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Ian Cameron

@IanCameron23170,829 subscribers

Crime Activist// Chairperson: Portfolio Committee on Police// 🇿🇦 Member of Parliament @Our_DA// Founder @FirearmsZA

Shorts

Today I conducted several surprise oversight visits in the Western Cape. The point of these visits is simple, to test the real conditions under which police officers are expected to serve, not only what appears in official presentations. What I saw again is that many police officers are doing serious, difficult and often dangerous work with far too little support. That must be said clearly. The problem is not the commitment of the cops on the ground. The problem is a system that too often expects results without providing the people, vehicles, facilities, equipment and basic support required to do the job properly. At Khayelitsha FCS, the unit is dealing with some of the most sensitive crimes in the criminal justice system, including sexual offences, child victims and family violence. The reported ideal staffing level is about 43 personnel. The current number is about 21. That means a specialist unit dealing with deeply traumatic cases is reportedly about 22 people short. This is not an administrative issue. Every shortage affects victims, investigations, court preparation, forensic follow-up and the ability of detectives to give proper attention to each case. FCS work cannot be reduced to moving dockets. It involves children, families, trauma, dignity and justice. At the FCS unit serving Kuils River, Kleinvlei, Mfuleni and Mfuleni Satellite, the same pattern emerged. The unit reportedly has only about seven to eight investigators and one administrative clerk, while receiving around 40 dockets per month. The D1 and D7 rape-kit stock was reported as sufficient at the time of the visit. That is important. The immediate problem there is not current rape-kit stock. The urgent pressure is too few investigators, too little administrative support and inadequate victim-friendly office space. Victim-friendly facilities are not a luxury. They are part of proper policing. A child victim or rape survivor should not be failed by an office environment that is not designed for trauma-sensitive work. At Khayelitsha SAPS, the vehicle situation is deeply concerning. The station recorded 38 vehicles, but 15 were at garages. That means almost 40% of the fleet was unavailable. This affects visible policing, complaint response, scene attendance, hotspot policing and detective work. Some vehicles have reportedly been stuck for long periods, including detective vehicles delayed for 88 and 121 days. A police station cannot properly serve a high-demand community if so many vehicles are unavailable. A vehicle in a garage is not a vehicle serving the public. SAPS must explain the repair delays, garage bottlenecks and fleet management failures. At TRT, the concern is structural and operational. These are police officers expected to perform high-risk specialist policing, yet there are serious concerns about structural certainty, vehicles, ICT, accommodation, equipment and deployment governance. Specialist policing cannot run on goodwill alone. If SAPS expects tactical units to confront gangs, violent criminals and high-risk threats, then those units must be properly formalised, properly equipped, properly housed and properly supported. Across all the visits, the pattern is clear: Police officers are doing too much with too little. FCS units are under-resourced while dealing with some of the most vulnerable victims. Vehicle shortages are weakening visible policing and investigations. Victim-friendly infrastructure is still not where it should be. Specialist units are being expected to deliver without the full structural and logistical support they need. SAPS must now provide formal written answers and time-bound corrective plans. Oversight is not about attacking frontline police officers. It is about making sure the system gives them what they need to serve communities properly. Citizens deserve effective policing. Victims deserve dignity and justice. Police officers deserve the tools and support to do the job. Feedback to follow IC

Today I conducted several surprise oversight visits in the Western Cape. The point of these visits is simple, to test the real conditions under which police officers are expected to serve, not only what appears in official presentations. What I saw again is that many police officers are doing serious, difficult and often dangerous work with far too little support. That must be said clearly. The problem is not the commitment of the cops on the ground. The problem is a system that too often expects results without providing the people, vehicles, facilities, equipment and basic support required to do the job properly. At Khayelitsha FCS, the unit is dealing with some of the most sensitive crimes in the criminal justice system, including sexual offences, child victims and family violence. The reported ideal staffing level is about 43 personnel. The current number is about 21. That means a specialist unit dealing with deeply traumatic cases is reportedly about 22 people short. This is not an administrative issue. Every shortage affects victims, investigations, court preparation, forensic follow-up and the ability of detectives to give proper attention to each case. FCS work cannot be reduced to moving dockets. It involves children, families, trauma, dignity and justice. At the FCS unit serving Kuils River, Kleinvlei, Mfuleni and Mfuleni Satellite, the same pattern emerged. The unit reportedly has only about seven to eight investigators and one administrative clerk, while receiving around 40 dockets per month. The D1 and D7 rape-kit stock was reported as sufficient at the time of the visit. That is important. The immediate problem there is not current rape-kit stock. The urgent pressure is too few investigators, too little administrative support and inadequate victim-friendly office space. Victim-friendly facilities are not a luxury. They are part of proper policing. A child victim or rape survivor should not be failed by an office environment that is not designed for trauma-sensitive work. At Khayelitsha SAPS, the vehicle situation is deeply concerning. The station recorded 38 vehicles, but 15 were at garages. That means almost 40% of the fleet was unavailable. This affects visible policing, complaint response, scene attendance, hotspot policing and detective work. Some vehicles have reportedly been stuck for long periods, including detective vehicles delayed for 88 and 121 days. A police station cannot properly serve a high-demand community if so many vehicles are unavailable. A vehicle in a garage is not a vehicle serving the public. SAPS must explain the repair delays, garage bottlenecks and fleet management failures. At TRT, the concern is structural and operational. These are police officers expected to perform high-risk specialist policing, yet there are serious concerns about structural certainty, vehicles, ICT, accommodation, equipment and deployment governance. Specialist policing cannot run on goodwill alone. If SAPS expects tactical units to confront gangs, violent criminals and high-risk threats, then those units must be properly formalised, properly equipped, properly housed and properly supported. Across all the visits, the pattern is clear: Police officers are doing too much with too little. FCS units are under-resourced while dealing with some of the most vulnerable victims. Vehicle shortages are weakening visible policing and investigations. Victim-friendly infrastructure is still not where it should be. Specialist units are being expected to deliver without the full structural and logistical support they need. SAPS must now provide formal written answers and time-bound corrective plans. Oversight is not about attacking frontline police officers. It is about making sure the system gives them what they need to serve communities properly. Citizens deserve effective policing. Victims deserve dignity and justice. Police officers deserve the tools and support to do the job. Feedback to follow IC

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“I repeat, Kill the Boer, the Farmer”, how can anyone in their right mind say this is not incitement of violence, not even mentioning hate speech? These guys feel nothing for South Africa! After this week and everything that happened with the presidents US visit, these breakers continued with their hate in Koppies in the Free State province this weekend. This is again another element that makes a farm attack a unique crime. It is the only violent crime in South Africa that is celebrated by song, hateful political rhetoric and welcomed on social media. The singing of this hateful song has never been publicly condemned by the South African government. (To a certain extent in Washington this week, only after being cornered?)

“I repeat, Kill the Boer, the Farmer”, how can anyone in their right mind say this is not incitement of violence, not even mentioning hate speech? These guys feel nothing for South Africa! After this week and everything that happened with the presidents US visit, these breakers continued with their hate in Koppies in the Free State province this weekend. This is again another element that makes a farm attack a unique crime. It is the only violent crime in South Africa that is celebrated by song, hateful political rhetoric and welcomed on social media. The singing of this hateful song has never been publicly condemned by the South African government. (To a certain extent in Washington this week, only after being cornered?)

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As received: Looting of a truck in Belhar, Cape Town just after 17h00 on Freedom Day. Seems truck got stuck in mud or something

As received: Looting of a truck in Belhar, Cape Town just after 17h00 on Freedom Day. Seems truck got stuck in mud or something

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The Minister admits knowing and meeting Mr Mogotsi, calling him “just a comrade”, yet denies any association? ‘📝FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 9 July 2025 STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS REGARDING THE MINISTER’S ALLEGED ASSOCIATION WITH MR MATLALA AND MR MOGOTSI In response to the recent allegations made by Provincial Commissioner Mkhwanazi, and while respecting the President's call for calm, the Minister of Police, Mr. Senzo Mchunu feels it is important to clarify the following: The Minister has never met Mr. Matlala, has never spoken to him, nor has the Minister ever requested or received anything from him. The Minister did however, initiate a review of the SAPS tender awarded to him when suspicions of possible wrongdoing surfaced. It was the same tender which has since been terminated. Furthermore, whilst the Minister knows and has met Mr. Brown Mogotsi, he is just a comrade and not an associate of the Minister. The Minister has never requested or received anything from him. For more information, contact Ministry Spokesperson, Kamogelo Mogotsi on 076 523 0085. For media releases, speeches and news visit the SAPS portal at: ‘

The Minister admits knowing and meeting Mr Mogotsi, calling him “just a comrade”, yet denies any association? ‘📝FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 9 July 2025 STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS REGARDING THE MINISTER’S ALLEGED ASSOCIATION WITH MR MATLALA AND MR MOGOTSI In response to the recent allegations made by Provincial Commissioner Mkhwanazi, and while respecting the President's call for calm, the Minister of Police, Mr. Senzo Mchunu feels it is important to clarify the following: The Minister has never met Mr. Matlala, has never spoken to him, nor has the Minister ever requested or received anything from him. The Minister did however, initiate a review of the SAPS tender awarded to him when suspicions of possible wrongdoing surfaced. It was the same tender which has since been terminated. Furthermore, whilst the Minister knows and has met Mr. Brown Mogotsi, he is just a comrade and not an associate of the Minister. The Minister has never requested or received anything from him. For more information, contact Ministry Spokesperson, Kamogelo Mogotsi on 076 523 0085. For media releases, speeches and news visit the SAPS portal at: ‘

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Videos

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For years, there have been growing concerns about the conduct of VIP protection officers particularly those assigned to certain high-ranking politicians. Allegations of reckless driving, intimidation and excessive force have surfaced repeatedly, often brushed aside or quietly dealt with, with little visible accountability. Then came the incident that forced the country to pay attention. #BlueLightMafia On that day, members of Paul Mashatile’s protection detail were captured on video violently assaulting civilians on the side of the road. The footage spread rapidly not because South Africans were shocked that it happened, but because it was finally undeniable. What many had experienced or warned about was now in plain sight. The video showed a group of heavily armed officers dragging individuals from a vehicle and assaulting them. There was no immediate threat visible that could justify such force. Instead, what the public saw looked like punishment not policing. Fast forward to TODAY and the matter is currently before the court. One of the accused has taken the stand. When shown the now widely circulated video, he claimed that he did not see anyone being kicked only “legs moving.” South Africans have seen this video. The question is simple: you be the judge, what does you see? The explanations did not end there. It was further stated that the civilian failed to follow instructions. Yet,when pressed on whether they intended to “teach him a lesson,” the responses shifted, with multiple versions and inconsistencies emerging. The accused repeatedly leaned on the argument that “not everything is shown in the video,” raising more questions than answers. The matter returns to court from 27 July to 30 July. When those at the highest levels are accused of acting above the law, it sends a dangerous message down the chain. The allegations surrounding Paul Mashatile and claims of lawlessness only deepen the concern: that power in South Africa is too often mistaken for permission. If we are serious about restoring trust, accountability cannot be selective. It must apply equally whether you are a VIP protection officer or a senior political figure. Justice must not only be done. It must be seen to be done. The Democratic Alliance will continue the fight for justice against the #BlueLightMafia (Video credit: Action Society)

Ian Cameron

30,300 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce

I was quite shocked to read the proposed amendments to the Private Security Industry Regulations (IG: PSiRALive) published in the government gazette on 28 March 2025. You should be very concerned, and here is why: ⚠️ Summary of Key Risks in Proposed PSIRA Regulation Amendments: 1. Regulatory Weaponisation Through Investigations: The proposed changes introduce a rule that allows regulators to effectively cripple a security firm’s operations solely on the basis of an investigation or misconduct enquiry, regardless of whether any wrongdoing has been proven. This amounts to a presumption of guilt, which can be maliciously exploited by competitors, corrupt actors, or disgruntled parties to sabotage a legitimate firm by triggering investigations. The mere existence of an enquiry would disqualify the firm from issuing firearms to its personnel—paralysing core services without formal suspension or due process. 2. Severe Operational Limits in Public Areas A further provision would make it almost impossible for armed officers to operate in public spaces—including malls, restaurants, schools, hospitals, and even residential streets—unless those locations meet an extensive and unclear list of regulatory conditions. This undermines the core model of armed response and patrol services, especially in urban environments. Clients may be left unprotected, and security officers legally constrained from acting where they’re most needed. 3. Ambiguity and Subjectivity in Ammunition Limits The draft regulations seek to restrict armed officers to carrying only a “reasonable” amount of ammunition, without defining what “reasonable” means. This vagueness is a liability, given the diverse operational contexts in which firms operate—e.g., a mine in a remote area has very different needs than a suburban patrol unit. What one inspector or regulator sees as excessive may be mission-critical in another context, creating legal uncertainty and uneven enforcement. 4. Mandated Medical and Psychological Screening – Without Standards All armed security officers would be subject to annual physical, psychiatric, and psychometric assessments. While the principle is sound, the regulations offer no clarity on who qualifies to perform these assessments, what the benchmarks are, or how reliability and objectivity will be ensured. This not only places a massive financial and logistical burden on security firms, but also opens the door to inconsistent or even fraudulent certifications. 5. Restrictions on Tactical Equipment Undermine Security Capabilities The amendments seek to heavily restrict the use of semi-automatic rifles, limiting their deployment to a narrow list of circumstances (like cash-in-transit). This would render many tactical intervention units and high-risk security teams ineffective, especially those protecting mines, industrial facilities, warehouses, and executive clients. Armed gangs, including illegal miners and hijackers, often operate with rifles; these changes would strip security officers of the tools necessary to meet such threats. 6. Impossible-to-Implement Firearm Tracking Mandate Firms would be required to install tracking devices in every firearm to monitor usage and possession. However, no such viable commercial technology currently exists—certainly not at scale, and not within the legal and technical confines of firearm design. This is a textbook example of regulatory overreach without feasibility, and duplicates existing legal requirements for registers and designated firearm managers. 7. Ban on Less-Lethal Tools Hampers Crowd Control The proposal would prohibit use of several essential crowd-control tools including rubber bullets, water cannons, Tasers, and sponge grenades. The only path to use would involve an onerous exemption process, even in high-risk protest or riot situations. By banning these tools outright, the amendments risk forcing officers into more dangerous confrontations or leaving them helpless altogether, increasing risk to public safety and officer welfare. 8. Overregulation Without Addressing Core Enforcement Failures The overarching problem is that these amendments focus on creating new layers of bureaucracy, while failing to address the root cause of criminality in the sector—namely, the lack of enforcement of existing regulations. Rogue and corrupt firms thrive due to inefficiency, poor oversight, and institutional failure within PSIRA and SAPS. Burdening compliant players with more red tape will do nothing to stop criminal elements, and may even drive more firms underground. 🔚 Conclusion and Strategic Risk Outlook: These amendments, if passed, could destabilize a R45+ billion sector, jeopardise over half a million jobs, and significantly reduce public safety capacity. Instead of strengthening oversight, the draft rules risk: -Punishing law-abiding firms for unproven accusations -Making routine armed response illegal in practice -Creating vague and unenforceable operational criteria -Forcing impractical compliance with non-existent technology -Rendering security teams under-equipped against violent threats 📣 Urgent Recommendations are perfectly summarised by SA Gunowners Association Gideon Joubert (Paratus 🏴) : 🚨Scrap the current draft. Prioritise enforcement of existing laws, target rogue firms through criminal prosecution, and initiate a genuine consultation process with industry stakeholders to develop workable, proportionate reforms. Joubert further says: "If these amendments aim to tighten control over the private security industry to root out rogue and criminal players, they are taking the wrong path. Most would agree that purging harmful entities is a vital task for the regulatory authority—but this can be achieved by enforcing existing laws, not piling on new burdens. Criminal groups thrive by exploiting corruption and inefficiency in state bodies like SAPS and PSIRA, operating as sham security firms. The rational fix is to investigate, prosecute, and convict these bad actors, not to saddle a critical industry with costly, crippling restrictions that punish legitimate players and weaken their ability to serve the public and state. By pushing these changes, the regulator risks harming the very industry it is meant to protect—along with its clients, employees, and the broader economy. If enacted, they will leave us with a less safe, less secure society." The attached video of Martin Hood is extremely important to watch to understand the dangers of these proposed regulation amendments. We will fight this. If the state cannot protect you, you should be allowed to do it yourself and also appoint the company of your choice to lawfully do so. Deadline for Comments: 25 April 2025 Submission Email: Regulations@psira.co.za
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IanCameron23's profile picture

I was quite shocked to read the proposed amendments to the Private Security Industry Regulations (IG: PSiRALive) published in the government gazette on 28 March 2025. You should be very concerned, and here is why: ⚠️ Summary of Key Risks in Proposed PSIRA Regulation Amendments: 1. Regulatory Weaponisation Through Investigations: The proposed changes introduce a rule that allows regulators to effectively cripple a security firm’s operations solely on the basis of an investigation or misconduct enquiry, regardless of whether any wrongdoing has been proven. This amounts to a presumption of guilt, which can be maliciously exploited by competitors, corrupt actors, or disgruntled parties to sabotage a legitimate firm by triggering investigations. The mere existence of an enquiry would disqualify the firm from issuing firearms to its personnel—paralysing core services without formal suspension or due process. 2. Severe Operational Limits in Public Areas A further provision would make it almost impossible for armed officers to operate in public spaces—including malls, restaurants, schools, hospitals, and even residential streets—unless those locations meet an extensive and unclear list of regulatory conditions. This undermines the core model of armed response and patrol services, especially in urban environments. Clients may be left unprotected, and security officers legally constrained from acting where they’re most needed. 3. Ambiguity and Subjectivity in Ammunition Limits The draft regulations seek to restrict armed officers to carrying only a “reasonable” amount of ammunition, without defining what “reasonable” means. This vagueness is a liability, given the diverse operational contexts in which firms operate—e.g., a mine in a remote area has very different needs than a suburban patrol unit. What one inspector or regulator sees as excessive may be mission-critical in another context, creating legal uncertainty and uneven enforcement. 4. Mandated Medical and Psychological Screening – Without Standards All armed security officers would be subject to annual physical, psychiatric, and psychometric assessments. While the principle is sound, the regulations offer no clarity on who qualifies to perform these assessments, what the benchmarks are, or how reliability and objectivity will be ensured. This not only places a massive financial and logistical burden on security firms, but also opens the door to inconsistent or even fraudulent certifications. 5. Restrictions on Tactical Equipment Undermine Security Capabilities The amendments seek to heavily restrict the use of semi-automatic rifles, limiting their deployment to a narrow list of circumstances (like cash-in-transit). This would render many tactical intervention units and high-risk security teams ineffective, especially those protecting mines, industrial facilities, warehouses, and executive clients. Armed gangs, including illegal miners and hijackers, often operate with rifles; these changes would strip security officers of the tools necessary to meet such threats. 6. Impossible-to-Implement Firearm Tracking Mandate Firms would be required to install tracking devices in every firearm to monitor usage and possession. However, no such viable commercial technology currently exists—certainly not at scale, and not within the legal and technical confines of firearm design. This is a textbook example of regulatory overreach without feasibility, and duplicates existing legal requirements for registers and designated firearm managers. 7. Ban on Less-Lethal Tools Hampers Crowd Control The proposal would prohibit use of several essential crowd-control tools including rubber bullets, water cannons, Tasers, and sponge grenades. The only path to use would involve an onerous exemption process, even in high-risk protest or riot situations. By banning these tools outright, the amendments risk forcing officers into more dangerous confrontations or leaving them helpless altogether, increasing risk to public safety and officer welfare. 8. Overregulation Without Addressing Core Enforcement Failures The overarching problem is that these amendments focus on creating new layers of bureaucracy, while failing to address the root cause of criminality in the sector—namely, the lack of enforcement of existing regulations. Rogue and corrupt firms thrive due to inefficiency, poor oversight, and institutional failure within PSIRA and SAPS. Burdening compliant players with more red tape will do nothing to stop criminal elements, and may even drive more firms underground. 🔚 Conclusion and Strategic Risk Outlook: These amendments, if passed, could destabilize a R45+ billion sector, jeopardise over half a million jobs, and significantly reduce public safety capacity. Instead of strengthening oversight, the draft rules risk: -Punishing law-abiding firms for unproven accusations -Making routine armed response illegal in practice -Creating vague and unenforceable operational criteria -Forcing impractical compliance with non-existent technology -Rendering security teams under-equipped against violent threats 📣 Urgent Recommendations are perfectly summarised by SA Gunowners Association Gideon Joubert (Paratus 🏴) : 🚨Scrap the current draft. Prioritise enforcement of existing laws, target rogue firms through criminal prosecution, and initiate a genuine consultation process with industry stakeholders to develop workable, proportionate reforms. Joubert further says: "If these amendments aim to tighten control over the private security industry to root out rogue and criminal players, they are taking the wrong path. Most would agree that purging harmful entities is a vital task for the regulatory authority—but this can be achieved by enforcing existing laws, not piling on new burdens. Criminal groups thrive by exploiting corruption and inefficiency in state bodies like SAPS and PSIRA, operating as sham security firms. The rational fix is to investigate, prosecute, and convict these bad actors, not to saddle a critical industry with costly, crippling restrictions that punish legitimate players and weaken their ability to serve the public and state. By pushing these changes, the regulator risks harming the very industry it is meant to protect—along with its clients, employees, and the broader economy. If enacted, they will leave us with a less safe, less secure society." The attached video of Martin Hood is extremely important to watch to understand the dangers of these proposed regulation amendments. We will fight this. If the state cannot protect you, you should be allowed to do it yourself and also appoint the company of your choice to lawfully do so. Deadline for Comments: 25 April 2025 Submission Email: [email protected]

Ian Cameron

117,475 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce