Great post by Matt here explaining why Bitcoin amplification... can matter dramatically more than cost of capital. A lot of people like to obsess over the dividend rates, but what actually hits the common stock? It is cost × scale × amplification. Here’s an actual sensitivity test with two mathematical examples. I ran the exact same Bitcoin treasury model twice. They have the same BTC purchases, same preferred issuance, same capital structure, and same BTC path. The only thing I changed was the dividend rate on new preferred capital: 13% vs. 15%. If Bitcoin ends at $150K: 13% prefs → 26,662 sats/share 15% prefs → 26,466 sats/share Difference: 0.74% If Bitcoin ends at $250K: 13% prefs → 32,225 sats/share 15% prefs → 32,062 sats/share Difference: 0.50% Obviously, cheaper capital is better when everything else is equal. But that's the point. A 200 bps difference in preferred cost moved the modeled common-equity outcome by less than 1%. Matt's math is right. Now take the thought experiment one step further. Assume two companies each begin with $100M of common equity, Bitcoin rises 50%, and both can invest their preferred proceeds into Bitcoin. Company A can raise $50M of preferred capital at 13%. $150M of Bitcoin appreciates to $225M. Subtract $50M of preferred principal and $6.5M of dividends. Ending common equity: $168.5M Common equity return: +68.5% Company B has to pay 15%, but its investor base and liquidity allow it to raise twice as much: $100M. $200M of Bitcoin appreciates to $300M. Subtract $100M of preferred principal and $15M of dividends. Ending common equity: $185M Common equity return: +85.0% So the company paying the higher cost of capital produces the higher common-equity return: 13% financing → +68.5% 15% financing → +85.0% That is a 16.5 percentage point advantage despite paying 200 bps more for capital. Assuming an unchanged valuation multiple and no common-share dilution (could be accretive economically), those are also approximately the stock returns. This is why obsessing over the lowest possible preferred coupon can miss the bigger variable. Cost of capital matters, but how much accretive capital can you raise and deploy is a lot more important. Amplification overwhelmingly drives shareholder returns:show more

What if we backtested the digital credit / perpetual... preferred equity model by inserting it into Bitcoin’s actual price history at the start of 2015? I modeled a hypothetical Bitcoin treasury company with: 1. $100M of common equity 2. $100M of 11% perpetual preferred equity 3. $200M of Bitcoin purchased on day one 4. 2.0x initial BTC coverage on the preferred 5. Up to $100M of additional preferred-funded BTC purchases per year 6. No additional common stock issuance 7. Dividends funded by selling Bitcoin 8. The ability to defer cumulative dividends during periods of weak coverage Then I ran the structure through every Bitcoin boom and crash from January 2015 through September 2026. Bitcoin itself compounded at 59.8% annually over the period. $100M invested directly into BTC became $24.08 billion. The same $100M of initial common equity behind the preferred-funded Bitcoin treasury became $62.87 billion. That is 2.61x the terminal value of simply holding Bitcoin. Modeled common NAV CAGR = 73.4% vs. 59.8% for BTC And this happened despite the company selling 103,729 BTC over the period to fund $770M of cash preferred dividends. When Bitcoin appreciates faster than the cost of the preferred capital, the fixed-dollar claim becomes progressively smaller relative to the asset base. The preferred starts with only 2.0x BTC coverage. By the end of the backtest, coverage reaches 54.1x. The common equity effectively captures the residual convexity. But there is a huge caveat. The modeled common also suffered a 91.2% maximum drawdown. That is the entire game. Perpetual preferred equity changes the time structure of the liability. There is no maturity date forcing the company to refinance or liquidate Bitcoin at the worst possible moment. And if dividends are cumulative but deferrable, management can choose not to sell scarce Bitcoin into a crash merely to satisfy a quarterly cash obligation. You are effectively matching a permanent dollar liability against a scarce monetary asset with historically enormous long-term appreciation, while allowing common equity to own the residual upside. That might be the deepest insight from the backtest. The superpower of digital credit is not leverage. It is time itself.show more

Metaplanet from $1.83 to $69. Model assumptions: $100M/month preferred... issuance of MARS 6% preferred cost 30% BTC CAGR Sell common stock to pay dividends Zero common stock sold to buy Bitcoin, EVER CEBE mNAV linear expansion to 1.55x over 10 years. Start: 40,177 BTC 2,729 CEBE sats/share $1.83 implied price Year 10: 74,166 BTC 4,381 CEBE sats/share $69.12 implied price That is 37.8x in the model. And the share count only rises 10.7%. If you can raise fiat claims at 6% and buy Bitcoin compounding at 30%, the spread is the entire trade. CEBE is the scoreboard. Metaplanet is turning fiat liabilities into residual Bitcoin exposure for common shareholders. That is the flywheel once prefs get here. And what if they can raise more than $100m per month? The senior claim ratio of the balance sheet peaks at month 15 of this model. They have plenty of room to continue adding leverage. Bullish Metaplanet.show more

MSTR from $149 to $14,368 dollars per share is... BEARISH. Assumptions: $2B/month preferred issuance (they're already doing this) 11.5% preferred cost (they never lower the rate, lol) 30% BTC CAGR (power law CAGR) 1.32x CEBE mNAV (multiple NEVER expands) Also, they NEVER issue common stock MSTR to buy more Bitcoin. Start today: 843,738 BTC 573,757 common equity BTC 163,144 CEBE sats/share $158.97 implied price Year 14: 2,064,691 BTC 1,942,234 common equity BTC 374,504 CEBE sats/share $14,368.51 implied price That is 90.4x in the model. Preferred balance goes from $15.5B to $351.5B. Senior claims fall from 270K BTC to 122K BTC. Claim ratio falls from 32.0% to 5.9%. This means they have so much room to issue more credit given this Bitcoin growth rate. Common equity BTC rises by 1.37M BTC. CEBE sats/share rise 129.6%. Shares rise 47.5%. If the Bitcoin treasury compounds faster than the fiat claims, the capital structure becomes a machine that transfers residual Bitcoin exposure back to common equity. This is Ownership Acceleration. CEBE is the scoreboard. Bullish Strategy. See you in 2040:show more

Long but VERY IMPORTANT POST on the importance of... Bitcoin amplification while Bitcoin is cheap. Bitcoin treasury X has spent months litigating preferred dividends. "9% is smart. 13% is expensive. 15% is reckless." If you're underwriting a long-term bull thesis, you're arguing about the wrong variable. So I built a model. Three hypothetical companies. Same $10 stock. Same Bitcoin per share. Bitcoin compounds 25% a year for ten years, $75k to ~$698k. mNAV is pinned at 1.0x the entire time. No premium, no reflexivity, no ATM magic. The only difference is how much amplification they buy (preferred notional ÷ Bitcoin holdings) and what they pay for it: A: 9% dividend, sliding to 0% by year ten. 10% amplification. B: 13% dividend. 35% amplification. C: 15% dividend. 60% amplification. The preferred is senior, perpetual, and a fixed-dollar claim. Proceeds buy Bitcoin. Each company keeps issuing at a steady monthly pace, and every dividend gets paid by issuing common at NAV. Every coupon dollar costs shareholders real Bitcoin. Year ten: A: $123 B: $146 C: $166 Just owning Bitcoin: $93 The ranking is perfectly backwards to cost of capital. The cheapest money finished dead last. So let's be generous. Give Company A a 0% dividend rate from day one. Yup. Free money, forever. $134. Still last. C could pay 17% and still tie free money. Over the decade C pays $5.3 billion in dividends. A pays $84 million. C nearly quadruples its share count funding those coupons and still grows Bitcoin per share 78%. A grows it 32%. The first-order math explains it: Extra return ≈ (preferred per $1 of equity) × (Bitcoin return − dividend) A has the better spread: 25 minus 9 is 16 points. C's is 10. But C carries $1.50 of preferred per dollar of equity. A carries 11 cents. The dividend is a subtraction. Amplification is a multiplier. You can't subtract your way past someone who's multiplying. It also tells you exactly when the coupon matters: in proportion to the amplification it's attached to. A cheap coupon on a sliver of amplification is just a very efficient way to own less Bitcoin. Now the attribution. Treat your Bitcoin path as the given, since that is literally the thesis you're underwriting, and run Shapley over the two players left: amplification and mNAV. Remember... mNAV sat at 1.0x for ten years, so its Shapley value is exactly zero. Bitcoin paid every company the same +$83. Amplification, net of every dividend: A +$30, B +$53, C +$73. All of the outperformance is amplification, and mNAV hasn't even entered the equation. Put any premium you like on top. It multiplies an amplified NAV. Timing is the part people miss. A fixed-dollar claim locked in while Bitcoin is cheap gets melted by the run. Company C issues preferred every single month and still drifts from 60% amplification to 21% by year ten. The bull market de-levers you for free. Run C's exact playbook but wait for Bitcoin to double before starting: $150 instead of $166. Same coupon, same ratio, worse entry. The real question if you are a Bitcoin bull is "how fast do you think Bitcoin compounds?" If your answer is under 20%, the coupon is the least of your problems. If you think Bitcoin is cheap, amplify while it's cheap. Penny pinching the coupon is optimizing the toll on a road you're barely driving on. Hypothetical model, not investment advice. Explainer video below:show more

For a Bitcoin treasury company underwriting a bullish thesis... through 2030, the price at which it adds preferred-funded Bitcoin exposure can have an enormous effect on the returns for the common stock shareholders. The mechanism is straightforward: a preferred claim does not grow with Bitcoin. After funding its dividends, the remaining appreciation belongs to the common. Buying more Bitcoin per dollar of that claim gives common shareholders more of that residual upside. Consider two hypothetical companies with identical starting balance sheets: 1. $100 million of Bitcoin 2. $50 million of cash just raised through one perpetual preferred class 3. $100 million of common NAV 4. Both have the same common share count. 5. Both preferreds carry a fixed $50 million liquidation claim and an assumed 13% annual dividend. Company A deploys its $50 million immediately at $85,867 per BTC, buying approximately 582 BTC. That price is 30.4% above the $65,845 200-week moving average in the supplied partial-week snapshot. Company A now has $150 million of Bitcoin exposure supporting $100 million of common NAV: 1.50× initial amplification, or 50% additional exposure. Company B holds its $50 million until Bitcoin reaches $131,689, then buys approximately 380 BTC. That entry is twice the SAME starting moving-average reference; this example does not project the future 200-week average. Now assume Bitcoin compounds smoothly at 50% annually for 51 months, from the September 2026 model baseline through December 2030. Bitcoin reaches approximately $481,075. B’s purchase occurs about 12.7 months into that shared price path. Both companies pay every dividend through monthly Bitcoin sales. Both pay $27.6 million in total dividends. B’s waiting cash earns an assumed 0%. Neither issues additional common shares. After those payments and subtracting the outstanding $50 million preferred claim, December 2030 common NAV is: Company A: $717.8 million, up 617.8%. Company B: $620.4 million, up 520.4%. The earlier buyer finishes with $97.5 million more common NAV, a 15.7% advantage. With identical, unchanged share counts, the same advantage exists per share. The explanation is approximately 203 additional BTC acquired against the same preferred claim. At the assumed terminal price, those additional coins account for the entire $97.5 million difference. This is why a treasury company with a durable bullish thesis can rationally prefer adding amplification at a smaller premium to its long-term valuation reference. Each new preferred-funded purchase should be underwritten against its entry price, financing cost, senior coverage, and ability to fund dividends through a difficult market. Issuing capital creates value only when its deployment earns enough to justify the claims attached to it. A smooth 50% growth path favors earlier buying by construction; this is an illustration of residual capture, not proof that today’s price is cheap. Company A starts with greater Bitcoin exposure and therefore greater downside: an immediate 20% Bitcoin decline would cut its common NAV by 30%, before dividends. This comparison holds financing identical and changes deployment timing. B does not avoid dividends while waiting, and neither company maintains a constant 1.50× amplification ratio. These are hypothetical NAV outcomes, not stock-price forecasts; taxes, fees, and operating costs are excluded. The discipline is to accumulate more Bitcoin for each dollar of senior claim while preserving the liquidity to carry the thesis through the cycle. Common shareholders capture the residual only if the company can stay the course:show more

ASST from $17 to $793. From May 1st to... May 22, the company has reported $150 million deployed into Bitcoin. Let's assume they raise even less. Let's go with $100m per month with SATA issuance. $100M/month preferred issuance buying BTC, 13% preferred cost, dividends paid via share issuance, CEBE mNAV held flat at 1.7x. Common stock sold to buy Bitcoin, zero common stock issued to buy Bitcoin. 30% BTC CAGR. Starting point: $17.67 ASST 16,500 BTC 14,080 CEBE sats/share 35.3% senior claim drag Year 5: $153/share 61,264 BTC 32,825 CEBE sats/share 8.7x from today Year 10: $793/share 73,320 BTC 45,845 CEBE sats/share 44.9x from today And the psychotic part is the model keeps CEBE mNAV flat at 1.7x the entire time. No multiple expansion required. The senior claim drag falls from 35.3% to 16.7% because fixed fiat claims get slowly humiliated by BTC appreciation. Bitcoin goes up, residual common equity exposure grows, and the bears are left screaming at a spreadsheet like it owes them child support. Bullish ASST.show more

“If I was designing a Bitcoin Treasury company from... a clean sheet of paper, the company would consist of One common equity, One monthly or semi-monthly variable preferred equity, and a BIG stack of Bitcoin & NOTHING else” -Michael Saylor 😏show more

🔥BITCOIN, CAPITAL, RISK: DIGITAL CREDIT MASTERCLASS🔥 Bitcoin is beginning... to transform from a treasury asset into the foundation of an entirely new credit market. In this digital credit masterclass, we examine how perpetual preferred capital can convert Bitcoin’s long-term appreciation into recurring income for investors. Using 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations, we model a Bitcoin balance sheet with 40% compound annual growth, 40% volatility, recurring preferred dividends, and multiple liquidity-reserve designs. We compare Strategy’s STRC with traditional preferred securities from JPMorgan and examine how Apple and Berkshire Hathaway manage liquidity alongside productive assets. The results reveal how common-equity amplification, loss absorption, sequence risk, and forced asset sales can produce radically different outcomes from the same Bitcoin return. We also identify what investors must prove before claiming that digital credit is mispriced rather than merely offering a high yield. This is the ultimate breakdown of Bitcoin, risk, capital structure, and the financial engineering that could reshape global credit markets:show more

🔥METAPLANET = INSANE OPPORTUNITY🔥 I think everyone is SEVERELY... underappreciating what Metaplanet is building out in Japan. If Metaplanet can borrow at 4.15% today and carry that debt until Bitcoin reaches $1 million, the economics for existing shareholders resemble selling common equity at more than TEN TIMES NAV. Yup. Imagine being able to issue equity to buy Bitcoin at a 10x mNAV. Let's break it down. The first BitBond issuance was tiny, roughly ¥200 million, or $1.3 million. The pipe behind it could eventually become enormous. Metaplanet can now issue ordinary yen-denominated bonds through its own securities subsidiary, pay investors around 4.15%, use the capital to buy Bitcoin, and roll the principal into new bonds every three years. The bondholders receive a fixed yield in yen. Metaplanet’s common shareholders capture everything Bitcoin earns above that cost of capital. Here’s how absurdly powerful the math gets. Metaplanet borrows $1 at 4.15% and buys $1 of Bitcoin. After 3 years, that $1 of debt has grown to approximately $1.13 if we assume the interest is financed and rolled. If Bitcoin doubles, the Bitcoin is worth $2. Pay the $1.13 obligation and common shareholders are left with $0.87 of incremental equity without issuing a single common share. Economically, that is equivalent to selling common equity at roughly 1.77× mNAV: $2.00 of Bitcoin ÷ $1.13 bond obligation = 1.77×. Starting with Bitcoin around $63,000: At $100,000 BTC, the bond behaves like equity issued at 1.41× mNAV. At $150,000 BTC, it behaves like equity issued at 2.11× mNAV. At $200,000 BTC, it behaves like equity issued at 2.81× mNAV. That matters enormously while Metaplanet’s common stock trades around or below NAV. Selling common shares down here would dilute existing shareholders. BitBonds allow the company to acquire more Bitcoin per share while waiting for the common-stock premium to return. Now extend this idea over the next decade. Assume Bitcoin rises from $63,000 to $1 million over 10 years. Every $1 of Bitcoin purchased today becomes $15.87. $1 borrowed at 4.15% and continuously rolled becomes approximately $1.50 owed. Common shareholders capture the remaining $14.37. The mNAV-equivalent financing multiple becomes: 15.87 ÷ 1.50 = 10.57× mNAV. Read that again. Yes. I'll repeat it for you. Metaplanet can borrow at 4.15% today and carry that debt until Bitcoin reaches $1 million, the economics for existing shareholders resemble selling common equity at more than TEN TIMES NAV. So I modeled a simple scenario. Metaplanet begins with 43,000 BTC at $63,000, giving it roughly $2.71 billion of Bitcoin. It then maintains 10% balance-sheet amplification all the way to $1 million Bitcoin. Gross BTC exposure stays at 1.10× common equity. New bonds are issued monthly at 4.15%, and every bond is rolled after three years. The opening issuance would be approximately $271 million, buying another 4,300 BTC immediately. As Bitcoin appreciates, the balance sheet creates additional borrowing capacity. Metaplanet keeps issuing enough to maintain the same conservative 10% amplification instead of allowing leverage to run wild. Average monthly issuance begins around $8 million during year one. Once the three-year rollover cycle starts, new issuance plus refinancings average approximately: $37 million per month in year 3 $72 million per month in year 6 $101 million per month in year 8 $192 million per month in year 10 Across the full decade, the company issues approximately $8.9 billion of gross bonds, including around $3.5 billion of refinanced maturities. Here is where Metaplanet ends when Bitcoin reaches $1 million (not a prediction, just a projection of these inputs): 59,727 BTC $59.73 billion of gross Bitcoin assets $5.43 billion of outstanding debt $54.30 billion of common NAV Without BitBonds, the original 43,000 BTC would simply be worth $43 billion. The bond strategy therefore creates approximately $11.30 billion of additional common equity. Same common shareholders. Same original 43,000 BTC starting point. Approximately 16,727 additional Bitcoin accumulated through controlled balance-sheet amplification. That produces 26.3% more NAV per share at $1 million Bitcoin without common-share dilution from the bond program. Of course, they still need buyers for the bonds. They must stagger maturities, maintain adequate liquidity, service the coupons and avoid building some psychotic refinancing wall during a Bitcoin bear market. The relevant hurdle is also BTC measured in yen, rather than dollars. But at 10% amplification, Bitcoin only needs to outperform a 4.15% yen cost of capital for the strategy to become accretive. Metaplanet owns 43,000 Bitcoin and now owns the securities platform capable of distributing its debt directly into Japan’s gigantic market for fixed-income savings. This is becoming much bigger than a Bitcoin treasury company. They are building a machine that converts Japanese demand for fixed yen yield into permanently increasing Bitcoin per common share. The bondholders get 4.15%. Metaplanet shareholders get everything Bitcoin does above it for the next decade. Short fiat. Long Bitcoin. This trade is OBSCENE:show more

🔥HOW I'M GETTING FILTHY, DISGUSTINGLY RICH WITH MSTR +... ASST CALLS - 7X BITCOIN RETURNS?!?🔥 MSTR is the giant capital markets war machine. ASST is the smaller creature in the basement discovering preferred stock and screaming “ACCUMULATE”. The trade is simple in concept: Bitcoin reverts higher. Treasury companies keep buying. Common equity exposure compounds. LEAPS turn the whole thing into financial plutonium. This is absolutely not financial advice. Options can and do expire worthless. I am a man on the internet with charts, caffeine, and a dangerous emotional relationship with Bitcoin treasury companies. But the math is fascinating. And if the market is underpricing the rate of BTC accumulation, the CEBE-adjusted common-equity exposure, and the reflexive premium expansion of these companies, this could be one of the most asymmetric setups in the entire Bitcoin ecosystem. MSTR is the cannon. ASST is the compressed spring. BITCOIN IS THE TRIGGER:show more

BITCOIN AMPLIFICATION DRIVES TOTAL RETURNS A company paying 14%... for preferred capital can outperform a company paying 6% - when greater amplification captures a sufficiently large positive Bitcoin spread. I think the actual math behind how much amplification drives total returns will shock you. In this video I explain the mechanism, the math, and the funding challenge behind an amplified Bitcoin strategy. We walk through four fictional Bitcoin treasury companies, starting with $100 million, $1 billion, $10 billion, and $50 billion of Bitcoin assets. You will see why the largest company does not necessarily earn the highest percentage return, why amplification decays without new funding, and how much preferred capital sustaining the ratio would require. I also examine why a lower Bitcoin entry price improves upside to a fixed future price... and why cheaper Bitcoin does not automatically mean less balance-sheet risk. Enjoy!show more

Strive (ASST) is set up to absolutely moon. The... catapult has been loaded. ASST holders might have this question: What happens to common equity if Bitcoin rises and the balance sheet either stays static or keeps accumulating through SATA issuance? Using CEBE math, I modeled two scenarios with Bitcoin going from roughly $68.5k to $126k. Scenario 1: Static balance sheet No new Bitcoin. No new SATA. No additional capital formation. Just the existing balance sheet riding Bitcoin higher. In that scenario, ASST goes from roughly $15.86 to $37.24. That is still a very strong outcome, because the company’s existing Bitcoin exposure appreciates and CEBE per share rises as fixed senior claims shrink in BTC terms. At $126k Bitcoin, CEBE reaches roughly 17,488 sats per share. $37.24 stock price with the multiple staying flat and zero new Bitcoin purchased :) Scenario 2: $200 million of SATA issued every month Same Bitcoin path. Same starting point. But Strive adds $200 million of SATA every month and uses it to acquire more Bitcoin. In this scenario, the stock goes from roughly $15.86 to $54.21. CEBE rises to roughly 25,456 sats per share. The Bitcoin stack grows from about 19,000 BTC to roughly 45,900 BTC. This is where the mechanism gets violent. The static balance sheet benefits from Bitcoin appreciation. The SATA issuance scenario benefits from Bitcoin appreciation plus monthly balance sheet expansion. That means the common equity is not simply waiting for Bitcoin to go up. It is watching the company potentially compound its Bitcoin exposure while the denominator gets partially protected by the capital structure. At the end of the model: Static case: $37.24 stock price SATA monthly case: $54.21 stock price Difference: +$16.97 per share Relative uplift: about 45.6% If SATA issuance is done at attractive terms and deployed into Bitcoin, the common wins big after Bitcoin moons. That is the whole game. This is amplified Bitcoin. And if the market starts pricing that correctly, the stock does not merely track Bitcoin. It can re-rate around the speed and quality of true Bitcoin-per-share growth:show more

Bitcoin vs. Amplified Bitcoin I ran 500,000 paired Monte... Carlo simulations over four years. Bitcoin starts at $86,000, with a 40% geometric CAGR assumption and 40% annualized volatility. The amplified model takes 1.5× each simulated daily Bitcoin return, producing roughly 60% volatility. Same Bitcoin shocks. Same $86,000 starting investment. Different sensitivity. Median ending value: Bitcoin: $330,057 - 3.84× Amplified Bitcoin: $508,584 - 5.91× At the 95th percentile: Bitcoin: $1.235 million Amplified Bitcoin: $3.676 million At the 99th percentile: Bitcoin: $2.132 million Amplified Bitcoin: $8.327 million The probability of finishing at 10× or more rises from 11.6% to 33.1%. Amplified Bitcoin finishes ahead in 85.9% of the paired simulations. But the wider upside distribution comes with a materially rougher ride. Median maximum drawdown increases from 42.2% to 57.7%. The probability of finishing below the starting investment rises from 4.7% to 7.0%. A company targeting sustained amplified exposure needs to actively manage its capital structure and Bitcoin exposure. Issuing preferred equity once does not permanently lock in 1.5× stock-price sensitivity, and balance-sheet amplification is not the same as market beta. These are the mathematical results of a maintained-sensitivity projection, not a forecast for any company. Financing costs, preferred dividends, dilution, valuation changes, and company-specific risks are excluded. Volatility is vitality:show more

Give Them MORE. Welcome back to The Bitcoin Treasuries... Podcast. Powered by Quantify Funds and Cake Wallet. Today's guest is Andrew Webley. We discuss The Smarter Web Company's new preferred equity offering, the company's updated capital structure, best practices for the ATM, management compensation, and much more. Here's my conversation with Andrew Webley. 0:00 - Intro 0:13 - Andrew’s Background 7:33 - Transitioning from Private to Public 13:53 - Management Compensation in Bitcoin Treasuries 19:48 - Smarter Web Company Capital Structure 27:13 - Best Practices for ATM 32:38 - Smarter Web’s Preferred Equity 40:09 - The UK’s First Preferred Equity with a Weekly Dividend 47:32 - Closing thoughts and where to find Smarter Web Company onlineshow more

CEO of Strategy, Phong Le, explains why selling one... of their preferred stocks (ie $STRC) to buy Bitcoin is significantly more accretive to shareholders than issuing $MSTR common equity. This was a great explanation by Phong. 🔥show more

WHY I AM BUYING STRIVE (ASST) In this video,... I walk through my full investment thesis on Strive (ASST), a Bitcoin treasury company with one of the cleanest and most interesting capital structures in the market today. This is not a hype video. This is a long-duration, balance-sheet-driven compounding thesis. I break down: Why ASST’s lack of debt matters more than people realize How SATA (perpetual preferred equity) creates Bitcoin amplification without liquidation risk Why maintaining ~31% amplification dramatically changes long-term outcomes What happens to the common stock under 20%, 25%, and 30% Bitcoin CAGR scenarios How Bitcoin per share compounds quietly over time due to the structure itself What dilution, PIPE overhang, and ATMs actually mean in practice Under conservative assumptions, even the lowest modeled Bitcoin growth scenario produces extreme asymmetry over long time horizons. Higher CAGR scenarios push the equity into territory most investors psychologically struggle to model. No multiple expansion assumed. No debt leverage assumed. No heroic assumptions required. This video is about understanding how time, compounding, and capital structure interact, and why that combination can produce non-linear outcomes if Bitcoin continues to succeed. This is not financial advice. This is how I’m thinking about risk, asymmetry, and survival over the next 10 to 20 years:show more

“There was never any talk of the risk.” Peter... Schiff is just lying at this point. The risk of $STRC was always obvious: it is preferred equity issued by a Bitcoin Treasury Company. Saylor said it clearly: if Bitcoin goes down long term or forever, that is the risk. And what are we seeing now? Bitcoin under pressure. Liquidity rotated into AI and IPOs. Maximum fear. STRC down. That is not some hidden scandal. That is risk premium repricing. Strategy does not magically control STRC’s market price. They can adjust the dividend rate, but the market prices the risk of Bitcoin and Strategy’s ability to keep paying dividends. And when Bitcoin starts going up again, what do you think happens? The same risk premium reprices in the other direction. If you buy preferred equity in a Bitcoin company, you are making one core assumption: Bitcoin goes up over the long term. That was never hidden.show more

Treasury companies keep buying more Bitcoin while their shareholders... quietly own less of it "The strategy contained the seeds of its own destruction. The more companies copied it, the less unique each company became. The less unique each became, the harder it was to justify its premium. And when the premium disappeared, the machine went into reverse" "If dilution grows faster than the Bitcoin treasury, the economics become worse for existing shareholders. Bitcoin held by the company can increase while Bitcoin per share falls. That's the trap" "The headline says the company bought more Bitcoin, but the shareholder quietly owns less. Common shareholders can lose even more once debt, convertible instruments and preferred securities are included"show more