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๐Ÿšจ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ U.S. IN PANIC: Iranโ€™s Shaheds are already breaking defenses โ€” but Chinaโ€™s drones will be a nightmare Drones are getting cheaper, smarter, and harder to stop. Recent clashes in the Middle East showed how even relatively simple Iranian systems can slip through and damage high-value targets, exposing gaps...

105,656 views โ€ข 3 months ago โ€ขvia X (Twitter)

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Amid Irans heavy use of low cost Shahed kamikaze drones and missiles, Gulf states are rapidly depleting their expensive air defense interceptors. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are now urgently negotiating with South Korea to accelerate deliveries and acquire additional Cheongung II medium range surface to air missile systems. This move highlights growing frustration with delays in United States weapons supplies particularly Patriot missiles whose production has struggled to meet surging global demand. Even close American allies are diversifying their sources to avoid gaps in their defenses. The Cheongung II effectively counters drones cruise missiles and aircraft. The United Arab Emirates has already deployed it in combat against Iranian attacks reporting high interception success rates. It offers a more cost effective alternative to premium United States systems for dealing with mass drone swarms. Saudi Arabia previously signed a major contract for the system and the Gulf states are now pushing for faster delivery of missiles and additional units. The shift reflects a broader reality in modern warfare. Cheap attacking drones are forcing defenders to burn through costly missiles at an unsustainable rate. Gulf countries are also exploring options from the United Kingdom Ukraine and even Japan for Patriot components. This pragmatic diversification shows how battlefield economics are reshaping arms procurement in the Middle East.

Chay Bowes

16,861 views โ€ข 3 months ago

What if any preparations have you seen Iran make ahead of the war? Can you discuss Itโ€™s missile capabilities? Any intelligence capabilities? Any surprises it might happen in store? When the 12-day war ended, I estimated that Iran would need about six months to recover, including its nuclear program. Contrary to popular belief, Iran did not lose its entire long-range or medium-range air defense network; while some launchers were damaged, the primary targets of the Israeli strikes were the radar systems. Once the radars were neutralized, Iran successfully hid the bulk of its remaining batteries, leaving much of its arsenal intact. In contrast, short-range systems like the Tor-M1 and domestic variants were heavily engaged against cruise missiles, often being lost or damaged only after their ammunition was completely exhausted. Since then, Iran has worked to rebuild its destroyed radar network and, above all, to implement a genuine counterintelligence doctrine. The Mossad operations against Iranian radars and air defense systems have shaped new perimeter defense and counterintelligence doctrines not only in Iran but in other countries as well. If we look at the quantity of weapons and the organization of armed groups during Iranโ€™s most recent protests, I would say the problem of foreign intelligence operations inside the country remains severe. This seriously threatens much of Iranโ€™s capabilities, and I foresee a wave of sabotage operations as a new war draws closer. Iran has begun receiving collaboration from China across multiple areas,from satellites to internal counterintelligence, but it may still take some time for this to produce tangible results. During the last years, the Mossad relied heavily on cell phones, using SMS for recruitment and accessing device GPS for target location. Iran has since focused intensely on preventing any repetition of this, and on this specific issue, the Chinese appear to have provided support. Although foreign intelligence services have operated extensively inside Iran, the scale of any armed opposition groups is negligible compared to the Iranian armed forces, which could still draw on allied paramilitaries and militias in neighboring countries, including the Houthis. Iran has become a missile power with a stockpile far larger than Western estimates suggest. As early as 1998, Iran was already producing missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, and it has continued doing so ever since, developing 12 to 15 different models in that range - meaning all are capable of reaching Israel. That is nearly 30 years of continuous missile production, resulting in a stockpile of several thousands. Another area where Iran has emerged as a global power is drones, including underwater ones. Iranโ€™s UUVs have evolved rapidly into mass-produced models with integrated AI, and I believe they hold some major surprises in reserve. A key point today is that the AN/TPY-2 radars, which played a critical role in tracking Iranian missiles, would be among the first targets to be engaged. These high-powered X-band radars are the backbone of regional missile defense, providing essential data to THAAD and Patriot batteries. However, because they are large, stationary, and emit high-energy signals, they are highly vulnerable to a first-strike or saturation attack, which would effectively 'blind' the entire defensive network. Obviously, a defense budget of nearly one trillion dollars cannot be compared to Iranโ€™s, but the real question is whether the cost and effort are worth the potential casualties. Even without Israel, the Americans maintain an immense advantage in aerial operations over Iran; however, as I have stated before, this superiority does not translate to the maritime theater.

Patricia Marins

21,142 views โ€ข 4 months ago

Iranโ€™s Post-War Air Defense: Changes in System Integration and Deployment Tactics The 12-Day War, marked by Israeli air superiority, prompted accelerated reforms in mobility, autonomy, and hybrid integration in Iranian air defenses, particularly in their long-range battery, the Bavar-373. 1. Hardware Changes - Miniaturization and Autonomy (TELAR): The Babar-373-II now integrates AESA radars into each launcher, eliminating cables and vulnerable central radars, enabling independent operations. The range is 300-400 km for large targets and about 85-150 km for stealth fighters. - New Sayyad-4B+ Missiles: Featuring dual seekers (active radar and IR), extended range (300-400 km), and a focus on counter-stealth, Iran believes these new missiles can overcome jamming and past failures against drones heavy drones. - Integration of the Arman System: This is Iran's equivalent to AEGIS, covering medium-range defense (up to 120 km) in self-sufficient vehicles. Investments improved setup agility to just 3 minutes; moreover, if links fail due to satellite disruptions like last year, both the Bavar-373-II and the 15th Khordad can continue operating autonomously. This was a major issue for Iran that caused blackouts in their air defenses. - Surveillance Drones as "Flying Radars": Models like the Mohajer-10 and Karrar conduct patrols and transmit data via satellites (BeiDou), allowing passive detection and keeping radars off until engagement. 2. Tactical Changes - Radar Ambush (Passive Tracking): The implementation of modern sensors was another shift. Now, optical/IRST sensors and drones detect targets; radars activate only for seconds to lock on, reducing exposure to counter-attacks. - Geographic Dispersion: This autonomy allows units to spread across 10-15 kmยฒ in tunnels and civilian sheds, emerging only after drone alerts and integrating with smaller systems for layers resistant to saturation. It seems Iran is attempting an interesting tactic that could work if cyber elements don't cause issues. - Radical "Shoot-and-Scoot" Mobility: I've never seen this tactic with long-range air systems before, but Iran claims repositioning in under 4 minutes, with logistics for remote reloads, transforming this system tactically like MLRS or artillery. 3. Post-War Comparative (2025 vs. 2026) Comparing configurations before and after the war, in 2025 connections relied on physical cables and centralized infrastructure, while in 2026 it adopts wireless datalinks with independent launchers, seemingly built with Chinese assistance. Dependency evolved from a giant, vulnerable search radar to a hybrid sensor network incorporating drones, IRST systems, and satellites. Reaction time, which previously took a long time to move the entire battery, is now reduced to under 4 minutes for the first vehicle to depart. Finally, the target focus shifted from conventional missiles and aircraft to advanced threats, such as counter-stealth, counter-drones, and, according to them, even hypersonic missiles. 4. Persistent Fragilities - Slow Reload Logistics: Missile reloading takes 30-60 minutes with cranes, exposing them to orbital surveillance. However, all heavy batteries are like this. - Datalink Vulnerability: Although Iran has strong link protection technology as seen in drone, it has limits against interference, and the number of American assets dedicated to this indicates that jamming or hacking loads won't be small. - Massive Thermal Signature: Heat from the chassis detectable by LEO satellites is another vulnerability that would also nullify camouflage, but it's the same with every system. - Radar Horizon vs. Cruise Missiles: The truck-embedded radar has a short tracking radius of 35-45 km, with a brief reaction against low-altitude or terrain-masking threats, which in certain situations could favor Tomahawks.

Patricia Marins

69,042 views โ€ข 4 months ago

How Ukraine reached parity with Russia in long-range capabilities Analysts from the Back And Alive Foundation analyzed Ukraine's transition from local frontline strikes to the systemic employment of long-range drones. The volume of drones Ukraine has launched has surged from 110 units in January 2024 to over 7,000 in March 2026. Throughout 2025, Ukraine increased our launch frequency fivefold. In March 2026, Ukraine even managed to surpass the Russia in the number of launched and recorded drones. Flight Geography and Extreme Ranges ๐Ÿ”นUkrainian drones are increasingly detected at facilities located hundreds and thousands of kilometers from the frontline. The number of Russian regions where they are spotted is steadily growing. ๐Ÿ”นThis evolution is not just about quantity, but also about a significant increase in operational range. For instance, in February 2026, an oil refinery in the city of Ukhta (Komi Republic) was struckโ€”over 1,800 km from the Ukrainian border. A Nightmare for Russian Air Defense ๐Ÿ”นAs Ukraine deploys more drones, Russian air defense forces must track and intercept a vastly higher number of simultaneous targets, leading to system saturation. ๐Ÿ”นThe Russian military is forced to make a choice: protect assets near the frontline to cover their troops, or deploy systems deep into the interior to defend industrial and energy infrastructure. Given Russiaโ€™s vast landmass, it is physically impossible to cover all critical sites with limited resources. ๐Ÿ”นFurthermore, the Defense Forces of Ukraine continue to degrade Russian air defense capabilities. Over the past year, open-source intelligence (OSINT) has confirmed 172 hits on Russian air defense systems through video footage; however, the actual number of successful strikes is significantly higher. ๐Ÿ“น๐Ÿ“ˆCumulative number of days on which at least one UAV reached the region (from January 2024 to March 2026).

Anton Gerashchenko

51,874 views โ€ข 2 months ago

๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ท IRAN WAR STRATEGY EXPLAINED! It is important to understand that Iran is not fighting a symmetric war against the USA/Israel. They canโ€™t and they donโ€™t. ๐Ÿ“‹ Iran is doing two things at the same time: 1) WAR ON OIL AND GAS Iran is trying to choke off oil and gas trade from the Middle East through strikes on oil and gas platforms/refineries and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which handles about 25% of seaborne oil and gas trade. (Video 3) This hits US and Arab interests hard. The sheikhs are already calling Trump and urging quick action. They need peace to continue business. โ†’ This is achieved with minimal effort by Iran and is working. No ships pass the strait, oil/gas production is halted to some extent, prices skyrocket. This affects everyone worldwide. Trump is under heavy pressure as long as this continues. 2) MISSILE WAR The missile campaign is not aimed at quickly destroying USA or Israel. Thatโ€™s pure internet hype. Iran fires enough drones and missiles to keep defenses busy and deplete interceptor stocks. They strike multiple locations simultaneously (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, even Cyprus), forcing the US to spread air defenses thin. Concentrating heavy defenses in one place becomes impossible. As Rubio noted yesterday, only 6โ€“7 interceptors are produced per month (Video 2), while Iran produces over 100 missiles per month. If Iran sustains the campaign, it will win the attrition war against air defenses. Time is on Iranโ€™s side. The more air-defense missiles are expended per Iranian projectile, (just look how much they fire to intercept one missile - Video 4), the worse the situation becomes for the defendersโ€”especially after Ukraine depleted much of the Western stockpile over the past four years. Key takeaway: As long as Iran maintains the missile campaign, time works in their favour. The longer the conflict lasts, the stronger Iranโ€™s position becomes. If air defenses run out, Iran can strike freely anything and will win. ๐Ÿ“‹ Status quo: A) Iran fired fewer missiles on Monday, so they are losing? No! Analysis of the US CENTCOM video (Video 1): The US Air Force struck abandoned, already-used launchers and a broken-down truck. They clearly couldnโ€™t locate active Iranian missile forces, so they hit whatever they found. The launchers were already expended; the crews had left after firing. When the US releases such footage, it suggests this is the best they have. They are not destroying Iranโ€™s missile forces at a high rate. They destroy abandoned trucks. Iran doesnโ€™t need to act quickly. Firing drones and missiles a few times a day is enough to keep oil/gas trade stopped and air defenses occupied. As long as they sustain this, time remains on their side. B) Is Iran winning? Also No. Iran struggles to keep its airspace clear. US surveillance drones continue to penetrate, preventing free movement of launchers. As long as those drones remain active, Iran cannot fire at will without risk. Failure to neutralise them would break their strategy. While American and Israeli drones fly in Irans sky, Irans missiles stay under ground and canโ€™t surface, or they risk being struck quickly. Hence US/Israeli Surveillance drones, that direct strikes are the biggest problem Iran has now. They want to roll out missile infrastructure from below ground to the surface, and they canโ€™t โ€ฆ at least not at scale. Watch this closely as a key indicator. How many drones are flying above Iran and how many are shot down. C) What is the US/Israeli strategy? They planned to remove Khamenei, trigger mass protests by Shah supporters, and install a new regime. This has clearly failed. Now they destroy military buildings (police headquarters, etc.), mostly for posture and intimidation. Essential personnel do not work in above-ground officesโ€”doing so would be foolish. The remaining option is to make life unbearable and force surrender by bombing power plants and similar infrastructure. This will come soon at scale. More bombs!

Lord Bebo

1,612,322 views โ€ข 4 months ago

Iran Loses Frigate and Yak-130 and Decides to Deploy Jet-Powered Kamikaze Drones An Iranian frigate was sunk near Sri Lanka, nearly 4,000 km from the theater of operations. Another Iranian catamaran was hit by a missile launched from a drone and headed for repairs. Tehran was heavily bombed today in a day that, according to Iranian authorities, 900 civilians were killed. Iran also reported downing another drone, this time a Heron. However, an F-35I shot down a YAK-130, with both pilots ejecting safely. Facing these recent losses, Iran decided to deploy two jet-powered drones: the Arash-2 and the Hadid-110. Both are stealth drones that reach more than 450 km/h, with the Hadid exceeding 500 km/h. The targets of these drones were more high-cost radars existing in the region, with the Arash-2 in this version achieving hundreds of kilometers in range. Iran maintains an average of 300โ€“500 drones launched per day. While these numbers have been decreasing, the drone models seem to have greater explosive payload and to be more modern. Despite all the surveillance and attacks that the US and Israel carry out, there is a limit to the ability to inhibit Iranian capabilities due to various tactical, geographical, and armament diversity factors. Today Iran is still launching hundreds of drones and between 30โ€“50 missiles, a level that should stabilize or stay slightly below that. However, the big issue that will not be resolved is the reopening of Hormuz and relief for the markets. Iran still possesses around 5,000 mines, which if dumped in Hormuz will seal the closure for long periods. As I have been saying, it is not the capacity for destruction that dictates the rules in this type of war, but the asymmetric nuances of the theater, giving Iran the advantage. For example, if Iran starts mining the Strait tomorrow, oil prices should exceed $100 and gas $70/MWh. This control of the Strait will not be taken from Iran anytime soon, since the American navy still remains 700 km from the Iranian coast out of fear of anti-ship missiles. I even have the impression that Iran does not want to sink any American ship, as this would cause outrage in America and could escalate the war, even increasing support for the government. I say this because the American fleet is within range of Iranian anti-ship missiles even at 750 km. The true enemy of the US-Israel coalition today is not Iran, but the global economy and the political pressure both internal and from the Gulf countries. Can the US-Israel sustain this pressure for much longer?

Patricia Marins

367,308 views โ€ข 4 months ago

RC-135 Deployments Signal Imminent Attack: Myths and Realities of Iran's Military Power The RC-135 is a family of large reconnaissance aircraft operated by the ISAF. These jets are designed for ISR missions, providing near real-time data to military commanders and national leaders. The primary variant focuses on detecting, identifying, and geolocating electromagnetic signals, such as communications, radar emissions, and electronic warfare activities. Based on past experience, the early arrival of these aircraft often signals that an attack may be very close. But what about Iran, what capabilities does it actually have? There are many myths surrounding Iran's military power. Here are some key points: 1. Israel did not overfly Iran during the 12-day war This is implausible. Most part of the munitions used included bombs like the GBU-28 and GBU-31, both with ranges under 25 km, which suggests they could only have been dropped from inside Iranian territory. 2. Iranian missiles have poor accuracy In 2025, several Iranian missiles were launched against targets in Erbil, Iraq, with excellent precision. During the 12-day war, Iran struck the Weizmann Institute and the Haifa refinery with high accuracy, as well as some Israeli launchers, all in an environment of heavy jamming. The truth is that Iranian missile accuracy depends on the model. Iran has missiles in its arsenal that are more than 15 years old, but there is no evidence that the precision of its modern anti-ship missiles is deficient. 3. Iranian air defenses are of very poor quality This cannot be stated with absolute certainty because they were never fully tested. Israel's ground sabotage operations were highly effective, successfully disabling radars and most short-range air defense systems. Iran does not keep its long- and medium-range air defenses permanently deployed, and consequently none of them were destroyed during the 12 days of war. 4. Iran has no radars capable of detecting stealth aircraft In 2024, Iranian radars locked onto Israeli F-35s while they were still over Iraqi territory. In 2025, Iranian-supplied radars integrated into missile batteries in Yemen also locked onto and fired at U.S. F-35s on multiple occasions, nearly downing one. 5. The high technology of U.S. ships and aircraft will paralyze Iranian weapons This would only happen if the Iranians turned their systems off, as reportedly occurred in the Venezuela case. So far, Iranian equipment has proven extremely resistant to interference. Shahed drones continue to operate accurately, and after years of Western efforts, they have not been successfully jammed. This will pose a major challenge for the Americans. 6. The U.S. Carrier Strike Group will easily crush the Iranian navy They would destroy Iran's large ships in minutes, but they would face enormous difficulty against mini-submarines, USVs, UAVs, UUVs, and fast attack craft equipped with missiles. In additional, the U.S. drones would not have complete freedom for target acquisition and would have to rely on LEO/ISR sats. Iran possesses drones like the Karrar, a jet-powered interceptor equipped with air-to-air missiles that can operate at 15,000 meters to deny U.S. drones freedom of action. The Israelis lost an unknown number of drones during the 12-day war, though losses were reported. Summary Does Iran have any advantage? At sea, against the current Carrier Strike Group and considering all of Iran's resources, I would say Iran holds an advantage, evidenced by factors such as missile range, number of containers, tubes, VLS cells, drones, mines, submarines, anti-ship missiles, and other assets. However, once the focus shifts from the sea to the air, the American advantage is overwhelming, both in satellite intelligence and in combat aviation. And this is the type of war the Americans know best.

Patricia Marins

30,566 views โ€ข 5 months ago