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The Russian FAB-3000 with Extended 200 km Glide Kit: A Devastating Precision Weapon The FAB-3000, or Fugasnaya Aviabomba 3000, represents one of Russia's most formidable unguided aerial bombs from the Soviet era, now revolutionized by modern glide kits. Originally developed in the 1950s as a high-explosive demolition weapon, the...

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โญ• Pakistan Unveils Advanced Canister Launched Abdali Missile with Extended 450km Range In a major leap forward for its tactical missile capability, Pakistan has successfully test-fired an advanced canister-based version of its Abdali short-range ballistic missile, now boasting an extended range of 450 kilometers. The new missile marks a significant evolution from its predecessor, offering enhanced mobility, survivability, and strike precision. The earlier Abdali system had a maximum range of 180 km and was mounted on a Soviet-era MAZ-587 chassis using a rail-type launch system. This older setup required longer launch preparations and was less adaptable to rapid response scenarios. In stark contrast, the upgraded Abdali missile is launched from a modern Chinese origin Taian truck and stored in a sealed canisterโ€”reflecting a contemporary shift toward quicker, more secure, and more mobile missile deployments. ๐Ÿ”นKey Upgrades Over Previous Version: ๐Ÿ”นExtended Range: The new Abdali can strike targets up to 450 km awayโ€”more than doubling the reach of the earlier model. ๐Ÿ”นCanister Based Launch System: Offers faster reaction time, all-weather capability, and improved safety during storage and handling. ๐Ÿ”นHigh Mobility Platform: The Taian launcher ensures better on-road and off-road performance, enabling rapid repositioning and increased survivability. ๐Ÿ”นImproved Accuracy and Reliability: While classified, the missile is believed to incorporate upgraded guidance systems for more precise targeting. This successful test underscores Pakistanโ€™s continued efforts to modernize its strategic forces, signaling enhanced battlefield flexibility and deterrent capability in an evolving regional security landscape.
0:11

โญ• Pakistan Unveils Advanced Canister Launched Abdali Missile with Extended 450km Range In a major leap forward for its tactical missile capability, Pakistan has successfully test-fired an advanced canister-based version of its Abdali short-range ballistic missile, now boasting an extended range of 450 kilometers. The new missile marks a significant evolution from its predecessor, offering enhanced mobility, survivability, and strike precision. The earlier Abdali system had a maximum range of 180 km and was mounted on a Soviet-era MAZ-587 chassis using a rail-type launch system. This older setup required longer launch preparations and was less adaptable to rapid response scenarios. In stark contrast, the upgraded Abdali missile is launched from a modern Chinese origin Taian truck and stored in a sealed canisterโ€”reflecting a contemporary shift toward quicker, more secure, and more mobile missile deployments. ๐Ÿ”นKey Upgrades Over Previous Version: ๐Ÿ”นExtended Range: The new Abdali can strike targets up to 450 km awayโ€”more than doubling the reach of the earlier model. ๐Ÿ”นCanister Based Launch System: Offers faster reaction time, all-weather capability, and improved safety during storage and handling. ๐Ÿ”นHigh Mobility Platform: The Taian launcher ensures better on-road and off-road performance, enabling rapid repositioning and increased survivability. ๐Ÿ”นImproved Accuracy and Reliability: While classified, the missile is believed to incorporate upgraded guidance systems for more precise targeting. This successful test underscores Pakistanโ€™s continued efforts to modernize its strategic forces, signaling enhanced battlefield flexibility and deterrent capability in an evolving regional security landscape.

Defence Index

18,059 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 1 ๅนดๅ‰

Unique footage has emerged showing remote control of interceptor drones. The 190th Training Center of the SBS reportedly used a drone-interceptor to shoot down a Shahed UAV remotely, with the pilot located at a significant distance from the launch site. The system used was LITAVR, developed by FDrones. According to the company, an operator can control the interceptor from hundreds of kilometers away from the launch point. The F7 LITAVR is already a well-known and highly effective system. As a reminder, here are the technical details (this is all open-source information): Development of the system began in autumn 2024. It was successfully tested and officially adopted in summer 2025. Serial production and deliveries to the military started in autumn 2025. Maximum speed: 350 km/h Flight time: up to 15 minutes Equipped with two cameras: daytime and thermal imaging The officially stated tactical range is 36 km, though in practice it can reach up to 60 km and operate at altitudes of up to 9.5 km. The warhead (separately codified) weighs 500 g. Detonation can occur via kinetic impact, self-destruction upon contact with the target, or manual activation by the operator. The system uses inertial guidance without GPS and features automatic terminal guidance (โ€œlast mileโ€ / target lock system). At present, it reportedly destroys hundreds of targets per week, including Shaheds, Gerberas, Molniyas, Orlans, Lancets, and others. What is fundamentally new? Until now, mobile air defense fire groups and frontline crews using interceptor drones required a qualified pilot on-site. It has now been successfully demonstrated that a different tactic is possible: pilots can operate from protected, remote locations. The only requirement is internet access at both the control center and the launch site. Ukraineโ€™s defense sector continues to develop innovative solutions. ๐Ÿ“น Oleksii Kopytko/Facebook
0:18

Unique footage has emerged showing remote control of interceptor drones. The 190th Training Center of the SBS reportedly used a drone-interceptor to shoot down a Shahed UAV remotely, with the pilot located at a significant distance from the launch site. The system used was LITAVR, developed by FDrones. According to the company, an operator can control the interceptor from hundreds of kilometers away from the launch point. The F7 LITAVR is already a well-known and highly effective system. As a reminder, here are the technical details (this is all open-source information): Development of the system began in autumn 2024. It was successfully tested and officially adopted in summer 2025. Serial production and deliveries to the military started in autumn 2025. Maximum speed: 350 km/h Flight time: up to 15 minutes Equipped with two cameras: daytime and thermal imaging The officially stated tactical range is 36 km, though in practice it can reach up to 60 km and operate at altitudes of up to 9.5 km. The warhead (separately codified) weighs 500 g. Detonation can occur via kinetic impact, self-destruction upon contact with the target, or manual activation by the operator. The system uses inertial guidance without GPS and features automatic terminal guidance (โ€œlast mileโ€ / target lock system). At present, it reportedly destroys hundreds of targets per week, including Shaheds, Gerberas, Molniyas, Orlans, Lancets, and others. What is fundamentally new? Until now, mobile air defense fire groups and frontline crews using interceptor drones required a qualified pilot on-site. It has now been successfully demonstrated that a different tactic is possible: pilots can operate from protected, remote locations. The only requirement is internet access at both the control center and the launch site. Ukraineโ€™s defense sector continues to develop innovative solutions. ๐Ÿ“น Oleksii Kopytko/Facebook

Anton Gerashchenko

22,311 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 4 ไธชๆœˆๅ‰

๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ Russian occupiers report that Ukraine has sharply increased the use of the medium-range loitering munition โ€œTrustโ€ (as they call it). ๐Ÿ”ป There is no official information or confirmation about this system from Ukrainian sources, and its real designation remains unknown. According to the occupiers, it is mainly used to destroy transport vehicles on logistical routes. ๐Ÿ”ป The Trust is an aircraft-type drone with a very simple design, optimized for mass production. It has a tubular fiberglass body, an internal combustion engine, and carries a 12 kg warhead, which can be either high-explosive fragmentation or thermobaric. This drone appears to be another cost-effective and efficient Ukrainian development focused on deep strikes against Russian logistics. Its simplicity and mass-production potential make it particularly dangerous for Russian supply lines in the rear. Video is generated by grok AI
0:10

๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ Russian occupiers report that Ukraine has sharply increased the use of the medium-range loitering munition โ€œTrustโ€ (as they call it). ๐Ÿ”ป There is no official information or confirmation about this system from Ukrainian sources, and its real designation remains unknown. According to the occupiers, it is mainly used to destroy transport vehicles on logistical routes. ๐Ÿ”ป The Trust is an aircraft-type drone with a very simple design, optimized for mass production. It has a tubular fiberglass body, an internal combustion engine, and carries a 12 kg warhead, which can be either high-explosive fragmentation or thermobaric. This drone appears to be another cost-effective and efficient Ukrainian development focused on deep strikes against Russian logistics. Its simplicity and mass-production potential make it particularly dangerous for Russian supply lines in the rear. Video is generated by grok AI

NSTRIKE

29,071 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 2 ไธชๆœˆๅ‰

We continue to analyze the technical details of the war with Iran, and we would like to note the Iranian novelty - subsonic barraging anti-aircraft missiles Missile 358, equipped with compact turbojet engines. To some extent unexpectedly, they showed good effectiveness against Israeli reconnaissance and strike UAVs Hermes-900. The key role is played by the thermal homing head: it is able to reliably detect and track a wide range of heat-contrasting targets, including UAVs with various flight profiles. An additional advantage is the command and telemetry channel, which ensures data transmission and allows for radio correction of the trajectory. This is especially important in situations when the target attempts to disrupt the capture with infrared decoys or other means of counteraction. According to the stated parameters, the range of application of Missile 358 reaches about 100 km. At the same time, the maximum interception altitude is about 8.5 km, and the speed is up to 700 km/h, which expands the capabilities of the complex in covering objects and intercepting medium-altitude UAVs. Of course, this is a niche tool, and compared to solid-fuel missiles, the turbojet engine provides exponentially higher flight energy. This allows to dramatically increase the range at low speed, and the mass of the main units of the ammunition, its warhead and control system. On the other hand, this is a solution of necessity, because classic anti-aircraft missiles perfectly hit such high-altitude and slow-moving targets. But for such ammunition, no radar, complex and expensive beam installations are required, which greatly improves its survivability under constant air strikes. And in its niche of targets, there are enough of them, as such UAVs of Israel and the USA are the basis of UCAV, and are constantly over the territory of Iran. So with the 358th ammunition, you can score quite a lot of frags, and significantly complicate air strikes on Iran for the Epstein coalition. Russian Engineer -
0:15

We continue to analyze the technical details of the war with Iran, and we would like to note the Iranian novelty - subsonic barraging anti-aircraft missiles Missile 358, equipped with compact turbojet engines. To some extent unexpectedly, they showed good effectiveness against Israeli reconnaissance and strike UAVs Hermes-900. The key role is played by the thermal homing head: it is able to reliably detect and track a wide range of heat-contrasting targets, including UAVs with various flight profiles. An additional advantage is the command and telemetry channel, which ensures data transmission and allows for radio correction of the trajectory. This is especially important in situations when the target attempts to disrupt the capture with infrared decoys or other means of counteraction. According to the stated parameters, the range of application of Missile 358 reaches about 100 km. At the same time, the maximum interception altitude is about 8.5 km, and the speed is up to 700 km/h, which expands the capabilities of the complex in covering objects and intercepting medium-altitude UAVs. Of course, this is a niche tool, and compared to solid-fuel missiles, the turbojet engine provides exponentially higher flight energy. This allows to dramatically increase the range at low speed, and the mass of the main units of the ammunition, its warhead and control system. On the other hand, this is a solution of necessity, because classic anti-aircraft missiles perfectly hit such high-altitude and slow-moving targets. But for such ammunition, no radar, complex and expensive beam installations are required, which greatly improves its survivability under constant air strikes. And in its niche of targets, there are enough of them, as such UAVs of Israel and the USA are the basis of UCAV, and are constantly over the territory of Iran. So with the 358th ammunition, you can score quite a lot of frags, and significantly complicate air strikes on Iran for the Epstein coalition. Russian Engineer -

๐ƒ๐š๐ฏ๐ข๐ ๐™ ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ช

17,874 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 4 ไธชๆœˆๅ‰

๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ Russiaโ€™s Starlink killers showcase new era of electronic battlefield warfare Russia has ramped-up EW use to detect and jam Elon Muskโ€™s Starlink terminals and satellites, Ukrainian media reports. ๐Ÿ‘‰ Meet Russiaโ€™s key counter-Starlink systems: ๐Ÿ”ธ Volna Kupol Garant Russiaโ€™s latest electronic warfare system reportedly uses a directed high-frequency radio beam to disrupt Starlink operations. Rather than damaging satellites orbiting roughly 500 kilometers above Earth, the system blinds them โ€“ cutting their ability to connect with ground terminals while they remain under attack. According to reports, Volna is a mobile system built around six trailers. Each carries a pair of steerable satellite dishes mounted on rotating platforms. A single battery is reportedly capable of denying Starlink coverage across an area of up to 20 sq km. Some analysts say the system was previously referenced under the designation Peresvet-M, although this has not been independently confirmed. Ukrainian sources claim Volna was first deployed during Russia's offensive in the Kharkov region in 2024. They also say its use has increased significantly in recent months. ๐Ÿ”ธ Tobol The secretive Russian EW complex is reportedly used to disrupt signals from NATO-linked satellite networks, including GPS, Galileo, and Starlink. Reports claim that Tobol attacks satellite communications on both ends of the link โ€“ jamming downlinks from satellites to ground receivers and uplinks from Earth to orbit. Its power and range also allegedly allow it to create an electromagnetic "umbrella." ๐Ÿ”ธ Kalinka The system is designed to hunt down satellite communications signals, including those transmitted by Starlink terminals at distances of up to 15 km. It can reportedly track and lock onto even Starshield โ€“ SpaceXโ€™s hardened military variant of Starlink. Western media warns that while Tobol disrupts GPS signals on a broad scale, the Kalinkaโ€™s precision-targeting capabilities could pose a more direct threat to specific military operations. ๐Ÿ”ธ Krasukha The Krasukha-S4 is designed to neutralize reconnaissance satellites, ground-based radar installations, and airborne surveillance systems. It does so by emitting powerful electronic jamming signals that disrupt key radar bands and other radio-frequency emissions. A standard Krasukha-S4 battery consists of two vehicles and has an operational range exceeding 300 kilometers. ๐Ÿ”ธ Borshchevik The light mobile system is designed to detect and geolocate Starlink terminals within a 180-degree sector at ranges of up to 10 km, with a reported accuracy of five meters. Using direction-finding and biangulation algorithms, it can locate a target in less than three minutes at a single scanning position. The Borshchevik-2 airborne system hunts Starlink signals from the sky, with reported accuracy down to 0.4 m.
0:20

๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ Russiaโ€™s Starlink killers showcase new era of electronic battlefield warfare Russia has ramped-up EW use to detect and jam Elon Muskโ€™s Starlink terminals and satellites, Ukrainian media reports. ๐Ÿ‘‰ Meet Russiaโ€™s key counter-Starlink systems: ๐Ÿ”ธ Volna Kupol Garant Russiaโ€™s latest electronic warfare system reportedly uses a directed high-frequency radio beam to disrupt Starlink operations. Rather than damaging satellites orbiting roughly 500 kilometers above Earth, the system blinds them โ€“ cutting their ability to connect with ground terminals while they remain under attack. According to reports, Volna is a mobile system built around six trailers. Each carries a pair of steerable satellite dishes mounted on rotating platforms. A single battery is reportedly capable of denying Starlink coverage across an area of up to 20 sq km. Some analysts say the system was previously referenced under the designation Peresvet-M, although this has not been independently confirmed. Ukrainian sources claim Volna was first deployed during Russia's offensive in the Kharkov region in 2024. They also say its use has increased significantly in recent months. ๐Ÿ”ธ Tobol The secretive Russian EW complex is reportedly used to disrupt signals from NATO-linked satellite networks, including GPS, Galileo, and Starlink. Reports claim that Tobol attacks satellite communications on both ends of the link โ€“ jamming downlinks from satellites to ground receivers and uplinks from Earth to orbit. Its power and range also allegedly allow it to create an electromagnetic "umbrella." ๐Ÿ”ธ Kalinka The system is designed to hunt down satellite communications signals, including those transmitted by Starlink terminals at distances of up to 15 km. It can reportedly track and lock onto even Starshield โ€“ SpaceXโ€™s hardened military variant of Starlink. Western media warns that while Tobol disrupts GPS signals on a broad scale, the Kalinkaโ€™s precision-targeting capabilities could pose a more direct threat to specific military operations. ๐Ÿ”ธ Krasukha The Krasukha-S4 is designed to neutralize reconnaissance satellites, ground-based radar installations, and airborne surveillance systems. It does so by emitting powerful electronic jamming signals that disrupt key radar bands and other radio-frequency emissions. A standard Krasukha-S4 battery consists of two vehicles and has an operational range exceeding 300 kilometers. ๐Ÿ”ธ Borshchevik The light mobile system is designed to detect and geolocate Starlink terminals within a 180-degree sector at ranges of up to 10 km, with a reported accuracy of five meters. Using direction-finding and biangulation algorithms, it can locate a target in less than three minutes at a single scanning position. The Borshchevik-2 airborne system hunts Starlink signals from the sky, with reported accuracy down to 0.4 m.

Sputnik

24,974 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 4 ๅคฉๅ‰

๐Ÿšจ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณU.S. IN PANIC: China's J-35 Stealth Fighter Now in 'Beast Mode' With Increased Firepower China's J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighter has been seen in a new configuration carrying four PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles on external pylons under its wings. Combined with the six missiles it carries inside its internal weapons bays, the aircraft can now go into combat with up to ten air-to-air missiles in total. ๐Ÿ”ธThis setup is informally called "beast mode" โ€” a term borrowed from the U.S. military's similar configuration for the F-35. The idea is straightforward: the aircraft trades some of its stealth capability for significantly more firepower. When weapons are carried externally, they increase the aircraft's radar signature, making it more visible to enemy systems. However, the PL-15 missile's long range means the J-35 can potentially engage enemy aircraft from a safe distance before that visibility becomes a serious problem. ๐Ÿ”ธThe J-35 entered service in 2025 in both Air Force and Navy variants. The naval version is designed to operate from Chinese supercarriers such as the Fujian. Both versions are considered among the most advanced fifth-generation fighters in the world today, alongside the J-20 and the American F-35 โ€” all three of which are regarded as more sophisticated than the older F-22 or Russia's Su-57. ๐Ÿ”ธWithin China's own air fleet, the J-35 is expected to serve as a lighter and more affordable complement to the larger and more powerful J-20, which carries a bigger radar, heavier weapons load, and longer range. The J-20 is expected to remain the priority for large-scale procurement, while the J-35 fills a broader operational role at lower cost. Do you think the U.S. can really counter it? NewRulesGeopoliticsโ—๏ธ
0:19

๐Ÿšจ๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณU.S. IN PANIC: China's J-35 Stealth Fighter Now in 'Beast Mode' With Increased Firepower China's J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighter has been seen in a new configuration carrying four PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles on external pylons under its wings. Combined with the six missiles it carries inside its internal weapons bays, the aircraft can now go into combat with up to ten air-to-air missiles in total. ๐Ÿ”ธThis setup is informally called "beast mode" โ€” a term borrowed from the U.S. military's similar configuration for the F-35. The idea is straightforward: the aircraft trades some of its stealth capability for significantly more firepower. When weapons are carried externally, they increase the aircraft's radar signature, making it more visible to enemy systems. However, the PL-15 missile's long range means the J-35 can potentially engage enemy aircraft from a safe distance before that visibility becomes a serious problem. ๐Ÿ”ธThe J-35 entered service in 2025 in both Air Force and Navy variants. The naval version is designed to operate from Chinese supercarriers such as the Fujian. Both versions are considered among the most advanced fifth-generation fighters in the world today, alongside the J-20 and the American F-35 โ€” all three of which are regarded as more sophisticated than the older F-22 or Russia's Su-57. ๐Ÿ”ธWithin China's own air fleet, the J-35 is expected to serve as a lighter and more affordable complement to the larger and more powerful J-20, which carries a bigger radar, heavier weapons load, and longer range. The J-20 is expected to remain the priority for large-scale procurement, while the J-35 fills a broader operational role at lower cost. Do you think the U.S. can really counter it? NewRulesGeopoliticsโ—๏ธ

๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ STANISLAV KRAPIVNIK ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ

11,360 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 2 ไธชๆœˆๅ‰

I recently read an interesting article by a journalist and one of the founders of the Babel online outlet, Hlib Husiev, who spent three days with the group that created the "Horynych" drone. Main points: โ—พ๏ธ The Horynych drone is a modified French Skyranger ultralight aircraft. Ukrainian engineers and light aircraft enthusiasts have turned it into a formidable weapon. They removed the pilot's seat from the Skyranger, added an auxiliary fuel tank, batteries, navigation and communications systems, and hardpoints for munitions. Horynych gained the ability to carry OFAB-100-120 fragmentation-high-explosive aerial bombs (about 40 kg of explosives) or the more powerful OFAB-250 (100 kg of explosives), as well as 120-mm mortar bombs. The drone's hit precision reaches one meter, and its flight range is up to one thousand kilometers. The uniqueness of Horynych lies in its ability to navigate through GPS-spoofed zones and evade Russian air defense systems such as the Pantsir-S1, Buk, and S-300. It can return and land autonomously. โ—พ๏ธ For two years now, the group led by the commander with the callsign "Horynych" has been striking strategic targets in Russia. He does not disclose his real name for security reasons. Before the full-scale invasion, "Horynych" worked in a business far removed from war; during the pandemic, he became interested in light aircraft and obtained a pilot's license. In spring 2022, he volunteered for the front, served in the territorial defense, then in the Special Operations Forces, and later moved to the 14th UAS Regiment. His unit is now focused on strategic drone strikes with ranges of up to several hundred kilometers. The drone was named after his callsign. โ—พ๏ธ The "Horynych" group was able to create an unmanned aircraft for deep strikes and carry out successful missions thanks to many factors: from administrative backing and freedom of action granted by the commander to intelligence and special equipment from partner countries. The entire group is made up of light aircraft enthusiasts. The drone's missions are not disclosed. What can be seen, however, is their result: burning Russian strategic infrastructure. For "Horynych's" operations in 2023-2024, members of the regiment have already been awarded two Orders of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. The "Horynych" operations themselves are complex, multi-stage missions. First, reconnaissance drones are launched to identify air defense positions and signals intelligence stations. Then come decoy drones that distract the attention of the air defense systems. Strike drones, such as the AN-196 Liutyi, attack EW systems, creating a 'corridor' for the Horynych. Only after that does the bomber drone set off for its target, covering hundreds of kilometers. Thus, on the night of October 6, Horynych flew about a thousand kilometers, dropped two 120-mm mortar bombs and an OFAB-100-120 on the Yakov Sverdlov factory in Russian Dzerzhinsk (near Nizhny Novgorod), and then dove kamikaze-style onto the target. At that enterprise, the Russians produce explosives and fill FAB bombs for aircraft with them. A few hours later, a second drone repeated the attack, and the next day, another seven Horynych drones completed the mission. Such strikes inflict serious damage on Russia's military-industrial complex - on factories, arsenals, and facilities of the oil and gas complex. "Horynych" himself estimates the total losses inflicted on the occupiers at between $3 and $5 billion. Full article is available here:
0:13

I recently read an interesting article by a journalist and one of the founders of the Babel online outlet, Hlib Husiev, who spent three days with the group that created the "Horynych" drone. Main points: โ—พ๏ธ The Horynych drone is a modified French Skyranger ultralight aircraft. Ukrainian engineers and light aircraft enthusiasts have turned it into a formidable weapon. They removed the pilot's seat from the Skyranger, added an auxiliary fuel tank, batteries, navigation and communications systems, and hardpoints for munitions. Horynych gained the ability to carry OFAB-100-120 fragmentation-high-explosive aerial bombs (about 40 kg of explosives) or the more powerful OFAB-250 (100 kg of explosives), as well as 120-mm mortar bombs. The drone's hit precision reaches one meter, and its flight range is up to one thousand kilometers. The uniqueness of Horynych lies in its ability to navigate through GPS-spoofed zones and evade Russian air defense systems such as the Pantsir-S1, Buk, and S-300. It can return and land autonomously. โ—พ๏ธ For two years now, the group led by the commander with the callsign "Horynych" has been striking strategic targets in Russia. He does not disclose his real name for security reasons. Before the full-scale invasion, "Horynych" worked in a business far removed from war; during the pandemic, he became interested in light aircraft and obtained a pilot's license. In spring 2022, he volunteered for the front, served in the territorial defense, then in the Special Operations Forces, and later moved to the 14th UAS Regiment. His unit is now focused on strategic drone strikes with ranges of up to several hundred kilometers. The drone was named after his callsign. โ—พ๏ธ The "Horynych" group was able to create an unmanned aircraft for deep strikes and carry out successful missions thanks to many factors: from administrative backing and freedom of action granted by the commander to intelligence and special equipment from partner countries. The entire group is made up of light aircraft enthusiasts. The drone's missions are not disclosed. What can be seen, however, is their result: burning Russian strategic infrastructure. For "Horynych's" operations in 2023-2024, members of the regiment have already been awarded two Orders of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. The "Horynych" operations themselves are complex, multi-stage missions. First, reconnaissance drones are launched to identify air defense positions and signals intelligence stations. Then come decoy drones that distract the attention of the air defense systems. Strike drones, such as the AN-196 Liutyi, attack EW systems, creating a 'corridor' for the Horynych. Only after that does the bomber drone set off for its target, covering hundreds of kilometers. Thus, on the night of October 6, Horynych flew about a thousand kilometers, dropped two 120-mm mortar bombs and an OFAB-100-120 on the Yakov Sverdlov factory in Russian Dzerzhinsk (near Nizhny Novgorod), and then dove kamikaze-style onto the target. At that enterprise, the Russians produce explosives and fill FAB bombs for aircraft with them. A few hours later, a second drone repeated the attack, and the next day, another seven Horynych drones completed the mission. Such strikes inflict serious damage on Russia's military-industrial complex - on factories, arsenals, and facilities of the oil and gas complex. "Horynych" himself estimates the total losses inflicted on the occupiers at between $3 and $5 billion. Full article is available here:

Anton Gerashchenko

28,641 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 9 ไธชๆœˆๅ‰

Why Having a Satellite Network is So Important In 2023, the Russians were about to close a deal with a certain North Korean MLRS, but the deal fell through exactly because the North Koreans, +20 years ago, had revolted against Russian opposition to their nuclear program and switched from GLONASS to BeiDou. Only few years ago, the NK returned to Glonass and started converting their equipment to work with dual GNSS guidance. But why did the deal sour? Because the Chinese did not authorize the use of their satellites in the Ukraine conflict. The same problem occurred with the Belarusian POLONEZ MLRS, which uses missiles based on Chinese technology. Today, Iran has switched from GPS to BeiDou, aiming for greater resistance to jammers and integration with Chinese systems. This shows that a missile program is much more than the missiles themselves. It is necessary to have one's own constellation, even if it is strictly military and regionalized, with resources for monitoring and target acquisition, in addition to the ability to deal with jammers and spoofers. When I mentioned Iran and BeiDou, it is the beginning and serves as a gateway that enables integration with Chinese networks, provided the Chinese decide to allow it. However, it is essentially a massive gateway, with numerous smaller, more specialized sub-channels operating underneath. For targeting moving objects, Iran would need to receive data from the Guowang or Yaogan networks. In the last six months, the Chinese could have provided partial integration. At this stage, since the Iranians are conducting their ISR primarily with drones, I believe the Chinese are not sharing data from the LEO satellites in those networks. Iran also has its own satellites, but the Chinese network is far more mature and likely equipped with a wide array of integration and data-sharing tools. While the Chinese are providing intelligence to Iran, I believe they are prudent in doing so to preserve the relationships they have built with other Arab states. At this moment, I believe that the sharing of intelligence from satellites isnโ€™t in real time. For a country like Iran, it is crucial to have GNSS independence with its own program. The same applies to other medium-sized countries, which need at least an LEO constellation capable of providing the minimum ISR, and this is linked to security, but also a series of other factors. I'll give a practical example here. Drones usually lose link with 50% of their range in the Amazon due to weather conditions. With an LEO constellation, this would not occur. Today, to have independence, a constellation project is necessary.
0:17

Why Having a Satellite Network is So Important In 2023, the Russians were about to close a deal with a certain North Korean MLRS, but the deal fell through exactly because the North Koreans, +20 years ago, had revolted against Russian opposition to their nuclear program and switched from GLONASS to BeiDou. Only few years ago, the NK returned to Glonass and started converting their equipment to work with dual GNSS guidance. But why did the deal sour? Because the Chinese did not authorize the use of their satellites in the Ukraine conflict. The same problem occurred with the Belarusian POLONEZ MLRS, which uses missiles based on Chinese technology. Today, Iran has switched from GPS to BeiDou, aiming for greater resistance to jammers and integration with Chinese systems. This shows that a missile program is much more than the missiles themselves. It is necessary to have one's own constellation, even if it is strictly military and regionalized, with resources for monitoring and target acquisition, in addition to the ability to deal with jammers and spoofers. When I mentioned Iran and BeiDou, it is the beginning and serves as a gateway that enables integration with Chinese networks, provided the Chinese decide to allow it. However, it is essentially a massive gateway, with numerous smaller, more specialized sub-channels operating underneath. For targeting moving objects, Iran would need to receive data from the Guowang or Yaogan networks. In the last six months, the Chinese could have provided partial integration. At this stage, since the Iranians are conducting their ISR primarily with drones, I believe the Chinese are not sharing data from the LEO satellites in those networks. Iran also has its own satellites, but the Chinese network is far more mature and likely equipped with a wide array of integration and data-sharing tools. While the Chinese are providing intelligence to Iran, I believe they are prudent in doing so to preserve the relationships they have built with other Arab states. At this moment, I believe that the sharing of intelligence from satellites isnโ€™t in real time. For a country like Iran, it is crucial to have GNSS independence with its own program. The same applies to other medium-sized countries, which need at least an LEO constellation capable of providing the minimum ISR, and this is linked to security, but also a series of other factors. I'll give a practical example here. Drones usually lose link with 50% of their range in the Amazon due to weather conditions. With an LEO constellation, this would not occur. Today, to have independence, a constellation project is necessary.

Patricia Marins

19,508 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 5 ไธชๆœˆๅ‰

On the Oreshnik and the eternal question about the warhead There is a particular type of commentator who, after every Oreshnik strike, routinely asks the same question. Was there even a warhead in it this time? The question is meant to suggest that the weapon, without a classical explosive payload, is somehow fake or less dangerous. What it really reveals is that the person asking does not understand how the system works. A conventional ballistic missile carries explosives or a nuclear warhead. The destruction comes from the detonation at the target. The missile is essentially the delivery service. The Oreshnik works differently. It is an intermediate-range missile (range around 5000 kilometers) carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). These reentry vehicles enter the atmosphere at roughly Mach 10 to Mach 12, with Russian sources claiming higher in some cases. That works out to 3 to 3.5 kilometers per second on terminal approach. This is where the physics comes in. Kinetic energy is calculated as E = 0.5 times mass times velocity squared. Velocity enters the equation as a square. A reentry vehicle of a few hundred kilograms, on impact alone, releases energy in the range of several tons of TNT equivalent. With multiple submunitions per missile, that adds up. A tungsten or steel core entering the ground at this speed produces temperatures of several thousand degrees through friction and compression shock. Bunkers and hardened installations are not destroyed by an explosion, they are destroyed by the sheer force and heat of the impact itself. The technical term is kinetic penetration. Now to the actual answer for the warhead-askers. Yes, the Oreshnik is nuclear-capable. This was part of the design from the start, not a retrofit, but a built-in configuration option. Russian officials have stated this openly. The carrier is there. The only question is what it carries. But that is exactly the point the warhead-asker skips over. The whole point of the Oreshnik is that even in its conventional configuration it achieves an effect that previously required nuclear weapons against hardened targets. To destroy an underground command bunker, historically you needed a small tactical nuclear weapon. Today a reentry vehicle at Mach 10 with a few hundred kilograms of mass is enough. No radioactive fallout, no crossing of the nuclear threshold, no political price attached to a nuclear use. In a strike on a major city, the nuclear configuration would, in this conflict, almost certainly not be deployed. Not because it does not exist, but because it is neither necessary nor politically tenable for that purpose. The conventional version is sufficient to send a message without crossing the threshold above which entirely different chains of escalation are set in motion. In short. The question "was there a warhead in it?" misses the point. The Oreshnik does not need a large warhead, because its velocity is the weapon. It can carry a nuclear warhead, at any time. It just does not do so in the current conflict, because it does not have to.
0:10

On the Oreshnik and the eternal question about the warhead There is a particular type of commentator who, after every Oreshnik strike, routinely asks the same question. Was there even a warhead in it this time? The question is meant to suggest that the weapon, without a classical explosive payload, is somehow fake or less dangerous. What it really reveals is that the person asking does not understand how the system works. A conventional ballistic missile carries explosives or a nuclear warhead. The destruction comes from the detonation at the target. The missile is essentially the delivery service. The Oreshnik works differently. It is an intermediate-range missile (range around 5000 kilometers) carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). These reentry vehicles enter the atmosphere at roughly Mach 10 to Mach 12, with Russian sources claiming higher in some cases. That works out to 3 to 3.5 kilometers per second on terminal approach. This is where the physics comes in. Kinetic energy is calculated as E = 0.5 times mass times velocity squared. Velocity enters the equation as a square. A reentry vehicle of a few hundred kilograms, on impact alone, releases energy in the range of several tons of TNT equivalent. With multiple submunitions per missile, that adds up. A tungsten or steel core entering the ground at this speed produces temperatures of several thousand degrees through friction and compression shock. Bunkers and hardened installations are not destroyed by an explosion, they are destroyed by the sheer force and heat of the impact itself. The technical term is kinetic penetration. Now to the actual answer for the warhead-askers. Yes, the Oreshnik is nuclear-capable. This was part of the design from the start, not a retrofit, but a built-in configuration option. Russian officials have stated this openly. The carrier is there. The only question is what it carries. But that is exactly the point the warhead-asker skips over. The whole point of the Oreshnik is that even in its conventional configuration it achieves an effect that previously required nuclear weapons against hardened targets. To destroy an underground command bunker, historically you needed a small tactical nuclear weapon. Today a reentry vehicle at Mach 10 with a few hundred kilograms of mass is enough. No radioactive fallout, no crossing of the nuclear threshold, no political price attached to a nuclear use. In a strike on a major city, the nuclear configuration would, in this conflict, almost certainly not be deployed. Not because it does not exist, but because it is neither necessary nor politically tenable for that purpose. The conventional version is sufficient to send a message without crossing the threshold above which entirely different chains of escalation are set in motion. In short. The question "was there a warhead in it?" misses the point. The Oreshnik does not need a large warhead, because its velocity is the weapon. It can carry a nuclear warhead, at any time. It just does not do so in the current conflict, because it does not have to.

Zlatti71

36,837 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 2 ไธชๆœˆๅ‰

OCEANIC SHIELD: RUSSIA'S DOOMSDAY TORPEDO CARRIER NEARS COMPLETION Russia's Khabarovsk submarine, launched in November 2025, is currently completing fitting out and mooring tests at Sevmash shipyard, with sea trials expected later in 2026 and commissioning by year's end. It's a nuclear-powered special-purpose vessel built for one mission: to carry and deploy Poseidon (Status-6) nuclear torpedoes. What is Poseidon? ๐Ÿ”ธA nuclear-powered, autonomous underwater torpedo ๐Ÿ”ธEstimated range: up to 6,200 miles, intercontinental ๐Ÿ”ธCapable of carrying a 2-megaton nuclear warhead, 100x more destructive than the Hiroshima bomb ๐Ÿ”ธRuns at depths and speeds that make interception near impossible Putin confirmed its successful test in October 2025, calling it "a huge success" and saying "there is nothing like this." Khabarovsk, Poseidon's carrier: ๐Ÿ”ธNuclear-powered special-purpose submarine, launched November 2025 ๐Ÿ”ธDesigned to carry up to 6 Poseidon torpedoes in specialized side-mounted launch hangars ๐Ÿ”ธPowered by a single OK-650V nuclear reactor Operates from protected bastion zones near Russian coastlines, while Poseidon autonomously travels to its target ๐Ÿ”ธNo countermeasure exists to intercept it Poseidon is Moscow's direct hedge against U.S. missile defense, precision-strike capabilities, and low-yield nuclear systems that Russia views as a threat to strategic stability. Integrated with the Perimeter dead-hand system, Poseidon guarantees retaliation even if Russia's nuclear command and control is destroyed. Russia's plan, according to the U.S. Naval Institute, calls for 30 Poseidons on 4 submarines, with torpedoes in the Atlantic and Pacific capable of autonomously striking U.S. port cities, far beyond the effective reach of any American torpedo. The U.S. has no standoff weapon to intercept Poseidon.
0:15

OCEANIC SHIELD: RUSSIA'S DOOMSDAY TORPEDO CARRIER NEARS COMPLETION Russia's Khabarovsk submarine, launched in November 2025, is currently completing fitting out and mooring tests at Sevmash shipyard, with sea trials expected later in 2026 and commissioning by year's end. It's a nuclear-powered special-purpose vessel built for one mission: to carry and deploy Poseidon (Status-6) nuclear torpedoes. What is Poseidon? ๐Ÿ”ธA nuclear-powered, autonomous underwater torpedo ๐Ÿ”ธEstimated range: up to 6,200 miles, intercontinental ๐Ÿ”ธCapable of carrying a 2-megaton nuclear warhead, 100x more destructive than the Hiroshima bomb ๐Ÿ”ธRuns at depths and speeds that make interception near impossible Putin confirmed its successful test in October 2025, calling it "a huge success" and saying "there is nothing like this." Khabarovsk, Poseidon's carrier: ๐Ÿ”ธNuclear-powered special-purpose submarine, launched November 2025 ๐Ÿ”ธDesigned to carry up to 6 Poseidon torpedoes in specialized side-mounted launch hangars ๐Ÿ”ธPowered by a single OK-650V nuclear reactor Operates from protected bastion zones near Russian coastlines, while Poseidon autonomously travels to its target ๐Ÿ”ธNo countermeasure exists to intercept it Poseidon is Moscow's direct hedge against U.S. missile defense, precision-strike capabilities, and low-yield nuclear systems that Russia views as a threat to strategic stability. Integrated with the Perimeter dead-hand system, Poseidon guarantees retaliation even if Russia's nuclear command and control is destroyed. Russia's plan, according to the U.S. Naval Institute, calls for 30 Poseidons on 4 submarines, with torpedoes in the Atlantic and Pacific capable of autonomously striking U.S. port cities, far beyond the effective reach of any American torpedo. The U.S. has no standoff weapon to intercept Poseidon.

DD Geopolitics

17,640 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 2 ไธชๆœˆๅ‰

The Chinese are flying 4 sixth-generation prototypes, but what does that mean? While the West keeps debating wars that seem never-ending, huh, China is flying low โ€“ or rather, high! โ€“ improving their 6th generation fighter prototypes, like the J-36/J-50, with total focus on advanced integration. This gives a huge strategic advantage, with emphasis on long-range missiles and multiple guidance to dominate global scenarios. China already has about 4 6th generation prototypes and plans to reach 8, selecting the most adapted one. All this under the General Concept: Indestructible Flying Brain: 6th generation fighters go way beyond just a slightly improved stealth; they are central platforms that command a global war web via AI, drones, and varied weapons, making previous fighters obsolete in connectivity and limiting them to very local operations. This omnipresence redefines air superiority, with the fighter surviving as a resilient node in the first hours of conflicts and being able to operate with speed. Kill Web: The Global War Web: The fighter acts as the central node of a real-time network, connecting submarines, satellites, ships, drones, and troops worldwide. It allows omnipresence, receiving data from a destroyer thousands of km away and attacking as if it were right nearby, with AI assisting the pilot in analysis and target acquisition. That's why the Chinese focus on missiles with ranges of thousands of km, with multiple guidance, turning the 6th generation pilot into a tactical manager very different from today's. Being a 6th generation fighter pilot is going to demand a lot. Command of Drone Swarms (CCA/Loyal Wingman) The fighter controls 6-20 drones simultaneously for reconnaissance, jamming, or suicide attacks. It transforms the pilot (or AI) into a "maestro" of a robotic orchestra, or quarterback of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs), which carry extra weapons, expanding offensive power without exposing the main fighter. Like, a controlled symphony of destruction! Superior Multi-Spectral Stealth (Stealth++) Not limited to radar, it covers infrared, acoustic, visual, and electromagnetic. It uses advanced materials, tailless designs, and minimal thermal signature to penetrate dense A2/AD defenses, making it extremely hard to detect and essential for operations in contested environments. Extreme Range, Autonomy, and New Generation Weapons Combat radius of 1,800-2,500 km without refueling, with sustained supercruise (Mach 1.5-2.0) without afterburner, thanks to adaptive cycle engines and huge internal tanks. There's talk of including lasers, but so far, what's really there are internal hypersonic missiles and 2-3x greater armament capacity than the F-35, all while maintaining total stealth. Artificial Intelligence, Integrated Sensors, Resilience, and Open Architecture AI as co-pilot or main, processing data in real time and making tactical decisions to reduce human load; optionally manned mode: piloted, remote, or autonomous flight; virtual cockpit via helmet visor. Multifunctional sensors combine radar, electronic warfare, communications, and non-kinetic effects, with total data fusion transforming the fighter into a flying data center. Network resistant to jamming and GPS loss via quantum-resistant communications, mesh networks, and inertial/computer vision navigation. Modular architecture allows quick upgrades (90% by software), avoiding high costs like in the F-35; in "Decision Centric Warfare," AI decides in milliseconds, with the human as an optional bottleneck, including cyber warfare and active defense. In another article, I'll talk about what I think of this in terms of costs and demand and if such an investment is really worth it.
0:13

The Chinese are flying 4 sixth-generation prototypes, but what does that mean? While the West keeps debating wars that seem never-ending, huh, China is flying low โ€“ or rather, high! โ€“ improving their 6th generation fighter prototypes, like the J-36/J-50, with total focus on advanced integration. This gives a huge strategic advantage, with emphasis on long-range missiles and multiple guidance to dominate global scenarios. China already has about 4 6th generation prototypes and plans to reach 8, selecting the most adapted one. All this under the General Concept: Indestructible Flying Brain: 6th generation fighters go way beyond just a slightly improved stealth; they are central platforms that command a global war web via AI, drones, and varied weapons, making previous fighters obsolete in connectivity and limiting them to very local operations. This omnipresence redefines air superiority, with the fighter surviving as a resilient node in the first hours of conflicts and being able to operate with speed. Kill Web: The Global War Web: The fighter acts as the central node of a real-time network, connecting submarines, satellites, ships, drones, and troops worldwide. It allows omnipresence, receiving data from a destroyer thousands of km away and attacking as if it were right nearby, with AI assisting the pilot in analysis and target acquisition. That's why the Chinese focus on missiles with ranges of thousands of km, with multiple guidance, turning the 6th generation pilot into a tactical manager very different from today's. Being a 6th generation fighter pilot is going to demand a lot. Command of Drone Swarms (CCA/Loyal Wingman) The fighter controls 6-20 drones simultaneously for reconnaissance, jamming, or suicide attacks. It transforms the pilot (or AI) into a "maestro" of a robotic orchestra, or quarterback of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs), which carry extra weapons, expanding offensive power without exposing the main fighter. Like, a controlled symphony of destruction! Superior Multi-Spectral Stealth (Stealth++) Not limited to radar, it covers infrared, acoustic, visual, and electromagnetic. It uses advanced materials, tailless designs, and minimal thermal signature to penetrate dense A2/AD defenses, making it extremely hard to detect and essential for operations in contested environments. Extreme Range, Autonomy, and New Generation Weapons Combat radius of 1,800-2,500 km without refueling, with sustained supercruise (Mach 1.5-2.0) without afterburner, thanks to adaptive cycle engines and huge internal tanks. There's talk of including lasers, but so far, what's really there are internal hypersonic missiles and 2-3x greater armament capacity than the F-35, all while maintaining total stealth. Artificial Intelligence, Integrated Sensors, Resilience, and Open Architecture AI as co-pilot or main, processing data in real time and making tactical decisions to reduce human load; optionally manned mode: piloted, remote, or autonomous flight; virtual cockpit via helmet visor. Multifunctional sensors combine radar, electronic warfare, communications, and non-kinetic effects, with total data fusion transforming the fighter into a flying data center. Network resistant to jamming and GPS loss via quantum-resistant communications, mesh networks, and inertial/computer vision navigation. Modular architecture allows quick upgrades (90% by software), avoiding high costs like in the F-35; in "Decision Centric Warfare," AI decides in milliseconds, with the human as an optional bottleneck, including cyber warfare and active defense. In another article, I'll talk about what I think of this in terms of costs and demand and if such an investment is really worth it.

Patricia Marins

60,403 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 8 ไธชๆœˆๅ‰

#PLA #China #Japan #Korea #Guam #India #Hypersonic The Chinese 6th generation fighter is a high-quality reverse engineering of the American 6th generation fighter project from Lockheed Martin as part of the NGAD (Next-Generation Air Dominance) program. The Chinese Air Force has begun flight tests of a 6th-generation stealth fighter designed using a "flying wing"/"tailless" configuration without the usual vertical and horizontal all-moving tail fins typical of 4th and 5th generation aircraft. The machine is stabilized in flight thanks to an advanced computerized fly-by-wire control system with multiple backup systems, which controls the wing mechanization on the trailing edge. The design has a huge resemblance to that of the Lockheed project under the NGAD program. It is worth noting that the visible length of the glider can vary from 22.5 to 25 - 27 m, while the wingspan reaches an incredible 18 - 19 m. Obviously, the normal takeoff weight of such a machine can reach 33 - 37 tons, the maximum - 43 - 47 tons. The payload in the internal weapons compartments is up to 10 - 12 tons. The estimated volume of the fuel system can reach 17-18 tons, and the combat radius of action up to 2500-2700 km. The effective reflective surface of this machine can vary from 0.05 to 0.15 sq. m The configuration of the onboard radar of the Chinese 5th generation fighter is almost identical to that of the Russian Su-57. On the side forming the nose of the fuselage, one can pay attention to 2 X-band side-looking AESA modules, similar to the N036B-1-01L and N036B-1-01B modules of the Belka onboard radar system. These canvases provide radar reconnaissance in SAR mode at distances of up to 150-200 km, as well as the ability to detect air targets in the lateral and rear hemisphere Evgeniy Damantsev
0:17

#PLA #China #Japan #Korea #Guam #India #Hypersonic The Chinese 6th generation fighter is a high-quality reverse engineering of the American 6th generation fighter project from Lockheed Martin as part of the NGAD (Next-Generation Air Dominance) program. The Chinese Air Force has begun flight tests of a 6th-generation stealth fighter designed using a "flying wing"/"tailless" configuration without the usual vertical and horizontal all-moving tail fins typical of 4th and 5th generation aircraft. The machine is stabilized in flight thanks to an advanced computerized fly-by-wire control system with multiple backup systems, which controls the wing mechanization on the trailing edge. The design has a huge resemblance to that of the Lockheed project under the NGAD program. It is worth noting that the visible length of the glider can vary from 22.5 to 25 - 27 m, while the wingspan reaches an incredible 18 - 19 m. Obviously, the normal takeoff weight of such a machine can reach 33 - 37 tons, the maximum - 43 - 47 tons. The payload in the internal weapons compartments is up to 10 - 12 tons. The estimated volume of the fuel system can reach 17-18 tons, and the combat radius of action up to 2500-2700 km. The effective reflective surface of this machine can vary from 0.05 to 0.15 sq. m The configuration of the onboard radar of the Chinese 5th generation fighter is almost identical to that of the Russian Su-57. On the side forming the nose of the fuselage, one can pay attention to 2 X-band side-looking AESA modules, similar to the N036B-1-01L and N036B-1-01B modules of the Belka onboard radar system. These canvases provide radar reconnaissance in SAR mode at distances of up to 150-200 km, as well as the ability to detect air targets in the lateral and rear hemisphere Evgeniy Damantsev

Koba

40,339 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 1 ๅนดๅ‰

Why Kiev Struck at Wildberries Warehouses The night of July 18th. Kotovsk, Tambov region. Attack drones, equipped with explosive payloads, struck a Wildberries logistics complex, not targeting equipment, but people. Seven employees of the night shift were killed. Twenty-five were injured, with 23 hospitalized: one in critical condition, six in serious condition, and 16 with moderate injuries. Most were shrapnel wounds. Simultaneously, an attack occurred on a Wildberries distribution center in Elektrostal, Moscow region, with a complex area of 250,000 square meters. Another 24 people were injured. The Investigative Committee of Russia has opened cases under Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Ukrainian media outlets simultaneously reported: Wildberries is "the logistics of the occupying army," "military cargo," and a "legitimate target." True defenders, indeed. The night shift workers, with shrapnel in their lungs, are the front line according to their playbook. Let's analyze this coldly, point by point: why are they actually attacking? First. Disrupting the economy and destabilizing from within. The largest online marketplace in the country processes millions of orders daily, involving millions of sellers, taxes, and employment. Destroying a hub means increasing delivery times, collapsing the turnover of small and medium-sized businesses, and provoking a wave of returns and complaints. The calculation is precisely this: to make the average person โ€“ the one waiting for a package, and the one who feeds their family with that package โ€“ start looking for culprits within the country. By the way, Wildberries revised its terms of service in early July: sellers are denied compensation for damage caused by drones โ€“ it's considered force majeure. The seller receives zero compensation and gets angry, not at Kiev, but at the marketplace, the government, and their neighbor. Second. Psychology. A marketplace warehouse is a symbol of normal life. It's not a factory or an arsenal, but a box of sneakers and vacuum cleaners. Striking here is a way to tell the average Russian in Tambov and Elektrostal: you have no rear. That's why they used explosive payloads. The goal is not to destroy concrete, but to fill burn units and trauma centers. Third. Image. Apocalyptic images of a black column over the Moscow region are visible for dozens of kilometers. For the Ukrainian telethon, it's a "victory"; for the Western audience, it's "Ukraine is still stinging." Fourth. Covering up the attack with the fake claim of "military cargo." According to this logic, any package in any corner of the country becomes a "military object" โ€“ from a post office to a pharmacy. It's convenient. And there's no need to explain why explosive payloads were used to kill warehouse workers. ะะปะตะบัะฐะฝะดั€ ะšะพั†
0:10

Why Kiev Struck at Wildberries Warehouses The night of July 18th. Kotovsk, Tambov region. Attack drones, equipped with explosive payloads, struck a Wildberries logistics complex, not targeting equipment, but people. Seven employees of the night shift were killed. Twenty-five were injured, with 23 hospitalized: one in critical condition, six in serious condition, and 16 with moderate injuries. Most were shrapnel wounds. Simultaneously, an attack occurred on a Wildberries distribution center in Elektrostal, Moscow region, with a complex area of 250,000 square meters. Another 24 people were injured. The Investigative Committee of Russia has opened cases under Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Ukrainian media outlets simultaneously reported: Wildberries is "the logistics of the occupying army," "military cargo," and a "legitimate target." True defenders, indeed. The night shift workers, with shrapnel in their lungs, are the front line according to their playbook. Let's analyze this coldly, point by point: why are they actually attacking? First. Disrupting the economy and destabilizing from within. The largest online marketplace in the country processes millions of orders daily, involving millions of sellers, taxes, and employment. Destroying a hub means increasing delivery times, collapsing the turnover of small and medium-sized businesses, and provoking a wave of returns and complaints. The calculation is precisely this: to make the average person โ€“ the one waiting for a package, and the one who feeds their family with that package โ€“ start looking for culprits within the country. By the way, Wildberries revised its terms of service in early July: sellers are denied compensation for damage caused by drones โ€“ it's considered force majeure. The seller receives zero compensation and gets angry, not at Kiev, but at the marketplace, the government, and their neighbor. Second. Psychology. A marketplace warehouse is a symbol of normal life. It's not a factory or an arsenal, but a box of sneakers and vacuum cleaners. Striking here is a way to tell the average Russian in Tambov and Elektrostal: you have no rear. That's why they used explosive payloads. The goal is not to destroy concrete, but to fill burn units and trauma centers. Third. Image. Apocalyptic images of a black column over the Moscow region are visible for dozens of kilometers. For the Ukrainian telethon, it's a "victory"; for the Western audience, it's "Ukraine is still stinging." Fourth. Covering up the attack with the fake claim of "military cargo." According to this logic, any package in any corner of the country becomes a "military object" โ€“ from a post office to a pharmacy. It's convenient. And there's no need to explain why explosive payloads were used to kill warehouse workers. ะะปะตะบัะฐะฝะดั€ ะšะพั†

๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ STANISLAV KRAPIVNIK ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ

44,764 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 14 ๅคฉๅ‰

Iran Loses Frigate and Yak-130 and Decides to Deploy Jet-Powered Kamikaze Drones An Iranian frigate was sunk near Sri Lanka, nearly 4,000 km from the theater of operations. Another Iranian catamaran was hit by a missile launched from a drone and headed for repairs. Tehran was heavily bombed today in a day that, according to Iranian authorities, 900 civilians were killed. Iran also reported downing another drone, this time a Heron. However, an F-35I shot down a YAK-130, with both pilots ejecting safely. Facing these recent losses, Iran decided to deploy two jet-powered drones: the Arash-2 and the Hadid-110. Both are stealth drones that reach more than 450 km/h, with the Hadid exceeding 500 km/h. The targets of these drones were more high-cost radars existing in the region, with the Arash-2 in this version achieving hundreds of kilometers in range. Iran maintains an average of 300โ€“500 drones launched per day. While these numbers have been decreasing, the drone models seem to have greater explosive payload and to be more modern. Despite all the surveillance and attacks that the US and Israel carry out, there is a limit to the ability to inhibit Iranian capabilities due to various tactical, geographical, and armament diversity factors. Today Iran is still launching hundreds of drones and between 30โ€“50 missiles, a level that should stabilize or stay slightly below that. However, the big issue that will not be resolved is the reopening of Hormuz and relief for the markets. Iran still possesses around 5,000 mines, which if dumped in Hormuz will seal the closure for long periods. As I have been saying, it is not the capacity for destruction that dictates the rules in this type of war, but the asymmetric nuances of the theater, giving Iran the advantage. For example, if Iran starts mining the Strait tomorrow, oil prices should exceed $100 and gas $70/MWh. This control of the Strait will not be taken from Iran anytime soon, since the American navy still remains 700 km from the Iranian coast out of fear of anti-ship missiles. I even have the impression that Iran does not want to sink any American ship, as this would cause outrage in America and could escalate the war, even increasing support for the government. I say this because the American fleet is within range of Iranian anti-ship missiles even at 750 km. The true enemy of the US-Israel coalition today is not Iran, but the global economy and the political pressure both internal and from the Gulf countries. Can the US-Israel sustain this pressure for much longer?
0:17

Iran Loses Frigate and Yak-130 and Decides to Deploy Jet-Powered Kamikaze Drones An Iranian frigate was sunk near Sri Lanka, nearly 4,000 km from the theater of operations. Another Iranian catamaran was hit by a missile launched from a drone and headed for repairs. Tehran was heavily bombed today in a day that, according to Iranian authorities, 900 civilians were killed. Iran also reported downing another drone, this time a Heron. However, an F-35I shot down a YAK-130, with both pilots ejecting safely. Facing these recent losses, Iran decided to deploy two jet-powered drones: the Arash-2 and the Hadid-110. Both are stealth drones that reach more than 450 km/h, with the Hadid exceeding 500 km/h. The targets of these drones were more high-cost radars existing in the region, with the Arash-2 in this version achieving hundreds of kilometers in range. Iran maintains an average of 300โ€“500 drones launched per day. While these numbers have been decreasing, the drone models seem to have greater explosive payload and to be more modern. Despite all the surveillance and attacks that the US and Israel carry out, there is a limit to the ability to inhibit Iranian capabilities due to various tactical, geographical, and armament diversity factors. Today Iran is still launching hundreds of drones and between 30โ€“50 missiles, a level that should stabilize or stay slightly below that. However, the big issue that will not be resolved is the reopening of Hormuz and relief for the markets. Iran still possesses around 5,000 mines, which if dumped in Hormuz will seal the closure for long periods. As I have been saying, it is not the capacity for destruction that dictates the rules in this type of war, but the asymmetric nuances of the theater, giving Iran the advantage. For example, if Iran starts mining the Strait tomorrow, oil prices should exceed $100 and gas $70/MWh. This control of the Strait will not be taken from Iran anytime soon, since the American navy still remains 700 km from the Iranian coast out of fear of anti-ship missiles. I even have the impression that Iran does not want to sink any American ship, as this would cause outrage in America and could escalate the war, even increasing support for the government. I say this because the American fleet is within range of Iranian anti-ship missiles even at 750 km. The true enemy of the US-Israel coalition today is not Iran, but the global economy and the political pressure both internal and from the Gulf countries. Can the US-Israel sustain this pressure for much longer?

Patricia Marins

367,343 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 5 ไธชๆœˆๅ‰

Slow Progress is the New Reality of Modern Wars There are many people commenting on Russian difficulties and coming up with numerous reasons for their alleged collapse. I absolutely do not see any collapse; on the contrary, Russia has already normalized a state of war in Ukraine, which boosts its economic and industrial growth. The difficulties faced by Russia today are the same as at the beginning of the war, with soldiers having to spend up to half of their initial salaries on their own equipment, delays in pensions, and a series of other problems that are mirrored on the Ukrainian side, even with all the support from allies. The war today is much less lethal than it was months ago, and both Russian and Ukrainian losses have significantly decreased during this phase. Lethality has fallen, but Russian advances persist. And why are they slow? Is it a Ukrainian tactic? No. They are slow because they are accompanied by the deployment of communication infrastructure like signal repeaters for drones, the advancement of artillery guided by drones, maneuvers using FAB and more recently ODAB bombs against Ukrainian drone operators' facilities, infiltration by reconnaissance teams, saboteurs, and a series of protocols they have developed. That conventional war with rapid advances no longer exists, and in the context of a battlefield dominated by drones, it is unlikely to return. Modern wars will have slow progress, as seen in the attacks and counter-attacks of the Russians and Ukrainians in this war. Contemporary military forces are still unable to see this new reality of war. When analyzing the Russian advance, it's important to consider that all these maneuvers take days to unfold, but the point is that the Russians have already adapted to this pace, not bothered whether a particular advance will take 3 weeks or 3 months. They advance continuously following tactical protocols with little threat from Ukrainian forces, which, without new equipment, have had their defensive tactics remain almost unchanged over the past two years, relying mainly on drones and making it easier for Russian studies of countermeasures. And what can Ukraine do in this situation? I see few options, but one would be to delay the Russian advance with a good number of missiles, though personally, I find it unlikely that they will reach Ukrainian hands. It wouldn't have the power to change the balance of the war, but it would guarantee more time, which is important because the battlefield is dynamic, and the implementation of new tactics based on innovative weapons can change everything overnight. A war that seems almost lost today could take a different turn in weeks. Time is crucial for Ukraine, which has fronts only about 130 km from cities like Zaporizhia and Dnipro.
0:17

Slow Progress is the New Reality of Modern Wars There are many people commenting on Russian difficulties and coming up with numerous reasons for their alleged collapse. I absolutely do not see any collapse; on the contrary, Russia has already normalized a state of war in Ukraine, which boosts its economic and industrial growth. The difficulties faced by Russia today are the same as at the beginning of the war, with soldiers having to spend up to half of their initial salaries on their own equipment, delays in pensions, and a series of other problems that are mirrored on the Ukrainian side, even with all the support from allies. The war today is much less lethal than it was months ago, and both Russian and Ukrainian losses have significantly decreased during this phase. Lethality has fallen, but Russian advances persist. And why are they slow? Is it a Ukrainian tactic? No. They are slow because they are accompanied by the deployment of communication infrastructure like signal repeaters for drones, the advancement of artillery guided by drones, maneuvers using FAB and more recently ODAB bombs against Ukrainian drone operators' facilities, infiltration by reconnaissance teams, saboteurs, and a series of protocols they have developed. That conventional war with rapid advances no longer exists, and in the context of a battlefield dominated by drones, it is unlikely to return. Modern wars will have slow progress, as seen in the attacks and counter-attacks of the Russians and Ukrainians in this war. Contemporary military forces are still unable to see this new reality of war. When analyzing the Russian advance, it's important to consider that all these maneuvers take days to unfold, but the point is that the Russians have already adapted to this pace, not bothered whether a particular advance will take 3 weeks or 3 months. They advance continuously following tactical protocols with little threat from Ukrainian forces, which, without new equipment, have had their defensive tactics remain almost unchanged over the past two years, relying mainly on drones and making it easier for Russian studies of countermeasures. And what can Ukraine do in this situation? I see few options, but one would be to delay the Russian advance with a good number of missiles, though personally, I find it unlikely that they will reach Ukrainian hands. It wouldn't have the power to change the balance of the war, but it would guarantee more time, which is important because the battlefield is dynamic, and the implementation of new tactics based on innovative weapons can change everything overnight. A war that seems almost lost today could take a different turn in weeks. Time is crucial for Ukraine, which has fronts only about 130 km from cities like Zaporizhia and Dnipro.

Patricia Marins

39,318 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 1 ๅนดๅ‰

This is real gun camera footage from a P-51 Mustang, chasing a German Bf 109 down to the treetops until it goes down in flames. The American pilot flying it, Lt John Kirla, shot down five enemy planes in a single day, becoming an ace in one mission. This footage captures one of his victories over a Bf 109. This is his story.. From Trainee to the Yoxford Boys John Kirla was not a born fighter ace. He was an ordinary young American who had come up through flight training in Texas, graduating at the start of 1944. He learned his trade on trainers, moved up to fighters, and got just 15 hours in the P-51 Mustang before being sent to England as a replacement pilot. He joined the 362nd Fighter Squadron of the 357th Fighter Group, a unit based at Leiston that was already becoming a legend. The 357th was the first group in the Eighth Air Force fully equipped with the Mustang, and it would go on to produce more aces than any other fighter group in the Eighth, including Chuck Yeager and Bud Anderson. Kirla was the newest pilot in a squadron already filled with experienced aces. His job was to escort American bombers deep into Germany and protect them from the Luftwaffe. On November 27 1944, he got the day that would define him. Five Victories in One Mission That morning the 357th ran headlong into a massive swarm of German fighters trying to get at the bombers. Kirla's flight dropped their fuel tanks and dived straight into the middle of it. Almost immediately, the fight became a swirling, low-level brawl of Mustangs, Messerschmitts, and Focke-Wulfs twisting across the sky. Kirla picked out his first target and opened fire, and from that moment he did not stop hunting. In his own account, he spotted a Bf 109 that was attacking an American bomber. He went after it, closed to just 30 yards, and when the German threw his fighter into a tight barrel roll straight down toward the ground, Kirla stayed glued to his tail and, in his words, clobbered him all over until he went down. An Ace in a Day He kept finding more. Again and again through that wild, sprawling fight, Kirla latched onto an enemy aircraft and did not let go. At one point he watched a German fighter shoot down one of his fellow Mustang pilots right in front of him, and closed in for revenge. As he described it afterward, he opened fire, saw pieces start to fly off the enemy aircraft, and watched it fall out of the sky like a leaf drifting to the ground. Rather than breaking away and climbing back to safety, Kirla chased his targets down low, following them almost to the ground, the fighters weaving over villages and treetops until the enemy aircraft finally went down. By the time the fight was over, John Kirla had shot down five German aircraft in a single mission. He had become an ace in a day, one of the relatively few American fighter pilots to achieve that in a single mission. The Mustang That Changed the Air War The Mustang was the aircraft that made days like Kirla's possible. The P-51 combined long range, high speed, and deadly firepower, and it could follow the bombers all the way to their targets and fight the German fighters on equal or better terms. By the end of the war, P-51 groups had claimed close to 5,000 enemy aircraft shot down, about half of all American air-to-air kills in the European theater. Kirla's own group, the 357th, became the top-scoring Mustang group in the Eighth Air Force. Flying one of the finest escort fighters of the war, men like Kirla helped turn the tide of the air war over Germany. The gun-camera film rolling every time he pressed the trigger captured it all, including the footage you are watching. John Kirla's Legacy John Kirla flew on to the end of his combat tour and finished the war as a double ace, credited with 11 and a half enemy aircraft destroyed in the air. He was awarded the Silver Star and the Distinguished Flying Cross for his courage in the skies over Europe. He had gone from a trainee with a handful of hours in a Mustang to one of the deadliest fighter pilots in one of the deadliest fighter groups of the war, in the span of a single year. The footage of his Mustang chasing a Bf 109 down to the trees is only a few seconds long. But behind those few seconds is a young American who climbed into a fighter, dove into a swarm of the enemy, and shot down five of them before the day was out. This was the story of John Kirla. I post a story like this every single day. Most people never see them. Follow so you don't miss the next one.
0:16

This is real gun camera footage from a P-51 Mustang, chasing a German Bf 109 down to the treetops until it goes down in flames. The American pilot flying it, Lt John Kirla, shot down five enemy planes in a single day, becoming an ace in one mission. This footage captures one of his victories over a Bf 109. This is his story.. From Trainee to the Yoxford Boys John Kirla was not a born fighter ace. He was an ordinary young American who had come up through flight training in Texas, graduating at the start of 1944. He learned his trade on trainers, moved up to fighters, and got just 15 hours in the P-51 Mustang before being sent to England as a replacement pilot. He joined the 362nd Fighter Squadron of the 357th Fighter Group, a unit based at Leiston that was already becoming a legend. The 357th was the first group in the Eighth Air Force fully equipped with the Mustang, and it would go on to produce more aces than any other fighter group in the Eighth, including Chuck Yeager and Bud Anderson. Kirla was the newest pilot in a squadron already filled with experienced aces. His job was to escort American bombers deep into Germany and protect them from the Luftwaffe. On November 27 1944, he got the day that would define him. Five Victories in One Mission That morning the 357th ran headlong into a massive swarm of German fighters trying to get at the bombers. Kirla's flight dropped their fuel tanks and dived straight into the middle of it. Almost immediately, the fight became a swirling, low-level brawl of Mustangs, Messerschmitts, and Focke-Wulfs twisting across the sky. Kirla picked out his first target and opened fire, and from that moment he did not stop hunting. In his own account, he spotted a Bf 109 that was attacking an American bomber. He went after it, closed to just 30 yards, and when the German threw his fighter into a tight barrel roll straight down toward the ground, Kirla stayed glued to his tail and, in his words, clobbered him all over until he went down. An Ace in a Day He kept finding more. Again and again through that wild, sprawling fight, Kirla latched onto an enemy aircraft and did not let go. At one point he watched a German fighter shoot down one of his fellow Mustang pilots right in front of him, and closed in for revenge. As he described it afterward, he opened fire, saw pieces start to fly off the enemy aircraft, and watched it fall out of the sky like a leaf drifting to the ground. Rather than breaking away and climbing back to safety, Kirla chased his targets down low, following them almost to the ground, the fighters weaving over villages and treetops until the enemy aircraft finally went down. By the time the fight was over, John Kirla had shot down five German aircraft in a single mission. He had become an ace in a day, one of the relatively few American fighter pilots to achieve that in a single mission. The Mustang That Changed the Air War The Mustang was the aircraft that made days like Kirla's possible. The P-51 combined long range, high speed, and deadly firepower, and it could follow the bombers all the way to their targets and fight the German fighters on equal or better terms. By the end of the war, P-51 groups had claimed close to 5,000 enemy aircraft shot down, about half of all American air-to-air kills in the European theater. Kirla's own group, the 357th, became the top-scoring Mustang group in the Eighth Air Force. Flying one of the finest escort fighters of the war, men like Kirla helped turn the tide of the air war over Germany. The gun-camera film rolling every time he pressed the trigger captured it all, including the footage you are watching. John Kirla's Legacy John Kirla flew on to the end of his combat tour and finished the war as a double ace, credited with 11 and a half enemy aircraft destroyed in the air. He was awarded the Silver Star and the Distinguished Flying Cross for his courage in the skies over Europe. He had gone from a trainee with a handful of hours in a Mustang to one of the deadliest fighter pilots in one of the deadliest fighter groups of the war, in the span of a single year. The footage of his Mustang chasing a Bf 109 down to the trees is only a few seconds long. But behind those few seconds is a young American who climbed into a fighter, dove into a swarm of the enemy, and shot down five of them before the day was out. This was the story of John Kirla. I post a story like this every single day. Most people never see them. Follow so you don't miss the next one.

Untold War Stories

156,432 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 28 ๅคฉๅ‰

What if any preparations have you seen Iran make ahead of the war? Can you discuss Itโ€™s missile capabilities? Any intelligence capabilities? Any surprises it might happen in store? When the 12-day war ended, I estimated that Iran would need about six months to recover, including its nuclear program. Contrary to popular belief, Iran did not lose its entire long-range or medium-range air defense network; while some launchers were damaged, the primary targets of the Israeli strikes were the radar systems. Once the radars were neutralized, Iran successfully hid the bulk of its remaining batteries, leaving much of its arsenal intact. In contrast, short-range systems like the Tor-M1 and domestic variants were heavily engaged against cruise missiles, often being lost or damaged only after their ammunition was completely exhausted. Since then, Iran has worked to rebuild its destroyed radar network and, above all, to implement a genuine counterintelligence doctrine. The Mossad operations against Iranian radars and air defense systems have shaped new perimeter defense and counterintelligence doctrines not only in Iran but in other countries as well. If we look at the quantity of weapons and the organization of armed groups during Iranโ€™s most recent protests, I would say the problem of foreign intelligence operations inside the country remains severe. This seriously threatens much of Iranโ€™s capabilities, and I foresee a wave of sabotage operations as a new war draws closer. Iran has begun receiving collaboration from China across multiple areas,from satellites to internal counterintelligence, but it may still take some time for this to produce tangible results. During the last years, the Mossad relied heavily on cell phones, using SMS for recruitment and accessing device GPS for target location. Iran has since focused intensely on preventing any repetition of this, and on this specific issue, the Chinese appear to have provided support. Although foreign intelligence services have operated extensively inside Iran, the scale of any armed opposition groups is negligible compared to the Iranian armed forces, which could still draw on allied paramilitaries and militias in neighboring countries, including the Houthis. Iran has become a missile power with a stockpile far larger than Western estimates suggest. As early as 1998, Iran was already producing missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, and it has continued doing so ever since, developing 12 to 15 different models in that range - meaning all are capable of reaching Israel. That is nearly 30 years of continuous missile production, resulting in a stockpile of several thousands. Another area where Iran has emerged as a global power is drones, including underwater ones. Iranโ€™s UUVs have evolved rapidly into mass-produced models with integrated AI, and I believe they hold some major surprises in reserve. A key point today is that the AN/TPY-2 radars, which played a critical role in tracking Iranian missiles, would be among the first targets to be engaged. These high-powered X-band radars are the backbone of regional missile defense, providing essential data to THAAD and Patriot batteries. However, because they are large, stationary, and emit high-energy signals, they are highly vulnerable to a first-strike or saturation attack, which would effectively 'blind' the entire defensive network. Obviously, a defense budget of nearly one trillion dollars cannot be compared to Iranโ€™s, but the real question is whether the cost and effort are worth the potential casualties. Even without Israel, the Americans maintain an immense advantage in aerial operations over Iran; however, as I have stated before, this superiority does not translate to the maritime theater.
0:18

What if any preparations have you seen Iran make ahead of the war? Can you discuss Itโ€™s missile capabilities? Any intelligence capabilities? Any surprises it might happen in store? When the 12-day war ended, I estimated that Iran would need about six months to recover, including its nuclear program. Contrary to popular belief, Iran did not lose its entire long-range or medium-range air defense network; while some launchers were damaged, the primary targets of the Israeli strikes were the radar systems. Once the radars were neutralized, Iran successfully hid the bulk of its remaining batteries, leaving much of its arsenal intact. In contrast, short-range systems like the Tor-M1 and domestic variants were heavily engaged against cruise missiles, often being lost or damaged only after their ammunition was completely exhausted. Since then, Iran has worked to rebuild its destroyed radar network and, above all, to implement a genuine counterintelligence doctrine. The Mossad operations against Iranian radars and air defense systems have shaped new perimeter defense and counterintelligence doctrines not only in Iran but in other countries as well. If we look at the quantity of weapons and the organization of armed groups during Iranโ€™s most recent protests, I would say the problem of foreign intelligence operations inside the country remains severe. This seriously threatens much of Iranโ€™s capabilities, and I foresee a wave of sabotage operations as a new war draws closer. Iran has begun receiving collaboration from China across multiple areas,from satellites to internal counterintelligence, but it may still take some time for this to produce tangible results. During the last years, the Mossad relied heavily on cell phones, using SMS for recruitment and accessing device GPS for target location. Iran has since focused intensely on preventing any repetition of this, and on this specific issue, the Chinese appear to have provided support. Although foreign intelligence services have operated extensively inside Iran, the scale of any armed opposition groups is negligible compared to the Iranian armed forces, which could still draw on allied paramilitaries and militias in neighboring countries, including the Houthis. Iran has become a missile power with a stockpile far larger than Western estimates suggest. As early as 1998, Iran was already producing missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, and it has continued doing so ever since, developing 12 to 15 different models in that range - meaning all are capable of reaching Israel. That is nearly 30 years of continuous missile production, resulting in a stockpile of several thousands. Another area where Iran has emerged as a global power is drones, including underwater ones. Iranโ€™s UUVs have evolved rapidly into mass-produced models with integrated AI, and I believe they hold some major surprises in reserve. A key point today is that the AN/TPY-2 radars, which played a critical role in tracking Iranian missiles, would be among the first targets to be engaged. These high-powered X-band radars are the backbone of regional missile defense, providing essential data to THAAD and Patriot batteries. However, because they are large, stationary, and emit high-energy signals, they are highly vulnerable to a first-strike or saturation attack, which would effectively 'blind' the entire defensive network. Obviously, a defense budget of nearly one trillion dollars cannot be compared to Iranโ€™s, but the real question is whether the cost and effort are worth the potential casualties. Even without Israel, the Americans maintain an immense advantage in aerial operations over Iran; however, as I have stated before, this superiority does not translate to the maritime theater.

Patricia Marins

21,142 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 5 ไธชๆœˆๅ‰

Facial reconstruction of a 5,500-year-old man from Middle Irtysh, Kazakhstan Based on the era and geographical proximity, it is likely that this individual belonged to the ANE-rich West Siberian Hunter-Gatherer/WSHG genetic cluster. The skull was described by (Konstantin Solodovnikov, Anatoli Bagashev, Tur Svetlana, A.V Gromov, 2019) as follows: The facial portion of the skull with the mandible of an adult individual comes from the destroyed Neolithic burial ground of Zhelezinka. The originally incomplete cranium was studied by V. V. Ginzburg, who identified it as belonging to a mature-aged woman. It was noted to have a moderately sloping forehead, a supraorbital region developed above average, and markedly protruding brow ridges. The face is low, of medium width, moderately projecting in the horizontal plane, with deep canine fossae, moderately high orbits, and a strongly projecting, medium-wide nose. Despite some flattening of the face, the anthropological type of the skull was defined by the author as Proto-Europoid, possibly close to the Afanasievo population type of Southern Siberia. One of the authors has previously noted that the Zhelezinka skull, judging by the structure of the preserved facial part, is characterized by a narrow forehead, a wide, medium-high, moderately flattened face, rather high orbits and nasal region, a high nasal bridge, and a moderately large angle of projection of the nasal bones. By these traits, it is more similar, for example, to a male skull from a Neolithic burial at the Shiderty-3 site in Pavlodar Oblast (according to L. T. Yablonsky), than to craniological series of Proto-Europoid populations of the Bronze Age, which are characterized by sharply profiled faces in the horizontal plane, low orbits, and a broad forehead. At the present level of accumulation and interpretation of materials, the Zhelezinka skull is extremely difficult to consider as an ancestral form for the Andronovo Proto-Europoid morphological variant; however, its similarity to another pre-Bronze Age skull from the same region deserves separate consideration. For this reason, the incomplete cranium from Zhelezinka was re-examined at the Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography (Kunstkamera) of the Russian Academy of Sciences using a standard program, with the addition of the angle of horizontal curvature of the forehead. Based on the scale of sexual dimorphism of ancient populations of Northern Eurasia, we determined the sex of the individual as male. To the characteristics given above, it can be added that, according to male size categories, the frontal bone width is small both at the frontotemporal points and in the coronal region. Visually, the frontal bone is rather sloping and weakly convex in the sagittal plane and weakly profiled horizontally. Visual assessment indicates a tendency toward mesognathism of the facial region; its height is small, bordering on medium values for upper and total facial height. The zygomatic diameter cannot be measured due to broken zygomatic arches, but by approximate assessment of the projection size, its value appears to have been close to the boundary between medium and large categories. The mid-facial width falls within the medium size category, while the upper facial and biorbital widths are large. The width of the alveolar arch is small, and that of the palate is medium. The orbits are high, at the boundary with the medium size category in absolute terms. Given the very large orbital width measured from maxillofrontale, this yields a chamaeconch index, whereas measured from dacrion the orbits are mesoconch. Nasal height and width are at the boundary between small and medium values; the inferior margin of the piriform aperture is in the form of pre-nasal fossae; the anterior nasal spine is moderately developed. The angle of nasal projection is medium (closer to large values), with large simotic and dacrial indices. At the same time, the dimensions of the nasal bridge are large, while the nasal bones at their point of greatest narrowing are of medium size. The rami of the mandible are extremely wide, of medium height, and vertically oriented. The mandible has medium values for bicondylar length, body height, and thickness; the bigonial width lies at the boundary between small and medium values. The chin is broad, with a high symphysis, and weakly projecting relative to the basal plane. The generalized index of facial skeletal flatness of the Zhelezinka skull is 38.2; accordingly, the proportion of the Mongolid component, calculated solely on the basis of this index, amounts to 30.4%.
0:10

Facial reconstruction of a 5,500-year-old man from Middle Irtysh, Kazakhstan Based on the era and geographical proximity, it is likely that this individual belonged to the ANE-rich West Siberian Hunter-Gatherer/WSHG genetic cluster. The skull was described by (Konstantin Solodovnikov, Anatoli Bagashev, Tur Svetlana, A.V Gromov, 2019) as follows: The facial portion of the skull with the mandible of an adult individual comes from the destroyed Neolithic burial ground of Zhelezinka. The originally incomplete cranium was studied by V. V. Ginzburg, who identified it as belonging to a mature-aged woman. It was noted to have a moderately sloping forehead, a supraorbital region developed above average, and markedly protruding brow ridges. The face is low, of medium width, moderately projecting in the horizontal plane, with deep canine fossae, moderately high orbits, and a strongly projecting, medium-wide nose. Despite some flattening of the face, the anthropological type of the skull was defined by the author as Proto-Europoid, possibly close to the Afanasievo population type of Southern Siberia. One of the authors has previously noted that the Zhelezinka skull, judging by the structure of the preserved facial part, is characterized by a narrow forehead, a wide, medium-high, moderately flattened face, rather high orbits and nasal region, a high nasal bridge, and a moderately large angle of projection of the nasal bones. By these traits, it is more similar, for example, to a male skull from a Neolithic burial at the Shiderty-3 site in Pavlodar Oblast (according to L. T. Yablonsky), than to craniological series of Proto-Europoid populations of the Bronze Age, which are characterized by sharply profiled faces in the horizontal plane, low orbits, and a broad forehead. At the present level of accumulation and interpretation of materials, the Zhelezinka skull is extremely difficult to consider as an ancestral form for the Andronovo Proto-Europoid morphological variant; however, its similarity to another pre-Bronze Age skull from the same region deserves separate consideration. For this reason, the incomplete cranium from Zhelezinka was re-examined at the Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography (Kunstkamera) of the Russian Academy of Sciences using a standard program, with the addition of the angle of horizontal curvature of the forehead. Based on the scale of sexual dimorphism of ancient populations of Northern Eurasia, we determined the sex of the individual as male. To the characteristics given above, it can be added that, according to male size categories, the frontal bone width is small both at the frontotemporal points and in the coronal region. Visually, the frontal bone is rather sloping and weakly convex in the sagittal plane and weakly profiled horizontally. Visual assessment indicates a tendency toward mesognathism of the facial region; its height is small, bordering on medium values for upper and total facial height. The zygomatic diameter cannot be measured due to broken zygomatic arches, but by approximate assessment of the projection size, its value appears to have been close to the boundary between medium and large categories. The mid-facial width falls within the medium size category, while the upper facial and biorbital widths are large. The width of the alveolar arch is small, and that of the palate is medium. The orbits are high, at the boundary with the medium size category in absolute terms. Given the very large orbital width measured from maxillofrontale, this yields a chamaeconch index, whereas measured from dacrion the orbits are mesoconch. Nasal height and width are at the boundary between small and medium values; the inferior margin of the piriform aperture is in the form of pre-nasal fossae; the anterior nasal spine is moderately developed. The angle of nasal projection is medium (closer to large values), with large simotic and dacrial indices. At the same time, the dimensions of the nasal bridge are large, while the nasal bones at their point of greatest narrowing are of medium size. The rami of the mandible are extremely wide, of medium height, and vertically oriented. The mandible has medium values for bicondylar length, body height, and thickness; the bigonial width lies at the boundary between small and medium values. The chin is broad, with a high symphysis, and weakly projecting relative to the basal plane. The generalized index of facial skeletal flatness of the Zhelezinka skull is 38.2; accordingly, the proportion of the Mongolid component, calculated solely on the basis of this index, amounts to 30.4%.

Ancestral Whispers

17,478 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 6 ไธชๆœˆๅ‰