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🚨 China unveils ‘Radar Reaper’ swarm drone 🇨🇳 The PLA’s new system can autonomously detect, track, and destroy enemy radars. In wartime, production could reach 2 million units per month. Thousands launched at once can blind air defenses in seconds.

191,960 views • 9 months ago •via X (Twitter)

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Iran-US war update summary last night • The US bombed an area dangerously close to a cancer hospital causing disruptions to chemotherapy treatments forcing 121 children to evacuate, in Ahvaz. • Iranian air defenses were activated in: Bander Abbas Qeshm Island Sirik Bushehr Chabahar Konarak Rask Semnan Khorramabad Khandab Ahvaz Pakdast (There were no explosions in the center, air defenses intercepted all the threats) • The IRGC says it targeted: 🇰🇼 Satellite communications center at the Ali al Salem Air Base, in Kuwait 🇰🇼 An Early-Warning Radar for the C-RAM air defense system at Ali Al Salem Air Base, in Kuwait 🇰🇼 Gathering site of US soldiers with missiles & drones at the Shuaiba pier, in Kuwait 🇯🇴 Newly-established C&C center and a fighter jet maintenance site at the Muwaffaq al Salti US Air Base, in Jordan 🇺🇸 IRGC shot down an American MQ-9A Reaper UCAV above Andimeshk in Khouzestan province, Iran 🇧🇭 Completely destroyed a US airspace detection and surveillance radar, as well as the pumping station for its fighter-jet fuel tanks at Sheikh Isa Air Base, in Bahrain • Iran’s Army (Artesh) says it targeted: 🇯🇴 A radar site, communications system, and fuel depots at the Muwaffaq al Salti Air Base, in Jordan • Footage 1: Iranian drone launches towards Muwaffaq al Salti Air Base • Footage 2: Footage shows the launch of a short-range ballistic missile, fired from Kuwait towards Iran. • Footage 3 & 4: Iranian Shahed-136 drone headed towards a US base in the region

Arya Yadegaar

70,742 views • 29 days ago

🚨🇺🇸 U.S. IN PANIC: Iran’s Shaheds are already breaking defenses — but China’s drones will be a nightmare Drones are getting cheaper, smarter, and harder to stop. Recent clashes in the Middle East showed how even relatively simple Iranian systems can slip through and damage high-value targets, exposing gaps in US/Israel air defense networks. That battlefield reality is now forcing a harder question, what happens when a more advanced industrial power applies the same logic at scale? China’s ASN-301 represents a different class of threat. Unlike Iran’s Shahed-136, which operates largely as a pre-programmed strike tool, the Chinese system is built to hunt air defenses. It can loiter for hours, detect radar emissions, switch to electro-optical tracking if signals disappear, and receive mid-flight updates via datalink. In effect, it turns the battlefield into a persistent seek-and-destroy environment for radars, the backbone of any modern defense system. Iran relies on volume: cheap, long-range drones launched in waves to exhaust interceptors. China combines that model with precision. Variants like the Feilong-300D push costs even lower while retaining flexibility in payload and targeting, making mass deployment economically viable on an entirely different scale. And this is where the real pressure point emerges. If US systems are already struggling to consistently intercept Iranian drones, the implications are stark. A conflict in the Western Pacific would hinge on production capacity. China’s ability to flood the battlespace with smarter, adaptable drones could force the US and its allies into a costly cycle: burning million-dollar interceptors to stop systems that cost a fraction to produce. The US is facing major difficulties in stopping Iranian drones—do they stand a chance against Chinese drones? NewRulesGeopolitics

𝐃𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐝 𝐙 🇷🇺🇮🇪

106,077 views • 4 months ago

Iran’s Post-War Air Defense: Changes in System Integration and Deployment Tactics The 12-Day War, marked by Israeli air superiority, prompted accelerated reforms in mobility, autonomy, and hybrid integration in Iranian air defenses, particularly in their long-range battery, the Bavar-373. 1. Hardware Changes - Miniaturization and Autonomy (TELAR): The Babar-373-II now integrates AESA radars into each launcher, eliminating cables and vulnerable central radars, enabling independent operations. The range is 300-400 km for large targets and about 85-150 km for stealth fighters. - New Sayyad-4B+ Missiles: Featuring dual seekers (active radar and IR), extended range (300-400 km), and a focus on counter-stealth, Iran believes these new missiles can overcome jamming and past failures against drones heavy drones. - Integration of the Arman System: This is Iran's equivalent to AEGIS, covering medium-range defense (up to 120 km) in self-sufficient vehicles. Investments improved setup agility to just 3 minutes; moreover, if links fail due to satellite disruptions like last year, both the Bavar-373-II and the 15th Khordad can continue operating autonomously. This was a major issue for Iran that caused blackouts in their air defenses. - Surveillance Drones as "Flying Radars": Models like the Mohajer-10 and Karrar conduct patrols and transmit data via satellites (BeiDou), allowing passive detection and keeping radars off until engagement. 2. Tactical Changes - Radar Ambush (Passive Tracking): The implementation of modern sensors was another shift. Now, optical/IRST sensors and drones detect targets; radars activate only for seconds to lock on, reducing exposure to counter-attacks. - Geographic Dispersion: This autonomy allows units to spread across 10-15 km² in tunnels and civilian sheds, emerging only after drone alerts and integrating with smaller systems for layers resistant to saturation. It seems Iran is attempting an interesting tactic that could work if cyber elements don't cause issues. - Radical "Shoot-and-Scoot" Mobility: I've never seen this tactic with long-range air systems before, but Iran claims repositioning in under 4 minutes, with logistics for remote reloads, transforming this system tactically like MLRS or artillery. 3. Post-War Comparative (2025 vs. 2026) Comparing configurations before and after the war, in 2025 connections relied on physical cables and centralized infrastructure, while in 2026 it adopts wireless datalinks with independent launchers, seemingly built with Chinese assistance. Dependency evolved from a giant, vulnerable search radar to a hybrid sensor network incorporating drones, IRST systems, and satellites. Reaction time, which previously took a long time to move the entire battery, is now reduced to under 4 minutes for the first vehicle to depart. Finally, the target focus shifted from conventional missiles and aircraft to advanced threats, such as counter-stealth, counter-drones, and, according to them, even hypersonic missiles. 4. Persistent Fragilities - Slow Reload Logistics: Missile reloading takes 30-60 minutes with cranes, exposing them to orbital surveillance. However, all heavy batteries are like this. - Datalink Vulnerability: Although Iran has strong link protection technology as seen in drone, it has limits against interference, and the number of American assets dedicated to this indicates that jamming or hacking loads won't be small. - Massive Thermal Signature: Heat from the chassis detectable by LEO satellites is another vulnerability that would also nullify camouflage, but it's the same with every system. - Radar Horizon vs. Cruise Missiles: The truck-embedded radar has a short tracking radius of 35-45 km, with a brief reaction against low-altitude or terrain-masking threats, which in certain situations could favor Tomahawks.

Patricia Marins

69,042 views • 5 months ago

#PLA #China #Japan #Korea #Guam #India #Hypersonic The Chinese 6th generation fighter is a high-quality reverse engineering of the American 6th generation fighter project from Lockheed Martin as part of the NGAD (Next-Generation Air Dominance) program. The Chinese Air Force has begun flight tests of a 6th-generation stealth fighter designed using a "flying wing"/"tailless" configuration without the usual vertical and horizontal all-moving tail fins typical of 4th and 5th generation aircraft. The machine is stabilized in flight thanks to an advanced computerized fly-by-wire control system with multiple backup systems, which controls the wing mechanization on the trailing edge. The design has a huge resemblance to that of the Lockheed project under the NGAD program. It is worth noting that the visible length of the glider can vary from 22.5 to 25 - 27 m, while the wingspan reaches an incredible 18 - 19 m. Obviously, the normal takeoff weight of such a machine can reach 33 - 37 tons, the maximum - 43 - 47 tons. The payload in the internal weapons compartments is up to 10 - 12 tons. The estimated volume of the fuel system can reach 17-18 tons, and the combat radius of action up to 2500-2700 km. The effective reflective surface of this machine can vary from 0.05 to 0.15 sq. m The configuration of the onboard radar of the Chinese 5th generation fighter is almost identical to that of the Russian Su-57. On the side forming the nose of the fuselage, one can pay attention to 2 X-band side-looking AESA modules, similar to the N036B-1-01L and N036B-1-01B modules of the Belka onboard radar system. These canvases provide radar reconnaissance in SAR mode at distances of up to 150-200 km, as well as the ability to detect air targets in the lateral and rear hemisphere Evgeniy Damantsev

Koba

40,339 views • 1 year ago