happened. One is the deployment of RAT, which has happened, and the second is that the APU, auxiliary power unit, has started operations. This automatically happens in an aircraft when there is a twin-engine failure. So this, as indicated in the report, has happened, and both the initial stages of APU have started, and the RAT has deployed, so it indicates the engine failure has taken... When you start losing the aircraft, the pilot monitoring the situation immediately puts the fuel switch control off and on. After the crash, both switches were found on..."

ANI

11,523 views • 11 months ago

#WATCH | Delhi: As Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) releases its preliminary report on the Air India plane crash, former Flight Operations Inspector with DGCA, Captain Prashant Dhalla, says, "There are many aspects that the govt and the agencies look into. The report will be divided into many phases. If we go by the minute details, then the conversation of the pilots, their flying hours, what was mentioned about the engine, and what procedure was followed by them. This is a preliminary report, and several factors will be seen in this... The system of restarting the fuel cutoff is a process where the pilot tries to regain the power in the engine... The time was also very critical; in that moment they tried connecting with the ATC also. They were very experienced pilots..."

#WATCH | Delhi: As Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) releases its preliminary report on the Air India plane crash, former Flight Operations Inspector with DGCA, Captain Prashant Dhalla, says, "There are many aspects that the govt and the agencies look into. The report will be divided into many phases. If we go by the minute details, then the conversation of the pilots, their flying hours, what was mentioned about the engine, and what procedure was followed by them. This is a preliminary report, and several factors will be seen in this... The system of restarting the fuel cutoff is a process where the pilot tries to regain the power in the engine... The time was also very critical; in that moment they tried connecting with the ATC also. They were very experienced pilots..."

ANI

32,884 views • 11 months ago

Following the Delta A330-323(N813NW) engine failure after departure from São Paulo (GRU), many are asking: what actually happens if an airliner loses an engine just after takeoff? As passenger in the cabin watching this scenario unfold, the panic is understandable. Seeing flames from an engine is alarming. But this is exactly the kind of scenario pilots are trained for repeatedly in simulators. Modern multi-engine aircraft are designed to fly safely on one engine. In fact, losing one engine is a certification requirement during testing. Here’s what happens: At liftoff, pilots target V2 speed—the minimum safe speed that guarantees the aircraft can continue climbing even with one engine inoperative. If an engine fails: • The MASTER FIRE warning light will illuminate in the cockpit and the fire warning bell will sound, alerting the pilots on the affected engine (they will close the fuel, hydraulic shutoff, and engine bleed air valves, and also discharge the related fire bottle to extinguish the engine fire). Of course, they will be careful NOT TO shut down the wrong engine (this has happened before). • Maximum thrust is applied on the remaining engine. • Rudder input keeps the aircraft straight (countering asymmetric thrust) • The aircraft climbs straight ahead for best performance (turns reduce climb rate unless required) Once above a safe altitude (typically ~1,500 ft / Minimum Flap Retraction Altitude(MFRA): • The aircraft accelerates • Flaps are retracted (“cleaning up”) • Crew assesses the situation and plans a return or diversion Even at very low altitude, the aircraft remains controllable by design. It may not climb aggressively, but it will climb. Bottom line: What looks catastrophic from the cabin is a scenario pilots are highly trained to handle—and aircraft are engineered to withstand. Hope this helps any nervous flyer. Flying is safe, and the chances of this happening have reduced due to lessons learned from previous incidents. And if you ever find yourself in this situation, trust that the pilots will act according to their training—because that’s their job.

Following the Delta A330-323(N813NW) engine failure after departure from São Paulo (GRU), many are asking: what actually happens if an airliner loses an engine just after takeoff? As passenger in the cabin watching this scenario unfold, the panic is understandable. Seeing flames from an engine is alarming. But this is exactly the kind of scenario pilots are trained for repeatedly in simulators. Modern multi-engine aircraft are designed to fly safely on one engine. In fact, losing one engine is a certification requirement during testing. Here’s what happens: At liftoff, pilots target V2 speed—the minimum safe speed that guarantees the aircraft can continue climbing even with one engine inoperative. If an engine fails: • The MASTER FIRE warning light will illuminate in the cockpit and the fire warning bell will sound, alerting the pilots on the affected engine (they will close the fuel, hydraulic shutoff, and engine bleed air valves, and also discharge the related fire bottle to extinguish the engine fire). Of course, they will be careful NOT TO shut down the wrong engine (this has happened before). • Maximum thrust is applied on the remaining engine. • Rudder input keeps the aircraft straight (countering asymmetric thrust) • The aircraft climbs straight ahead for best performance (turns reduce climb rate unless required) Once above a safe altitude (typically ~1,500 ft / Minimum Flap Retraction Altitude(MFRA): • The aircraft accelerates • Flaps are retracted (“cleaning up”) • Crew assesses the situation and plans a return or diversion Even at very low altitude, the aircraft remains controllable by design. It may not climb aggressively, but it will climb. Bottom line: What looks catastrophic from the cabin is a scenario pilots are highly trained to handle—and aircraft are engineered to withstand. Hope this helps any nervous flyer. Flying is safe, and the chances of this happening have reduced due to lessons learned from previous incidents. And if you ever find yourself in this situation, trust that the pilots will act according to their training—because that’s their job.

Turbine Traveller

42,927 views • 3 months ago

Former Captain Gaurav Taneja gave 8 reasons why Air India crash was not a pilot error: He explained that both the engines of AI171 had already failed before the fuel was cut off. The pilots then CUT OFF the fuel and restarted it again, which is a standard procedure to reignite the engines during engine failure. The pilots did everything they could to save the aircraft till the very end.

Former Captain Gaurav Taneja gave 8 reasons why Air India crash was not a pilot error: He explained that both the engines of AI171 had already failed before the fuel was cut off. The pilots then CUT OFF the fuel and restarted it again, which is a standard procedure to reignite the engines during engine failure. The pilots did everything they could to save the aircraft till the very end.

Mohit Chauhan

17,309 views • 11 months ago

With a 787-8 Boeing grounded after the pilot logged a defect in the Fuel control switch, those who blamed AI 171 Captain for turning switches off deliberately are on backfoot. 91 year old father of AI 171 pilot spoke to me in his only interview. In full

With a 787-8 Boeing grounded after the pilot logged a defect in the Fuel control switch, those who blamed AI 171 Captain for turning switches off deliberately are on backfoot. 91 year old father of AI 171 pilot spoke to me in his only interview. In full

barkha dutt

204,971 views • 4 months ago

As a Member State of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), India is obligated to comply with the provisions of ICAO Annex 13, which governs aircraft accident and incident investigations. Under Annex 13, the investigating authority—in this case, India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB)—must: 1. Submit a Preliminary Report within 30 days of the occurrence. 2. Make the Final Report publicly available as soon as possible and, where feasible, within 12 months of the accident. 3. If the Final Report cannot be completed within 12 months, publish an Interim Statement on each anniversary of the occurrence, outlining the progress of the investigation and any safety issues identified. Importantly, ICAO emphasizes that preliminary reports are not substitutes for final reports. Preliminary reports provide only factual information available at an early stage and do not contain a comprehensive analysis of the systemic, operational, technical, or human factors that may have contributed to an accident. The AAIB complied with the first requirement by releasing its preliminary report on 12 July 2025, exactly one month after the accident. As the first anniversary of the crash approaches on 12 June 2026, attention is now focused on whether the AAIB will publish the Final Report or issue an Interim Statement in accordance with the requirements of Annex 13. On 12 June 2025, Air India Flight AI171, operated by a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner registered VT-ANB, departed Ahmedabad, India, bound for London Gatwick. The aircraft was carrying 230 passengers, 10 cabin crew members, and 2 pilots. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft suffered a catastrophic loss of thrust and crashed outside the airport boundary. Of the 242 people onboard, only one passenger survived, making it one of the deadliest aviation accidents involving a Boeing 787 and one of India's worst air disasters. According to the AAIB's preliminary findings, the aircraft reached a maximum recorded airspeed of approximately 180 knots indicated airspeed (IAS) at 08:08:42 UTC during its initial climb. Immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF one second apart. As fuel flow to both engines ceased, engine parameters began decreasing from their takeoff values. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data captured a brief exchange between the pilots. One pilot was heard asking the other why he had cut off the fuel. The other pilot replied that he had not done so. Airport CCTV footage showed the deployment of the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) shortly after liftoff, indicating a significant loss of electrical and hydraulic power consistent with the dual-engine power loss. Investigators also reported no significant bird activity in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft began losing altitude before crossing the airport perimeter wall. Flight recorder data subsequently showed attempts to recover engine power. At approximately 08:08:52 UTC, Engine 1's fuel cutoff switch moved back from CUTOFF to RUN. Two seconds later, the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) inlet door began opening, consistent with the aircraft's automatic emergency restart logic. At 08:08:56 UTC, Engine 2's fuel cutoff switch also returned to RUN. The Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) systems on both engines initiated automatic relight sequences. Engine 1 showed signs of recovery as exhaust gas temperatures increased and core speed stabilized. Engine 2 also relit but was unable to recover sufficient core speed before impact despite repeated fuel reintroductions. At approximately 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted a distress call: "MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY." Air Traffic Control acknowledged the transmission and requested confirmation of the callsign. No further response was received. Controllers then observed the aircraft crash beyond the airport boundary and immediately initiated emergency response procedures. The preliminary report established a sequence of events but stopped short of determining why both engine fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF during the critical initial climb phase. It also did not assign blame, determine probable cause, or provide a complete analysis of the human, technical, operational, and systemic factors involved. We now await either the AAIB's Final Report or an Interim Statement.

As a Member State of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), India is obligated to comply with the provisions of ICAO Annex 13, which governs aircraft accident and incident investigations. Under Annex 13, the investigating authority—in this case, India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB)—must: 1. Submit a Preliminary Report within 30 days of the occurrence. 2. Make the Final Report publicly available as soon as possible and, where feasible, within 12 months of the accident. 3. If the Final Report cannot be completed within 12 months, publish an Interim Statement on each anniversary of the occurrence, outlining the progress of the investigation and any safety issues identified. Importantly, ICAO emphasizes that preliminary reports are not substitutes for final reports. Preliminary reports provide only factual information available at an early stage and do not contain a comprehensive analysis of the systemic, operational, technical, or human factors that may have contributed to an accident. The AAIB complied with the first requirement by releasing its preliminary report on 12 July 2025, exactly one month after the accident. As the first anniversary of the crash approaches on 12 June 2026, attention is now focused on whether the AAIB will publish the Final Report or issue an Interim Statement in accordance with the requirements of Annex 13. On 12 June 2025, Air India Flight AI171, operated by a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner registered VT-ANB, departed Ahmedabad, India, bound for London Gatwick. The aircraft was carrying 230 passengers, 10 cabin crew members, and 2 pilots. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft suffered a catastrophic loss of thrust and crashed outside the airport boundary. Of the 242 people onboard, only one passenger survived, making it one of the deadliest aviation accidents involving a Boeing 787 and one of India's worst air disasters. According to the AAIB's preliminary findings, the aircraft reached a maximum recorded airspeed of approximately 180 knots indicated airspeed (IAS) at 08:08:42 UTC during its initial climb. Immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF one second apart. As fuel flow to both engines ceased, engine parameters began decreasing from their takeoff values. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data captured a brief exchange between the pilots. One pilot was heard asking the other why he had cut off the fuel. The other pilot replied that he had not done so. Airport CCTV footage showed the deployment of the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) shortly after liftoff, indicating a significant loss of electrical and hydraulic power consistent with the dual-engine power loss. Investigators also reported no significant bird activity in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft began losing altitude before crossing the airport perimeter wall. Flight recorder data subsequently showed attempts to recover engine power. At approximately 08:08:52 UTC, Engine 1's fuel cutoff switch moved back from CUTOFF to RUN. Two seconds later, the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) inlet door began opening, consistent with the aircraft's automatic emergency restart logic. At 08:08:56 UTC, Engine 2's fuel cutoff switch also returned to RUN. The Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) systems on both engines initiated automatic relight sequences. Engine 1 showed signs of recovery as exhaust gas temperatures increased and core speed stabilized. Engine 2 also relit but was unable to recover sufficient core speed before impact despite repeated fuel reintroductions. At approximately 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted a distress call: "MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY." Air Traffic Control acknowledged the transmission and requested confirmation of the callsign. No further response was received. Controllers then observed the aircraft crash beyond the airport boundary and immediately initiated emergency response procedures. The preliminary report established a sequence of events but stopped short of determining why both engine fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF during the critical initial climb phase. It also did not assign blame, determine probable cause, or provide a complete analysis of the human, technical, operational, and systemic factors involved. We now await either the AAIB's Final Report or an Interim Statement.

Turbine Traveller

64,463 views • 18 days ago

The AI171 crash raises alarming questions. According to AAIB preliminary report both fuel control switches moved to cutoff in a gap of one second, yet both pilots seemed unaware who moved the switches. Madeeha Mujawar looks at the unanswered questions. #AI171 #AviationInvestigation #AirCrash #FlightSafety #Boeing787 #cnbctv18digital

The AI171 crash raises alarming questions. According to AAIB preliminary report both fuel control switches moved to cutoff in a gap of one second, yet both pilots seemed unaware who moved the switches. Madeeha Mujawar looks at the unanswered questions. #AI171 #AviationInvestigation #AirCrash #FlightSafety #Boeing787 #cnbctv18digital

CNBC-TV18

17,547 views • 11 months ago

🛑 EXPLOSIVE: Fuel Cutoff Mid-Air, Pilots Deny Switching Off Engines says #Boeing787 Crash Report. ~ Report dropped late night. Both engines went dead 32 seconds after takeoff, fuel switches flipped from RUN to CUTOFF one after another. Cockpit voice recorder captures chilling moment: “Why did you cut off?” - “I didn’t,” the other pilot replies. • Engine 1 tried relight, Engine 2 failed completely • Aircraft crashed 0.9 NM from runway, into hostel • Weather was clear, no bird hits, no fuel contamination • Pilots were fit, experienced, and fully rested • FAA had issued advisory on fuel switch flaws — Air India didn’t inspect No sabotage found, but is Boeing trying a face-saver? 👉🏼 Blaming Dead Pilots when a known flaw was ignored?

🛑 EXPLOSIVE: Fuel Cutoff Mid-Air, Pilots Deny Switching Off Engines says #Boeing787 Crash Report. ~ Report dropped late night. Both engines went dead 32 seconds after takeoff, fuel switches flipped from RUN to CUTOFF one after another. Cockpit voice recorder captures chilling moment: “Why did you cut off?” - “I didn’t,” the other pilot replies. • Engine 1 tried relight, Engine 2 failed completely • Aircraft crashed 0.9 NM from runway, into hostel • Weather was clear, no bird hits, no fuel contamination • Pilots were fit, experienced, and fully rested • FAA had issued advisory on fuel switch flaws — Air India didn’t inspect No sabotage found, but is Boeing trying a face-saver? 👉🏼 Blaming Dead Pilots when a known flaw was ignored?

The Analyzer (News Updates🗞️)

16,707 views • 11 months ago

WHY DID FLIGHT AI132 DEPART LONDON WITH A POSSIBLE “NO-DISPATCH” FUEL SWITCH FAULT? The UK CAA is seeking answers after Air India Flight AI132 flew 9 hours from LHR to Bengaluru on a Boeing 787 that was grounded on arrival for safety checks. According to a CAA letter, the regulator wants to know why the captain accepted the aircraft despite a suspected fault with a fuel control switch — a component critical to engine fuel flow. The UK regulator has warned Air India of possible regulatory action if a full explanation is not provided within a week. Air India states that a precautionary re-inspection found no faults and that it will respond to the CAA. Fuel control switches are already under intense scrutiny following a previous fatal Dreamliner crash, making this case especially sensitive. This raises serious questions about: • Dispatch decision-making • MEL / no-dispatch compliance • Captain’s acceptance of technical risk 📹: airlinepilotperformance(IG)

WHY DID FLIGHT AI132 DEPART LONDON WITH A POSSIBLE “NO-DISPATCH” FUEL SWITCH FAULT? The UK CAA is seeking answers after Air India Flight AI132 flew 9 hours from LHR to Bengaluru on a Boeing 787 that was grounded on arrival for safety checks. According to a CAA letter, the regulator wants to know why the captain accepted the aircraft despite a suspected fault with a fuel control switch — a component critical to engine fuel flow. The UK regulator has warned Air India of possible regulatory action if a full explanation is not provided within a week. Air India states that a precautionary re-inspection found no faults and that it will respond to the CAA. Fuel control switches are already under intense scrutiny following a previous fatal Dreamliner crash, making this case especially sensitive. This raises serious questions about: • Dispatch decision-making • MEL / no-dispatch compliance • Captain’s acceptance of technical risk 📹: airlinepilotperformance(IG)

Turbine Traveller

41,246 views • 4 months ago

Elon Musk on Raptor 3 Engine: "Raptor 3 is designed to require no basic heat shield, saving a lot of mass on the bottom and actually improving reliability, so that if there is, for example, a small fuel leak from the Raptor engine, it will simply leak into the existing flaming plasma and not really matter, whereas a fuel leak when the engines are contained in a box is a very scary thing indeed. It will be a massive increase in payload capability, in engine efficiency and in reliability. So this is really a revolutionary engine. Raptor 3 is really, I'd say, kind of alien technology, rocket engine. So in order to make the engine like that, we had to simplify so many parts of the design, incorporate secondary fluid circuits and electronics in the structure of the engine itself, so everything is contained and protected. It is a marvel of engineering."

Elon Musk on Raptor 3 Engine: "Raptor 3 is designed to require no basic heat shield, saving a lot of mass on the bottom and actually improving reliability, so that if there is, for example, a small fuel leak from the Raptor engine, it will simply leak into the existing flaming plasma and not really matter, whereas a fuel leak when the engines are contained in a box is a very scary thing indeed. It will be a massive increase in payload capability, in engine efficiency and in reliability. So this is really a revolutionary engine. Raptor 3 is really, I'd say, kind of alien technology, rocket engine. So in order to make the engine like that, we had to simplify so many parts of the design, incorporate secondary fluid circuits and electronics in the structure of the engine itself, so everything is contained and protected. It is a marvel of engineering."

DogeDesigner

94,713 views • 6 months ago

AIR INDIA 787 ‘thoughts’ I’m surprised nobody, even the experts) have mentioned this… The 787 Dreamliner (all variants) has an ‘Air Ground Sensing’ system that opens the Main Gear doors immediately upon leaving the runway and prior to the (Flight Deck) Lever being moved manually to the ‘up’ position. I’ve witnessed this literally hundreds of times when filming The 787 and it’s clear on the footage attached: upon rotate, about one second from wheels off ground, the main Gear Doors open. Then, around three to four seconds (pilot discretion) Positive Rate is called/agreed and the Gear Lever is moved to the UP position. On a side note, the 787 is quite prone to brake malfunction, mostly down to the electric brake system that can fail from time to time on a single (or more) wheel. If the wheels are not retracted within a given amount of time due to a wheel continuing to spin, the gear doors will close back-up until the wheel(s) stop spinning and the gear is recycled at which time the doors will re-open and the gear will retract fully. This is the takeoff/gear-up procedure with all 787s. This is quite clearly not the case when observing the CCTV footage of the doomed Air India jet. I think it’s quite evident there was some kind of (electrical?) malfunction with the system(s). The question of the Flap (takeoff) Setting is still a mystery as, with poor quality footage, it’s difficult to completely confirm whether the flaps were extended or not. In my personal opinion they were not extended. There was a CNN reporter right next to one of the wings on the ground. Although it was heavily charred, it would’ve been clear to see if they were extended or not 🤷🏼‍♂️ Also, as for possible (engine) ingestion/failure, whether by birds or other FOD, there is no evidence of engine Compressor Stall, which is very clear to see in many videos online when it does happen with bird strikes, especially at rotate power/speed. The engine(s) will ‘pop’ flames out of the back. What is evident, is that the Jet uses all of the available runway, which is clear by the amount of dust being kicked-up on rotate. The Jet never seems to reach the optimal takeoff angle, right from the rotate point it appears to struggle, which would suggest either engine power issues or, as mentioned, the lack of lift from the Flaps/Slats. Witness accounts say there was a distinct lack of engine noise coming from the jet, which backs-up some theories of engine failure. You would expect, even with a lack of Flap setting the pilot would be able to increase to max (TOGA) power to give them some chance of climbing or at least gaining enough altitude to get themselves back to the airfield or to a safer (crash) landing zone. That ‘power up’ would be evident with black exhaust from the engines, but that didn’t happen - at all. You’ll see/hear from the (second part) footage I’ve filmed, that the engine sound is very evident at this height and that this climb-out is too Standard Operating Procedures. Personally I find it hard to believe the NFP would make such a rookie mistake as to raise the flaps (push and move the staggered lever) as opposed to the gear lever which is a simple up-down motion. The two levers are also in completely different positions: Gear lever on the facing panel and flap lever (with many settings) next to the throttles. Plus this is such a basic procedure that even the most rookie pilot wouldn’t make this mistake 🤷🏼‍♂️ Again, this is just my opinion and observations based on visual and actual experiences. The CVR and FDR will deliver the final evidence.

AIR INDIA 787 ‘thoughts’ I’m surprised nobody, even the experts) have mentioned this… The 787 Dreamliner (all variants) has an ‘Air Ground Sensing’ system that opens the Main Gear doors immediately upon leaving the runway and prior to the (Flight Deck) Lever being moved manually to the ‘up’ position. I’ve witnessed this literally hundreds of times when filming The 787 and it’s clear on the footage attached: upon rotate, about one second from wheels off ground, the main Gear Doors open. Then, around three to four seconds (pilot discretion) Positive Rate is called/agreed and the Gear Lever is moved to the UP position. On a side note, the 787 is quite prone to brake malfunction, mostly down to the electric brake system that can fail from time to time on a single (or more) wheel. If the wheels are not retracted within a given amount of time due to a wheel continuing to spin, the gear doors will close back-up until the wheel(s) stop spinning and the gear is recycled at which time the doors will re-open and the gear will retract fully. This is the takeoff/gear-up procedure with all 787s. This is quite clearly not the case when observing the CCTV footage of the doomed Air India jet. I think it’s quite evident there was some kind of (electrical?) malfunction with the system(s). The question of the Flap (takeoff) Setting is still a mystery as, with poor quality footage, it’s difficult to completely confirm whether the flaps were extended or not. In my personal opinion they were not extended. There was a CNN reporter right next to one of the wings on the ground. Although it was heavily charred, it would’ve been clear to see if they were extended or not 🤷🏼‍♂️ Also, as for possible (engine) ingestion/failure, whether by birds or other FOD, there is no evidence of engine Compressor Stall, which is very clear to see in many videos online when it does happen with bird strikes, especially at rotate power/speed. The engine(s) will ‘pop’ flames out of the back. What is evident, is that the Jet uses all of the available runway, which is clear by the amount of dust being kicked-up on rotate. The Jet never seems to reach the optimal takeoff angle, right from the rotate point it appears to struggle, which would suggest either engine power issues or, as mentioned, the lack of lift from the Flaps/Slats. Witness accounts say there was a distinct lack of engine noise coming from the jet, which backs-up some theories of engine failure. You would expect, even with a lack of Flap setting the pilot would be able to increase to max (TOGA) power to give them some chance of climbing or at least gaining enough altitude to get themselves back to the airfield or to a safer (crash) landing zone. That ‘power up’ would be evident with black exhaust from the engines, but that didn’t happen - at all. You’ll see/hear from the (second part) footage I’ve filmed, that the engine sound is very evident at this height and that this climb-out is too Standard Operating Procedures. Personally I find it hard to believe the NFP would make such a rookie mistake as to raise the flaps (push and move the staggered lever) as opposed to the gear lever which is a simple up-down motion. The two levers are also in completely different positions: Gear lever on the facing panel and flap lever (with many settings) next to the throttles. Plus this is such a basic procedure that even the most rookie pilot wouldn’t make this mistake 🤷🏼‍♂️ Again, this is just my opinion and observations based on visual and actual experiences. The CVR and FDR will deliver the final evidence.

BIG JET TV

1,728,296 views • 1 year ago

In June 1937 at Neuhardenberg, pilot Erich Warsitz (posibly the first jet pilot) ignited the von Braun Liquid Fuel Rocket Engine on his Heinkel He 112 after climbing to altitude and shutting down the Jumo piston engine. Smoke and fire quickly filled the cockpit due to exhaust flowing back into the fuselage. Despite the wheels-up landing and having the fuselage on fire, it proved to official circles that an aircraft could be flown satisfactorily with a back-thrust system through the rear without causing an aircraft to flip or become uncontrollable. It convinced the German Air Ministry (RLM) that rocket-powered flight was feasible, leading directly to the development of the purpose-built Heinkel He 176.

In June 1937 at Neuhardenberg, pilot Erich Warsitz (posibly the first jet pilot) ignited the von Braun Liquid Fuel Rocket Engine on his Heinkel He 112 after climbing to altitude and shutting down the Jumo piston engine. Smoke and fire quickly filled the cockpit due to exhaust flowing back into the fuselage. Despite the wheels-up landing and having the fuselage on fire, it proved to official circles that an aircraft could be flown satisfactorily with a back-thrust system through the rear without causing an aircraft to flip or become uncontrollable. It convinced the German Air Ministry (RLM) that rocket-powered flight was feasible, leading directly to the development of the purpose-built Heinkel He 176.

Aviation Archive - Tim Farmer

85,884 views • 3 months ago

#AirIndia | The switch won't slide down so easily; it's in a lock position. Why would a pilot switch it off just 3 seconds after the takeoff? And that too, both the engines? It's easy to blame the pilot: Fmr Senior Pilot Captain S.Bhatnagar #AirIndiaPlaneCrash | Anand Narasimhan🇮🇳

#AirIndia | The switch won't slide down so easily; it's in a lock position. Why would a pilot switch it off just 3 seconds after the takeoff? And that too, both the engines? It's easy to blame the pilot: Fmr Senior Pilot Captain S.Bhatnagar #AirIndiaPlaneCrash | Anand Narasimhan🇮🇳

News18

51,764 views • 11 months ago

ELON: SOMEONE HAS TO SOLVE ROCKET REUSABILITY — WHETHER IT’S SPACEX OR SOMEONE ELSE “The cost of the fuel and oxygen on a Falcon 9 is 0.3% of the cost of the rocket. So, it's a very tiny number. It's very similar to an airplane. How much does it cost to fuel up an airplane, and how much does it cost to buy an airplane? They're very different things. If humanity is ever to expand beyond Earth and establish a self-sustaining base on another planet, it's critical that we solve this problem. Whether it's SpaceX or someone else, someone has to solve the problem, and we can have a hundred-fold reduction in the cost of spaceflight. That's what SpaceX has been trying to do, and really that's been the goal since the beginning of the company. So far, I've not been very successful in that regard, but I think we have a handle on it. We've got a design that closes in the simulations. If we can build that thing, it should work.” Source: SXSW, March 2013

ELON: SOMEONE HAS TO SOLVE ROCKET REUSABILITY — WHETHER IT’S SPACEX OR SOMEONE ELSE “The cost of the fuel and oxygen on a Falcon 9 is 0.3% of the cost of the rocket. So, it's a very tiny number. It's very similar to an airplane. How much does it cost to fuel up an airplane, and how much does it cost to buy an airplane? They're very different things. If humanity is ever to expand beyond Earth and establish a self-sustaining base on another planet, it's critical that we solve this problem. Whether it's SpaceX or someone else, someone has to solve the problem, and we can have a hundred-fold reduction in the cost of spaceflight. That's what SpaceX has been trying to do, and really that's been the goal since the beginning of the company. So far, I've not been very successful in that regard, but I think we have a handle on it. We've got a design that closes in the simulations. If we can build that thing, it should work.” Source: SXSW, March 2013

Mario Nawfal

2,652,391 views • 1 year ago