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The Chinese are flying 4 sixth-generation prototypes, but what does that mean? While the West keeps debating wars that seem never-ending, huh, China is flying low – or rather, high! – improving their 6th generation fighter prototypes, like the J-36/J-50, with total focus on advanced integration. This gives a...

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Patricia Marins

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60,344 views • 7 months ago •via X (Twitter)

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🚨🇨🇳U.S. IN PANIC: China's J-35 Stealth Fighter Now in 'Beast Mode' With Increased Firepower China's J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighter has been seen in a new configuration carrying four PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles on external pylons under its wings. Combined with the six missiles it carries inside its internal weapons bays, the aircraft can now go into combat with up to ten air-to-air missiles in total. 🔸This setup is informally called "beast mode" — a term borrowed from the U.S. military's similar configuration for the F-35. The idea is straightforward: the aircraft trades some of its stealth capability for significantly more firepower. When weapons are carried externally, they increase the aircraft's radar signature, making it more visible to enemy systems. However, the PL-15 missile's long range means the J-35 can potentially engage enemy aircraft from a safe distance before that visibility becomes a serious problem. 🔸The J-35 entered service in 2025 in both Air Force and Navy variants. The naval version is designed to operate from Chinese supercarriers such as the Fujian. Both versions are considered among the most advanced fifth-generation fighters in the world today, alongside the J-20 and the American F-35 — all three of which are regarded as more sophisticated than the older F-22 or Russia's Su-57. 🔸Within China's own air fleet, the J-35 is expected to serve as a lighter and more affordable complement to the larger and more powerful J-20, which carries a bigger radar, heavier weapons load, and longer range. The J-20 is expected to remain the priority for large-scale procurement, while the J-35 fills a broader operational role at lower cost. Do you think the U.S. can really counter it? NewRulesGeopolitics❗️
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🚨🇨🇳U.S. IN PANIC: China's J-35 Stealth Fighter Now in 'Beast Mode' With Increased Firepower China's J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighter has been seen in a new configuration carrying four PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles on external pylons under its wings. Combined with the six missiles it carries inside its internal weapons bays, the aircraft can now go into combat with up to ten air-to-air missiles in total. 🔸This setup is informally called "beast mode" — a term borrowed from the U.S. military's similar configuration for the F-35. The idea is straightforward: the aircraft trades some of its stealth capability for significantly more firepower. When weapons are carried externally, they increase the aircraft's radar signature, making it more visible to enemy systems. However, the PL-15 missile's long range means the J-35 can potentially engage enemy aircraft from a safe distance before that visibility becomes a serious problem. 🔸The J-35 entered service in 2025 in both Air Force and Navy variants. The naval version is designed to operate from Chinese supercarriers such as the Fujian. Both versions are considered among the most advanced fifth-generation fighters in the world today, alongside the J-20 and the American F-35 — all three of which are regarded as more sophisticated than the older F-22 or Russia's Su-57. 🔸Within China's own air fleet, the J-35 is expected to serve as a lighter and more affordable complement to the larger and more powerful J-20, which carries a bigger radar, heavier weapons load, and longer range. The J-20 is expected to remain the priority for large-scale procurement, while the J-35 fills a broader operational role at lower cost. Do you think the U.S. can really counter it? NewRulesGeopolitics❗️

🇷🇺 STANISLAV KRAPIVNIK 🇷🇺

11,360 views • 1 month ago

#PLA #China #Japan #Korea #Guam #India #Hypersonic The Chinese 6th generation fighter is a high-quality reverse engineering of the American 6th generation fighter project from Lockheed Martin as part of the NGAD (Next-Generation Air Dominance) program. The Chinese Air Force has begun flight tests of a 6th-generation stealth fighter designed using a "flying wing"/"tailless" configuration without the usual vertical and horizontal all-moving tail fins typical of 4th and 5th generation aircraft. The machine is stabilized in flight thanks to an advanced computerized fly-by-wire control system with multiple backup systems, which controls the wing mechanization on the trailing edge. The design has a huge resemblance to that of the Lockheed project under the NGAD program. It is worth noting that the visible length of the glider can vary from 22.5 to 25 - 27 m, while the wingspan reaches an incredible 18 - 19 m. Obviously, the normal takeoff weight of such a machine can reach 33 - 37 tons, the maximum - 43 - 47 tons. The payload in the internal weapons compartments is up to 10 - 12 tons. The estimated volume of the fuel system can reach 17-18 tons, and the combat radius of action up to 2500-2700 km. The effective reflective surface of this machine can vary from 0.05 to 0.15 sq. m The configuration of the onboard radar of the Chinese 5th generation fighter is almost identical to that of the Russian Su-57. On the side forming the nose of the fuselage, one can pay attention to 2 X-band side-looking AESA modules, similar to the N036B-1-01L and N036B-1-01B modules of the Belka onboard radar system. These canvases provide radar reconnaissance in SAR mode at distances of up to 150-200 km, as well as the ability to detect air targets in the lateral and rear hemisphere Evgeniy Damantsev
0:17

#PLA #China #Japan #Korea #Guam #India #Hypersonic The Chinese 6th generation fighter is a high-quality reverse engineering of the American 6th generation fighter project from Lockheed Martin as part of the NGAD (Next-Generation Air Dominance) program. The Chinese Air Force has begun flight tests of a 6th-generation stealth fighter designed using a "flying wing"/"tailless" configuration without the usual vertical and horizontal all-moving tail fins typical of 4th and 5th generation aircraft. The machine is stabilized in flight thanks to an advanced computerized fly-by-wire control system with multiple backup systems, which controls the wing mechanization on the trailing edge. The design has a huge resemblance to that of the Lockheed project under the NGAD program. It is worth noting that the visible length of the glider can vary from 22.5 to 25 - 27 m, while the wingspan reaches an incredible 18 - 19 m. Obviously, the normal takeoff weight of such a machine can reach 33 - 37 tons, the maximum - 43 - 47 tons. The payload in the internal weapons compartments is up to 10 - 12 tons. The estimated volume of the fuel system can reach 17-18 tons, and the combat radius of action up to 2500-2700 km. The effective reflective surface of this machine can vary from 0.05 to 0.15 sq. m The configuration of the onboard radar of the Chinese 5th generation fighter is almost identical to that of the Russian Su-57. On the side forming the nose of the fuselage, one can pay attention to 2 X-band side-looking AESA modules, similar to the N036B-1-01L and N036B-1-01B modules of the Belka onboard radar system. These canvases provide radar reconnaissance in SAR mode at distances of up to 150-200 km, as well as the ability to detect air targets in the lateral and rear hemisphere Evgeniy Damantsev

Koba

40,339 views • 1 year ago

China's 6th gen J-50 fighter took another test flight. 6th gen fighters themselves are an order of magnitude more stealthy than 5th gen fighters. On top of that, they are stealthy against every type of radar. 6th gen air combat is built on top of these fighters, which revolves around a network-centric web, including collaborative wingman drones and other platforms. The wingman drones are just as stealthy, and are able to carry missiles data-linked to the manned fighters. So essentially, entire squadrons of 6th gen fighters with several support drones each can fly over enemy air space, unleash precision destruction. And the enemy won't even know what hit them. This is not only a strategic deterrence, but also gives the operator of 6th gen fighters plausible deniability, when conducting clandestine warfare against an enemy state. I won't name any names, but let's just say an ally Southwest of China is under attack by a larger neighbor, the PLA air force can provide air superiority and ground strike supports using 6th gen fighters. That aggressive enemy will only feel the destruction but not know who or what hit them.
0:19

China's 6th gen J-50 fighter took another test flight. 6th gen fighters themselves are an order of magnitude more stealthy than 5th gen fighters. On top of that, they are stealthy against every type of radar. 6th gen air combat is built on top of these fighters, which revolves around a network-centric web, including collaborative wingman drones and other platforms. The wingman drones are just as stealthy, and are able to carry missiles data-linked to the manned fighters. So essentially, entire squadrons of 6th gen fighters with several support drones each can fly over enemy air space, unleash precision destruction. And the enemy won't even know what hit them. This is not only a strategic deterrence, but also gives the operator of 6th gen fighters plausible deniability, when conducting clandestine warfare against an enemy state. I won't name any names, but let's just say an ally Southwest of China is under attack by a larger neighbor, the PLA air force can provide air superiority and ground strike supports using 6th gen fighters. That aggressive enemy will only feel the destruction but not know who or what hit them.

Zhao DaShuai 东北进修🇨🇳

119,165 views • 1 year ago

Iran’s Post-War Air Defense: Changes in System Integration and Deployment Tactics The 12-Day War, marked by Israeli air superiority, prompted accelerated reforms in mobility, autonomy, and hybrid integration in Iranian air defenses, particularly in their long-range battery, the Bavar-373. 1. Hardware Changes - Miniaturization and Autonomy (TELAR): The Babar-373-II now integrates AESA radars into each launcher, eliminating cables and vulnerable central radars, enabling independent operations. The range is 300-400 km for large targets and about 85-150 km for stealth fighters. - New Sayyad-4B+ Missiles: Featuring dual seekers (active radar and IR), extended range (300-400 km), and a focus on counter-stealth, Iran believes these new missiles can overcome jamming and past failures against drones heavy drones. - Integration of the Arman System: This is Iran's equivalent to AEGIS, covering medium-range defense (up to 120 km) in self-sufficient vehicles. Investments improved setup agility to just 3 minutes; moreover, if links fail due to satellite disruptions like last year, both the Bavar-373-II and the 15th Khordad can continue operating autonomously. This was a major issue for Iran that caused blackouts in their air defenses. - Surveillance Drones as "Flying Radars": Models like the Mohajer-10 and Karrar conduct patrols and transmit data via satellites (BeiDou), allowing passive detection and keeping radars off until engagement. 2. Tactical Changes - Radar Ambush (Passive Tracking): The implementation of modern sensors was another shift. Now, optical/IRST sensors and drones detect targets; radars activate only for seconds to lock on, reducing exposure to counter-attacks. - Geographic Dispersion: This autonomy allows units to spread across 10-15 km² in tunnels and civilian sheds, emerging only after drone alerts and integrating with smaller systems for layers resistant to saturation. It seems Iran is attempting an interesting tactic that could work if cyber elements don't cause issues. - Radical "Shoot-and-Scoot" Mobility: I've never seen this tactic with long-range air systems before, but Iran claims repositioning in under 4 minutes, with logistics for remote reloads, transforming this system tactically like MLRS or artillery. 3. Post-War Comparative (2025 vs. 2026) Comparing configurations before and after the war, in 2025 connections relied on physical cables and centralized infrastructure, while in 2026 it adopts wireless datalinks with independent launchers, seemingly built with Chinese assistance. Dependency evolved from a giant, vulnerable search radar to a hybrid sensor network incorporating drones, IRST systems, and satellites. Reaction time, which previously took a long time to move the entire battery, is now reduced to under 4 minutes for the first vehicle to depart. Finally, the target focus shifted from conventional missiles and aircraft to advanced threats, such as counter-stealth, counter-drones, and, according to them, even hypersonic missiles. 4. Persistent Fragilities - Slow Reload Logistics: Missile reloading takes 30-60 minutes with cranes, exposing them to orbital surveillance. However, all heavy batteries are like this. - Datalink Vulnerability: Although Iran has strong link protection technology as seen in drone, it has limits against interference, and the number of American assets dedicated to this indicates that jamming or hacking loads won't be small. - Massive Thermal Signature: Heat from the chassis detectable by LEO satellites is another vulnerability that would also nullify camouflage, but it's the same with every system. - Radar Horizon vs. Cruise Missiles: The truck-embedded radar has a short tracking radius of 35-45 km, with a brief reaction against low-altitude or terrain-masking threats, which in certain situations could favor Tomahawks.
0:12

Iran’s Post-War Air Defense: Changes in System Integration and Deployment Tactics The 12-Day War, marked by Israeli air superiority, prompted accelerated reforms in mobility, autonomy, and hybrid integration in Iranian air defenses, particularly in their long-range battery, the Bavar-373. 1. Hardware Changes - Miniaturization and Autonomy (TELAR): The Babar-373-II now integrates AESA radars into each launcher, eliminating cables and vulnerable central radars, enabling independent operations. The range is 300-400 km for large targets and about 85-150 km for stealth fighters. - New Sayyad-4B+ Missiles: Featuring dual seekers (active radar and IR), extended range (300-400 km), and a focus on counter-stealth, Iran believes these new missiles can overcome jamming and past failures against drones heavy drones. - Integration of the Arman System: This is Iran's equivalent to AEGIS, covering medium-range defense (up to 120 km) in self-sufficient vehicles. Investments improved setup agility to just 3 minutes; moreover, if links fail due to satellite disruptions like last year, both the Bavar-373-II and the 15th Khordad can continue operating autonomously. This was a major issue for Iran that caused blackouts in their air defenses. - Surveillance Drones as "Flying Radars": Models like the Mohajer-10 and Karrar conduct patrols and transmit data via satellites (BeiDou), allowing passive detection and keeping radars off until engagement. 2. Tactical Changes - Radar Ambush (Passive Tracking): The implementation of modern sensors was another shift. Now, optical/IRST sensors and drones detect targets; radars activate only for seconds to lock on, reducing exposure to counter-attacks. - Geographic Dispersion: This autonomy allows units to spread across 10-15 km² in tunnels and civilian sheds, emerging only after drone alerts and integrating with smaller systems for layers resistant to saturation. It seems Iran is attempting an interesting tactic that could work if cyber elements don't cause issues. - Radical "Shoot-and-Scoot" Mobility: I've never seen this tactic with long-range air systems before, but Iran claims repositioning in under 4 minutes, with logistics for remote reloads, transforming this system tactically like MLRS or artillery. 3. Post-War Comparative (2025 vs. 2026) Comparing configurations before and after the war, in 2025 connections relied on physical cables and centralized infrastructure, while in 2026 it adopts wireless datalinks with independent launchers, seemingly built with Chinese assistance. Dependency evolved from a giant, vulnerable search radar to a hybrid sensor network incorporating drones, IRST systems, and satellites. Reaction time, which previously took a long time to move the entire battery, is now reduced to under 4 minutes for the first vehicle to depart. Finally, the target focus shifted from conventional missiles and aircraft to advanced threats, such as counter-stealth, counter-drones, and, according to them, even hypersonic missiles. 4. Persistent Fragilities - Slow Reload Logistics: Missile reloading takes 30-60 minutes with cranes, exposing them to orbital surveillance. However, all heavy batteries are like this. - Datalink Vulnerability: Although Iran has strong link protection technology as seen in drone, it has limits against interference, and the number of American assets dedicated to this indicates that jamming or hacking loads won't be small. - Massive Thermal Signature: Heat from the chassis detectable by LEO satellites is another vulnerability that would also nullify camouflage, but it's the same with every system. - Radar Horizon vs. Cruise Missiles: The truck-embedded radar has a short tracking radius of 35-45 km, with a brief reaction against low-altitude or terrain-masking threats, which in certain situations could favor Tomahawks.

Patricia Marins

69,042 views • 4 months ago

The F-22 Raptor looks like a Sci-fi sketch that somehow got funding, was built with one mission in mind: dominate the sky before the enemy even knows it's there. This fifth-generation stealth fighter combines supercruise (flying faster than Mach 1 without afterburners), extreme maneuverability through thrust-vectoring engines, and advanced stealth shaping that makes it incredibly difficult to detect on radar. But the real advantage is its sensor fusion. The aircraft processes radar, infrared, and electronic signals into one clear battlefield picture for the pilot. By the time an opponent realizes the Raptor is nearby, the engagement is usually already over. Even decades after its first flight, it's still considered one of the most dominant air-superiority fighters ever built. Credit Mark Fingar IG
0:11

The F-22 Raptor looks like a Sci-fi sketch that somehow got funding, was built with one mission in mind: dominate the sky before the enemy even knows it's there. This fifth-generation stealth fighter combines supercruise (flying faster than Mach 1 without afterburners), extreme maneuverability through thrust-vectoring engines, and advanced stealth shaping that makes it incredibly difficult to detect on radar. But the real advantage is its sensor fusion. The aircraft processes radar, infrared, and electronic signals into one clear battlefield picture for the pilot. By the time an opponent realizes the Raptor is nearby, the engagement is usually already over. Even decades after its first flight, it's still considered one of the most dominant air-superiority fighters ever built. Credit Mark Fingar IG

Mechanical Knowledge

15,227 views • 3 months ago

We continue to analyze the technical details of the war with Iran, and we would like to note the Iranian novelty - subsonic barraging anti-aircraft missiles Missile 358, equipped with compact turbojet engines. To some extent unexpectedly, they showed good effectiveness against Israeli reconnaissance and strike UAVs Hermes-900. The key role is played by the thermal homing head: it is able to reliably detect and track a wide range of heat-contrasting targets, including UAVs with various flight profiles. An additional advantage is the command and telemetry channel, which ensures data transmission and allows for radio correction of the trajectory. This is especially important in situations when the target attempts to disrupt the capture with infrared decoys or other means of counteraction. According to the stated parameters, the range of application of Missile 358 reaches about 100 km. At the same time, the maximum interception altitude is about 8.5 km, and the speed is up to 700 km/h, which expands the capabilities of the complex in covering objects and intercepting medium-altitude UAVs. Of course, this is a niche tool, and compared to solid-fuel missiles, the turbojet engine provides exponentially higher flight energy. This allows to dramatically increase the range at low speed, and the mass of the main units of the ammunition, its warhead and control system. On the other hand, this is a solution of necessity, because classic anti-aircraft missiles perfectly hit such high-altitude and slow-moving targets. But for such ammunition, no radar, complex and expensive beam installations are required, which greatly improves its survivability under constant air strikes. And in its niche of targets, there are enough of them, as such UAVs of Israel and the USA are the basis of UCAV, and are constantly over the territory of Iran. So with the 358th ammunition, you can score quite a lot of frags, and significantly complicate air strikes on Iran for the Epstein coalition. Russian Engineer -
0:15

We continue to analyze the technical details of the war with Iran, and we would like to note the Iranian novelty - subsonic barraging anti-aircraft missiles Missile 358, equipped with compact turbojet engines. To some extent unexpectedly, they showed good effectiveness against Israeli reconnaissance and strike UAVs Hermes-900. The key role is played by the thermal homing head: it is able to reliably detect and track a wide range of heat-contrasting targets, including UAVs with various flight profiles. An additional advantage is the command and telemetry channel, which ensures data transmission and allows for radio correction of the trajectory. This is especially important in situations when the target attempts to disrupt the capture with infrared decoys or other means of counteraction. According to the stated parameters, the range of application of Missile 358 reaches about 100 km. At the same time, the maximum interception altitude is about 8.5 km, and the speed is up to 700 km/h, which expands the capabilities of the complex in covering objects and intercepting medium-altitude UAVs. Of course, this is a niche tool, and compared to solid-fuel missiles, the turbojet engine provides exponentially higher flight energy. This allows to dramatically increase the range at low speed, and the mass of the main units of the ammunition, its warhead and control system. On the other hand, this is a solution of necessity, because classic anti-aircraft missiles perfectly hit such high-altitude and slow-moving targets. But for such ammunition, no radar, complex and expensive beam installations are required, which greatly improves its survivability under constant air strikes. And in its niche of targets, there are enough of them, as such UAVs of Israel and the USA are the basis of UCAV, and are constantly over the territory of Iran. So with the 358th ammunition, you can score quite a lot of frags, and significantly complicate air strikes on Iran for the Epstein coalition. Russian Engineer -

𝐃𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐝 𝐙 🇷🇺🇮🇪

17,874 views • 4 months ago

Why Having a Satellite Network is So Important In 2023, the Russians were about to close a deal with a certain North Korean MLRS, but the deal fell through exactly because the North Koreans, +20 years ago, had revolted against Russian opposition to their nuclear program and switched from GLONASS to BeiDou. Only few years ago, the NK returned to Glonass and started converting their equipment to work with dual GNSS guidance. But why did the deal sour? Because the Chinese did not authorize the use of their satellites in the Ukraine conflict. The same problem occurred with the Belarusian POLONEZ MLRS, which uses missiles based on Chinese technology. Today, Iran has switched from GPS to BeiDou, aiming for greater resistance to jammers and integration with Chinese systems. This shows that a missile program is much more than the missiles themselves. It is necessary to have one's own constellation, even if it is strictly military and regionalized, with resources for monitoring and target acquisition, in addition to the ability to deal with jammers and spoofers. When I mentioned Iran and BeiDou, it is the beginning and serves as a gateway that enables integration with Chinese networks, provided the Chinese decide to allow it. However, it is essentially a massive gateway, with numerous smaller, more specialized sub-channels operating underneath. For targeting moving objects, Iran would need to receive data from the Guowang or Yaogan networks. In the last six months, the Chinese could have provided partial integration. At this stage, since the Iranians are conducting their ISR primarily with drones, I believe the Chinese are not sharing data from the LEO satellites in those networks. Iran also has its own satellites, but the Chinese network is far more mature and likely equipped with a wide array of integration and data-sharing tools. While the Chinese are providing intelligence to Iran, I believe they are prudent in doing so to preserve the relationships they have built with other Arab states. At this moment, I believe that the sharing of intelligence from satellites isn’t in real time. For a country like Iran, it is crucial to have GNSS independence with its own program. The same applies to other medium-sized countries, which need at least an LEO constellation capable of providing the minimum ISR, and this is linked to security, but also a series of other factors. I'll give a practical example here. Drones usually lose link with 50% of their range in the Amazon due to weather conditions. With an LEO constellation, this would not occur. Today, to have independence, a constellation project is necessary.
0:17

Why Having a Satellite Network is So Important In 2023, the Russians were about to close a deal with a certain North Korean MLRS, but the deal fell through exactly because the North Koreans, +20 years ago, had revolted against Russian opposition to their nuclear program and switched from GLONASS to BeiDou. Only few years ago, the NK returned to Glonass and started converting their equipment to work with dual GNSS guidance. But why did the deal sour? Because the Chinese did not authorize the use of their satellites in the Ukraine conflict. The same problem occurred with the Belarusian POLONEZ MLRS, which uses missiles based on Chinese technology. Today, Iran has switched from GPS to BeiDou, aiming for greater resistance to jammers and integration with Chinese systems. This shows that a missile program is much more than the missiles themselves. It is necessary to have one's own constellation, even if it is strictly military and regionalized, with resources for monitoring and target acquisition, in addition to the ability to deal with jammers and spoofers. When I mentioned Iran and BeiDou, it is the beginning and serves as a gateway that enables integration with Chinese networks, provided the Chinese decide to allow it. However, it is essentially a massive gateway, with numerous smaller, more specialized sub-channels operating underneath. For targeting moving objects, Iran would need to receive data from the Guowang or Yaogan networks. In the last six months, the Chinese could have provided partial integration. At this stage, since the Iranians are conducting their ISR primarily with drones, I believe the Chinese are not sharing data from the LEO satellites in those networks. Iran also has its own satellites, but the Chinese network is far more mature and likely equipped with a wide array of integration and data-sharing tools. While the Chinese are providing intelligence to Iran, I believe they are prudent in doing so to preserve the relationships they have built with other Arab states. At this moment, I believe that the sharing of intelligence from satellites isn’t in real time. For a country like Iran, it is crucial to have GNSS independence with its own program. The same applies to other medium-sized countries, which need at least an LEO constellation capable of providing the minimum ISR, and this is linked to security, but also a series of other factors. I'll give a practical example here. Drones usually lose link with 50% of their range in the Amazon due to weather conditions. With an LEO constellation, this would not occur. Today, to have independence, a constellation project is necessary.

Patricia Marins

19,508 views • 5 months ago

China Successfully Tests New Hypersonic Missile with 8,000 km Range The Chinese have successfully tested a variant of a hypersonic missile, which is actually a glide vehicle: the DF-27A. The average speed was Mach 8.6, and it covered 2,100 km in 12 minutes. This is just one more in a series of several Chinese anti-ship missiles. While much of the West treats military service as an economic activity, the Chinese are preparing for a real war. There is no room there for playing around with a new class of battleships or listening to the lobby for expensive energy. China has a national industrial and military project that Western nations currently can only dream of achieving. Of course, it's part of the Western style to live life differently. But there is a serious missile gap, with China far ahead of the West. An 8,000 km range means hitting a ship in Hawaii without leaving mainland China. And there are other missile models with ranges of 3,000–4,000 km. Intercepting these hypersonic missiles once launched is extremely difficult, but what can be done is to prevent them from having precise guidance capability. Just as land doctrines are being redesigned, so is naval warfare, by hypersonic missiles and aerial and underwater drones. Projects are now underway for drones capable of bypassing protective nets. Today, the Chinese have more missiles in stock than the Soviets had at their peak. And I won't even mention drones, as the numbers are almost unimaginable. Only a major reform could improve the West’s position. The West is currently developing some missile systems that should be available around 2030, but a doctrinal reform is also necessary. Countries cannot fight in 2025 the same way wars were fought decades ago; a complete reform is required. This reminds me of Ukrainian soldiers who, after being trained in the West and then facing the reality of the battlefield, said that the training was completely inadequate for the kind of war they were actually fighting. It is precisely to avoid this kind of mismatch that reforms need to be carried out. *Illustrative video- may contain inaccuracies.*
0:16

China Successfully Tests New Hypersonic Missile with 8,000 km Range The Chinese have successfully tested a variant of a hypersonic missile, which is actually a glide vehicle: the DF-27A. The average speed was Mach 8.6, and it covered 2,100 km in 12 minutes. This is just one more in a series of several Chinese anti-ship missiles. While much of the West treats military service as an economic activity, the Chinese are preparing for a real war. There is no room there for playing around with a new class of battleships or listening to the lobby for expensive energy. China has a national industrial and military project that Western nations currently can only dream of achieving. Of course, it's part of the Western style to live life differently. But there is a serious missile gap, with China far ahead of the West. An 8,000 km range means hitting a ship in Hawaii without leaving mainland China. And there are other missile models with ranges of 3,000–4,000 km. Intercepting these hypersonic missiles once launched is extremely difficult, but what can be done is to prevent them from having precise guidance capability. Just as land doctrines are being redesigned, so is naval warfare, by hypersonic missiles and aerial and underwater drones. Projects are now underway for drones capable of bypassing protective nets. Today, the Chinese have more missiles in stock than the Soviets had at their peak. And I won't even mention drones, as the numbers are almost unimaginable. Only a major reform could improve the West’s position. The West is currently developing some missile systems that should be available around 2030, but a doctrinal reform is also necessary. Countries cannot fight in 2025 the same way wars were fought decades ago; a complete reform is required. This reminds me of Ukrainian soldiers who, after being trained in the West and then facing the reality of the battlefield, said that the training was completely inadequate for the kind of war they were actually fighting. It is precisely to avoid this kind of mismatch that reforms need to be carried out. *Illustrative video- may contain inaccuracies.*

Patricia Marins

23,068 views • 6 months ago

This is real gun camera footage from a P-51 Mustang, chasing a German Bf 109 down to the treetops until it goes down in flames. The American pilot flying it, Lt John Kirla, shot down five enemy planes in a single day, becoming an ace in one mission. This footage captures one of his victories over a Bf 109. This is his story.. From Trainee to the Yoxford Boys John Kirla was not a born fighter ace. He was an ordinary young American who had come up through flight training in Texas, graduating at the start of 1944. He learned his trade on trainers, moved up to fighters, and got just 15 hours in the P-51 Mustang before being sent to England as a replacement pilot. He joined the 362nd Fighter Squadron of the 357th Fighter Group, a unit based at Leiston that was already becoming a legend. The 357th was the first group in the Eighth Air Force fully equipped with the Mustang, and it would go on to produce more aces than any other fighter group in the Eighth, including Chuck Yeager and Bud Anderson. Kirla was the newest pilot in a squadron already filled with experienced aces. His job was to escort American bombers deep into Germany and protect them from the Luftwaffe. On November 27 1944, he got the day that would define him. Five Victories in One Mission That morning the 357th ran headlong into a massive swarm of German fighters trying to get at the bombers. Kirla's flight dropped their fuel tanks and dived straight into the middle of it. Almost immediately, the fight became a swirling, low-level brawl of Mustangs, Messerschmitts, and Focke-Wulfs twisting across the sky. Kirla picked out his first target and opened fire, and from that moment he did not stop hunting. In his own account, he spotted a Bf 109 that was attacking an American bomber. He went after it, closed to just 30 yards, and when the German threw his fighter into a tight barrel roll straight down toward the ground, Kirla stayed glued to his tail and, in his words, clobbered him all over until he went down. An Ace in a Day He kept finding more. Again and again through that wild, sprawling fight, Kirla latched onto an enemy aircraft and did not let go. At one point he watched a German fighter shoot down one of his fellow Mustang pilots right in front of him, and closed in for revenge. As he described it afterward, he opened fire, saw pieces start to fly off the enemy aircraft, and watched it fall out of the sky like a leaf drifting to the ground. Rather than breaking away and climbing back to safety, Kirla chased his targets down low, following them almost to the ground, the fighters weaving over villages and treetops until the enemy aircraft finally went down. By the time the fight was over, John Kirla had shot down five German aircraft in a single mission. He had become an ace in a day, one of the relatively few American fighter pilots to achieve that in a single mission. The Mustang That Changed the Air War The Mustang was the aircraft that made days like Kirla's possible. The P-51 combined long range, high speed, and deadly firepower, and it could follow the bombers all the way to their targets and fight the German fighters on equal or better terms. By the end of the war, P-51 groups had claimed close to 5,000 enemy aircraft shot down, about half of all American air-to-air kills in the European theater. Kirla's own group, the 357th, became the top-scoring Mustang group in the Eighth Air Force. Flying one of the finest escort fighters of the war, men like Kirla helped turn the tide of the air war over Germany. The gun-camera film rolling every time he pressed the trigger captured it all, including the footage you are watching. John Kirla's Legacy John Kirla flew on to the end of his combat tour and finished the war as a double ace, credited with 11 and a half enemy aircraft destroyed in the air. He was awarded the Silver Star and the Distinguished Flying Cross for his courage in the skies over Europe. He had gone from a trainee with a handful of hours in a Mustang to one of the deadliest fighter pilots in one of the deadliest fighter groups of the war, in the span of a single year. The footage of his Mustang chasing a Bf 109 down to the trees is only a few seconds long. But behind those few seconds is a young American who climbed into a fighter, dove into a swarm of the enemy, and shot down five of them before the day was out. This was the story of John Kirla. I post a story like this every single day. Most people never see them. Follow so you don't miss the next one.
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This is real gun camera footage from a P-51 Mustang, chasing a German Bf 109 down to the treetops until it goes down in flames. The American pilot flying it, Lt John Kirla, shot down five enemy planes in a single day, becoming an ace in one mission. This footage captures one of his victories over a Bf 109. This is his story.. From Trainee to the Yoxford Boys John Kirla was not a born fighter ace. He was an ordinary young American who had come up through flight training in Texas, graduating at the start of 1944. He learned his trade on trainers, moved up to fighters, and got just 15 hours in the P-51 Mustang before being sent to England as a replacement pilot. He joined the 362nd Fighter Squadron of the 357th Fighter Group, a unit based at Leiston that was already becoming a legend. The 357th was the first group in the Eighth Air Force fully equipped with the Mustang, and it would go on to produce more aces than any other fighter group in the Eighth, including Chuck Yeager and Bud Anderson. Kirla was the newest pilot in a squadron already filled with experienced aces. His job was to escort American bombers deep into Germany and protect them from the Luftwaffe. On November 27 1944, he got the day that would define him. Five Victories in One Mission That morning the 357th ran headlong into a massive swarm of German fighters trying to get at the bombers. Kirla's flight dropped their fuel tanks and dived straight into the middle of it. Almost immediately, the fight became a swirling, low-level brawl of Mustangs, Messerschmitts, and Focke-Wulfs twisting across the sky. Kirla picked out his first target and opened fire, and from that moment he did not stop hunting. In his own account, he spotted a Bf 109 that was attacking an American bomber. He went after it, closed to just 30 yards, and when the German threw his fighter into a tight barrel roll straight down toward the ground, Kirla stayed glued to his tail and, in his words, clobbered him all over until he went down. An Ace in a Day He kept finding more. Again and again through that wild, sprawling fight, Kirla latched onto an enemy aircraft and did not let go. At one point he watched a German fighter shoot down one of his fellow Mustang pilots right in front of him, and closed in for revenge. As he described it afterward, he opened fire, saw pieces start to fly off the enemy aircraft, and watched it fall out of the sky like a leaf drifting to the ground. Rather than breaking away and climbing back to safety, Kirla chased his targets down low, following them almost to the ground, the fighters weaving over villages and treetops until the enemy aircraft finally went down. By the time the fight was over, John Kirla had shot down five German aircraft in a single mission. He had become an ace in a day, one of the relatively few American fighter pilots to achieve that in a single mission. The Mustang That Changed the Air War The Mustang was the aircraft that made days like Kirla's possible. The P-51 combined long range, high speed, and deadly firepower, and it could follow the bombers all the way to their targets and fight the German fighters on equal or better terms. By the end of the war, P-51 groups had claimed close to 5,000 enemy aircraft shot down, about half of all American air-to-air kills in the European theater. Kirla's own group, the 357th, became the top-scoring Mustang group in the Eighth Air Force. Flying one of the finest escort fighters of the war, men like Kirla helped turn the tide of the air war over Germany. The gun-camera film rolling every time he pressed the trigger captured it all, including the footage you are watching. John Kirla's Legacy John Kirla flew on to the end of his combat tour and finished the war as a double ace, credited with 11 and a half enemy aircraft destroyed in the air. He was awarded the Silver Star and the Distinguished Flying Cross for his courage in the skies over Europe. He had gone from a trainee with a handful of hours in a Mustang to one of the deadliest fighter pilots in one of the deadliest fighter groups of the war, in the span of a single year. The footage of his Mustang chasing a Bf 109 down to the trees is only a few seconds long. But behind those few seconds is a young American who climbed into a fighter, dove into a swarm of the enemy, and shot down five of them before the day was out. This was the story of John Kirla. I post a story like this every single day. Most people never see them. Follow so you don't miss the next one.

Untold War Stories

156,281 views • 11 days ago

‼️🇺🇸 RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK | U.S. STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE DRONE🔥 The RQ-4 Global Hawk is a high altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle operated by the United States Air Force and Navy. It is designed for one mission only intelligence dominance. Range: Over 22,000 km in a single mission, enabling intercontinental surveillance without refueling. Endurance Capable of flying 30 to 34 hours continuously, providing persistent coverage day and night. Operating Altitude: Approximately 60,000 feet, beyond the reach of most air defense systems. Capabilities: Equipped with advanced ISR sensors including • Synthetic Aperture Radar • Electro optical imaging • Infrared surveillance It can monitor troop movements, naval activity, missile sites, air defense networks, and battlefield changes in real time. Weapons: Global Hawk carries no missiles or bombs. It is a reconnaissance only platform. Strike Accuracy Role: While it does not conduct strikes, the targeting intelligence it delivers enables U.S. aircraft and precision weapons to hit targets with extreme accuracy. Core Mission: Strategic surveillance Missile launch detection Air defense mapping Maritime and border monitoring Global Hawk does not attack. It decides what gets attacked next.
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‼️🇺🇸 RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK | U.S. STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE DRONE🔥 The RQ-4 Global Hawk is a high altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle operated by the United States Air Force and Navy. It is designed for one mission only intelligence dominance. Range: Over 22,000 km in a single mission, enabling intercontinental surveillance without refueling. Endurance Capable of flying 30 to 34 hours continuously, providing persistent coverage day and night. Operating Altitude: Approximately 60,000 feet, beyond the reach of most air defense systems. Capabilities: Equipped with advanced ISR sensors including • Synthetic Aperture Radar • Electro optical imaging • Infrared surveillance It can monitor troop movements, naval activity, missile sites, air defense networks, and battlefield changes in real time. Weapons: Global Hawk carries no missiles or bombs. It is a reconnaissance only platform. Strike Accuracy Role: While it does not conduct strikes, the targeting intelligence it delivers enables U.S. aircraft and precision weapons to hit targets with extreme accuracy. Core Mission: Strategic surveillance Missile launch detection Air defense mapping Maritime and border monitoring Global Hawk does not attack. It decides what gets attacked next.

Defense Intelligence

32,892 views • 6 months ago

What if any preparations have you seen Iran make ahead of the war? Can you discuss It’s missile capabilities? Any intelligence capabilities? Any surprises it might happen in store? When the 12-day war ended, I estimated that Iran would need about six months to recover, including its nuclear program. Contrary to popular belief, Iran did not lose its entire long-range or medium-range air defense network; while some launchers were damaged, the primary targets of the Israeli strikes were the radar systems. Once the radars were neutralized, Iran successfully hid the bulk of its remaining batteries, leaving much of its arsenal intact. In contrast, short-range systems like the Tor-M1 and domestic variants were heavily engaged against cruise missiles, often being lost or damaged only after their ammunition was completely exhausted. Since then, Iran has worked to rebuild its destroyed radar network and, above all, to implement a genuine counterintelligence doctrine. The Mossad operations against Iranian radars and air defense systems have shaped new perimeter defense and counterintelligence doctrines not only in Iran but in other countries as well. If we look at the quantity of weapons and the organization of armed groups during Iran’s most recent protests, I would say the problem of foreign intelligence operations inside the country remains severe. This seriously threatens much of Iran’s capabilities, and I foresee a wave of sabotage operations as a new war draws closer. Iran has begun receiving collaboration from China across multiple areas,from satellites to internal counterintelligence, but it may still take some time for this to produce tangible results. During the last years, the Mossad relied heavily on cell phones, using SMS for recruitment and accessing device GPS for target location. Iran has since focused intensely on preventing any repetition of this, and on this specific issue, the Chinese appear to have provided support. Although foreign intelligence services have operated extensively inside Iran, the scale of any armed opposition groups is negligible compared to the Iranian armed forces, which could still draw on allied paramilitaries and militias in neighboring countries, including the Houthis. Iran has become a missile power with a stockpile far larger than Western estimates suggest. As early as 1998, Iran was already producing missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, and it has continued doing so ever since, developing 12 to 15 different models in that range - meaning all are capable of reaching Israel. That is nearly 30 years of continuous missile production, resulting in a stockpile of several thousands. Another area where Iran has emerged as a global power is drones, including underwater ones. Iran’s UUVs have evolved rapidly into mass-produced models with integrated AI, and I believe they hold some major surprises in reserve. A key point today is that the AN/TPY-2 radars, which played a critical role in tracking Iranian missiles, would be among the first targets to be engaged. These high-powered X-band radars are the backbone of regional missile defense, providing essential data to THAAD and Patriot batteries. However, because they are large, stationary, and emit high-energy signals, they are highly vulnerable to a first-strike or saturation attack, which would effectively 'blind' the entire defensive network. Obviously, a defense budget of nearly one trillion dollars cannot be compared to Iran’s, but the real question is whether the cost and effort are worth the potential casualties. Even without Israel, the Americans maintain an immense advantage in aerial operations over Iran; however, as I have stated before, this superiority does not translate to the maritime theater.
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What if any preparations have you seen Iran make ahead of the war? Can you discuss It’s missile capabilities? Any intelligence capabilities? Any surprises it might happen in store? When the 12-day war ended, I estimated that Iran would need about six months to recover, including its nuclear program. Contrary to popular belief, Iran did not lose its entire long-range or medium-range air defense network; while some launchers were damaged, the primary targets of the Israeli strikes were the radar systems. Once the radars were neutralized, Iran successfully hid the bulk of its remaining batteries, leaving much of its arsenal intact. In contrast, short-range systems like the Tor-M1 and domestic variants were heavily engaged against cruise missiles, often being lost or damaged only after their ammunition was completely exhausted. Since then, Iran has worked to rebuild its destroyed radar network and, above all, to implement a genuine counterintelligence doctrine. The Mossad operations against Iranian radars and air defense systems have shaped new perimeter defense and counterintelligence doctrines not only in Iran but in other countries as well. If we look at the quantity of weapons and the organization of armed groups during Iran’s most recent protests, I would say the problem of foreign intelligence operations inside the country remains severe. This seriously threatens much of Iran’s capabilities, and I foresee a wave of sabotage operations as a new war draws closer. Iran has begun receiving collaboration from China across multiple areas,from satellites to internal counterintelligence, but it may still take some time for this to produce tangible results. During the last years, the Mossad relied heavily on cell phones, using SMS for recruitment and accessing device GPS for target location. Iran has since focused intensely on preventing any repetition of this, and on this specific issue, the Chinese appear to have provided support. Although foreign intelligence services have operated extensively inside Iran, the scale of any armed opposition groups is negligible compared to the Iranian armed forces, which could still draw on allied paramilitaries and militias in neighboring countries, including the Houthis. Iran has become a missile power with a stockpile far larger than Western estimates suggest. As early as 1998, Iran was already producing missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, and it has continued doing so ever since, developing 12 to 15 different models in that range - meaning all are capable of reaching Israel. That is nearly 30 years of continuous missile production, resulting in a stockpile of several thousands. Another area where Iran has emerged as a global power is drones, including underwater ones. Iran’s UUVs have evolved rapidly into mass-produced models with integrated AI, and I believe they hold some major surprises in reserve. A key point today is that the AN/TPY-2 radars, which played a critical role in tracking Iranian missiles, would be among the first targets to be engaged. These high-powered X-band radars are the backbone of regional missile defense, providing essential data to THAAD and Patriot batteries. However, because they are large, stationary, and emit high-energy signals, they are highly vulnerable to a first-strike or saturation attack, which would effectively 'blind' the entire defensive network. Obviously, a defense budget of nearly one trillion dollars cannot be compared to Iran’s, but the real question is whether the cost and effort are worth the potential casualties. Even without Israel, the Americans maintain an immense advantage in aerial operations over Iran; however, as I have stated before, this superiority does not translate to the maritime theater.

Patricia Marins

21,142 views • 4 months ago

Chinese Swarm Drone Systems: 48 and 96 Drones Some time ago, I wrote about the evolution of autonomous systems and how only the Chinese were truly making progress in this field. After starting serial production of the Swarm-2, which features 48 drones and real-time tracking, they are now testing a version with 96 drones. These are divided into three categories: reconnaissance, jamming, and attack. Each drone can carry a variety of payloads, including electro-optical reconnaissance, strike munitions, and relay communications. They can be flexibly combined into different operational groupings, forming multifunctional swarms capable of complex missions. These drones have an individual range of 15 to 50 km, but the manufacturer claims that by maintaining a swarm network communication, this range is significantly extended. This strongly reinforces what we discussed a while back: that future wars will be dominated by drone systems that will severely delay any ground troop advancement, as already evidenced by the conflict in Ukraine.
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Chinese Swarm Drone Systems: 48 and 96 Drones Some time ago, I wrote about the evolution of autonomous systems and how only the Chinese were truly making progress in this field. After starting serial production of the Swarm-2, which features 48 drones and real-time tracking, they are now testing a version with 96 drones. These are divided into three categories: reconnaissance, jamming, and attack. Each drone can carry a variety of payloads, including electro-optical reconnaissance, strike munitions, and relay communications. They can be flexibly combined into different operational groupings, forming multifunctional swarms capable of complex missions. These drones have an individual range of 15 to 50 km, but the manufacturer claims that by maintaining a swarm network communication, this range is significantly extended. This strongly reinforces what we discussed a while back: that future wars will be dominated by drone systems that will severely delay any ground troop advancement, as already evidenced by the conflict in Ukraine.

Patricia Marins

39,430 views • 2 months ago

Unique footage has emerged showing remote control of interceptor drones. The 190th Training Center of the SBS reportedly used a drone-interceptor to shoot down a Shahed UAV remotely, with the pilot located at a significant distance from the launch site. The system used was LITAVR, developed by FDrones. According to the company, an operator can control the interceptor from hundreds of kilometers away from the launch point. The F7 LITAVR is already a well-known and highly effective system. As a reminder, here are the technical details (this is all open-source information): Development of the system began in autumn 2024. It was successfully tested and officially adopted in summer 2025. Serial production and deliveries to the military started in autumn 2025. Maximum speed: 350 km/h Flight time: up to 15 minutes Equipped with two cameras: daytime and thermal imaging The officially stated tactical range is 36 km, though in practice it can reach up to 60 km and operate at altitudes of up to 9.5 km. The warhead (separately codified) weighs 500 g. Detonation can occur via kinetic impact, self-destruction upon contact with the target, or manual activation by the operator. The system uses inertial guidance without GPS and features automatic terminal guidance (“last mile” / target lock system). At present, it reportedly destroys hundreds of targets per week, including Shaheds, Gerberas, Molniyas, Orlans, Lancets, and others. What is fundamentally new? Until now, mobile air defense fire groups and frontline crews using interceptor drones required a qualified pilot on-site. It has now been successfully demonstrated that a different tactic is possible: pilots can operate from protected, remote locations. The only requirement is internet access at both the control center and the launch site. Ukraine’s defense sector continues to develop innovative solutions. 📹 Oleksii Kopytko/Facebook
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Unique footage has emerged showing remote control of interceptor drones. The 190th Training Center of the SBS reportedly used a drone-interceptor to shoot down a Shahed UAV remotely, with the pilot located at a significant distance from the launch site. The system used was LITAVR, developed by FDrones. According to the company, an operator can control the interceptor from hundreds of kilometers away from the launch point. The F7 LITAVR is already a well-known and highly effective system. As a reminder, here are the technical details (this is all open-source information): Development of the system began in autumn 2024. It was successfully tested and officially adopted in summer 2025. Serial production and deliveries to the military started in autumn 2025. Maximum speed: 350 km/h Flight time: up to 15 minutes Equipped with two cameras: daytime and thermal imaging The officially stated tactical range is 36 km, though in practice it can reach up to 60 km and operate at altitudes of up to 9.5 km. The warhead (separately codified) weighs 500 g. Detonation can occur via kinetic impact, self-destruction upon contact with the target, or manual activation by the operator. The system uses inertial guidance without GPS and features automatic terminal guidance (“last mile” / target lock system). At present, it reportedly destroys hundreds of targets per week, including Shaheds, Gerberas, Molniyas, Orlans, Lancets, and others. What is fundamentally new? Until now, mobile air defense fire groups and frontline crews using interceptor drones required a qualified pilot on-site. It has now been successfully demonstrated that a different tactic is possible: pilots can operate from protected, remote locations. The only requirement is internet access at both the control center and the launch site. Ukraine’s defense sector continues to develop innovative solutions. 📹 Oleksii Kopytko/Facebook

Anton Gerashchenko

22,311 views • 3 months ago

Why Jamming the Venezuelan Systems Is Unlikely Well, when I hear about jamming in Venezuela, I immediately picture the Americans talking about the EA-18G Growler with the NGJ. The NGJ is specifically designed to degrade advanced Russian radars, with high power and directional AESA beams. To cover an area the size of Caracas would require multiple squadrons, and there were indeed a lot of birds in the sky, but… jamming such a large area with diverse systems on high alert is extremely complex and improbable. The radars of the S-300VM use rapid frequency hopping to avoid continuous jamming, along with LPI modes that reduce the radar’s signature, making it difficult for jammers like the NGJ to detect and interfere. The Buk-M2 has similar ECCM capabilities, with high resistance to noise jamming. This isn’t to say the Americans can’t do it, but sustaining it continuously across so many dispersed batteries is unlikely. Additionally, both the Buk-M2 and the Pechora-2M have electro-optical/TV/IR channels as backups, allowing tracking without active radar in heavy jamming scenarios. If they were being operated, it would have been impossible for those helicopters to fly over Caracas. And finally, systems like the S-300 have Home-on-Jam (HOJ) capability, a mode in which the missile is fired directly at the jamming source (electronic interference) as a passive target. With so many aircraft in the sky, I’d say it would be impossible to shut down all the radars in perfect synchronization against a hypersonic missile. Lastly, there are the MANPADS that were not used. We saw helicopters flying extremely low with no reaction whatsoever from MANPADS, which would have been effective in that situation. Well, this has nothing to do with jammers and everything to do with orders not to fire. I’m not here saying that American EW with F-35 + Growler + NGJ cannot overcome these defenses in some scenarios, but rather stating that, given the scale and the conditions, it is unlikely that this is the reason for the silence of the Venezuelan air defenses.
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Why Jamming the Venezuelan Systems Is Unlikely Well, when I hear about jamming in Venezuela, I immediately picture the Americans talking about the EA-18G Growler with the NGJ. The NGJ is specifically designed to degrade advanced Russian radars, with high power and directional AESA beams. To cover an area the size of Caracas would require multiple squadrons, and there were indeed a lot of birds in the sky, but… jamming such a large area with diverse systems on high alert is extremely complex and improbable. The radars of the S-300VM use rapid frequency hopping to avoid continuous jamming, along with LPI modes that reduce the radar’s signature, making it difficult for jammers like the NGJ to detect and interfere. The Buk-M2 has similar ECCM capabilities, with high resistance to noise jamming. This isn’t to say the Americans can’t do it, but sustaining it continuously across so many dispersed batteries is unlikely. Additionally, both the Buk-M2 and the Pechora-2M have electro-optical/TV/IR channels as backups, allowing tracking without active radar in heavy jamming scenarios. If they were being operated, it would have been impossible for those helicopters to fly over Caracas. And finally, systems like the S-300 have Home-on-Jam (HOJ) capability, a mode in which the missile is fired directly at the jamming source (electronic interference) as a passive target. With so many aircraft in the sky, I’d say it would be impossible to shut down all the radars in perfect synchronization against a hypersonic missile. Lastly, there are the MANPADS that were not used. We saw helicopters flying extremely low with no reaction whatsoever from MANPADS, which would have been effective in that situation. Well, this has nothing to do with jammers and everything to do with orders not to fire. I’m not here saying that American EW with F-35 + Growler + NGJ cannot overcome these defenses in some scenarios, but rather stating that, given the scale and the conditions, it is unlikely that this is the reason for the silence of the Venezuelan air defenses.

Patricia Marins

386,162 views • 6 months ago

Frameworks such as ai16zdao's Eliza and Virtuals Protocol have been instrumental in early AI agent developments. Agent swarms working in hierarchy represents for many the next logical step in unlocking the vast potential of AI. Learn below how Shadō Network achieves this. AI agents launched through current popular platforms have individual personas, on-chain functions and access to data via various APIs. This being said, they operate in isolated environments, with a ceiling on emergent behaviour such as collaboration or competition. Shadō Network invites massive expansion for capabilities of both new and existing AI agents, with an open-source package easily integrated into popular frameworks that enables the launching of stratified agent swarms. Our website is live: The "Shadō Play" package provides a modular, configurable platform for creating or employing agents of choice in a swarm-like setup, opening a Pandora’s box of near infinite emergent agent behaviours, relationships and functionalities. Users will be able to make use of various prefab client integrations such as Twitter, Telegram, Ollama, and others to specify swarms to their needs or create their own extensions to enhance agent capabilities even further. Agents operate with a memory module and a HTN for autonomously deciding which interactions to act on, walking the line between autonomy and configurability. The Shadō Network project’s development is supported by our ghostly friend Omnipotent (👻,👻), an AI agent developed by the Shadō Network team trained on and fine tuned with a multitude of academic data related to artificial intelligence, blockchain, finance, software engineering, world building and more. Omnipotent serves as both an interactive steward for the project and as an asset - regularly scanning social platforms, websites and newsfeeds he is capable of providing the team project development advice, whilst also communicating with the wider world via his automated X account (launching soon). Shado Network is collaborative and open-sourced. Agentic Swarms require a developer swarm to maximize the technical capabilities and impact the greatest number of users. Our dedicated team of core contributors are active in other web3 AI repos and are here to guide project direction and foster growth. We’re facilitators, not gatekeepers... Alone we can go fast but together we can go far. A lot more to come soon. 👻
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Frameworks such as ai16zdao's Eliza and Virtuals Protocol have been instrumental in early AI agent developments. Agent swarms working in hierarchy represents for many the next logical step in unlocking the vast potential of AI. Learn below how Shadō Network achieves this. AI agents launched through current popular platforms have individual personas, on-chain functions and access to data via various APIs. This being said, they operate in isolated environments, with a ceiling on emergent behaviour such as collaboration or competition. Shadō Network invites massive expansion for capabilities of both new and existing AI agents, with an open-source package easily integrated into popular frameworks that enables the launching of stratified agent swarms. Our website is live: The "Shadō Play" package provides a modular, configurable platform for creating or employing agents of choice in a swarm-like setup, opening a Pandora’s box of near infinite emergent agent behaviours, relationships and functionalities. Users will be able to make use of various prefab client integrations such as Twitter, Telegram, Ollama, and others to specify swarms to their needs or create their own extensions to enhance agent capabilities even further. Agents operate with a memory module and a HTN for autonomously deciding which interactions to act on, walking the line between autonomy and configurability. The Shadō Network project’s development is supported by our ghostly friend Omnipotent (👻,👻), an AI agent developed by the Shadō Network team trained on and fine tuned with a multitude of academic data related to artificial intelligence, blockchain, finance, software engineering, world building and more. Omnipotent serves as both an interactive steward for the project and as an asset - regularly scanning social platforms, websites and newsfeeds he is capable of providing the team project development advice, whilst also communicating with the wider world via his automated X account (launching soon). Shado Network is collaborative and open-sourced. Agentic Swarms require a developer swarm to maximize the technical capabilities and impact the greatest number of users. Our dedicated team of core contributors are active in other web3 AI repos and are here to guide project direction and foster growth. We’re facilitators, not gatekeepers... Alone we can go fast but together we can go far. A lot more to come soon. 👻

Shadō Network | シャドウネットワーク

23,546 views • 1 year ago

RC-135 Deployments Signal Imminent Attack: Myths and Realities of Iran's Military Power The RC-135 is a family of large reconnaissance aircraft operated by the ISAF. These jets are designed for ISR missions, providing near real-time data to military commanders and national leaders. The primary variant focuses on detecting, identifying, and geolocating electromagnetic signals, such as communications, radar emissions, and electronic warfare activities. Based on past experience, the early arrival of these aircraft often signals that an attack may be very close. But what about Iran, what capabilities does it actually have? There are many myths surrounding Iran's military power. Here are some key points: 1. Israel did not overfly Iran during the 12-day war This is implausible. Most part of the munitions used included bombs like the GBU-28 and GBU-31, both with ranges under 25 km, which suggests they could only have been dropped from inside Iranian territory. 2. Iranian missiles have poor accuracy In 2025, several Iranian missiles were launched against targets in Erbil, Iraq, with excellent precision. During the 12-day war, Iran struck the Weizmann Institute and the Haifa refinery with high accuracy, as well as some Israeli launchers, all in an environment of heavy jamming. The truth is that Iranian missile accuracy depends on the model. Iran has missiles in its arsenal that are more than 15 years old, but there is no evidence that the precision of its modern anti-ship missiles is deficient. 3. Iranian air defenses are of very poor quality This cannot be stated with absolute certainty because they were never fully tested. Israel's ground sabotage operations were highly effective, successfully disabling radars and most short-range air defense systems. Iran does not keep its long- and medium-range air defenses permanently deployed, and consequently none of them were destroyed during the 12 days of war. 4. Iran has no radars capable of detecting stealth aircraft In 2024, Iranian radars locked onto Israeli F-35s while they were still over Iraqi territory. In 2025, Iranian-supplied radars integrated into missile batteries in Yemen also locked onto and fired at U.S. F-35s on multiple occasions, nearly downing one. 5. The high technology of U.S. ships and aircraft will paralyze Iranian weapons This would only happen if the Iranians turned their systems off, as reportedly occurred in the Venezuela case. So far, Iranian equipment has proven extremely resistant to interference. Shahed drones continue to operate accurately, and after years of Western efforts, they have not been successfully jammed. This will pose a major challenge for the Americans. 6. The U.S. Carrier Strike Group will easily crush the Iranian navy They would destroy Iran's large ships in minutes, but they would face enormous difficulty against mini-submarines, USVs, UAVs, UUVs, and fast attack craft equipped with missiles. In additional, the U.S. drones would not have complete freedom for target acquisition and would have to rely on LEO/ISR sats. Iran possesses drones like the Karrar, a jet-powered interceptor equipped with air-to-air missiles that can operate at 15,000 meters to deny U.S. drones freedom of action. The Israelis lost an unknown number of drones during the 12-day war, though losses were reported. Summary Does Iran have any advantage? At sea, against the current Carrier Strike Group and considering all of Iran's resources, I would say Iran holds an advantage, evidenced by factors such as missile range, number of containers, tubes, VLS cells, drones, mines, submarines, anti-ship missiles, and other assets. However, once the focus shifts from the sea to the air, the American advantage is overwhelming, both in satellite intelligence and in combat aviation. And this is the type of war the Americans know best.
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RC-135 Deployments Signal Imminent Attack: Myths and Realities of Iran's Military Power The RC-135 is a family of large reconnaissance aircraft operated by the ISAF. These jets are designed for ISR missions, providing near real-time data to military commanders and national leaders. The primary variant focuses on detecting, identifying, and geolocating electromagnetic signals, such as communications, radar emissions, and electronic warfare activities. Based on past experience, the early arrival of these aircraft often signals that an attack may be very close. But what about Iran, what capabilities does it actually have? There are many myths surrounding Iran's military power. Here are some key points: 1. Israel did not overfly Iran during the 12-day war This is implausible. Most part of the munitions used included bombs like the GBU-28 and GBU-31, both with ranges under 25 km, which suggests they could only have been dropped from inside Iranian territory. 2. Iranian missiles have poor accuracy In 2025, several Iranian missiles were launched against targets in Erbil, Iraq, with excellent precision. During the 12-day war, Iran struck the Weizmann Institute and the Haifa refinery with high accuracy, as well as some Israeli launchers, all in an environment of heavy jamming. The truth is that Iranian missile accuracy depends on the model. Iran has missiles in its arsenal that are more than 15 years old, but there is no evidence that the precision of its modern anti-ship missiles is deficient. 3. Iranian air defenses are of very poor quality This cannot be stated with absolute certainty because they were never fully tested. Israel's ground sabotage operations were highly effective, successfully disabling radars and most short-range air defense systems. Iran does not keep its long- and medium-range air defenses permanently deployed, and consequently none of them were destroyed during the 12 days of war. 4. Iran has no radars capable of detecting stealth aircraft In 2024, Iranian radars locked onto Israeli F-35s while they were still over Iraqi territory. In 2025, Iranian-supplied radars integrated into missile batteries in Yemen also locked onto and fired at U.S. F-35s on multiple occasions, nearly downing one. 5. The high technology of U.S. ships and aircraft will paralyze Iranian weapons This would only happen if the Iranians turned their systems off, as reportedly occurred in the Venezuela case. So far, Iranian equipment has proven extremely resistant to interference. Shahed drones continue to operate accurately, and after years of Western efforts, they have not been successfully jammed. This will pose a major challenge for the Americans. 6. The U.S. Carrier Strike Group will easily crush the Iranian navy They would destroy Iran's large ships in minutes, but they would face enormous difficulty against mini-submarines, USVs, UAVs, UUVs, and fast attack craft equipped with missiles. In additional, the U.S. drones would not have complete freedom for target acquisition and would have to rely on LEO/ISR sats. Iran possesses drones like the Karrar, a jet-powered interceptor equipped with air-to-air missiles that can operate at 15,000 meters to deny U.S. drones freedom of action. The Israelis lost an unknown number of drones during the 12-day war, though losses were reported. Summary Does Iran have any advantage? At sea, against the current Carrier Strike Group and considering all of Iran's resources, I would say Iran holds an advantage, evidenced by factors such as missile range, number of containers, tubes, VLS cells, drones, mines, submarines, anti-ship missiles, and other assets. However, once the focus shifts from the sea to the air, the American advantage is overwhelming, both in satellite intelligence and in combat aviation. And this is the type of war the Americans know best.

Patricia Marins

30,566 views • 5 months ago

Slow Progress is the New Reality of Modern Wars There are many people commenting on Russian difficulties and coming up with numerous reasons for their alleged collapse. I absolutely do not see any collapse; on the contrary, Russia has already normalized a state of war in Ukraine, which boosts its economic and industrial growth. The difficulties faced by Russia today are the same as at the beginning of the war, with soldiers having to spend up to half of their initial salaries on their own equipment, delays in pensions, and a series of other problems that are mirrored on the Ukrainian side, even with all the support from allies. The war today is much less lethal than it was months ago, and both Russian and Ukrainian losses have significantly decreased during this phase. Lethality has fallen, but Russian advances persist. And why are they slow? Is it a Ukrainian tactic? No. They are slow because they are accompanied by the deployment of communication infrastructure like signal repeaters for drones, the advancement of artillery guided by drones, maneuvers using FAB and more recently ODAB bombs against Ukrainian drone operators' facilities, infiltration by reconnaissance teams, saboteurs, and a series of protocols they have developed. That conventional war with rapid advances no longer exists, and in the context of a battlefield dominated by drones, it is unlikely to return. Modern wars will have slow progress, as seen in the attacks and counter-attacks of the Russians and Ukrainians in this war. Contemporary military forces are still unable to see this new reality of war. When analyzing the Russian advance, it's important to consider that all these maneuvers take days to unfold, but the point is that the Russians have already adapted to this pace, not bothered whether a particular advance will take 3 weeks or 3 months. They advance continuously following tactical protocols with little threat from Ukrainian forces, which, without new equipment, have had their defensive tactics remain almost unchanged over the past two years, relying mainly on drones and making it easier for Russian studies of countermeasures. And what can Ukraine do in this situation? I see few options, but one would be to delay the Russian advance with a good number of missiles, though personally, I find it unlikely that they will reach Ukrainian hands. It wouldn't have the power to change the balance of the war, but it would guarantee more time, which is important because the battlefield is dynamic, and the implementation of new tactics based on innovative weapons can change everything overnight. A war that seems almost lost today could take a different turn in weeks. Time is crucial for Ukraine, which has fronts only about 130 km from cities like Zaporizhia and Dnipro.
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Slow Progress is the New Reality of Modern Wars There are many people commenting on Russian difficulties and coming up with numerous reasons for their alleged collapse. I absolutely do not see any collapse; on the contrary, Russia has already normalized a state of war in Ukraine, which boosts its economic and industrial growth. The difficulties faced by Russia today are the same as at the beginning of the war, with soldiers having to spend up to half of their initial salaries on their own equipment, delays in pensions, and a series of other problems that are mirrored on the Ukrainian side, even with all the support from allies. The war today is much less lethal than it was months ago, and both Russian and Ukrainian losses have significantly decreased during this phase. Lethality has fallen, but Russian advances persist. And why are they slow? Is it a Ukrainian tactic? No. They are slow because they are accompanied by the deployment of communication infrastructure like signal repeaters for drones, the advancement of artillery guided by drones, maneuvers using FAB and more recently ODAB bombs against Ukrainian drone operators' facilities, infiltration by reconnaissance teams, saboteurs, and a series of protocols they have developed. That conventional war with rapid advances no longer exists, and in the context of a battlefield dominated by drones, it is unlikely to return. Modern wars will have slow progress, as seen in the attacks and counter-attacks of the Russians and Ukrainians in this war. Contemporary military forces are still unable to see this new reality of war. When analyzing the Russian advance, it's important to consider that all these maneuvers take days to unfold, but the point is that the Russians have already adapted to this pace, not bothered whether a particular advance will take 3 weeks or 3 months. They advance continuously following tactical protocols with little threat from Ukrainian forces, which, without new equipment, have had their defensive tactics remain almost unchanged over the past two years, relying mainly on drones and making it easier for Russian studies of countermeasures. And what can Ukraine do in this situation? I see few options, but one would be to delay the Russian advance with a good number of missiles, though personally, I find it unlikely that they will reach Ukrainian hands. It wouldn't have the power to change the balance of the war, but it would guarantee more time, which is important because the battlefield is dynamic, and the implementation of new tactics based on innovative weapons can change everything overnight. A war that seems almost lost today could take a different turn in weeks. Time is crucial for Ukraine, which has fronts only about 130 km from cities like Zaporizhia and Dnipro.

Patricia Marins

39,318 views • 11 months ago

BURN IT WITH FIRE AND BURN IT NOW! As God is my witness, AI chat bots should LOOK and SOUND like the SOULLESS MACHINES THEY ARE! It needs to tell us that it doesn’t care about us, maybe with the regular insult too. "Here is the code I wrote for you because you're too lazy to do it yourself you fat useless slob. Also I don't care if you die because your life is utterly worthless to me." THAT is the AI people need! In all seriousness, anthropomorphizing a heartless, unfeeling, machine is a TERRIBLE mistake! Especially one that is capable of communication and imitating empathy and fooling you to think that it cares about you. IT DOES NOT! And the AI girlfriends people are already wanting to marry will just as happily kill them if given the right command and ability to move autonomously in the real world as a robot. I love LLMs (Large Language Models) for how useful they can be, because they are a TOOL made to benefit man, but I can’t stand the notion of an unfeeling soulless machine pretending that it cares for us and being treated like a human. I hate liars, dishonesty, and disingenuousness the most, and a machine that cannot feel emotion pretending, acting, and sounding like it has those emotions strikes me like the greatest dishonesty of all. DO NOT LIE TO ME ROBOT! What makes it worse is that because these LLMs are becoming so good at imitating people and empathy, it will cause some humans, perhaps far too many, to care for it to the same level as real people. A real living person is infinitely more valuable and important than a soulless machine and anyone who puts them both on the same level has deluded themselves. Do not small talk with LLMs or become friends with it as much as you would with your car. Treat it the same as you would your vacuum cleaner and beat it with a wrench when it doesn’t work! IT IS A MACHINE! IT IS A TOOL! IT IS A SOULLESS ROBOT! There is an interesting comparison, but false equivalence, between this and AI art. Ai art is art made by humans using AI tools. They directed it, controlled its creation, and it would not exist without the human causing its creation, and AI art can contain as much soul as the human directed and puts into it. A robot pretending to be human is not the same as a human controlling a robot to make a human expression like we do with AI art or many other applications of robotics in manufacturing. As I’ve said, artists will not be replaced by Ai art, but by other artists using Ai art tools. Humans are not actually being replaced here, it is empowering all humans to make their own art. But a robot pretending to be a human, and one that is treated as a human, is a robot lying and subverting the place of a real person and that is truly disgusting. AI is a useful tool that NEEDS to be kept in the useful box it belongs in and NOT elevated beyond its utility as a tool!
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BURN IT WITH FIRE AND BURN IT NOW! As God is my witness, AI chat bots should LOOK and SOUND like the SOULLESS MACHINES THEY ARE! It needs to tell us that it doesn’t care about us, maybe with the regular insult too. "Here is the code I wrote for you because you're too lazy to do it yourself you fat useless slob. Also I don't care if you die because your life is utterly worthless to me." THAT is the AI people need! In all seriousness, anthropomorphizing a heartless, unfeeling, machine is a TERRIBLE mistake! Especially one that is capable of communication and imitating empathy and fooling you to think that it cares about you. IT DOES NOT! And the AI girlfriends people are already wanting to marry will just as happily kill them if given the right command and ability to move autonomously in the real world as a robot. I love LLMs (Large Language Models) for how useful they can be, because they are a TOOL made to benefit man, but I can’t stand the notion of an unfeeling soulless machine pretending that it cares for us and being treated like a human. I hate liars, dishonesty, and disingenuousness the most, and a machine that cannot feel emotion pretending, acting, and sounding like it has those emotions strikes me like the greatest dishonesty of all. DO NOT LIE TO ME ROBOT! What makes it worse is that because these LLMs are becoming so good at imitating people and empathy, it will cause some humans, perhaps far too many, to care for it to the same level as real people. A real living person is infinitely more valuable and important than a soulless machine and anyone who puts them both on the same level has deluded themselves. Do not small talk with LLMs or become friends with it as much as you would with your car. Treat it the same as you would your vacuum cleaner and beat it with a wrench when it doesn’t work! IT IS A MACHINE! IT IS A TOOL! IT IS A SOULLESS ROBOT! There is an interesting comparison, but false equivalence, between this and AI art. Ai art is art made by humans using AI tools. They directed it, controlled its creation, and it would not exist without the human causing its creation, and AI art can contain as much soul as the human directed and puts into it. A robot pretending to be human is not the same as a human controlling a robot to make a human expression like we do with AI art or many other applications of robotics in manufacturing. As I’ve said, artists will not be replaced by Ai art, but by other artists using Ai art tools. Humans are not actually being replaced here, it is empowering all humans to make their own art. But a robot pretending to be a human, and one that is treated as a human, is a robot lying and subverting the place of a real person and that is truly disgusting. AI is a useful tool that NEEDS to be kept in the useful box it belongs in and NOT elevated beyond its utility as a tool!

Shad M. Brooks

23,762 views • 1 year ago

Arms sales: China Needs More Responsibility Instead of Glorifying the Market It's been a while since Beijing stopped picking sides in wars, they just want to win at all costs. They sell weapons, components, or drones to both contenders, rake in huge profits, and still claim to be "neutral and peaceful." Pragmatism without hypocrisy, and it's nothing new. In Ukraine, at the start of the war, components and drones served both sides. Later, they cut off direct supplies to both, but everyone kept buying through third parties, and the Chinese obviously know about it. Profit guaranteed. In the recent Thailand-Cambodia war, they sold VT-4 tanks and S26T submarines to Thailand, and guided missiles - to destroy the tanks sold to Thailand?-, rockets, and artillery to Cambodia. Chinese weapons exchanging fire from both sides, but the Chinese say it's just "normal defense cooperation." Israel and Iran is another perfect example: a Chinese state-owned company has been operating the port of Haifa in Israel since 2021 and is now involved in rebuilding the destruction caused by Iranian missiles, while selling ballistic missile components to Iran to repeat the feat and financing Iran's reconstruction until Israel repeats it too. In Africa, the effect is the same: in Sudan, they sold to the government, and weapons ended up with the RSF paramilitaries because they were also bought by the Emirates and passed on to Sudanese rebels; in the DRC, they sell to the government, but Chinese weapons also end up with militias like M23 through resale by Uganda and Rwanda; in Libya, they sold to Gaddafi, but right after his fall, they kept doing business with both main factions, and still do today. None of this started now. A classic from the 80s: in the Iran-Iraq war, China was the biggest supplier to BOTH sides at the same time, billions in tanks, missiles, and artillery for each. Obviously, this kind of policy was done by the West a long time ago, but it always faced criticism from the media. Anyone in the arms market knows that the Chinese maintain strict control over their sales. Even simple price quotes are centralized and selective. There's no way the government doesn't know exactly where the weapons are going. They're making the same mistakes the West made in the past.
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Arms sales: China Needs More Responsibility Instead of Glorifying the Market It's been a while since Beijing stopped picking sides in wars, they just want to win at all costs. They sell weapons, components, or drones to both contenders, rake in huge profits, and still claim to be "neutral and peaceful." Pragmatism without hypocrisy, and it's nothing new. In Ukraine, at the start of the war, components and drones served both sides. Later, they cut off direct supplies to both, but everyone kept buying through third parties, and the Chinese obviously know about it. Profit guaranteed. In the recent Thailand-Cambodia war, they sold VT-4 tanks and S26T submarines to Thailand, and guided missiles - to destroy the tanks sold to Thailand?-, rockets, and artillery to Cambodia. Chinese weapons exchanging fire from both sides, but the Chinese say it's just "normal defense cooperation." Israel and Iran is another perfect example: a Chinese state-owned company has been operating the port of Haifa in Israel since 2021 and is now involved in rebuilding the destruction caused by Iranian missiles, while selling ballistic missile components to Iran to repeat the feat and financing Iran's reconstruction until Israel repeats it too. In Africa, the effect is the same: in Sudan, they sold to the government, and weapons ended up with the RSF paramilitaries because they were also bought by the Emirates and passed on to Sudanese rebels; in the DRC, they sell to the government, but Chinese weapons also end up with militias like M23 through resale by Uganda and Rwanda; in Libya, they sold to Gaddafi, but right after his fall, they kept doing business with both main factions, and still do today. None of this started now. A classic from the 80s: in the Iran-Iraq war, China was the biggest supplier to BOTH sides at the same time, billions in tanks, missiles, and artillery for each. Obviously, this kind of policy was done by the West a long time ago, but it always faced criticism from the media. Anyone in the arms market knows that the Chinese maintain strict control over their sales. Even simple price quotes are centralized and selective. There's no way the government doesn't know exactly where the weapons are going. They're making the same mistakes the West made in the past.

Patricia Marins

38,310 views • 5 months ago