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🔸Update: Running battles continue between the police and protesters on the streets. Zimbabwe was brought to a standstill today when, through a national shutdown, citizens protested the attempt by Zanu PF to extend Mr Mnangagwa’s term of office in breach of the two-term limit imposed by the Constitution, which...

85,089 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce •via X (Twitter)

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Thank you Fadzi for the update , hope Nero os following maybe he will learn one or two things about effective leadership

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The Daily Muck1 yıl önce

DC Councilmember Trayon White Sr. arrested for accepting $156,000 in bribes to influence city contracts. Accused of using his position to push for contract renewals worth millions, White faces up to 15 years in prison if convicted.

gudoreblack profil fotoğrafı
gudoreblack1 yıl önce

Kowewe unongowawata pinda mustreet kaa

Friendly_Fire🇿🇼 profil fotoğrafı
Friendly_Fire🇿🇼1 yıl önce

we need new leaders in opposition

FIBER_BEATZ profil fotoğrafı
FIBER_BEATZ1 yıl önce

We need new leaders

C-Y-B-O-R-G profil fotoğrafı
C-Y-B-O-R-G1 yıl önce

Well done team riri paground

international orphan profil fotoğrafı
international orphan1 yıl önce

I don't see masses in this video. As for standstill, you are lying.

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Norman Chibhabha1 yıl önce

Nero should just focus on Zuva for now..chupeti yake

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Where were you? I guess leading from your comfortable home Xing! We need better opposition leaders!

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Percy Hanyani1 yıl önce

Salute to everyone who managed to go n protest

international orphan profil fotoğrafı
international orphan1 yıl önce

Zimbabwe was certainly not on standstill. Harare failed kuzoti dzimwe nzvimbo

Benzer Videolar

QUESTION: What is the relationship between section 91(2)—the term limit provision—and section 95(2)—the term length provision in the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013)? ANSWER: Section 91(2) is the term-limit provision. It regulates the President’s tenure by limiting the length of time that he or she may hold or occupy the Presidency as a public officer to a maximum of two terms—whether consecutive or not—where three or more years’ service is deemed a full term. By contrast, section 95(2) is the term-length provision. It regulates the electoral cycle of the Presidency as an office or institution by defining a single term as five years (now proposed to be seven years under Clause 4 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) H.B. 1 Bill, 2026). The relationship between sections 91(2) and 95(2) is therefore as clear and straightforward as that between a truck driver and a 500 km highway: section 91(2) limits the driver, while section 95(2) defines the length of the highway. Section 91(2) caps the time any individual may occupy the Presidency; section 95(2) sets the institutional length or duration of each presidential term or electoral cycle. This distinction matters because a persistent misconception claims that section 91(2) is not the presidential term-limit provision but merely a qualification rule for election as President, asserts that section 95(2) is the actual term-limit clause. Many who advance this incorrect view rely on one sentence in the obiter dictum by Patel JCC at paragraph 50 of the precedent-setting judgment in Marx Mupungu v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & 6 Ors (CCZ 7/21, 2021) [see: which includes section 95(2) among examples of term-limit provisions. That misconception overlooks a fundamental constitutional imperative: a presidential term-limit provision is, by definition, a disqualifier for election as President. Term limits on presidents are necessarily about elections. They limit qualification for election. Where there is no presidential term limit, re-election is unlimited. In a recent discussion with D. Tinashé Hofisi on 23 April 2026 [ on the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) Bill hosted by The Southern African Times, I explained the relationship between the two sections. Below is the verbatim text of the attached clip extracted from the discussion addressing the import of section 91(2) and its relationship with section 95(2): ME: “It’s a clear term limit provision; is similar to term limit provisions in other jurisdictions that are comparable to Zimbabwe. And when you say it doesn’t have time, it doesn’t make reference to time, I’m at a loss as to what that means, and where that is coming from, with respect to Dr Hofisi, because it says a person is disqualified for election as President or appointment as Vice President if he or she has already held office as President under this constitution for two terms. This is the only section which tells us how many terms a President is limited to. Section 95 doesn’t even tell us that he’s limited to one term. There’s no limit. This one limits the President to two terms. And the two terms, the last time I checked, was a reference to time. And in this case, the section doesn’t leave us doubting or not knowing what a term is or what sort of time a term is. Because it continues to say these two terms are counted whether they follow each other or not. But most significantly, for the purpose of the limit on the President, the term limit on the President, which is provided in this section: three or more years. That’s time. You said there’s no time here. Three years is time. The length of time is three years minimum, and the maximum is more. It’s not defined here. It’s three or more years. It’s more because that is subject to what the relevant law about electoral cycles says is the electoral cycle of the institution that the President occupies”. [verbatim text of clip from The 500 km Highway Metaphor: Distinguishing Sections 91(2) and 95(2) of the Constitution To clearly understand the relationship between sections 91(2) and 95(2), imagine the Presidency as a magnificent 500-kilometre highway built and maintained by section 95(2) of the Constitution. This provision creates the presidential highway itself: it defines the office of the President as a permanent public institution and sets the exact length of each single term — currently five years, now proposed under the Bill to be seven years. It establishes a structured, recurring electoral cycle that belongs to the people of Zimbabwe, ensuring regular, orderly renewal of leadership. Without section 95(2), there would be no defined road — only an open plain of indefinite power. Section 91(2) governs the individual truck driver on that highway. It imposes an absolute lifetime limit: no person may complete more than two full trips along this 500 km highway, whether those trips are taken back-to-back or years apart. Any segment of 300 kilometres or more — that is, three or more years in office — counts as one complete trip. There are no partial credits or exceptions. After two full trips, the driver is permanently disqualified from driving on that highway, again. The distinction is sharp and deliberate: Section 95(2) builds the highway and determines the length of each journey. Section 91(2) limits how many times any single individual is permitted to travel it. One structures the office; the other limits the person who occupies it. Together, they form the Constitution’s twin safeguards — working in perfect harmony to keep power temporary, accountable, and subordinate to the will of the people. To conflate their distinct roles is to weaken these vital safeguards and to invite the very tyranny the Constitution was written to prevent. The Profound and Protective Meaning of “Three or More Years” in Section 91(2) of the Constitution At the heart of section 91(2) lies one of the Constitution’s most brilliant safeguards: “for the purpose of this subsection, three or more years’ service is deemed to be a full term.” The word “more” is no mere drafting flourish—it is deliberate constitutional genius. It declares that section 91(2), as the personal lifetime term-limit provision, imposes no rigid numerical ceiling. Subject to what is reasonable and justifiable in a constitutional democracy under section 95(2), service of four years, five years, six years, seven years, or even longer—once it exceeds the three-year threshold—is unequivocally deemed a complete term for the purpose of lifetime disqualification. This flexibility is not a loophole; it is a wise design that refuses to let the term-limit clause under section 91(2) become brittle or easily evaded. This open-ended “more” is anchored in section 91(2)’s harmonious relationship with section 95(2)(b), which defines the official electoral cycle of the Presidency as a permanent public institution whose five-year lifespan is inextricably intertwined with that of Parliament. Section 91(2) places an iron-clad personal disqualification on the individual; section 95(2) defines the dimensions of the highway itself. Crucially, section 95(2) is not a term-limit provision under subsections (1) and (7) of section 328. Unlike the referendum-protected personal term limit in section 91(2), it may be amended by Parliament under section 328(5) without a national referendum. This distinction is no accident; it is constitutional wisdom. It allows the institutional framework of the Presidency to evolve with the nation’s needs while the unbreakable personal lifetime bar on any single individual remains forever sacrosanct. All told, sections 91(2) and 95(2) differ in character and purpose—one limits the President, the other structures the public office or institution of the Presidency—yet they stand together as the Constitution’s twin guardians. This elegant complementarity keeps presidential power temporary, accountable, and forever subordinate to the sovereign will of the people through the institution or office of the Presidency. To respect and defend this relationship is to honour the very soul of the Constitution: ensuring that no individual can ever turn the highway into their driveway—turning the public office into a personal fiefdom—and that the highway of governance remains open, regularly renewed, and eternally in faithful service to the people of Zimbabwe. This is the promise the Constitution makes!

Prof Jonathan Moyo

13,203 görüntüleme • 4 ay önce

President Emmerson Mnangagwa's spokesman George Charamba, who is also the Deputy Chief Secretary, Presidential Communications in the Office of the President and Cabinet, has provoked a storm of controversy by claiming that parliament trumps a national referendum on constitutional amendment issues currently being debated through a legislative public consultation process. Mnangagwa and his party are using parliament to amend the constitution to extend his rule to 2030 and introduce a raft of other significant changes without going through a referendum, which civil society and opposition activists insist is a requirement in terms of the constitution. The 2013 constitution mandates that any extension of presidential term limits or removal of two five-year term limits must be approved by voters through a referendum. Critics say extending terms from five to seven years, or changing the electoral system constitutes a major subversion of this clause, requiring a referendum. However, Mnangagwa and his allies say a referendum is not needed as they are not removing term limits, but elongating the term lengths and changing the electoral cycle. Zanu PF says the amendment is not a change to the limit of two terms, but rather the length of each term (five to seven years), meaning a referendum is not constitutionally mandated. They say the amendments are meant to ensure political stability and remove "election mode toxicity," disrupting peace, governance and development. The debate centres over holding a referendum on the proposed amendments, specifically Constitution Amendment Bill No.3, which proposes extending Mnangagwa's tenure by two years andpresidential and parliamentary terms from five to seven years as well as changing the presidential election system from direct voting through popular franchise to indirect selection via parliament. The ruling Zanu PF party controls parliament, leading to calls for a popular referendum to approve these significant changes, which critics argue violate the 2013 constitution's democratic intent. Charamba said: “Those who were old enough to participate and follow proceedings of 2013 will know that even after the referendum, that outcome of the referendum still had to be processed through Parliament. What that means is that, a referendum does not usurp the power of Parliament. It simply provides a popular basis for legislative action. Otherwise, at law, the body which is recognized as responsible for any changes, be they at the level of the primary law or at the level of subsidiary laws, is Parliament. Right? So, really, you can't place the referendum in apposition to Parliament. You can't. You just cannot because the referendum does not give you a result that writes the constitution. It is parliament which is mandated to do so in terms of our law. So, really, there shouldn't be any argument at all in respect of that matter. Right?.”

TheNewsHawks

16,586 görüntüleme • 4 ay önce