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WHY DID FLIGHT AI132 DEPART LONDON WITH A POSSIBLE “NO-DISPATCH” FUEL SWITCH FAULT? The UK CAA is seeking answers after Air India Flight AI132 flew 9 hours from LHR to Bengaluru on a Boeing 787 that was grounded on arrival for safety checks. According to a CAA letter, the...

41,246 Aufrufe • vor 5 Monaten •via X (Twitter)

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The Engine Start Levers or Fuel Cut off switches (different name, same switches) control the fuel and ignition for the engines. The 787 shares the same switches and very similar logic to the Boeing 737 Max. The switches have been designed in such a way that they require a very deliberate movement in order for them to move from one position to another. They’re also placed in such a position (below the thrust levers) so that it’s very unlikely that they’ll be knocked. But even if they were, the spring force and detent would prevent them from moving unintentionally. When we move the start levers from the “Run” or “Idle” position, to “Cutoff”, an electrical signal is sent to move the fuel valves from open to close. The engine ignitors are also then de-powered. This stops the supply and ignition of fuel and the engine spools down. Pilots are trained from day one to only touch those switches in flight when called for by a non normal checklist, such as an engine fire or failure. When a fuel switch has to be moved to cutoff in flight, we adhere to a very strict procedure… Pilot monitoring will place their hand on the switch of the damaged engine and both visually and audibly confirm with Pilot flying that the correct fuel switch has been selected. Only after both pilots have confirmed that the correct switch has been selected, will pilot monitoring move that switch to the cutoff position. As an additional layer of safety, some aircraft types only allow the switch to be moved to cutoff in flight if the thrust levers are in the closed or idle position. Do you think that this design feature should be implemented in all aircraft? 📸 by ig/airlinepilotperformance

aircraftmaintenancengineer

149,946 Aufrufe • vor 1 Jahr

A preventable tragedy On This Day in 1967: Stockport air disaster (England). A British Midland C-4 [G-ALHG] crashes in Stockport, 72 of 84 aboard die. On a go-around, crew lost control after 2 engines failed. Investigation traced the issues to a known - but never addressed - design issue in the fuel system. More details here by ASN (video is from British Pathé) PROBABLE CAUSE: "The immediate cause of the accident was loss of power of both engines on the starboard side, resulting in control problems which prevented the pilot from maintaining height on the available power with one propeller windmilling. The loss of power of the first engine was due to fuel starvation due to inadvertent fuel transfer in flight. The loss of power of the second engine was due either to fuel starvation resulting from inadvertent fuel transfer in flight or to misidentification by the crew of which engine had failed followed by failure to restore power in time to the engine misidentified as having failed. Contributory causes of the accident were: (a) The design of the fuel valves and location in the cockpit of their actuating levers, so that a failure by the pilot correctly to position the lever by an amount so small as to be easy to do and difficult to recognize would result in inadvertent fuel transfer on a scale sufficient to involve the risk after a long flight of a tank expected to contain sufficient fuel being in fact empty. (b) Failure of those responsible for the design of the fuel system or the fuel valves to warn users that failure by a small amount to place the actuating levers in the proper position would result in inadvertent fuel transfer on a scale involving this risk after a long flight. (c) Failure of British Midland's air crew or engineers to recognize the possibility of inadvertent fuel transfer in the air from the evidence available in previous incidents in flight and contained in the fuel logs. (d) Failure of other operators of Argonauts who had learned by experience of the possibility of inadvertent fuel transfer in flight to inform the Air Registration Board, the Directorate of Flight Safety of the Board of Trade or its predecessors, or the United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee of the facts which they had learned so that these might be communicated to other operators of Argonauts and other aircraft equipped with similar systems and fuel cocks."

Francisco Cunha

24,189 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat

Man Escapes Air India Crash by One Flight He Noticed Something Strange! A devastating incident involving Air India Flight 171, a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner has resulted in numerous fatalities after the aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff from Ahmedabad airport on its way to London. A passenger who had traveled on the same aircraft just two hours earlier, on a Delhi-to-Ahmedabad leg, took to social media to report troubling technical issues. He pointed out that the air conditioning and in-flight entertainment systems were not functioning, sparking serious concerns about the plane’s upkeep and overall safety. The tragedy has put a renewed spotlight on Air India’s operational practices, with the passenger’s account raising further doubts about the airline's service standards and safety track record. The Boeing 787-8, equipped with Rolls Royce Trent 1000 engines, has previously encountered mechanical challenges—now prompting investigations into potential system failures or deliberate interference. Indian aviation authorities, in coordination with their British counterparts, are actively probing the cause of the crash amid growing global criticism. This incident has once again ignited global conversations about the dependability of modern aircraft and the critical need for strict maintenance routines. It also revives scrutiny of Air India’s long-standing reputation, frequently ranked among the least reliable carriers worldwide. Credit : Republic Media Network.

Augadh

857,160 Aufrufe • vor 1 Jahr

As a Member State of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), India is obligated to comply with the provisions of ICAO Annex 13, which governs aircraft accident and incident investigations. Under Annex 13, the investigating authority—in this case, India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB)—must: 1. Submit a Preliminary Report within 30 days of the occurrence. 2. Make the Final Report publicly available as soon as possible and, where feasible, within 12 months of the accident. 3. If the Final Report cannot be completed within 12 months, publish an Interim Statement on each anniversary of the occurrence, outlining the progress of the investigation and any safety issues identified. Importantly, ICAO emphasizes that preliminary reports are not substitutes for final reports. Preliminary reports provide only factual information available at an early stage and do not contain a comprehensive analysis of the systemic, operational, technical, or human factors that may have contributed to an accident. The AAIB complied with the first requirement by releasing its preliminary report on 12 July 2025, exactly one month after the accident. As the first anniversary of the crash approaches on 12 June 2026, attention is now focused on whether the AAIB will publish the Final Report or issue an Interim Statement in accordance with the requirements of Annex 13. On 12 June 2025, Air India Flight AI171, operated by a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner registered VT-ANB, departed Ahmedabad, India, bound for London Gatwick. The aircraft was carrying 230 passengers, 10 cabin crew members, and 2 pilots. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft suffered a catastrophic loss of thrust and crashed outside the airport boundary. Of the 242 people onboard, only one passenger survived, making it one of the deadliest aviation accidents involving a Boeing 787 and one of India's worst air disasters. According to the AAIB's preliminary findings, the aircraft reached a maximum recorded airspeed of approximately 180 knots indicated airspeed (IAS) at 08:08:42 UTC during its initial climb. Immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF one second apart. As fuel flow to both engines ceased, engine parameters began decreasing from their takeoff values. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data captured a brief exchange between the pilots. One pilot was heard asking the other why he had cut off the fuel. The other pilot replied that he had not done so. Airport CCTV footage showed the deployment of the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) shortly after liftoff, indicating a significant loss of electrical and hydraulic power consistent with the dual-engine power loss. Investigators also reported no significant bird activity in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft began losing altitude before crossing the airport perimeter wall. Flight recorder data subsequently showed attempts to recover engine power. At approximately 08:08:52 UTC, Engine 1's fuel cutoff switch moved back from CUTOFF to RUN. Two seconds later, the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) inlet door began opening, consistent with the aircraft's automatic emergency restart logic. At 08:08:56 UTC, Engine 2's fuel cutoff switch also returned to RUN. The Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) systems on both engines initiated automatic relight sequences. Engine 1 showed signs of recovery as exhaust gas temperatures increased and core speed stabilized. Engine 2 also relit but was unable to recover sufficient core speed before impact despite repeated fuel reintroductions. At approximately 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted a distress call: "MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY." Air Traffic Control acknowledged the transmission and requested confirmation of the callsign. No further response was received. Controllers then observed the aircraft crash beyond the airport boundary and immediately initiated emergency response procedures. The preliminary report established a sequence of events but stopped short of determining why both engine fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF during the critical initial climb phase. It also did not assign blame, determine probable cause, or provide a complete analysis of the human, technical, operational, and systemic factors involved. We now await either the AAIB's Final Report or an Interim Statement.

Turbine Traveller

64,463 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat