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โš ๏ธโ€ผ๏ธ ๐—ฆ๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—ฏ๐—ถ๐—น๐˜€๐—ธ: ๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—˜๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ ๐—ฅ๐˜‚๐˜€๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ฎ ๐—œ๐˜€ ๐—ฅ๐˜‚๐—ป๐—ป๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ฎ ๐—ฃ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐˜ƒ๐—ผ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป BLUF: Russia claims Ukraine killed โ€œchildrenโ€ during a 21-22 May 2026 overnight strike on what the AFU identified as a Rubicon unmanned systems training and operations center in Starobilsk, occupied Luhansk. Russian sources report approximately 16 FP-1/FP-2 type loitering munitions...

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If only there were someone to tell the world that: - the concept of 'escalation management' does not work; - that Russia is not entitled to any 'safe zone' for its military power in a war of aggression it started; - that bowing down to Russian nuclear blackmailing is a lousy idea that brings the West nowhere and paralyzes its ability to react to a large-scale war of aggression at its very border; - that imposing drastic restrictions on the Ukrainian use of Western defense aid is absurd, non-sensical, and beneficial to Russia's war machine; - that such a half-hearted approach to helping Ukraine tackle the most significant European war of aggression since Adolf Hitler demonstrates weakness and only encourages the Kremlin to escalate its war and expand its acts of aggression - that the Kremlin openly spits on the West's attempts to 'avoid escalation', or 'give Putin a chance to stop' and does as much as it is allowed to with this deliberate omission; - that Ukraine can win (or at least precipitate a more or less favorable outcome) by directly undermining Russia's ability to fight and finance this war; - that highly effective Ukrainian attacks on Russian military power and infrastructure will result in Russia sustaining painful military losses rather than unleashing 'WWIII,' a 'nuclear apocalypse,' or whatever else Kremlin-paid propagandists and surrender cultists tried to intimidate the Western public opinion with. ...or was there? Anyways, there's a Russian S-400 system destroyed in a Ukrainian HIMARS strike in Russia's Belgorod region. Russia has lost yet another sophisticated air defense system in its territory used in the war on Ukraine.

Illia Ponomarenko ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ

314,347 ๆฌก่ง‚็œ‹ โ€ข 2 ๅนดๅ‰

๐ŸŸช MOSCOW IS FORCING RUSSIA TO MAKE A CHOICE ๐Ÿ‘€ A Pantsir air defense system fitted with an anti-drone โ€œgrillโ€ has reportedly been spotted in Moscow, fueling speculation that Russia is continuing to redeploy air defense assets away from other areas in order to protect the capital. If true, the implications are significant. Air defense systems are not unlimited. Every Pantsir moved to Moscow is a Pantsir that cannot protect a logistics hub, ammunition depot, airfield, refinery, command center, or military formation elsewhere. This highlights one of the most important effects of Ukraineโ€™s long-range drone campaign. Ukraine is no longer simply destroying targets. It is forcing Russia to make difficult choices. For years, Russian air defenses were concentrated around military facilities and the front. Now Moscow itself increasingly requires protection as Ukrainian drones reach deeper into Russian territory with growing frequency. The result is a dilemma for the Kremlin. Protect the front lines and logistics networks. Or protect Moscow. Protect refineries and military infrastructure. Or protect the political heart of Russia. The appearance of additional air defenses around the capital may suggest that Moscow is becoming a higher priority, and that alone represents a strategic success for Ukraineโ€™s long-range strike campaign. Russia still possesses significant air defense capabilities, but even the largest arsenal has limits. The more territory Ukraine can threaten, the more Russia is forced to spread those defenses thin. And every system guarding Moscow is one less system guarding the war effort elsewhere.

Gianl1974

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โ€ผ๏ธAn interesting interview with Lavrov Sergey Lavrov regularly gives interviews, and almost every one of them is an information operation designed to create an alternative reality. The March 26 interview with France Tรฉlรฉvisions is no exception. Let's break it down and point out where there are lies and where there is manipulation. 1. Lavrov claims that Russia is supposedly defending international law while speaking in the "language of principles" regarding Iran. What's wrong: it's basic role reversal. Moscow is trying to speak from the position of a "guardian of the law," even though it is waging an aggressive war against Ukraine. In the case of Iran, Lavrov is also deliberately omitting half the picture: yes, the US withdrew from the nuclear deal, but Iran also faced non-proliferation concerns raised by the IAEA. Why it matters: It is an attempt to whitewash Russia's crimes through someone else's crisis and to present the aggressor (Russia) as the judge. 2. Russia does not provide Iran with intelligence; the coordinates of US bases are "already known to everyone." What's wrong: it's an evasive statement, not a complete refutation. There is no independently verified evidence of specific target marking data transfers in open sources, nor can there be, but the Kremlin's "we have nothing to do with it" claim has no basis for being automatically considered true. Why it matters: A typical Kremlin tactic - to deny anything that does not align with Russia's interests and to continue operating in a gray area. 3. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have denied the US access to their airspace, so Russia is right about the "American venture." What's wrong: The caution of Gulf countries is real, but Lavrov turns it into a crude anti-Western caricature. Regional politics are more complex than the Kremlin's narrative that "everyone understands everything, only the US is pushing the world into chaos." Why it matters: The Kremlin takes a partial truth and builds a convenient political myth around it. 4. Russia isn't waging wars for its own gain; it's the US that wants to control the energy sector, the Strait of Hormuz, and the markets. What's wrong: It's pure projection. It is Russia that has used energy as a weapon for years, and after 2022, turned petrodollars into fuel for war. Why it matters: Moscow accuses others of doing what it does systematically - this is one of the central techniques of its propaganda. 5. Since 2014, Ukraine has been ruled by a "Nazi regime" that came to power through a coup. What's wrong: After Yanukovych fled, Ukraine held snap presidential elections, which the OSCE recognized as meeting international standards and being competitive. The claim of a "Nazi regime" is a political label, not a description of reality. Why it matters: "Nazism" in Kremlin rhetoric is a tool for dehumanizing Ukraine and justifying the war. 6. The Russian language is allegedly completely banned in Ukraine. What's wrong: Ukraine has strengthened the role of the state language, but this does not mean a total ban on Russian. The law does not apply to private communication and does not criminalize the everyday use of the language. Why it matters: The Kremlin is exaggerating language policy to the level of a "linguistic apocalypse" to sell the war as a supposed humanitarian mission. 7. Ukraine is allegedly at war with Orthodoxy and has "banned the canonical church." What's wrong: This is not about "banning a faith," but about a law regarding religious organizations linked to the Russian Orthodox Church. Even criticism from human rights activists does not support the Kremlin's claim of "persecution of Orthodoxy." Why it matters: Moscow is using the language of religious protection to cover up its network of influence in Ukraine. 8. The West allegedly cynically exploited the Minsk agreements as a respite to arm Ukraine. What's wrong: The Minsk process was collapsing because of the Kremlin's desire to use the agreements to establish de facto control over Ukraine, not because of some "cunning plot" by Paris and Berlin. Why it matters: The Kremlin is rewriting history retroactively to portray its own aggression as a supposedly forced response to "universal betrayal." 9. Russia does not attack civilians; its targets are solely facilities associated with the AFU. What's wrong: It's an outright lie. For years, the UN and independent sources have documented systematic Russian strikes on cities, residential areas, energy facilities, and civilian infrastructure. Why it matters: This is no longer just propaganda, but a cynical denial of documented terror against civilians. 10. The Bucha massacre is allegedly "not proven": there are no names, no evidence, and journalists haven't shown anything. What's wrong: This is one of the most mendacious claims. There are UN documents, testimonies, criminal investigations, identified suspects, and evidence of executions and killings of civilians. Why it matters: The Kremlin is not trying to refute the crime, but to wear down the audience with doubt and turn mass murder into "one of the versions." 11. Russia wants peace and negotiations. What's wrong: In the Kremlin's vocabulary, "peace" does not mean an end to aggression, but rather acceptance of its results. "Realities on the ground" means occupation; "root causes" means demanding recognition of Russia's right to punish neighbors for their political choices. Why it matters: Lavrov isn't offering peace. He's dressing up surrender in softer language. 12. Europe is supposedly dragging out the war, while Russia is looking for a solution. What's wrong: Russia started this war itself. European aid to Ukraine is a response to the aggression, not its cause. Why it matters: This is the main inversion of Kremlin logic - to make the audience forget who attacked first and shift the discussion from aggression to a "conflict that has dragged on too long." 13. RT and Sputnik are victims of censorship, and France has no right to speak about freedom of speech. What's wrong: RT and Sputnik were banned not as "ordinary media," but as state-run tools of disinformation. Their role as propaganda channels has been publicly acknowledged both in the EU and in France. Why it matters: The Kremlin wants to portray the defense of democracies against malicious information operations as a restriction of free speech. 14. France and Europe have made Russia an enemy; Moscow is merely reacting. What's wrong: The cause of the rift is not "Russophobia," but Russia's invasion, war crimes, blackmail, and influence operations against Europe. Why it matters: The Kremlin is systematically trying to reverse the cause-and-effect relationship: it is not that "Russia destroyed relations," but that "the West rejected Russia." 15. Individual real episodes - the tanker, incidents in France, disputes among allies - allegedly prove Western hypocrisy and justify Russia. What's wrong: Lavrov takes a real but local fact and uses it as a smokescreen. None of these incidents erases Russia's crimes or the very fact of its aggression. Why it matters: This is a favorite Kremlin method - using others' difficulties and whataboutism to cover up its own crimes.

Anton Gerashchenko

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๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ Israeli military observer Yigal Levin criticizes Moscowโ€™s strikes and writes: ๐Ÿ—ฃ๏ธ โ€œLately, Moscow has been trying more and more often to present its large-scale attacks as โ€˜retaliatory strikes.โ€™ As if this is a response to Ukraineโ€™s effective and massive attacks on Russian territory. Moreover, unlike Russiaโ€™s strikes on peaceful civilian objects, Ukraine targets oil refineries, military factories, ships, logistical hubs, arsenals, ports, army and FSB headquarters, etc. This thesis is absurd from the very beginning, because it was Russia that started the war. Accordingly, all of Ukraineโ€™s actions are a reaction. That is, when Kyiv strikes Russia, it is actually responding to aggression. This is completely logical: war can never be a โ€˜one-sided game.โ€™ If you decide to bomb someone, you must be prepared for them to bomb you back. Russia, on the other hand, behaves in an extremely infantile way โ€” just like its citizens, who express surprise when explosions and strikes begin on their own territory as well. Instead of taking responsibility โ€” yes, we started it, we are bombing, so what? โ€” Moscow, like a frightened and confused teenager, tries to present its own strikes as โ€˜responsesโ€™โ€ฆ Responses to what? No special intelligence is needed to engage elementary logic: no one was bombing Russia and no one was preparing to do so until Russia itself started the war. What will happen next is quite clear: while Russia has been attacking with full force for a long time, using the same โ€˜Oreshnikโ€™ for the third time already โ€” Ukraineโ€™s strikes will only intensify. In 2022, Ukraine struck weaker than in 2023; in 2024 โ€” weaker than in 2025; and now it is 2026, when sometimes Kyivโ€™s strikes already surpass Moscowโ€™s in terms of the scale of damage inflicted. War has its own inexorable logic of progression: Ukraineโ€™s next strikes, the real retaliatory strikes, will be even more massive and powerful than they were at the beginning of the year. And yes, Russians should be endlessly grateful to Ukrainians for how they are conducting this war. For example, with the same FP-5 type drones that carry a ton of explosives, striking the civilian population would not be difficult at all. And yes, Ukraine has this capability. It has the capability, but Kyiv chooses not to take this path. And when the war ends, if I were in the Russiansโ€™ place, I would express gratitude and respect to Ukrainians precisely for this restraint. But as long as the war continues, every Russian citizen must clearly understand that strikes from Ukraine will only increase, and there is only one party responsible for all of this โ€” the Kremlin. These are quite banal and obvious thoughts, but what can we do if Russian society continues to behave infantilely. The problem is that this infantilism is taking on a bloody form.โ€ Video is generated by grok AI

NSTRIKE

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Russia has built more than 2,500 km of roads and railroads, a new railway network, and revamped ports in the occupied territories of Ukraine, according to a Reuters investigation. Large-scale works, confirmed by satellite imagery and news agency data, indicate that this is not temporary wartime logistics, but a systematic integration of occupied territories into Russian infrastructure. One of the key projects is the "Novorossiya Railways" system, which includes a planned 525-km line started in 2023. Since that year, Russia has spent about $425 million on the construction and maintenance of the railway network in the occupied territories. At the same time, road infrastructure is also being developed: the "Novorossiya" highway is being built as part of the 1,400-kilometer "Azov Ring" loop, which is intended to connect the seized parts of Ukrainian regions with Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea. According to Reuters, the new rail and road connections already allow Moscow to circumvent the Crimean Bridge, which had previously been the main road and rail link to the peninsula and remains vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes. Occupied Ukrainian ports that were largely inactive in the first years of the war have been revamped and reopened under Russia's flag on the inland Sea of Azov. Satellite images taken of Mariupol's docks in August 2025 show a new silver-domed facility, and nearby, a mountain of what looks like coal being readied for export. The long-term nature of the infrastructure projects, as well as the scale of investment ($11.8 billion was allocated to develop four occupied Ukrainian regions between 2024 and 2026), shows the Kremlin has no intention of returning the territories to Ukraine as part of any future peace settlement, experts say.

Anton Gerashchenko

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๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐ŸŽฏ Intense and massive strikes using medium-range kamikaze drones have completely paralyzed the Russian land corridor passing through the occupied southern regions of Ukraine. โ–ช๏ธ Ukraineโ€™s medium-range strike campaign has effectively become an operation to isolate the battlefield, which is already severely disrupting Russian logistics in southern Ukraine. On May 21, the head of the occupation administration of Kherson region, Vladimir Saldo, signed a decree banning the movement of civilian cargo vehicles on certain sections of the R-280 โ€œNovorossiyaโ€ highway (occupiers renamed it M-14 Mariupol โ€“ Berdiansk โ€“ Melitopol โ€“ Henichesk highway). โ–ช๏ธ The M-14 is the main artery connecting Russia with occupied Crimea. The ban on civilian traffic is, in fact, an admission that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have the land corridor under fire control. Permissions are now issued only for military transport and essential goods, which further emphasizes the scale of the problem. โ–ช๏ธ The consequences are already being felt in Crimea. Due to the systematic destruction of fuel tankers, there is a fuel shortage on the peninsula. Gas stations have introduced limits โ€” 20 liters per person. Civilian infrastructure in the rear is suffering from fuel shortages while resources are prioritized for the front line. โ–ช๏ธ Geolocation footage from recent days confirms the reason for these decisions: Ukrainian forces are destroying Russian military cargo trucks on both the M-14 and the N-20 Mariupol โ€“ Donetsk highways. ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡บ Russian military bloggers (โ€œvoenkorsโ€) have already criticized this decision. Previously, Russian military convoys hid among civilian trucks and used them as human shields against Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance. โ–ช๏ธ Now everything has changed. An empty M-14 highway means that any large truck is automatically considered a military target, as they carry either ammunition, fuel, or personnel. The task has become extremely simplified for drone operators and artillery. โ–ช๏ธ This is a classic asymmetric war of attrition. Strikes within a 150-kilometer radius from the front line are forcing the Russians to make losing decisions. โ–ช๏ธ To reduce losses from Ukrainian AI-equipped drones, Russia will have to abandon large fuel tankers and truck convoys. Switching to small, dispersed transport groups will significantly slow down ammunition delivery to the front line and dramatically increase logistics costs. Redirecting civilian cargo to secondary roads will create traffic jams, limiting the maneuverability of Russian reserves if the situation on the front changes. The shortage of fuel and ammunition, which are being destroyed en route, is already slowing down Russian offensives. While the Russian command tries to reorganize its supply tactics, the key arteries of their southern grouping continue to burn. Video is generated by grok AI

NSTRIKE

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