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Timber trucks in Amedi supply Turkish outposts as satellite data shows sharp woodland loss along the border Truckloads of cut timber on roads in Amedi district, east Duhok province, over the past week have caused controversy in the Kurdistan Region. Rudaw reports five to ten trucks a day, which... has started a week or so ago, moving through Barwari Bala, which is to the north of Amedi close to the Turkish border, toward Turkish military positions, with wood cut on both the Amedi side and across the border in Turkey. Village heads and local officials told Rudaw that most of the cutting is done by contractors building roads to Turkish positions. The wood goes to outposts including Girê Biyê, Bin Brifka and Miska - all in Amedi district, often one or two truckloads per position. Turkey has steadily expanded its bases and roads in Duhok's border mountains since launching its Claw operations against the PKK in 2019. The practice dates back years. In 2021, Sheikh Mus Babat, a contractor from the Babat tribe - a Kurdish tribe from Turkey, told Rudaw that his company had built a 74 km military road into Haftanin. The Kurdish Babat tribe is influential in Uludere, directly across the border from this area, and has a strong presence in Turkey's village guard system, fighting the PKK alongside Turkish forces for decades. Babat said another firm had built a 38 km road from Ashite to the Kesta mountains. He confirmed that trees were being felled and said the wood heated Turkish soldiers, denying it was sold in Turkey. Turkish court records support his account. A 2024 Court of Cassation ruling on the death of a Turkish soldier states that he was in "northern Iraq" in November 2020 to inspect winter firewood supplied by tender to bases in the Claw-Tiger operation area. Residents told Shafaq News website that the cutting happens every year at this time and continues until late autumn, which is consistent with outposts stockpiling fuel before winter. There is no count of trees cut and no public record of whether the KRG has authorised the cutting. However, the trucks pass through KDP checkpoints on their way to the outposts, which means the authorities are at least aware of the movement. There is also no record of any restoration. Turkey runs large afforestation programmes at home, including in Sirnak province opposite Amedi, and its forestry law requires an afforestation fee when forest land is used for other purposes. No equivalent mechanism has been documented for its positions inside the Kurdistan Region. Long-term forest decline is a problem across Duhok governorate. A study using the same method for each district found that forest-classified land fell by about 19% in Amedi between 2000 and 2024. It fell by 27% in Zakho and 33% in Duhok district. Duhok district has no comparable Turkish military presence, so its larger decline points to drought, fires, urban growth and land-use change across the governorate.show more

Kurdistan Watch

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16,729 次观看 • 2 天前 •via X (Twitter)

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Amanc 的头像

Amanc1 天前

under the rule of two corrupt family everything is sold

Serdar Ali 的头像

Serdar Ali1 天前

Hade Kuzey Kürdistan işgal altında sömürgecilerin kontrolün de olduğu için agaç,doğa katliamların önüne geçilemiyor. Peki ya Güney Kürdistana ne demeli??

Kurda 的头像

Kurda1 天前

@UNEP

Ashkan_CH 的头像

Ashkan_CH2 天前

Stop the plundering of Kurdistan’s natural resources. Stand united, speak out, and demand accountability for the exploitation of our land.💚💛❤️✌️✌️✌️💪💪

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A historic moment: the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has announced a complete end to its operations in Turkey “The conflicts and wars unfolding in the Middle East have begun to pose a serious threat to the future of both Turkey and the Kurdish people. In this regard, we have decided to withdraw all our forces from Turkish territory,” the statement reads. The PKK — designated a terrorist organization by Turkish authorities — will withdraw all its fighters to northern Iraq. Earlier, the group declared its self-dissolution and the end of its armed struggle. Since the 1980s, the PKK has waged an insurgency against the Turkish state, seeking autonomy and rights for the Kurdish population. The conflict has claimed tens of thousands of lives and become one of the region’s longest-running. The Kurds are the largest stateless nation in the world, living mainly across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. There are more than 15 million Kurds in Turkey alone.

A historic moment: the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has announced a complete end to its operations in Turkey “The conflicts and wars unfolding in the Middle East have begun to pose a serious threat to the future of both Turkey and the Kurdish people. In this regard, we have decided to withdraw all our forces from Turkish territory,” the statement reads. The PKK — designated a terrorist organization by Turkish authorities — will withdraw all its fighters to northern Iraq. Earlier, the group declared its self-dissolution and the end of its armed struggle. Since the 1980s, the PKK has waged an insurgency against the Turkish state, seeking autonomy and rights for the Kurdish population. The conflict has claimed tens of thousands of lives and become one of the region’s longest-running. The Kurds are the largest stateless nation in the world, living mainly across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. There are more than 15 million Kurds in Turkey alone.

NEXTA

82,350 次观看 • 11 个月前

Growing indications suggest the PKK has vacated almost all tunnels, hideouts and positions along the border with Turkey, including on Mount Gara, as shown in this map. Several reports, including by the Turkish newspaper Nefes and the pan-Arab Asharq Al-Awsat, indicate the PKK has abandoned as many as 80 positions, redeploying fighters to Qandil and southward along the Iranian border into Sulaimani province. Several pro-PKK sources have indicated as much. We have reported previously that the PKK, while withdrawing from positions along the Turkish border, is simultaneously expanding its presence along the Iranian border. Here: This also explains the momentum on the legal framework set to be sent to the Turkish parliament in the coming days as final details are negotiated. Details here: One point that remains contested and unconfirmed is how many of these positions have been taken over by the Turkish military. For instance, have Turkish troops moved onto Mount Gara, which lies deep inside the KDP zone within the Kurdistan Region? Here is why Gara metters this much: It is also becoming increasingly clear that the PKK's residual presence is being funnelled entirely into the PUK zone around Sulaimani.

Growing indications suggest the PKK has vacated almost all tunnels, hideouts and positions along the border with Turkey, including on Mount Gara, as shown in this map. Several reports, including by the Turkish newspaper Nefes and the pan-Arab Asharq Al-Awsat, indicate the PKK has abandoned as many as 80 positions, redeploying fighters to Qandil and southward along the Iranian border into Sulaimani province. Several pro-PKK sources have indicated as much. We have reported previously that the PKK, while withdrawing from positions along the Turkish border, is simultaneously expanding its presence along the Iranian border. Here: This also explains the momentum on the legal framework set to be sent to the Turkish parliament in the coming days as final details are negotiated. Details here: One point that remains contested and unconfirmed is how many of these positions have been taken over by the Turkish military. For instance, have Turkish troops moved onto Mount Gara, which lies deep inside the KDP zone within the Kurdistan Region? Here is why Gara metters this much: It is also becoming increasingly clear that the PKK's residual presence is being funnelled entirely into the PUK zone around Sulaimani.

The National Context

10,771 次观看 • 2 个月前

This is perhaps one of the most candid acknowledgments from a KDP official regarding the depth of their ties with Turkey: Hoshyar Zebari states that the KDP is not only close to Turkey but saying, “We don’t hide anything from each other.” He goes on to praise Turkey’s treatment of civilians, claiming that it has shown more mercy and kindness than the PKK. When challenged by the reporter—who references conversations with local civilians—Zebari responds, “I know these locals better. Turkey isn’t preventing them from going about their daily lives or mistreating them”. Zebari also acknowledges direct intelligence cooperation, noting that the KDP knows the terrain better than the Turks. He adds that individuals arrested in the area are typically those collaborating with the PKK. When the report displays a map showing Turkish military bases scattered across the region, Zebari explains that their presence dates back to 1992, citing the threat posed by the PKK. He says that the KDP is fully aware of the extent of Turkey’s deployment, adding that he knows the location of Turkish posts “like the palm of my hand.” When pressed further about the scale of Turkey’s military footprint, Zebari responds bluntly: “You know what? We are fine with that.” The report states that Turkey currently maintains 136 bases and outposts across the KDP-controlled areas of the Kurdistan Region of which 121 of these—around 89%—have been established since 2018. Interestingly, the documentary also features PUK leader Bafel Talabani, who argues that Turkey uses the war against the PKK as a pretext for its military presence. He claims that Turkish forces have a far great presence than U.S. troops in the region, and that the Turkish deployment primarily serves to protect the KDP. Talabani also claims that cooperation between Turkey and the KDP goes beyond military coordination, encompassing intelligence-sharing as well.

This is perhaps one of the most candid acknowledgments from a KDP official regarding the depth of their ties with Turkey: Hoshyar Zebari states that the KDP is not only close to Turkey but saying, “We don’t hide anything from each other.” He goes on to praise Turkey’s treatment of civilians, claiming that it has shown more mercy and kindness than the PKK. When challenged by the reporter—who references conversations with local civilians—Zebari responds, “I know these locals better. Turkey isn’t preventing them from going about their daily lives or mistreating them”. Zebari also acknowledges direct intelligence cooperation, noting that the KDP knows the terrain better than the Turks. He adds that individuals arrested in the area are typically those collaborating with the PKK. When the report displays a map showing Turkish military bases scattered across the region, Zebari explains that their presence dates back to 1992, citing the threat posed by the PKK. He says that the KDP is fully aware of the extent of Turkey’s deployment, adding that he knows the location of Turkish posts “like the palm of my hand.” When pressed further about the scale of Turkey’s military footprint, Zebari responds bluntly: “You know what? We are fine with that.” The report states that Turkey currently maintains 136 bases and outposts across the KDP-controlled areas of the Kurdistan Region of which 121 of these—around 89%—have been established since 2018. Interestingly, the documentary also features PUK leader Bafel Talabani, who argues that Turkey uses the war against the PKK as a pretext for its military presence. He claims that Turkish forces have a far great presence than U.S. troops in the region, and that the Turkish deployment primarily serves to protect the KDP. Talabani also claims that cooperation between Turkey and the KDP goes beyond military coordination, encompassing intelligence-sharing as well.

Kurdistan Watch

16,736 次观看 • 1 年前

Yesterday night around 70 Turkish soldiers patrolled the village of Keste/Kesta in the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan (Iraq) The village has been largely (I think totally) vacated by the kurdish inhabitants since 2021 after massive bombardments by the Turkish army on that village. On Keste mountain the Turkish military is constructing a large military base As the village is full of camera traps and surveillance equipment - the Turks probably patrolled the village and its surroundings after movements inside the village were spotted - probably spying on the base nearby. Footage of Turkish soldiers patrolling in Kurdish villages whose inhabitants have been displaced because of their ethnicity is also some good propaganda material for the Turkish media Second video is from 2021 - it is footage of a Turkish helicopter massively firing on Keste village; essentially destroying a quarter of the village.

Yesterday night around 70 Turkish soldiers patrolled the village of Keste/Kesta in the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan (Iraq) The village has been largely (I think totally) vacated by the kurdish inhabitants since 2021 after massive bombardments by the Turkish army on that village. On Keste mountain the Turkish military is constructing a large military base As the village is full of camera traps and surveillance equipment - the Turks probably patrolled the village and its surroundings after movements inside the village were spotted - probably spying on the base nearby. Footage of Turkish soldiers patrolling in Kurdish villages whose inhabitants have been displaced because of their ethnicity is also some good propaganda material for the Turkish media Second video is from 2021 - it is footage of a Turkish helicopter massively firing on Keste village; essentially destroying a quarter of the village.

Scharo Bajalan

17,214 次观看 • 2 年前

Yesterday, KDP President Masoud Barzani attended a symposium in Şırnak (also spelled in Kurdish as Şirnax), a Kurdish city in southeast Turkey, and something quite revealing happened. One of the key speeches was delivered by Arslan Tatar, the ruling AKP MP from Şirnax, who tried to flatter Barzani with remarks such as: “You are the light of our eyes. We raise our children with your vision of Kurdâyetî in mind. You are the son of that great personage, the son of Mullah Mustafa Barzani…” He then added: “Mullah Mustafa Barzani told his Peshmerga: ‘When you see Turkish soldiers… even if they fire at you, do not fire at the Turkish soldiers.’ How can we ever forget this?” Which followed by a round of applauses. The speech quickly spread online: KDP supporters circulated the first part as praise, while critics of Barzani seized on the second part as yet another example of the KDP’s historical collaboration with Turkey. But what is more revealing is Tatar’s profile and the broader line-up seated alongside Barzani at the symposium. Arslan Tatar is among the most anti-PKK Kurdish figures in Turkey. His tribe, going back to his father’s generation, has been one of the main pillars of the village guard system - a local tribal formation that has backed the Turkish state against the PKK since the 1980s. The Tatar tribe and its broader tribal umbrella, which have long dominated Şirnax, in fact played a key role in the province becoming part of Turkey: they fiercely refused to work with the British in the 1920s, later cooperated closely with the Turkish state, and refused to join Kurdish rebellions, further cementing their position as a key pro-state tribe in the region. All of this took place at a symposium dedicated to Melayê Cizîrî, one of the greatest classical Kurdish poets and a foundational figure of written Kurdish literature. DEM Party representatives say they were blocked from attending, yet in the same row as Barzani sat Münir Karaloğlu, the Turkish Deputy Interior Minister and, until recently, the appointed trustee of Diyarbakır, and Şehzade Demir, a HÜDA-PAR MP from a Kurdish Islamist, staunchly anti-PKK party that recently voted “no” on the parliamentary commission to visit Öcalan and others. It is also noteworthy that the Tatar tribe is culturally and linguistically very close to the Bahdini Kurds of the Kurdistan Region, especially to the Zakho dialect. Of course, with the current peace process, the sharp edges between pro-PKK circles and the Turkish state have softened somewhat. But the deep hostility between pro-state Kurdish factions and the PKK-aligned camp clearly persists - and that line-up in Cizre captured it in a single frame.

Kurdistan Watch

21,058 次观看 • 10 个月前

In Mogadishu, the presence of the Turkish flag is impossible to miss. It can be seen on Bajaj taxis, painted on city walls, displayed at schools and universities, and in many public places across the capital. In some areas, the Turkish flag even appears more visible than the Somali flag itself. This reflects the unusually strong admiration that many Somalis have for Turkey. Over the years, Turkey has earned a special place in the hearts of many people through its engagement and support in Somalia. Yet, many Somali politicians seem to overlook or misunderstand these public sentiments. They often fail to recognize just how deeply Turkey is appreciated by ordinary Somalis and how strong the emotional connection has become between the two peoples.

In Mogadishu, the presence of the Turkish flag is impossible to miss. It can be seen on Bajaj taxis, painted on city walls, displayed at schools and universities, and in many public places across the capital. In some areas, the Turkish flag even appears more visible than the Somali flag itself. This reflects the unusually strong admiration that many Somalis have for Turkey. Over the years, Turkey has earned a special place in the hearts of many people through its engagement and support in Somalia. Yet, many Somali politicians seem to overlook or misunderstand these public sentiments. They often fail to recognize just how deeply Turkey is appreciated by ordinary Somalis and how strong the emotional connection has become between the two peoples.

Osman Omar🇺🇸🇸🇴🇹🇷

34,226 次观看 • 4 个月前

Reports in several Turkish outlets (parroted by Kurdish media) claimed a lavish wedding between a Barzani woman and a man from the Izol, a prominent Kurdish tribe in Turkey’s Urfa. The problem? the woman is actually not a Barzani. The story appears to have spread mainly because of the wedding’s extravagance and the heavy gold showered on the bride, much of it seemingly from her family. But the bride’s father, reported as “Abdulkarim Barzani,” is not from the Barzani tribe — the surname is misleading. He is Masoud Barzani’s secretary, known in Kurdistan as Karim Juma’a, and he is from the Gargari tribe, a separate Kurdish tribe that has presence mostly in Nineveh but also Duhok. Still, the scale of the gold and diamonds coming from her side does raise questions, given that her father is publicly known only as Barzani’s secretary. The Izol, for their part, are a large Urfa-based Kurdish tribe that is generally state-friendly and mostly aligned with the AKP and MHP.

Reports in several Turkish outlets (parroted by Kurdish media) claimed a lavish wedding between a Barzani woman and a man from the Izol, a prominent Kurdish tribe in Turkey’s Urfa. The problem? the woman is actually not a Barzani. The story appears to have spread mainly because of the wedding’s extravagance and the heavy gold showered on the bride, much of it seemingly from her family. But the bride’s father, reported as “Abdulkarim Barzani,” is not from the Barzani tribe — the surname is misleading. He is Masoud Barzani’s secretary, known in Kurdistan as Karim Juma’a, and he is from the Gargari tribe, a separate Kurdish tribe that has presence mostly in Nineveh but also Duhok. Still, the scale of the gold and diamonds coming from her side does raise questions, given that her father is publicly known only as Barzani’s secretary. The Izol, for their part, are a large Urfa-based Kurdish tribe that is generally state-friendly and mostly aligned with the AKP and MHP.

Kurdistan Watch

36,366 次观看 • 9 个月前

As the PKK Makes Peace with Turkey, It Is Quietly Building Up Along Iran's Border Despite the ongoing peace process with Turkey, under which it is expected to disarm and withdraw from its bases along Iraq's border with Turkey, the PKK and its affiliates are quietly expanding their presence along the Iranian frontier, particularly in Iraq's Suleimani province. Rather than disappearing, the movement appears to be concentrating its infrastructure further south, becoming the dominant armed actor along much of the Kurdistan Region's border with Iran. The latest indication comes from reports that the PKK is quietly digging new tunnels in the Halabja area, a border district directly adjacent to Iran's Kurdish area of Paveh, which has recently seen armed activity against the IRGC. If confirmed, this marks the latest stage of a southward expansion that has unfolded over more than a decade. That expansion has followed a clear geographical pattern. From its long-established stronghold in the Qandil Mountains, the PKK extended its infrastructure south into the Qaladze area, then into the Asos Mountains and Mawat district, now a major hub for PJAK, the PKK's Iranian affiliate, and arguably its second most important base after Qandil. From there, the organisation expanded towards Penjwen, another strategic border district with Iran. Its presence has also been reported as far south as Said Sadiq, and now, according to recent reports, it is constructing tunnel networks around Halabja. Although there are gaps between many of these positions, they are connected by a continuous mountainous chain stretching from Qandil southwards along the Iranian border. This terrain provides the PKK with a natural corridor, allowing relatively unrestricted movement despite the absence of permanent infrastructure across every section. The shift is notable because the PKK's expansion into the Suleimani area is relatively recent. When the organisation launched its insurgency against Turkey in the 1980s, its Iraqi bases were concentrated along the Turkish border, reflecting their role as staging grounds for operations inside Turkey. The movement established itself in the Haftanin area near Zakho, expanded eastwards into Amedi, then Khwakurk in Erbil province, before building permanent positions in the Gara Mountains and Qandil during the 1990s. Almost all of these areas lay within KDP-controlled territory. Turkey's increasingly aggressive military strategy gradually altered that geography. Rather than conducting temporary cross-border operations, Ankara began establishing permanent military positions inside northern Iraq, steadily pushing the PKK further south. The decisive turning point, however, appears to have come after the 2011 ceasefire between Iran and PJAK. While limited expansion had already begun, the PKK's most significant southward movement accelerated from 2012 onwards. That period also coincided with a major political transition inside the PUK. Following Jalal Talabani's stroke and prolonged absence from politics, Lahur Sheikh Jangi gradually assumed control over much of the party's security apparatus. It was during this period that PUK-PKK relations evolved into what increasingly resembled a strategic partnership, creating a far more permissive environment for the PKK's expansion throughout PUK-controlled territory. The locations identified above almost certainly represent a conservative estimate. Reports have periodically placed PKK elements further south around Kalar and as far west as Chamchamal. The systematic construction of tunnels and defensive infrastructure specifically along the Iranian frontier, however, is especially significant. As the organisation moves towards peace with Turkey, its strategic orientation is changing. Rather than remaining a Turkey-facing insurgency, it increasingly resembles an Iran-facing one. Under the reported terms of the peace process, the PKK is expected to vacate all positions along the Turkish border. Many of those areas, including Haftanin, Amedi and much of Khwakurk, are already effectively under Turkish military control. Only a handful of major positions, such as the Gara Mountains and parts of Khwakurk, remain and are widely expected to be evacuated as the process advances. If that occurs, the PKK's military geography will have been fundamentally transformed. Its presence along the Turkish border would effectively disappear, while almost all of its remaining infrastructure would be concentrated along the Iranian frontier. Equally striking is Turkey's apparent silence regarding this southern expansion. Turkish reporting on the peace process has consistently focused on evacuating positions along the Turkish border, with no indication that Ankara is demanding the PKK withdraw from areas such as Asos, Mawat, Penjwen or Halabja. This may suggest that Turkey's primary objective is not the complete removal of the PKK from Iraq, but securing its own border by replacing the PKK with permanent Turkish military control across the frontier zone. Another notable development is the rapid improvement in relations between Turkey and the PUK, despite the latter's continued close ties with the PKK. Turkey's intelligence chief recently travelled to Suleimani to meet Bafel Talabani and Qubad Talabani, and the following day Qubad met Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara. Reports now suggest that Bafel Talabani could even meet President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the peace process advances. These contacts are unlikely to be occurring without the PKK's knowledge. While the PUK and the PKK remain distinct organisations with different priorities, their interests continue to overlap. The recent diplomatic engagement appears more consistent with coordination, or at least mutual understanding, than with any breakdown in relations. An equally important trend concerns Iran. Traditionally, both the PUK and the PKK have been regarded as relatively close to Tehran. Yet both have recently adopted noticeably more confrontational positions. PJAK has resumed violent clashes with the IRGC, while PUK leader Bafel Talabani has issued arguably his strongest criticism of Iran to date, directly accusing Tehran of aggression following recent Iranian strikes inside the Kurdistan Region. Whether this represents a temporary tactical adjustment or the beginning of a broader strategic realignment remains unclear. The PUK and the PKK are, however, likely to remain broadly aligned in their approach to Iran. Although they are separate organisations with distinct interests, they influence one another and have increasingly coordinated their policies over the past decade. Their calculations should therefore be analysed separately from those of the KDP, which operates under a different set of strategic incentives. There is little evidence that either the PUK or the PKK is positioning itself as part of a broader effort to overthrow the Iranian regime. Their posture instead resembles Turkey's: they would likely welcome a weaker Iran, but not one whose weakening comes through becoming an instrument of Israel or a wider externally driven regime-change project. That distinguishes them, at least for now, from the more speculative claims that periodically surround Kurdish actors during periods of regional crisis. Ironically, despite the KDP's historically deeper ties with Israel, it too has been cautious about any direct confrontation with Iran. Rather than openly aligning with Israeli objectives, it has generally sought to avoid being drawn into the conflict. The differences between the Kurdish parties lie less in whether they favour confrontation and more in how they manage their relationships with the competing regional powers. Beyond the implications for Iran, the peace process could fundamentally reshape the PKK's long-term strategic position. Even if the organisation ultimately disarms inside Turkey and transforms into a legal political movement, it would not necessarily cease to be a regional actor. By relocating much of its remaining infrastructure to the Iranian frontier, the PKK would retain strategic depth outside Turkey while simultaneously becoming a legitimate participant in Turkish politics. If the peace process succeeds, the PKK would no longer be simply an insurgent organisation or merely a parliamentary movement. It could evolve into a hybrid actor: a stakeholder in Turkey's emerging political order while preserving extensive regional networks beyond its borders. That would allow the movement to avoid surrendering all of its strategic leverage and becoming entirely dependent on Ankara's goodwill. This could also benefit Turkey. If Ankara integrates the PKK into a stable political framework while tolerating its continued regional presence, it could transform a long-standing security threat into an actor whose interests become tied to regional stability. Rather than eliminating the PKK outright, Turkey would be incorporating it into a new strategic architecture, one in which the organisation gains legitimacy inside Turkey while Ankara gains indirect influence through a network of Kurdish actors whose interests become intertwined with its own. If this interpretation proves correct, the peace process would represent far more than the end of an insurgency. It would mark a strategic reorganisation of Kurdish politics across the region, with the PKK shifting from a border-based guerrilla movement focused on Turkey into a transnational political actor whose centre of gravity lies along Iraq's border with Iran while simultaneously becoming embedded within Turkey's own political system. More:

As the PKK Makes Peace with Turkey, It Is Quietly Building Up Along Iran's Border Despite the ongoing peace process with Turkey, under which it is expected to disarm and withdraw from its bases along Iraq's border with Turkey, the PKK and its affiliates are quietly expanding their presence along the Iranian frontier, particularly in Iraq's Suleimani province. Rather than disappearing, the movement appears to be concentrating its infrastructure further south, becoming the dominant armed actor along much of the Kurdistan Region's border with Iran. The latest indication comes from reports that the PKK is quietly digging new tunnels in the Halabja area, a border district directly adjacent to Iran's Kurdish area of Paveh, which has recently seen armed activity against the IRGC. If confirmed, this marks the latest stage of a southward expansion that has unfolded over more than a decade. That expansion has followed a clear geographical pattern. From its long-established stronghold in the Qandil Mountains, the PKK extended its infrastructure south into the Qaladze area, then into the Asos Mountains and Mawat district, now a major hub for PJAK, the PKK's Iranian affiliate, and arguably its second most important base after Qandil. From there, the organisation expanded towards Penjwen, another strategic border district with Iran. Its presence has also been reported as far south as Said Sadiq, and now, according to recent reports, it is constructing tunnel networks around Halabja. Although there are gaps between many of these positions, they are connected by a continuous mountainous chain stretching from Qandil southwards along the Iranian border. This terrain provides the PKK with a natural corridor, allowing relatively unrestricted movement despite the absence of permanent infrastructure across every section. The shift is notable because the PKK's expansion into the Suleimani area is relatively recent. When the organisation launched its insurgency against Turkey in the 1980s, its Iraqi bases were concentrated along the Turkish border, reflecting their role as staging grounds for operations inside Turkey. The movement established itself in the Haftanin area near Zakho, expanded eastwards into Amedi, then Khwakurk in Erbil province, before building permanent positions in the Gara Mountains and Qandil during the 1990s. Almost all of these areas lay within KDP-controlled territory. Turkey's increasingly aggressive military strategy gradually altered that geography. Rather than conducting temporary cross-border operations, Ankara began establishing permanent military positions inside northern Iraq, steadily pushing the PKK further south. The decisive turning point, however, appears to have come after the 2011 ceasefire between Iran and PJAK. While limited expansion had already begun, the PKK's most significant southward movement accelerated from 2012 onwards. That period also coincided with a major political transition inside the PUK. Following Jalal Talabani's stroke and prolonged absence from politics, Lahur Sheikh Jangi gradually assumed control over much of the party's security apparatus. It was during this period that PUK-PKK relations evolved into what increasingly resembled a strategic partnership, creating a far more permissive environment for the PKK's expansion throughout PUK-controlled territory. The locations identified above almost certainly represent a conservative estimate. Reports have periodically placed PKK elements further south around Kalar and as far west as Chamchamal. The systematic construction of tunnels and defensive infrastructure specifically along the Iranian frontier, however, is especially significant. As the organisation moves towards peace with Turkey, its strategic orientation is changing. Rather than remaining a Turkey-facing insurgency, it increasingly resembles an Iran-facing one. Under the reported terms of the peace process, the PKK is expected to vacate all positions along the Turkish border. Many of those areas, including Haftanin, Amedi and much of Khwakurk, are already effectively under Turkish military control. Only a handful of major positions, such as the Gara Mountains and parts of Khwakurk, remain and are widely expected to be evacuated as the process advances. If that occurs, the PKK's military geography will have been fundamentally transformed. Its presence along the Turkish border would effectively disappear, while almost all of its remaining infrastructure would be concentrated along the Iranian frontier. Equally striking is Turkey's apparent silence regarding this southern expansion. Turkish reporting on the peace process has consistently focused on evacuating positions along the Turkish border, with no indication that Ankara is demanding the PKK withdraw from areas such as Asos, Mawat, Penjwen or Halabja. This may suggest that Turkey's primary objective is not the complete removal of the PKK from Iraq, but securing its own border by replacing the PKK with permanent Turkish military control across the frontier zone. Another notable development is the rapid improvement in relations between Turkey and the PUK, despite the latter's continued close ties with the PKK. Turkey's intelligence chief recently travelled to Suleimani to meet Bafel Talabani and Qubad Talabani, and the following day Qubad met Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara. Reports now suggest that Bafel Talabani could even meet President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the peace process advances. These contacts are unlikely to be occurring without the PKK's knowledge. While the PUK and the PKK remain distinct organisations with different priorities, their interests continue to overlap. The recent diplomatic engagement appears more consistent with coordination, or at least mutual understanding, than with any breakdown in relations. An equally important trend concerns Iran. Traditionally, both the PUK and the PKK have been regarded as relatively close to Tehran. Yet both have recently adopted noticeably more confrontational positions. PJAK has resumed violent clashes with the IRGC, while PUK leader Bafel Talabani has issued arguably his strongest criticism of Iran to date, directly accusing Tehran of aggression following recent Iranian strikes inside the Kurdistan Region. Whether this represents a temporary tactical adjustment or the beginning of a broader strategic realignment remains unclear. The PUK and the PKK are, however, likely to remain broadly aligned in their approach to Iran. Although they are separate organisations with distinct interests, they influence one another and have increasingly coordinated their policies over the past decade. Their calculations should therefore be analysed separately from those of the KDP, which operates under a different set of strategic incentives. There is little evidence that either the PUK or the PKK is positioning itself as part of a broader effort to overthrow the Iranian regime. Their posture instead resembles Turkey's: they would likely welcome a weaker Iran, but not one whose weakening comes through becoming an instrument of Israel or a wider externally driven regime-change project. That distinguishes them, at least for now, from the more speculative claims that periodically surround Kurdish actors during periods of regional crisis. Ironically, despite the KDP's historically deeper ties with Israel, it too has been cautious about any direct confrontation with Iran. Rather than openly aligning with Israeli objectives, it has generally sought to avoid being drawn into the conflict. The differences between the Kurdish parties lie less in whether they favour confrontation and more in how they manage their relationships with the competing regional powers. Beyond the implications for Iran, the peace process could fundamentally reshape the PKK's long-term strategic position. Even if the organisation ultimately disarms inside Turkey and transforms into a legal political movement, it would not necessarily cease to be a regional actor. By relocating much of its remaining infrastructure to the Iranian frontier, the PKK would retain strategic depth outside Turkey while simultaneously becoming a legitimate participant in Turkish politics. If the peace process succeeds, the PKK would no longer be simply an insurgent organisation or merely a parliamentary movement. It could evolve into a hybrid actor: a stakeholder in Turkey's emerging political order while preserving extensive regional networks beyond its borders. That would allow the movement to avoid surrendering all of its strategic leverage and becoming entirely dependent on Ankara's goodwill. This could also benefit Turkey. If Ankara integrates the PKK into a stable political framework while tolerating its continued regional presence, it could transform a long-standing security threat into an actor whose interests become tied to regional stability. Rather than eliminating the PKK outright, Turkey would be incorporating it into a new strategic architecture, one in which the organisation gains legitimacy inside Turkey while Ankara gains indirect influence through a network of Kurdish actors whose interests become intertwined with its own. If this interpretation proves correct, the peace process would represent far more than the end of an insurgency. It would mark a strategic reorganisation of Kurdish politics across the region, with the PKK shifting from a border-based guerrilla movement focused on Turkey into a transnational political actor whose centre of gravity lies along Iraq's border with Iran while simultaneously becoming embedded within Turkey's own political system. More:

The National Context

186,308 次观看 • 2 个月前

As the SDF-Damascus clashes unfolded, the Smelka border crossing between Iraq’s Kurdistan Region and the remaining SDF-controlled strip in northeast Syria saw its strategic importance come to the forefront: What remains little known is how Turkey has transformed Smelka into one of the most heavily surveilled border crossings in the Middle East. Turkey monitors and tracks this route through two key methods. First, no truck can cross Smelka without prior coordination with either the Barzani Charity Foundation or the KRG’s Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC) which both have worked and coordinate with the Turkish authorities. Then there is the second layer, which is more decisive: Turkey’s surveillance advantage at this specific location. Smelka is not deep inside Syrian territory. It sits just over a kilometer from the Turkish border. The crossing area on the Iraq-Syria side is relatively flat, but the Turkish side overlooking it rises to higher ground, creating natural sightlines and making long-range observation easier than at many other crossings. At the tri-border area, the Turkish side includes facilities and elevated points that function, in effect, as persistent monitoring positions. From these elevated positions, Turkey uses advanced electro-optical systems such as Aselsan’s DragonEye, a system specifically designed for border surveillance that can read every truck’s licence plate, identify the driver’s face, and see exactly what the cargo looks like from the outside, even at night. These systems use thermal imaging, allowing them to observe traffic just as clearly in pitch-black darkness. Over a thousand DragonEye units have been delivered to Turkish border forces and security posts for precisely this purpose. Turkey’s thermal profiling tools add another layer. They use thermal imagers to examine truck engines and cargo areas. From a distance, they can tell if a truck is a refrigerated unit but the cooling system is off, yet the driver is acting secretively: a red flag. If a truck is a canvas-covered flatbed, thermal cameras can easily detect the heat signatures of people hiding inside the cargo area. Turkey also operates sophisticated signals intelligence arrays in this border triangle, capabilities that have been documented providing real-time SIGINT and electronic intelligence to Turkish joint command centres during cross-border operations. They do not just watch the truck; they listen to the driver’s mobile phone and radio. Turkey also creates “pattern of life” maps using its drone fleet, primarily Bayraktar TB2s and ANKAs, which frequently patrol this tri-border area. Rather than checking a truck at the bridge, a drone can simply follow a suspicious vehicle after it crosses into Syria. If a truck crosses Smelka and drives to a civilian market, it is ignored. If it crosses and drives directly to a known SDF military tunnel or ammunition depot, Turkey logs it as a military supply run. While high-risk smuggling routes that the SDF or PKK use for cross-border movement may exist, none pass through Smelka or the known routes, which are heavily monitored. Turkey has turned this crossing into one of the most surveilled border points in the Middle East. More details:

As the SDF-Damascus clashes unfolded, the Smelka border crossing between Iraq’s Kurdistan Region and the remaining SDF-controlled strip in northeast Syria saw its strategic importance come to the forefront: What remains little known is how Turkey has transformed Smelka into one of the most heavily surveilled border crossings in the Middle East. Turkey monitors and tracks this route through two key methods. First, no truck can cross Smelka without prior coordination with either the Barzani Charity Foundation or the KRG’s Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC) which both have worked and coordinate with the Turkish authorities. Then there is the second layer, which is more decisive: Turkey’s surveillance advantage at this specific location. Smelka is not deep inside Syrian territory. It sits just over a kilometer from the Turkish border. The crossing area on the Iraq-Syria side is relatively flat, but the Turkish side overlooking it rises to higher ground, creating natural sightlines and making long-range observation easier than at many other crossings. At the tri-border area, the Turkish side includes facilities and elevated points that function, in effect, as persistent monitoring positions. From these elevated positions, Turkey uses advanced electro-optical systems such as Aselsan’s DragonEye, a system specifically designed for border surveillance that can read every truck’s licence plate, identify the driver’s face, and see exactly what the cargo looks like from the outside, even at night. These systems use thermal imaging, allowing them to observe traffic just as clearly in pitch-black darkness. Over a thousand DragonEye units have been delivered to Turkish border forces and security posts for precisely this purpose. Turkey’s thermal profiling tools add another layer. They use thermal imagers to examine truck engines and cargo areas. From a distance, they can tell if a truck is a refrigerated unit but the cooling system is off, yet the driver is acting secretively: a red flag. If a truck is a canvas-covered flatbed, thermal cameras can easily detect the heat signatures of people hiding inside the cargo area. Turkey also operates sophisticated signals intelligence arrays in this border triangle, capabilities that have been documented providing real-time SIGINT and electronic intelligence to Turkish joint command centres during cross-border operations. They do not just watch the truck; they listen to the driver’s mobile phone and radio. Turkey also creates “pattern of life” maps using its drone fleet, primarily Bayraktar TB2s and ANKAs, which frequently patrol this tri-border area. Rather than checking a truck at the bridge, a drone can simply follow a suspicious vehicle after it crosses into Syria. If a truck crosses Smelka and drives to a civilian market, it is ignored. If it crosses and drives directly to a known SDF military tunnel or ammunition depot, Turkey logs it as a military supply run. While high-risk smuggling routes that the SDF or PKK use for cross-border movement may exist, none pass through Smelka or the known routes, which are heavily monitored. Turkey has turned this crossing into one of the most surveilled border points in the Middle East. More details:

The National Context

12,427 次观看 • 8 个月前

JUST IN: 🇮🇱🇹🇷🇸🇾🇨🇾 Israel Is Studying How To Strike Turkey Without Triggering NATO’s Article 5 THE TURKEY ISRAEL FLASHPOINT IS ESCALATING Israeli strategic thinking is examining whether Turkish forces operating outside Turkey’s territory, particularly in Syria, would be covered by NATO’s Article 5 if Israel attacked them. The analysis argues that Article 5 is not an automatic shield for Turkish military deployments abroad and that a clash with Turkish forces in Syria could create a major legal and strategic dilemma for NATO. The confrontation could extend beyond Syria. 🇹🇷 Turkey maintains a major military presence in northern Cyprus, while the Eastern Mediterranean is becoming an increasingly important arena in the growing Israel Turkey rivalry. Israel has already struck a Syrian airbase over concerns about a possible Turkish military deployment, bringing the two countries dangerously close to a direct military confrontation. 👀 If Israel and Turkey ever exchange fire in Syria, NATO could face one of its most explosive Article 5 dilemmas in decades.

JUST IN: 🇮🇱🇹🇷🇸🇾🇨🇾 Israel Is Studying How To Strike Turkey Without Triggering NATO’s Article 5 THE TURKEY ISRAEL FLASHPOINT IS ESCALATING Israeli strategic thinking is examining whether Turkish forces operating outside Turkey’s territory, particularly in Syria, would be covered by NATO’s Article 5 if Israel attacked them. The analysis argues that Article 5 is not an automatic shield for Turkish military deployments abroad and that a clash with Turkish forces in Syria could create a major legal and strategic dilemma for NATO. The confrontation could extend beyond Syria. 🇹🇷 Turkey maintains a major military presence in northern Cyprus, while the Eastern Mediterranean is becoming an increasingly important arena in the growing Israel Turkey rivalry. Israel has already struck a Syrian airbase over concerns about a possible Turkish military deployment, bringing the two countries dangerously close to a direct military confrontation. 👀 If Israel and Turkey ever exchange fire in Syria, NATO could face one of its most explosive Article 5 dilemmas in decades.

War Radar

21,390 次观看 • 1 个月前

Breaking News video Turkish President Erdogan has signaled to the Turkish intelligence chief to organize jihadist groups in Syria (a mix of ISIS and al-Qaeda) to prepare for and take over the Kurdish city of Kobani in coming days. For this purpose, and to prepare for the attack, he ordered Abu Mohammed al-Jolani to keep the Kurds occupied with a ceasefire and gain their trust, so that the jihadists can launch a surprise attack while the Kurds believe they will not be attacked due to the agreement with Damascus. To prevent the besieged city of Kobani from receiving assistance from Kurds in Turkey, he ordered deep trenches to be dug along the border to stop Turkish Kurds from crossing to assist Syrian Kurds during the operation . All Turkish-backed jihadists and Syrian army jihadists are said to disguise themselves as ISIS and commit a massive crime against humanity in the city. To avoid legal responsibility, al-Jolani is expected to keep the Kurds occupied with the ceasefire while the Turkish army, Syrian army, and jihadists—disguised as ISIS—take over the city. The attack on Kobani is expected to be far worse than the attack on Kurdish neighbourhoods in Aleppo. Turkey continues to send reinforcements to the jihadists. Turkey has approximately 105,000 radical Islamist jihadists in Syria , all receiving orders from Turkey. Any decision al-Jolani makes in Syria can allegedly be revoked or cancelled at any time by Turkey, and any ceasefire he agrees to is meaningless if it does not pass through the Turkish filter. Note: The Kurdish city of Kobani has been under siege by the Syrian regime and Turkey-backed jihadists. Water, electricity, phone service, and internet access have been cut off for more than 15 days. Ground report, Syria — AM, 30 January 2026, "Save the Kurds Act" , "The Kurdish" " The Kurds " "Kurds in Syria "

Breaking News video Turkish President Erdogan has signaled to the Turkish intelligence chief to organize jihadist groups in Syria (a mix of ISIS and al-Qaeda) to prepare for and take over the Kurdish city of Kobani in coming days. For this purpose, and to prepare for the attack, he ordered Abu Mohammed al-Jolani to keep the Kurds occupied with a ceasefire and gain their trust, so that the jihadists can launch a surprise attack while the Kurds believe they will not be attacked due to the agreement with Damascus. To prevent the besieged city of Kobani from receiving assistance from Kurds in Turkey, he ordered deep trenches to be dug along the border to stop Turkish Kurds from crossing to assist Syrian Kurds during the operation . All Turkish-backed jihadists and Syrian army jihadists are said to disguise themselves as ISIS and commit a massive crime against humanity in the city. To avoid legal responsibility, al-Jolani is expected to keep the Kurds occupied with the ceasefire while the Turkish army, Syrian army, and jihadists—disguised as ISIS—take over the city. The attack on Kobani is expected to be far worse than the attack on Kurdish neighbourhoods in Aleppo. Turkey continues to send reinforcements to the jihadists. Turkey has approximately 105,000 radical Islamist jihadists in Syria , all receiving orders from Turkey. Any decision al-Jolani makes in Syria can allegedly be revoked or cancelled at any time by Turkey, and any ceasefire he agrees to is meaningless if it does not pass through the Turkish filter. Note: The Kurdish city of Kobani has been under siege by the Syrian regime and Turkey-backed jihadists. Water, electricity, phone service, and internet access have been cut off for more than 15 days. Ground report, Syria — AM, 30 January 2026, "Save the Kurds Act" , "The Kurdish" " The Kurds " "Kurds in Syria "

Botin Kurdistani

28,639 次观看 • 8 个月前