Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi • 39,592 subscribers
senior fellow @CIPolicy | tweets mostly on Iran, US foreign policy, Middle East | bylines in @ForeignAffairs, @ForeignPolicy, @Guardian, and elsewhere.
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Iranian analyst says if war restarts, Iran has will & capability to escalate with more devastating strikes on energy infrastructure. He says past drone attacks were just a signal. If it chooses, Iran could use missiles or hit more precisely, targeting UAE's Bu Hasa & Zirku.
Sina Toossi76,293 次观看 • 1 个月前
👇 A revealing comment from Iranian economist Saeed Laylaz, whose leaked 2021 interview with Javad Zarif on “the battlefield vs diplomacy” ignited a seminal debate inside Iran over foreign policy and the IRGC’s role. Laylaz now argues there is effectively no meaningful deal on offer for Iran: even if Tehran gave Trump everything he wants, it would not fundamentally change Washington’s posture toward Iran. In that context, he says “surrender” amounts to suicide and Iran has no choice but “resistance.” This gets at one of the biggest flaws in the U.S. approach to Iran: diplomacy becomes impossible when the other side comes to believe sanctions and pressure are not meant to change behavior or reach compromise, but to permanently weaken their country and/or pave the way for war. Washington has spent years undermining its own ability to negotiate with Iran. This was not an accident. It was the product of sustained campaigns by hawkish groups and the Israel lobby network in Washington (a la FDD, UANI, WINEP, etc...), which openly pushed policies meant to kill even the possibility of diplomacy, from building a “sanctions wall” against future deals to politically entrenching maximalist untenable demands.
Sina Toossi43,923 次观看 • 26 天前
👇 This is an important window into how Iran is viewing the current diplomatic track. A post-Islamabad interview with Majid Shakeri, an advisor to Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led Iran’s delegation in Islamabad and headed talks with JD Vance. It offers a revealing look into how the Iranian side, especially Ghalibaf’s camp, is assessing the process. He says the first round was fundamentally about each side evaluating the other. But he highlights a core “problem” with the US delegation: “it neither has clear goals nor does it have the necessary mandate and the necessary ability for decision-making.” At the same time, he claims that for everything raised, “a solution truly existed.” His overall assessment of the round is telling: it was “not completely failed or completely won,” and no one expected that in a single round, a “result would immediately be created.” On escalation, he addresses Trump’s blockade threat. He says it is unclear whether it is a bluff or not. But in either case, he suggests it does not fundamentally alter Iran’s position, where the Strait of Hormuz remains its key leverage. More striking is his description of Iran’s economic posture. He argues Iran has long prepared for a blockade scenario. With imports reduced during the war, it now has more resources and liquidity, including proceeds from oil sold at sea. And this line stands out: “parallel to the war” the “the sale of Iranian oil no longer has any connection to the Dirham or any type of infrastructure susceptible to sanctions or American pressure.” If true, that is a significant shift given Iran’s previous dependence on UAE-linked financial channels. He adds that oil trade and currency exchange are now happening at the point of sale, for example in China. He also points to a broader logistical shift, saying Iran has diversified away from southern and western routes toward land-based and other alternatives, and that this transition is already complete for vital goods. On a wider geopolitical level, he argues a US blockade would “expand the game” by pulling in China more directly, ultimately to Iran’s benefit. He also notes that pressure on the Strait of Hormuz and shifts toward Red Sea export routes increase the leverage of actors like the Houthis. His closing assessment is blunt. He characterizes US decision-making currently as irrational and argues Washington is pursuing a path that raises costs for both sides while making the situation more entrenched and difficult to resolve.
Sina Toossi66,557 次观看 • 1 个月前
👇This is a deeply misleading framing. Iranians are not being placed in front of targets. Many are voluntarily showing up to defend the infrastructure that keeps their society alive. You have famous artists like Ali Ghamsari at a power plant and Benyamin Bahadori at a bridge in Tehran, alongside other ordinary people doing the same. This is about people trying to safeguard electricity, water, and basic *civilization* under open threat. The real legal and moral question is why civilian infrastructure is being targeted at all.
Sina Toossi69,529 次观看 • 2 个月前
Professor John Mearsheimer warns that Israel is in "deep trouble" after Hanniyeh's assassination. With no military solutions to external threats, internal chaos threatening civil war, & crippling dependence on US support, their problems are "unfixable & they're digging deeper."
Sina Toossi434,964 次观看 • 1 年前
![👇Pakistan: Iran has yet to confirm attendance, and the decision to join talks before the ceasefire expires at 4:50am PST on April 22 is “critical.” Against this backdrop, there is increased skepticism of Pakistan as a mediator in Iran. For example, today this Iranian state TV analyst argued that the mediation process is stacked against Iran, with Pakistan acting in a way that leans toward the U.S., amplifies American-favored optics, and risks putting Iran at a strategic and narrative disadvantage in negotiations. Below is an English translated transcript of what this host says: "It hasn't actually happened, if I'm not mistaken. "According to the account we had, Asim Munir came to Tehran, received our text, and was supposed to deliver this text to the American side, which naturally he should have delivered. "But as far as I know—and we were just discussing this in the editorial office—we haven't received a response yet as to whether this text can be [acceptable], and I say even if you do receive one, with this procedure you are following, you go and sit down and the other side says, 'Well, I don't accept this at all,' and in the middle of this, there is a—in colloquial terms they say—there's another 'bug' we have here. Look. "And it's this—let me say this too—and it's that it seems that, in fact, our mediator, who is the Pakistani side, is not a mediator who stands exactly in the middle. Meaning, if he is going to lean, he leans toward the American side. "Look, this thing that is happening—this Al Jazeera news that you mentioned—where the Pakistani side says, 'Our expectation is, we expect the negotiations to take place tomorrow, we are waiting'—sir, the Iranian side is [standing] firm until this very moment saying 'I am not coming.' "On what basis are you expecting and preparing things there? "Look, at the very least, the result is that you are currently creating a media, psychological, and public opinion pressure in favor of the Americans and against the Iranians. "What does that mean? "It means Vance comes there, takes his souvenir photo, and then says, 'See, we wanted to reach an agreement but the Iranians didn't come.' "This is a reality that the mediator side—let's call them the mediator, right? "Yes, they are the mediator—yes, as I was saying, that side must observe [neutrality] and say, 'Sir, these two people—' I mean, that incident that happened, have the Pakistanis even acknowledged it until now? No. "That the Iranians—the very thing that the President of the United States himself came and reposted Araghchi's posts with a 10-point framework—they came, and then Vance came and basically said, "'No, these are all canceled, let's sit and talk based on these 15 or 16 points of ours.' "This is not a very reasonable thing at all; our mediator is not very much on that side [neutral]."](https://image.24vids.com/tw-2046611788947456406/amplify_video_thumb/2046611593589366784/img/MFw72PffVyArv-08.jpg)
👇Pakistan: Iran has yet to confirm attendance, and the decision to join talks before the ceasefire expires at 4:50am PST on April 22 is “critical.” Against this backdrop, there is increased skepticism of Pakistan as a mediator in Iran. For example, today this Iranian state TV analyst argued that the mediation process is stacked against Iran, with Pakistan acting in a way that leans toward the U.S., amplifies American-favored optics, and risks putting Iran at a strategic and narrative disadvantage in negotiations. Below is an English translated transcript of what this host says: "It hasn't actually happened, if I'm not mistaken. "According to the account we had, Asim Munir came to Tehran, received our text, and was supposed to deliver this text to the American side, which naturally he should have delivered. "But as far as I know—and we were just discussing this in the editorial office—we haven't received a response yet as to whether this text can be [acceptable], and I say even if you do receive one, with this procedure you are following, you go and sit down and the other side says, 'Well, I don't accept this at all,' and in the middle of this, there is a—in colloquial terms they say—there's another 'bug' we have here. Look. "And it's this—let me say this too—and it's that it seems that, in fact, our mediator, who is the Pakistani side, is not a mediator who stands exactly in the middle. Meaning, if he is going to lean, he leans toward the American side. "Look, this thing that is happening—this Al Jazeera news that you mentioned—where the Pakistani side says, 'Our expectation is, we expect the negotiations to take place tomorrow, we are waiting'—sir, the Iranian side is [standing] firm until this very moment saying 'I am not coming.' "On what basis are you expecting and preparing things there? "Look, at the very least, the result is that you are currently creating a media, psychological, and public opinion pressure in favor of the Americans and against the Iranians. "What does that mean? "It means Vance comes there, takes his souvenir photo, and then says, 'See, we wanted to reach an agreement but the Iranians didn't come.' "This is a reality that the mediator side—let's call them the mediator, right? "Yes, they are the mediator—yes, as I was saying, that side must observe [neutrality] and say, 'Sir, these two people—' I mean, that incident that happened, have the Pakistanis even acknowledged it until now? No. "That the Iranians—the very thing that the President of the United States himself came and reposted Araghchi's posts with a 10-point framework—they came, and then Vance came and basically said, "'No, these are all canceled, let's sit and talk based on these 15 or 16 points of ours.' "This is not a very reasonable thing at all; our mediator is not very much on that side [neutral]."
Sina Toossi40,629 次观看 • 1 个月前
Here, Hossein Entezami, an Iranian government official, says that before the June 2025 war, IRGC commanders Gholam Ali Rashid & Mohammad Bagheri backed Ali Larijani for SNSC chief. All three, seen as pragmatists, have been assassinated, and the post is now held by a hardliner.
Sina Toossi28,670 次观看 • 1 个月前
We were told Iran was on the brink. That one more push would bring the Islamic Republic down. Netanyahu & Reza Pahlavi begged for revolt. Instead, we see a wave of mourning across the country for their dead. So who really understands Iran—and who just sells delusions?
Sina Toossi198,559 次观看 • 11 个月前
I think ignoring pro-government mobilization in Iran weakens ability to provide realistic analysis. The key is to separate: -regime capacity from regime legitimacy -short-term survival from long-term stability -protest movement setback from protest movement defeat A key part of Iran’s political reality today—one that shouldn’t be ignored for the sake of wishful thinking—is that the state has managed to bring sizable pro-government demonstrations onto the streets across multiple cities, even amid its brutal crackdown. This of course does not confer legitimacy on the Islamic Republic, nor does it erase the scale of repression, the hundreds confirmed killed so far, or the horrific violence obscured by internet shutdowns. But it does matter for assessing the immediate viability of protests or the efficacy of a US military attack on the country. As of now, there are no confirmed reports of major elite splits or security-force defections, though under conditions of near-total information blackout it is impossible to gauge the depth of internal fractures. What is visible is a state that has doubled down, relying on repression and foreign intervention narratives to rally its base. This suggests that a critical mass sufficient to topple the system has not yet formed. But it would be a grave mistake to conclude from this that the Islamic Republic can simply restore the prior, already highly volatile balance that existed between itself and society. The protesters’ message to the ruling elite has been unmistakable: coercion can no longer compel consent. Fear barriers have been breached. Iranians have en mass risked bullets to demand change. The state may suppress this round of protests, but without meaningful political and economic transformation, the conditions that produced them will persist. What lies ahead won't be stability for it, but a system limping forward—more brittle and increasingly vulnerable to the next eruption of public anger.
Sina Toossi84,007 次观看 • 4 个月前
Iran is rolling out a major economic reform: shifting key subsidies directly to households & moving toward exchange-rate unification. The bet is currency stability, real income gains & reducing poverty. Whether it works—or eases unrest—remains is an open question. 🧵>>>
Sina Toossi86,206 次观看 • 5 个月前
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the Iranian parliamentary speaker who led the first round of negotiations with JD Vance in Islamabad, gave an important TV interview today. In it, he lays out his narrative of the war, the diplomatic track, and signals where Iran’s political goalposts are currently. He projects firmness throughout. Iran, in his telling, will not back down from its negotiating demands. At the same time, he frames negotiations not as a retreat from conflict but as its continuation by other means, a way to consolidate gains and secure what he calls a “lasting peace.” 🔴His core framework is that military power, public mobilization, and diplomacy are inseparable: ➡️“Today, we have the ‘field,’ the ‘street,’ and ‘diplomacy of authority.’ These are not three separate things. Do not make a mistake. Today the street, the field, and diplomacy are together.” 🔴He argues this is precisely why now is the moment for diplomacy. Iran, he says, has reached a peak position militarily and in terms of social cohesion, and negotiations are meant to lock that in politically: ➡️“In the military sphere, we are at a maximum point. The street has given strength to the field. We have achieved part of our demands militarily, but they must now be stabilized and recorded politically. This is where diplomacy must take the flag in hand.” 🔴At the same time, he signals to hardliners to not be overly triumphalist. Iran’s asymmetric warfare has paid off, but he is explicit that this does not mean superiority over the United States: Iran has succeeded without being the stronger military power. 🔴On escalation, he is blunt. Iran is ready for the war to resume if necessary. He warns that the Strait of Hormuz remains a central lever and that restrictions will continue if the US “blockade” is not ended. 🔴Passage, in any case, will be governed by Iranian “protocols.” 🔴At the same time, he presents a calibrated position. Iran, he says, wants normalization in the Strait and does not seek broader disruption: ➡️“We have always sought normalization… but when commitments were not fulfilled, we restricted traffic. 🔴He adds that access will remain open to countries that are not hostile: ➡️“We want those who do not act with hostility toward us to pass easily. We are not seeking to create insecurity.” 🔴But that openness is conditional and controlled: ➡️“This Strait must be used by the world, but with the protocols that we set.” 🔴On the ceasefire and negotiations, his narrative is clear. The United States, not Iran, initiated the diplomatic shift. He says US ultimatums failed and that Washington, through Pakistan, sent a 15 point proposal. Iran rejected it and countered with its own 10 points after internal deliberations at the Supreme National Security Council and consultation with the Supreme Leader. 🔴According to him, the US accepted the "generalities" of the Iranian framework and sought a ceasefire to negotiate on that basis. 🔴On trust, his message is stark. In Islamabad, he says JD Vance spoke of "good faith", and his response was that Iran also came in good faith, but with zero trust. The burden, he says, is on the US to change that. 🔴He underscores that Iran’s negotiating positions have not shifted. They remain aligned with the framework set by Ali Khamenei: ➡️“Our strategy was those same measures the Supreme Leader has stated. We have not pursued and will not pursue anything outside that framework.” 🔴He adds that the delegation is operating fully in line with current leader Mojataba Khamenei, “neither ahead nor behind.” 🔴He repeatedly returns to the goal of a durable outcome: ➡️“We want a lasting peace, one with guarantees so this is not repeated.” 🔴He says the first round of Islamabad talks produced some movement, but major gaps remain: ➡️“We have had progress, but our distances are still great. Some fundamental points remain.” 🔴Still, he suggests one important outcome from the Islamabad talks was a more realistic understanding on both sides: ➡️“These negotiations did not resolve our mistrust, but both delegations gained a more realistic understanding of each other.” 🔴He credits the tripartite format for helping resolve misunderstandings in real time. 🔴Finally, he outlines Iran’s preferred structure for any deal going forward, a step by step process rooted in reciprocity: ➡️“Our policy is step by step action. Commitment against commitment. They must take one step, we take one step. It should not be that we fulfill our commitments and they do not.” The throughline of the interview is clear. Iran sees itself as having gained leverage through the war. Diplomacy is meant to convert that leverage into durable political outcomes. But that process will be conditional and shaped by deep mistrust, with readiness to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage, and readiness for renewed escalation and war.
Sina Toossi24,785 次观看 • 1 个月前
The Islamabad talks are the highest-level US–Iran engagement since 1979. With the US vice president present & an 80-member Iranian delegation spanning diplomatic, military, political actors, including “hardliners”, this signals authority & alignment in Tehran to pursue a deal.
Sina Toossi22,316 次观看 • 1 个月前
Steve Witkoff told Breitbart that Trump wants to resolve the Iran conflict through dialogue, but was again not clear on US bottom lines. He vaguely references Iran giving up enrichment, centrifuges & not having materials that could be enriched to weapons-grade levels (90%).
Sina Toossi90,780 次观看 • 1 年前