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News 12 Israel TV Interview with Ohad Hemo: “The second point: the understanding in Hamas, and what they told my source inside Hamas, is that 80% of the total of the 41,000 people killed in the Gaza Strip—according to Hamas’ claim—are members of Hamas and their families. I mean, this is what is said within Hamas: 80 percent of the casualties in the Gaza Strip are Hamas members and their families.”

News 12 Israel TV Interview with Ohad Hemo: “The second point: the understanding in Hamas, and what they told my source inside Hamas, is that 80% of the total of the 41,000 people killed in the Gaza Strip—according to Hamas’ claim—are members of Hamas and their families. I mean, this is what is said within Hamas: 80 percent of the casualties in the Gaza Strip are Hamas members and their families.”

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POTUS: “I don’t care what Tulsi says.” “We’re looking for better than a cease-fire,” said Trump aboard Air Force One on the way back to D.C. from the G7 early Tuesday morning, at about 5 a.m. EST. Asked whether the United States can defeat Iran’s deeply buried nuclear sites, he replied, “There’s no guarantee, but they’re not going to have a nuclear weapon—I can tell you that.” A reporter pressed: “Mr. President, can the United States destroy Iran’s nuclear program?” “It’ll be gone long before we have to get involved. They’re not going to have a nuclear program.” The reporter followed up: “Tulsi Gabbard said the Iranians aren’t building a nuclear weapon.” “I don’t care what Tulsi says,” the President shot back, shaking his head. Asked if Russia or China might intervene, he added, “Nobody wants to get involved.”

POTUS: “I don’t care what Tulsi says.” “We’re looking for better than a cease-fire,” said Trump aboard Air Force One on the way back to D.C. from the G7 early Tuesday morning, at about 5 a.m. EST. Asked whether the United States can defeat Iran’s deeply buried nuclear sites, he replied, “There’s no guarantee, but they’re not going to have a nuclear weapon—I can tell you that.” A reporter pressed: “Mr. President, can the United States destroy Iran’s nuclear program?” “It’ll be gone long before we have to get involved. They’re not going to have a nuclear program.” The reporter followed up: “Tulsi Gabbard said the Iranians aren’t building a nuclear weapon.” “I don’t care what Tulsi says,” the President shot back, shaking his head. Asked if Russia or China might intervene, he added, “Nobody wants to get involved.”

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Ali Vaez pledged his fealty to the Islamic Republic, expressing his “national and patriotic duty” as an Iranian, and offering assistance to then Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in 2014 as part of an Iran Experts Initiative. “As an Iranian, based on my national and patriotic duty, I have not hesitated to help you in any way; from proposing to Your Excellency a public campaign against the notion of [nuclear] breakout, to assisting your team in preparing reports on the practical needs of Iran.” That comes from a leaked email sent on Oct 2, 2014 by Ali Vaez, who was then Iran Project Director at the International Crisis Group, to Javad Zarif. [ ICG’s Iran desk had been run by Robert Malley since 2002 through Feb 2014 when he joined Obama’s NSC. His aides, Iran Expert Initiative core recruits, Ali Vaez, Dina Esfandiary and Arianne Tabatabai were key players in the Iran nuclear deal, [Solomon, J. (2024, Feb). How Iran used its ties to a top global NGO. Semafor. David Albright, then a proponent of the JCPOA, remarked on his own surprise while contending with Vaez’s positions in interviews with Jay Solomon. ICG’s public framing kept landing where Tehran needed it to land, and Vaez’s positions on verification and enforcement, which should have been the center of gravity, often aligned with the regime’s. Then there’s the curious case of ICG’s undisclosed 2016 memorandum of understanding with the regime’s Institute for Political and International Studies. IPIS, an arm of the foreign ministry, was responsible for the 2006 Tehran Holocaust denial conference, [Iran International. (2024, Feb). Covert ties between Iran and the International Crisis Group. What is less reported is the parallel uranium and donor backdrop to all this. In 2008, Frank Giustra, Kremlin-aligned Kyiv steel magnate Viktor Pinchuk, George Soros and the MacArthur Foundation each donated $5 million to ICG. Giustra who had joined the board in 2005 would go on to become its co-chairman. Giustra and two key partners, Sergey Kurzin and Ian Telfer, put together the UrAsia Energy deal in 2004 that moved three Kazakh uranium fields to Uranium One. Telfer became the chairman of Uranium One, Giustra shifted to consulting through Endeavor Financial after the 2007 sale that netted the group billions. Telfer then oversaw the transfer of Uranium One to Rosatom. By 2013 the Russians owned the entire project. Little known tidbit is that what was negotiated included an exchange of yellowcake for declared enriched uranium, which Rosatom’s Uranium One Netherlands managed when the deal closed. 200 tons replaced around 11.5 tons of uranium enriched beyond the JCPOA agreed upon threshold. Another detail: Norway actually stepped in to help finance the Kazakh portion of that yellowcake shipment, paying around $6 million to facilitate the transaction and get the LEU out of Iran. Giustra had bailed Telfer out after he, by his own account, lost his shirt in the dot com bust, with $5 million raise for a $17 million company that had flatlined, Wheaton River Minerals. Their first big hit was on an old Marc Rich-Soviet project in Argentina called Bajo de la Alumbrera, which turned into a multi-billion dollar bonanza -- to this day considered by industry insiders as one of the greatest pivot-and-strike moves in modern mining history. The billions generated by Wheaton River, which eventually merged with Goldcorp, gave Telfer and Giustra the capital, the track record, and the loyalty of institutional investors they needed to go into a risky jurisdiction like Kazakhstan a year later and pull off the UrAsia deal. Dr. Sergey Kurzin, the UrAsia deal’s facilitator and longtime Giustra associate, was a soviet nuclear engineer who defected right before the Iron Curtain fell. Within 6 months of landing in London he was working at Exploration Consultants Ltd, that by his own account had Marc Rich as its central client.

Ali Vaez pledged his fealty to the Islamic Republic, expressing his “national and patriotic duty” as an Iranian, and offering assistance to then Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in 2014 as part of an Iran Experts Initiative. “As an Iranian, based on my national and patriotic duty, I have not hesitated to help you in any way; from proposing to Your Excellency a public campaign against the notion of [nuclear] breakout, to assisting your team in preparing reports on the practical needs of Iran.” That comes from a leaked email sent on Oct 2, 2014 by Ali Vaez, who was then Iran Project Director at the International Crisis Group, to Javad Zarif. [ ICG’s Iran desk had been run by Robert Malley since 2002 through Feb 2014 when he joined Obama’s NSC. His aides, Iran Expert Initiative core recruits, Ali Vaez, Dina Esfandiary and Arianne Tabatabai were key players in the Iran nuclear deal, [Solomon, J. (2024, Feb). How Iran used its ties to a top global NGO. Semafor. David Albright, then a proponent of the JCPOA, remarked on his own surprise while contending with Vaez’s positions in interviews with Jay Solomon. ICG’s public framing kept landing where Tehran needed it to land, and Vaez’s positions on verification and enforcement, which should have been the center of gravity, often aligned with the regime’s. Then there’s the curious case of ICG’s undisclosed 2016 memorandum of understanding with the regime’s Institute for Political and International Studies. IPIS, an arm of the foreign ministry, was responsible for the 2006 Tehran Holocaust denial conference, [Iran International. (2024, Feb). Covert ties between Iran and the International Crisis Group. What is less reported is the parallel uranium and donor backdrop to all this. In 2008, Frank Giustra, Kremlin-aligned Kyiv steel magnate Viktor Pinchuk, George Soros and the MacArthur Foundation each donated $5 million to ICG. Giustra who had joined the board in 2005 would go on to become its co-chairman. Giustra and two key partners, Sergey Kurzin and Ian Telfer, put together the UrAsia Energy deal in 2004 that moved three Kazakh uranium fields to Uranium One. Telfer became the chairman of Uranium One, Giustra shifted to consulting through Endeavor Financial after the 2007 sale that netted the group billions. Telfer then oversaw the transfer of Uranium One to Rosatom. By 2013 the Russians owned the entire project. Little known tidbit is that what was negotiated included an exchange of yellowcake for declared enriched uranium, which Rosatom’s Uranium One Netherlands managed when the deal closed. 200 tons replaced around 11.5 tons of uranium enriched beyond the JCPOA agreed upon threshold. Another detail: Norway actually stepped in to help finance the Kazakh portion of that yellowcake shipment, paying around $6 million to facilitate the transaction and get the LEU out of Iran. Giustra had bailed Telfer out after he, by his own account, lost his shirt in the dot com bust, with $5 million raise for a $17 million company that had flatlined, Wheaton River Minerals. Their first big hit was on an old Marc Rich-Soviet project in Argentina called Bajo de la Alumbrera, which turned into a multi-billion dollar bonanza -- to this day considered by industry insiders as one of the greatest pivot-and-strike moves in modern mining history. The billions generated by Wheaton River, which eventually merged with Goldcorp, gave Telfer and Giustra the capital, the track record, and the loyalty of institutional investors they needed to go into a risky jurisdiction like Kazakhstan a year later and pull off the UrAsia deal. Dr. Sergey Kurzin, the UrAsia deal’s facilitator and longtime Giustra associate, was a soviet nuclear engineer who defected right before the Iron Curtain fell. Within 6 months of landing in London he was working at Exploration Consultants Ltd, that by his own account had Marc Rich as its central client.

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Y’all have lost yr ever lovin minds. Goy gadol in the Hebrew Bible refers to Israel, meaning great nation. Goy is simply nation or people, as in goyim rabbim, many nations. All of these uses appear in the bible. Over time the plural goyim began to be used as "the nations" other than Israel. That’s it. There is no cattle nothing involved. Hebrew for cattle has completely different roots like ’elef (oxen) or bakar (cattle) or tzon (sheep). Adar is herd or flock as in a group gathering, found in verses like "He will feed His flock like a shepherd" (Isaiah 40:11) and is a term of endearment. There is no way to get from Goy to any of these. If it was pejorative Israel wouldn’t be referred to as the great Goy in the bible. Seriously, if you’re buying this trash you’ve strayed way TF off the reservation Shawn Ryan. Who the hell is off camera feeding you this shit man?

Y’all have lost yr ever lovin minds. Goy gadol in the Hebrew Bible refers to Israel, meaning great nation. Goy is simply nation or people, as in goyim rabbim, many nations. All of these uses appear in the bible. Over time the plural goyim began to be used as "the nations" other than Israel. That’s it. There is no cattle nothing involved. Hebrew for cattle has completely different roots like ’elef (oxen) or bakar (cattle) or tzon (sheep). Adar is herd or flock as in a group gathering, found in verses like "He will feed His flock like a shepherd" (Isaiah 40:11) and is a term of endearment. There is no way to get from Goy to any of these. If it was pejorative Israel wouldn’t be referred to as the great Goy in the bible. Seriously, if you’re buying this trash you’ve strayed way TF off the reservation Shawn Ryan. Who the hell is off camera feeding you this shit man?

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In Qatar, people quickly learn that playing stupid games wins stupid prizes. What was all good and fine when it was happening in Tel Aviv and Tehran has come home to roost. Doha will be re-assessing its relations with the Islamic Regime.

In Qatar, people quickly learn that playing stupid games wins stupid prizes. What was all good and fine when it was happening in Tel Aviv and Tehran has come home to roost. Doha will be re-assessing its relations with the Islamic Regime.

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The U.S. Slams BATNA on the Table: Escalation Dominance, Deterrence, and Strategic Compellence to Avert Regional War Tehran’s nuclear ambitions threaten the emergence of a new North Korea in the Middle East—but one that is not territorially constrained. Instead, the Islamic Republic of Iran will house a transnational terror network under its nuclear umbrella. In order to address this threat to global security, Iran’s ability to retaliate to any kinetic action against its nuclear facilities must be addressed. CENTCOM operations against the Houthis is the first step, providing Tehran with a clear view of what BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) looks like while securing Gulf oil infrastructure from Iranian threats on its southern flank. They also shape the theater for further escalation which is a prerequisite to kinetic action against Tehran’s nuclear program given its retaliatory threats. The IRGC-N’s ability to create chaos in the Strait of Hormuz through which 20% of crude flows need to be neutralized. Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), or drone submersibles, developed by the IRGC and deployed by the Houthis for the first time in February 2024, represent a significant reframing of threat scenarios in the Strait of Hormuz. Looming maritime drone warfare is a wild-card; a first of its kind. Concurrently, the IRGC-AF’s ability to launch True Promise 3.0 must be addressed. Israel is poised to do the heavy lifting in defanging Tehran, in direct service of U.S. interests. The IAF is well-resourced to paralyze Iranian offensive missile capabilities. Ultimately, a series of high-intensity air campaigns aimed at degrading Iran’s offensive missile capabilities—threatening both Gulf oil facilities and Israel—and ensuring freedom of navigation in the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Strait of Hormuz are prerequisites to addressing Tehran’s runaway nuclear ambitions. A note on diplomatic approaches and current evolutions in U.S. strategy. First, it has become exceedingly clear that Tehran exploits diplomacy with the west to advance its aggressive agenda, invariably using it as a means to an end that undermines the very purpose of engagement. The relationship between diplomacy and conflict is dynamic, not static. Diplomacy is both the congenital source of conflict and its penultimate resolution. The failure to recognize when a catastrophic collapse of diplomatic efforts has occurred, and to slam BATNA on the table, merely represents the continuation of catastrophically failed diplomacy. History is littered with the bloodiest of examples, where ignoring the signs of collapsing diplomacy has led to protracted conflicts, larger-scale conflagrations and even global wars. Likewise, a scenario was permitted to emerge where the leadership in Tehran has sat quietly at the eye of a storm it has whipped up through a frenzy of militant activity via its Axis of Terror while Israel suffered an unprecedented blow, as the U.S. began to retreat its regional footprint, upending the deterrence equation. The new U.S. administration’s hard-power approach constitutes a significant course correction. Controlled and measured escalation linked to Tehran’s aggressions makes it clear that continued hostilities will lead to systematic degradation of their military and economic infrastructure. But the path to negotiation remains open at each stage, ensuring the door to diplomacy isn’t closed. Preventative escalation sends Iran a clear choice: back down now, or face the methodical dismantling of your offensive capabilities, and ultimately economy. If they continue to push, the response intensifies, resulting in their ability to project regional power being systematically destroyed. This approach is not war-seeking but war-preventing—through escalation dominance, deterrence, and strategic compellence: a 180 to the Biden administration’s “Don’t—OK, do” diplomacy.

The U.S. Slams BATNA on the Table: Escalation Dominance, Deterrence, and Strategic Compellence to Avert Regional War Tehran’s nuclear ambitions threaten the emergence of a new North Korea in the Middle East—but one that is not territorially constrained. Instead, the Islamic Republic of Iran will house a transnational terror network under its nuclear umbrella. In order to address this threat to global security, Iran’s ability to retaliate to any kinetic action against its nuclear facilities must be addressed. CENTCOM operations against the Houthis is the first step, providing Tehran with a clear view of what BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) looks like while securing Gulf oil infrastructure from Iranian threats on its southern flank. They also shape the theater for further escalation which is a prerequisite to kinetic action against Tehran’s nuclear program given its retaliatory threats. The IRGC-N’s ability to create chaos in the Strait of Hormuz through which 20% of crude flows need to be neutralized. Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), or drone submersibles, developed by the IRGC and deployed by the Houthis for the first time in February 2024, represent a significant reframing of threat scenarios in the Strait of Hormuz. Looming maritime drone warfare is a wild-card; a first of its kind. Concurrently, the IRGC-AF’s ability to launch True Promise 3.0 must be addressed. Israel is poised to do the heavy lifting in defanging Tehran, in direct service of U.S. interests. The IAF is well-resourced to paralyze Iranian offensive missile capabilities. Ultimately, a series of high-intensity air campaigns aimed at degrading Iran’s offensive missile capabilities—threatening both Gulf oil facilities and Israel—and ensuring freedom of navigation in the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Strait of Hormuz are prerequisites to addressing Tehran’s runaway nuclear ambitions. A note on diplomatic approaches and current evolutions in U.S. strategy. First, it has become exceedingly clear that Tehran exploits diplomacy with the west to advance its aggressive agenda, invariably using it as a means to an end that undermines the very purpose of engagement. The relationship between diplomacy and conflict is dynamic, not static. Diplomacy is both the congenital source of conflict and its penultimate resolution. The failure to recognize when a catastrophic collapse of diplomatic efforts has occurred, and to slam BATNA on the table, merely represents the continuation of catastrophically failed diplomacy. History is littered with the bloodiest of examples, where ignoring the signs of collapsing diplomacy has led to protracted conflicts, larger-scale conflagrations and even global wars. Likewise, a scenario was permitted to emerge where the leadership in Tehran has sat quietly at the eye of a storm it has whipped up through a frenzy of militant activity via its Axis of Terror while Israel suffered an unprecedented blow, as the U.S. began to retreat its regional footprint, upending the deterrence equation. The new U.S. administration’s hard-power approach constitutes a significant course correction. Controlled and measured escalation linked to Tehran’s aggressions makes it clear that continued hostilities will lead to systematic degradation of their military and economic infrastructure. But the path to negotiation remains open at each stage, ensuring the door to diplomacy isn’t closed. Preventative escalation sends Iran a clear choice: back down now, or face the methodical dismantling of your offensive capabilities, and ultimately economy. If they continue to push, the response intensifies, resulting in their ability to project regional power being systematically destroyed. This approach is not war-seeking but war-preventing—through escalation dominance, deterrence, and strategic compellence: a 180 to the Biden administration’s “Don’t—OK, do” diplomacy.

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Because 40,000 rabbis converting half a billion Muslims would take ten millennia, and Israel already made plans with democracy, it had to cancel its date with Greater Israel. Accordingly, in land for peace it gave up territory it seized in ‘73 that put it a stone throw from the Nile Delta, relinquishing control of the entire Sinai roughly thrice its size, just to make peace with the Egyptians, even though they ethnically cleansed Jews in the 50s and they are just very rude toward Israel. Still, land for peace was the bargain struck in ‘79. Also, important to note that Begin offered Sadat Gaza then. Sadat declined. No wonder why. Then in 1993-95 Israel traded control of Areas A and B in Judea and Samaria. The Pilisteinian Association took over civil and local policing with security cooperation in Area B. Area C remains under exclusive Israeli military and civilian control. Then in 2005, Israel simply upped and left Gaza unilaterally disengaging and forcing its own people out, even digging up the dead from cemeteries for repatriation. 1973, 1993-95, and 2005, Israel voluntarily shrunk its territorial control in the hopes of securing peace. It would try again in 2008 under Olmert to cede 94 percent of Judea and Samaria and hand over the remainder in Negev land swaps but the Pilistein Liberation Organ would have none of it, insisting instead on nothing less than the conquest of all of Israel via demographic inversion. In 1948 Arab armies tried to destroy Israel but lost a humiliating defeat. The man who coined the term Nakba explained the “seriousness of the disaster” thus: “The defeat of the Arabs in Palestine is no simple setback or light, passing evil. It is a disaster in every sense of the word and one of the harshest of the trials and tribulations with which the Arabs have been afflicted throughout their long history…Seven Arab states declare war on Zionism in Palestine, stop impotent before it, and then turn on their heels.” Ouch. Then in 1967 they tried it again and received a similar shellacking just for seconds and the same progenitor of the term, the Syrian Arab Constantine Zurayk, wrote a scathing sequel, The Meaning of the Nakba Anew. The ‘67 defeat was not merely a temporary “setback” (Naksa) he said, but another profound Nakba. A deeper, self-inflicted disaster rooted in Arab failures. If it wasn’t enough they tried yet again in ‘73, but Sadat’s plan was different. He thought that a limited land grab and a painful cut would enable politics to do the rest. He was only half wrong. And so after delivering the Arabs three humiliating defeats Israel began to offer land for peace, for no other reason than it’s shampooing its hair for the next ten thousand years and won’t have time to meet “Greater Israel”. Yet something appears to be getting lost in translation. Some people just can’t seem to take the hint.

dan linnaeus

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A nuclear only deal does not merely fail to address the Iranian missile, drone and proxy files as threats posed to Israeli interests. They threaten Gulf partners, US regional presence, and US multi theater coherence. VP has limited oversight of US strategy. He is not inside the US military command chain, whereas the Commander in Chief sits at its constitutional apex. Inasmuch as Potus has delegated to him the nuclear file only, Vance’s scope does not touch the full gamut of compartmented tier 0 planning let alone the fused products that inform it. In stark contrast, the Israeli PM sitting as the frontline civilian authority of the military and defense complex supporting Centcom in combined operations, is the apex consumer of critical operational intel feeding joint assessments of the full range of Iranian threat vectors. One is the delegated US negotiator on a single critical file. The other sits atop the entire engine of Israeli intelligence production and fused intel coproduction in concert with foreign intelligence partners, inclusive of inputs from US in theater collection and judgments, across every regional file. Do the math. In plain and public view, Tehran, through the Supreme Leader’s military advisor Mohsen Rezaee, today stated its policy to effectively disrupt US grand strategy by holding US resources hostage in a ‘quagmire’. Tehran’s bid is straightforward: tether US resources to Centcom in order to disrupt its global posture and decohere America’s grand strategic imperatives until it acquiesces to Iranian demands. Does a nuclear only deal dispose of the US security dilemma? Not when leaving Iran with the ability to spark integrated air defense saturating mass salvo crises through its “True Promise” operations permits the IRGC to whistle US resources into the theater at will, leaving America vulnerable to coordinated or opportunistic cross theater exploitation that undermines US Indo Pacific posture. That is a prize lever that can be traded to Moscow and Beijing in return for support, making the cost of pivoting to Asia on a suspended nuclear file exceed the cost of staying to finish the job with ready, willing and able partners.

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11,155 görüntüleme • 10 gün önce

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Former IDF Spox Jonathan Conricus: I think what Israel has done again is kind of shuffle the cards, and hopefully sent a message to terrorists, their supporters and countries that think about harboring terrorists, that even if you’ve been a beneficiary of the U.S. for a long time, and even if you think that you are untouchable—like you’re a made man in the mafia—you’re not. And if you harbor evil terrorists that kill Israeli civilians and try to kill additional Israeli civilians, and claim that you want to wage jihad until the last Jew is dead in Israel, then you are a target no matter where you are. It’s a matter of a political decision, because the military capabilities exist; Israel has the intel and the ordnance delivery capabilities. And I think what Israel did now is indicate that we are serious and we are going to deliver justice to each and every senior terrorist of value that threatens Israel. I think that’s a very important message. I hope that all terrorists and other state supporters of terrorism are paying notice. I would wish that the Turks would stop housing and supporting Hamas, because that looks like the next episode. Maybe far away, but it looks like kind of the next episode in this saga, and I would rather avoid it. But I think Israel is determined to really shift its posture here in the Middle East and not agree to have its civilians slaughtered like they were on October 7th, and to do everything necessary in order to prevent it—even if it is things that people will find offensive and will criticize Israel for doing. Mario Nawfal Jonathan Conricus John Kiriakou

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73,647 görüntüleme • 9 ay önce

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By and large, the Israel Air Force (IAF) possesses the range and capabilities necessary to neutralize the IRGC-AF’s heavily fortified offensive missile infrastructure. This needn’t rely on GB 57 MOPs or similarly massive deep penetration munitions, but can primarily be achieved through precision strikes targeting tunnel entrances and launch openings, effectively rendering these sites temporarily unusable, provided pinpoint intelligence of the target sites is both accurate and sufficiently comprehensive. Logistically, sustaining 24-hour long-range sortie operations against IRGC-AF’s missile infrastructure depends on highly-coordinated logistics and a carefully executed refueling chain. Two Boeing 707 tankers in a single wave can supply over 180,000 kilograms of fuel (with 90,000 kilograms transferable fuel capacity each). An F-35 requires approximately 8,300 kilograms for a full tank. The combat radius of the IAF’s F-35I “Adir” which shares the performance characteristics of the F-35A Lightning II, is approximately 1,075 kilometers for an operational range exceeding 2,000 kilometers. The distance from the Negev, through the Golan, Syria, and southern Iraq is roughly half this distance (about 1,200-1,400 kilometers) depending on the operation’s design). So a single refuel at the push point near the border of western Iran furnishes the F-35I with a fresh combat radius of 1,075 kilometers enabling it to strike deep into Iranian territory. Each strike package, potentially comprising 10-12 F-35Is, equipped with internal dual-weapon bays with payload capacities of 1,850 kg (4,000 lbs), and can therefore engage 10-12 targets per wave, assuming both weapons are deployed per target and depending on the complexity of the strike sites and the tactical requirements of the mission. Advanced standoff weapons like the Popeye, Rampage, or Delilah, with ranges of 400-600 kilometers, permit the IAF to strike targets up to 1,300-1,500 kilometers inside Iran without overextending its aerial refueling chain. Although air defense systems such as the Russian-made S-300, the enhanced Chinese HQ-9, and potentially domestic systems like the Bavar-373 possess ranges of 200 kilometers or more, 300 kilometers or more safe-distance for critical high-value strategic assets like the IAF’s Desert Giants refueling platforms will affect the F-35I’s strike range, as always depending on operational design. The IAF possesses heavily modified F-15 Ra’am and F-16 Sufa for combat air patrol (CAP or “Yis’ar”) and suppression of air defense (SEAD or “Chihan”) missions to protect strategic assets like its refueling chain, and to disrupt and destroy air and ground defense systems. SEAD platforms and wild weasels may comprise 10-20 fighters of each sortie package depending on targeting and operational design. Israel’s approach would require a multi-layered defense penetration strategy leveraging both kinetic and non-kinetic SEAD tactics, such as electronic warfare and cyber operations, pivotal for disrupting IRGC-AF missile guidance systems and command and control networks before and during initial air strikes. Electronic attack platforms like the AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) that can jam or spoof Iranian radars and communication system can shape the theater, providing a safer corridor for kinetic strike packages. Advanced standoff weapons, such as the AGM-142 Have Nap “Popeye” enhanced with an imaging infrared seeker to enhance its accuracy against high-value targets, the Delilah cruise missile designed for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and precision strike missions, and the Rampage, a supersonic, long-range, air-to-ground assault missile suited to overcome air defense systems with its speed and low radar cross-section and designed to strike high-value, well-protected targets with precision—all of which can be launched from significant stand-off distances. The IAF also employs state-of-the-art intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare (EW) platforms like the Gulfstream 550 Shavit and Nachshon aircraft, as well as locally produced Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) ISR UAVs called the Eitans. These UAVs, which can operate continuously for 36 hours and are equipped with advanced signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems, provide critical real-time intelligence during operations. Each of these strategic assets require CAPs, so each sortie package may assign elements of 2 or more F-16s or F-15s for each aerial asset: EW, ISR, UAV and refueling aircraft, for a total of 10-20 fighter jets in air patrol missions depending on design. The CAPs elements’ size and weaponeering will depend on how heavily contested the airspace, that the IAF anticipates operating in, will be. Robust protection for these strategic assets is an integral component in the design and planning of such a mission, including the IAF’s logistics chain. Operationally, with a publicly disclosed total of 7 refueling 707s in the IAF’s Desert Giants Sqn 120, it can deploy 6 tanker packages of 2 707s in order to execute three waves of airstrikes four times per day, with an estimated average of six-hour intervals between each takeoff. Roughly speaking this breaks down to 90 minutes from base to near-border push point (ferry leg), 90 minutes of combat operations time including return to egress point (on-stage leg), 90 minutes RTB (return to base) including refueling assets en route, and 90 minutes refuel, maintain and rearm for the entire sortie package (reconstitution phase) at base. This equates to twelve strike packages delivered approximately every 2 hours around the clock for a virtually continuous presence at the push point, covering Imam Ali, Arak, Kermanshah, Isfahan and many other critical sites within Iranian territory. The F-15I Ra’am is highly modular in its fuel design possessing a combat radius of approximately 1,600 kilometers, and a much greater ferry range which can be extended through a menu of external and detachable fuel tanks, making it one of the most versatile long-range platforms in the IAF’s aviation fleet. Given its primary assignments in CAP and SEAD operations it can theoretically conduct the entire mission without any refueling or only partial refueling. Likewise the IAF’s heavily modified F-16I Sufa is equipped with conformal fuel tanks that can extend its range, increasing its fuel capacity compared to the baseline F-16 model by up to 7,700 kilos (17,000 lbs) of external fuel, contributing to an operational range of about 3,220 km (2,000 miles). Therefore, it too adds limited burden to the IAF’s refueling logistics. Assuming 7 minute refueling time for each IAF F-35I, two tankers can refuel 10-12 F-35I strike packages in 35-40 minutes en route to push point and again en route to base from rendezvous point post-on-stage. No additional time is required for these refueling operations as they may be seamlessly integrated into the ferry and RTB legs of the mission. Altogether, the IAF can hit somewhere in the ball park of 120-130 sites a day, severely damaging the IRGC-AF’s defensive and offensive capabilities within 72 hours. After three days, the IAF could theoretically strike about 450 sites. For heavily fortified targets with deep burial depths, requiring deeper penetration, the GB 31 (A2K) with BLU 137/B deep penetration warheads are suitable for the F-35Is and the GBU 72 (A5K) with BLU 138 deep penetration warheads can be deployed by the F-15I Ra’ams once sufficient SEAD ops are completed and closer to the borders of western Iran. Weaponeering, shuffling assets to suit allocation needs, and the overall designing of sortie package inventories, including formulating the necessary logistics, is an immensely complex challenge managed by highly trained personnel and assisted by advanced systems in what can only be likened to a dark opera of destructive power. Whatever the challenges, one thing remains certain. Israel always finds a way to defy gravity, alter realities on the ground (and in the air) and take the region by storm. As long as the IRGC-AF maintains its offensive missile capabilities it is liable to heavily target Israel’s airbases, critical military installations and civilian centers. Therefore, before Israel considers oil, nuclear, or any other strategic assets, it will need to knock the front teeth out this snake when it strikes. Israel might front-load its first strike to meet these objectives, coordinating all 3 waves in rapid succession shaped by Jericho II and III strikes tightly preceded by cyber, electronic warfare and internal sabotage operations. The IAF’s first strike will likely be designed to leave the IRGC-AF reeling and off-balance long enough for its fleet to reconstitute and launch the next set of waves. These are likely to then settle into a steady pace for at least 72 hours given the volume, geographic and strategic depth of their missile program. Below: "No one must sleep, for the stars will tremble. No one shall know my name as I vanish into the night."

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Hamas leader Khaled Mashal: “We do not accept the two state solution.” — January 22, 2024 “I would like to say two things about the two-state solution. First, we have nothing to do with the two-state solution. We reject this notion, because it means you would get a promise for a [Palestinian] state, yet you are required to recognize the legitimacy of the other state, which is the Zionist entity. This is unacceptable. We demand to be liberated, to get rid of the occupation, and to have our independence, and our state. [Israel] is my enemy. It is not my concern." “Obviously, the position of Hamas, and the position of the vast majority of the Palestinian people, especially following October 7, I believe that the dream and the hope for Palestine from the River to the Sea, and from the north to the south, has been renewed. This has also become a slogan chanted in the U.S., and in western capital cities, by the American and Western public.” “Hamas agreed to a completely independent (Palestinian) state, with the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital, with the Right of Return included without recognizing the legitimacy of the Zionist entity. This position was meant to facilitate Palestinian and Arab agreement at this stage, but without relinquishing any of our rights or any part of our land, and without recognizing Israel. Our vision remains unchanged. I believe that October 7 has enhanced this conviction, has narrowed the disagreements, and has turned the idea of liberating Palestine from the River to the Sea into a realistic idea that has already begun. It is not something merely to be expected or hoped for, It is part of the plan, part of the agenda, and we are standing on its threshold, Allah willing.” TRANSLATED BY MEMRI Source:

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Israel begins construction on a multilayered defensive system extending roughly 500 kilometers on its eastern border from the southern Golan Heights to the Samar dunes north of Eilat. Director General of the Ministry of Defense, Maj. Gen. (res.) Amir Baram, stated: The eastern sector is Israel’s longest border. Defending it is a complex mission that begins with a physical barrier and a reorganization of IDF forces, but does not end there. The strategy we are advancing, together with government ministries, is to establish a full ecosystem of settlement, employment, transportation, water, agriculture, health, and more. The first 50 million NIS to launch the program were approved within the 2026 budget. Head of the Borders and Seam Directorate in the Ministry of Defense, Maj. Gen. Eran Ophir, stated: It will be a smart border incorporating both a physical fence and an array of sensors, radars, cameras, and advanced communications systems capable of providing an adaptive response to all current and future defense requirements. Work has begun on two segments, and in the coming months we plan to open additional work fronts on further sections to accelerate progress. This effort is integrated into the revised security concept developed by the IDF and Central Command, which also included the establishment of a new regional division responsible for the security of the Jordan Valley, Emek Yizre’el or the Jezreel Valley and surrounding Valleys region, and the Dead Sea area. The total project cost is estimated at approximately 5.5 billion NIS, or USD 1.7 billion. (Source: Israel MoD)

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Listen to this young Gazan’s seething rebuke of Islamist and Palestinian leadership: “You throw your slogans of resilience, armed struggle, be patient, fight, endure. But we are the patience ... You’ve made us hate this country. You’ve made us hate life … You’ve wrecked us. You’ve wrecked our kids.” Those slogans the young Gazan throws back in their faces, sabr (patience), sumud (steadfastness), muqawama (resistance), jihad—they’re exactly what Brotherhood preachers, Hamas, PIJ, and their patrons have wrapped themselves in for more than eight decades. From the Brotherhood founder al-Banna through al-Hudaybi and al-Qaradawi, they have preached be patient, remain steadfast, wait until “conditions are ripe,” fight only when victory is likely and the harm you will bring on your own people will not exceed the evil you are resisting—a “fiqh of patience and resistance.” That’s their own jurisprudence of balancing harm and good (fiqh al-muwazanat). Even Sayyid Qutb, the revolutionary, warned against “suicidal enthusiasm” that spills blood without changing reality. Yet for three decades Qaradawi wrote the fatwas that licensed suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, chaired the Union of Good that funneled money into Hamas’s military project, and used his Al Jazeera pulpit to portray the group as the vanguard of Islamic revival. And when Oct 7 came, Brotherhood clerics who spent years teaching that jihad must be a last resort with a real chance of success blessed “Al-Aqsa Flood” as holy war. Qaradawi’s successor in Doha prayed for God to “grant victory to our mujahideen brothers” and convened an online conference to praise the attack as jihad. Brotherhood figures from Cairo to Istanbul to Islamabad saluted Hamas, or hid behind “context” instead of saying the one thing their own fiqh demanded: that you don’t knowingly drag your people into a catastrophe you cannot possibly win. What this kid is saying is: you broke that covenant. You demanded our patience and then spent it on operations you knew would blow up our lives, our kids, our future. You turned sabr into a slogan but never applied it to yourselves. You told us to endure, and then you cashed out our endurance on wars you were never going to win. In their own Islamist idiom he is calling them unjust and hypocritical, and it’s devastating. Their refusal to condemn, and their choice instead to glorify, is not neutral silence. It’s a breach of their own rules. It exposes that their “fiqh of patience” is a safety pin they leave in place conveniently and celebrate the moment a proxy pulls it. That’s dissimulation, not piety. It means that Cynthia Farahat’s operational autopsy of the Brotherhood bites much harder than scholarly readings that treat its doctrine of restraint as a pragmatic safeguard. In real world practice, those doctrines collapse into utilitarian grammar, functioning as little more than cover for a transnational paramilitary support network. The Brotherhood is a terrorist organization wrapped in the robes of an Islamic “revival.” This young man’s words are deeply cutting when he says “but we are the patience” and rips into Muslim and Palestinian leadership for its hypocrisy. He is calling the Emperor’s new clothes. Listen … “You come at me with your slogans — steadfastness, resistance, be patient, fight, endure. But we are the patience. Me, as a young man — my life hasn’t even started. You’ve made us hate this country. You’ve made us hate life. We’re drowning. You’ve wrecked us. You’ve wrecked our kids. Our future? No education, no healthcare. Give us a decent life, you who call yourselves responsible for us — whether Hamas, the Jihad, Fatah, any official body that claims to represent the Palestinian people. I’m exhausted from this unjust land — this unjust land, to its people, to us. Man, we’re tired. Enough. Enough. Every two years — a war.” Source: Jusoor News International (JNI)

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Protesters on Attorney General Baharav-Miara’s block in Tel Aviv: “The phone doesn’t know how to swim! Where is the phone? Where is the evidence? Where is your witness? Where is the investigation? Did you forget to investigate? You sold us out! You sold the soldiers out!” The protest follows the IDF Military Advocate General Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi's disappearance and arrest last night; before her arrest her personal phone disappeared fueling suspicions of evidence tampering. In her resignation letter to the Chief of Staff LTG Eyal Zamir on Friday (Oct 31) Tomer-Yerushalmi admitted that she authorized the release of the Sde Teiman detention facility video to Channel 12’s Guy Peleg (in July/Aug) last year. She wrote that the leak was intended to counter public criticism that the military wasn't addressing the incident seriously, but it backfired and drew international condemnation and accusations of a cover-up. The day of her resignation letter (Friday), Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara opened a criminal inquiry, directing Israel Police's Lahav 433 unit to investigate the leak's circumstances. The AG’s office submitted an affidavit to Israel's High Court of Justice in August last year, during a petition related to the Sde Teiman case, stating that an internal probe conducted by Tomer-Yerushalmi office couldn't identify the leak's source—so her resignation letter’s admission raises allegations obstruction of justice, providing false information under oath, violation of trust, and possibly endangering national security by damaging Israel's international image during wartime. Yesterday evening Tomer-Yerushalmi left an ambiguous note for her family, abandoned her car on a beach in northern Tel Aviv-area, and went missing for several hours, prompting a large-scale search. She was found alive and arrested that evening after medical evaluation, but her phone remains missing, with authorities exploring the possibility that she threw it into the sea to eliminate potentially incriminating information, such as group chats or files tied to the case. Her detention was extended today as part of the ongoing probe into the video leak and related misconduct due to concerns about obstruction and tampering. Suspicions that Tomer-Yerushalmi staged her brief disappearance yesterday night as a ploy to dispose of her personal phone are exacerbated by speculation that it contained evidence implicating the AG’s role in the leak cover up and fueling the protesters' accusations that she "sold out" soldiers and the public. There are reports of a cellphone found on the beach near Tomer-Yerushalmi's last known location, though it's unclear if it's hers—she had reportedly switched devices weeks earlier. Justice Minister Yariv Levin has demanded that AG Baharav-Miara recuse herself from the investigation into Tomer-Yerushalmi, arguing it creates a conflict of interest and accusing the AG of misleading Bagatz (High Court of Justice) in the August affidavit last year, (which stated Tomer-Yerushalmi’s internal probe couldn’t locate the origin of the leak). Levin called for an independent probe, possibly by the Shin Bet, but Baharav-Miara rejected Levin’s call for her recusal, saying it’s without legal basis, and the investigation she launched proceeds under her authority via Lahav’s 433 unit. The disagreement over the criminal probe’s oversight and investigative authority may wind up in a Bagatz showdown before resolution. Tel Aviv’s Kikar Hamedina area a short while ago:

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About Dier Yassin (1948) | In the 1998 PBS documentary, "The 50 Years War Israel And The Arabs," Hazem Nusseibeh (a prominent Arab diplomat) and Abu Mahmoud (a resident of Deir Yassin) detail the events surrounding Dier Yassin in 1948. Nusseibeh, who met with the Palestinian Arab leaders after the attack on the village, details how the Arab leaders decided to exploit the event, lying about rape in the village in the hopes that the Arab armies would invade. Nusseibeh explains how the press release backfired, instead causing Arabs to flee in terror from their villages after they had heard the false reports of rape. Later in the 2008 BBC documentary, "The Birth of Israel," Nusseibeh would backtrack and say that it was the Israeli massacres which caused Arabs to flee their homes. Full Documentary: Palestinian Leader Hazem Nusseibeh admits to false reports of rape at Dier Yassin, On the eve of the Arab invasion of the newly declared State of Israel, Azzam Pasha, the Secretary-General of the Arab League in 1948 declared, "This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades.”[✝︎ Howard M Sachar, A History of Israel (New York: Knopf, 1979)p. 333] This widely reported declaration has since been frequently cited to exemplify the immense animosity and aggression of the Arab states towards Jews and the newly formed state of Israel at that time. It was made immediately following the United Nations’ partition plan for Palestine, which was accepted by Jewish leaders but rejected by the Arab side. For more perspectives that you’re likely unfamiliar with you can see the following interview with Hazem Nusseibeh and Abu Mahmoud; and if you really wish to upset your entire world view, I suggest reading the post attached directly below this clip of their direct testimonies.

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