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🚨 DEVELOPING | NORTHEAST SYRIA Footage shows Syrian regime “General Security” forces onder US-backed al-Jolani briefly escorted into a restricted security zone, under supervision by local SDF (Kurdish) forces, residents, and journalists — then expelled again shortly afterward in line with existing agreements. • Temporary access • No authority...

30,793 просмотров • 6 месяцев назад •via X (Twitter)

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🚨The full interview with Mazloum Abdi. “The secrets behind Assad’s fall, the behind-the-scenes details of the agreement with President Ahmad al-Sharaa… and the future of the #Syrian Democratic Forces.” 📞 First: Direct Communication with #Trump The #General confirmed that he spoke directly with President Trump twice by phone during his first term, in the context of the #American withdrawal decision from #Syria. #Trump told him personally, word for word: "We are far from you, I don't know, maybe seven thousand miles, and what are we doing here? We're leaving and letting the Russians stay to take over the file." 🇺🇸 Second: Pressuring #Trump to Change His Decision After the direct call with Trump, Mazloum Abdi turned to Congress and #American senators to pressure #Trump not to military leaders as the interviewer suggested. He specifically contacted: Senator Lindsey Graham Senator Chris Van Hollen And other friends of the #Kurdish cause in #Congress Graham told him: "I'll work on this and I'll convince Trump." And it worked #Trump reversed his withdrawal decision under pressure from Congress and #American #public opinion, and decided to keep #US forces in the region. 🤝 Third: The #Trump–#Erdoğan Agreement Mazloum Abdi referred to the fact that in 2019, there were two agreements: An agreement between #Trump and #Erdoğan An agreement between #Putin and #Erdoğan He said that the #Syrian Democratic Forces agreed to abide by both agreements, and that this formed the basis for the official relationship with #Russia at the time. General Mazloum Abdi on "Damascus Time" From Politics to the Military Mazloum Abdi began as a political activist for the #Kurdish cause in #Syria during his school years in #Aleppo, before being forced into military life when war broke out in 2012. Arrests & Exile He was imprisoned for #Kurdish political activities during the Ba'ath era, which eventually forced him to leave #Syria and continue his work abroad. Fighting #ISIS & Controversies The #SDF fought #ISIS, but the General acknowledges misuse of the #ISIS label to imprison local youth, as well as failures in governance, drug proliferation, and mismanagement of oil revenues in eastern #Syria. Raqqa's Destruction He admits that #Raqqa was devastated by war and that infrastructure was never properly rebuilt under #SDF administration. The Hasakah Conference Controversy He addresses the controversial conference in #Hasakah attended by figures seen as hostile to the new #Syrian government, calling it avoidable but not denying it happened. Relations with #Damascus He discusses ongoing dialogue with #President Ahmad Al-Sharaa, describing the #Syrian state's position on #Kurdish issues as broadly positive. #Turkey: From Conflict to Truce Relations with #Turkey deteriorated after the 2018 Afrin occupation and an assassination attempt, but have recently improved under a ceasefire influenced by #Turkey's domestic peace process and the March 10 agreement. A Possible Visit to #Ankara When asked if he might visit Ankara soon, he responded openly: "Why not?" Hope for Stability The interview closes with a shared hope that #Syria will enter a phase of security and stability.

Qusay Noor

10,921 просмотров • 3 месяцев назад

The video shows these so-called Syrian government forces dressed like ISIS fighters — no patches, no insignia — openly praying for God to terrorize the kuffar and put fear in their hearts. They repeat phrases like “help us against the kuffar” and “put terror in their hearts.” Yet this is being sold as a “security operation,” and Western legacy media is running with that framing. The New York Times, in reporting by Raja Abdul Rahim, frames it as clashes between the Syrian government and a Kurdish-led militia. The BBC does the same, presenting it as fighting between Syrian government forces and Kurdish fighters. Frankly, Al Jazeera’s coverage is less biased than most Western outlets. I never thought I’d say that. Al Jazeera at least calls this what it is: a siege. They identify who is attacking whom. They show maps. They report that the Syrian Ministry of Defense issued an ultimatum and then launched the attack. Even though they mostly interviewed people from the so-called Syrian transitional government side, they still framed the aggressor correctly. What no one is saying is that, until very recently, these same forces were on global terrorist lists because of their ties to al-Qaeda. No one mentions that this so-called Syrian transitional government is a direct outgrowth of jihadist groups. Al-Nusra did not just “overlap” with ISIS — it was an ISIS branch, and its leadership came straight from ISIS. Al-Jolani himself was a lieutenant of al-Baghdadi. That is who these people are. And this video shows it clearly: these forces are praying for Allah to put terror into the hearts of the kuffar. This is not a war against a militia that violated an agreement. It is a war against Kurds who chose secularism, coexistence with Druze, Alawites, and Yezidis, autonomy, feminism, and a progressive political project. For that choice, they are labeled kuffar even though the majority of Kurds are themselves Sunni Muslims.

Karim Franceschi

15,591 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

It’s disappointing to see Sky News legitimizing a figure from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a group heavily linked to the PKK, a recognized terrorist organization by NATO, the EU, and many others. Referring to such a figure as "General" and amplifying their narrative without context dangerously whitewashes a group with a documented history of child recruitment, forced conscription, and other human rights violations – even against the very communities they claim to protect. Rebranding the PKK/YPG—a designated terrorist organization—under the name 'Syrian Democratic Forces' (SDF) doesn’t change its reality. The claim that a resurgent ISIS is taking advantage of the fall of Bashar al Assad is nothing more than a fabricated narrative aimed at misleading the West. In reality, the rise of ISIS was directly linked to the chaotic policies and actions of forces like the SDF and their allies, not the fall of Assad's regime. This narrative is being used to distract from the actual situation on the ground, where local populations seek a return to legitimate governance, not the continuation of foreign-backed occupation. Let’s be clear: the SDF’s presence in northern Syria is nothing less than an occupation. Over 80% of the population in these areas are Arabs who overwhelmingly reject their rule. They view the SDF not as liberators, but as an occupying force that has seized their lands and imposed its will through violence and coercion. Now, with the successful revolution and the fall of the Assad regime, Syrians are beginning to rebuild their future under a new, legitimate government. These communities aspire to be governed by their own representatives, not by an occupying force tied to a terrorist organization. Efforts to whitewash the actions of the SDF are not just misleading – they actively undermine the aspirations of Syrians who have fought and sacrificed for their freedom. True peace in Syria will not come from foreign-backed militias or occupying forces imposing their rule on unwilling populations. It will come from respecting the will of the people and supporting a governance model rooted in justice and representation. Attempts to sanitize the actions of groups like the SDF ignore these realities and only deepen the suffering of those living under their oppression.

hermes | jeopolitik

82,226 просмотров • 1 год назад

WHILE YOU SLEPT - Jan 5, 2026 Here are the top stories you missed, While You Slept (If you like this content and our work, help it grow by subscribing for $5/month to Mossad Commentary) 1️⃣ AYATOLLAH PLAN B Intelligence reports indicate Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has prepared a contingency plan to flee to Moscow if security forces defect or unrest spirals out of control. 2️⃣ IRAN STRIKE RED LINE Hezbollah-linked Lebanese outlet Al-Akhbar reports Trump and Netanyahu agreed an attack on Iran will be launched if Tehran rejects American conditions, coordinated with the next phase of the Gaza ceasefire. 3️⃣ EILAT SECURITY OVERHAUL Israel is dramatically reinforcing Eilat with additional infantry, LOTAR units, artillery, increased tank readiness, shortened air alert times, and strengthened defenses around Ramon Airport and the Arava. 4️⃣ EU LAWMAKER SIGNALS SHIFT Senior European Parliament member Reinhold Lopatka, from the ruling party tied to EU leadership, visited Israel as a guest of Shomron Regional Council head Yossi Dagan and expressed support for Israeli sovereignty, signaling a notable shift in tone amid growing EU pressure on Israel. 5️⃣ ISRAEL–SYRIA TALKS IN PARIS Israeli and Syrian officials are reportedly meeting in Paris for US-mediated talks focused on border security, demilitarization of southern Syria, and a possible Israeli withdrawal. 6️⃣ JUDEA, SAMARIA AND LEBANON SECURITY UPDATE The IDF says its long-term presence in refugee camps is reducing organized terror, while also confirming the prevention of advanced rocket-building attempts and a drone strike that killed two Hezbollah operatives violating the Lebanon ceasefire. Stay connected, follow and subscribe. Mossad Commentary

Mossad Commentary

107,830 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

Mazloum Abdi's European tour and the limits of European influence SDF commander Mazloum Abdi this past week visited several European countries, including Italy and France. In Paris, he held meetings with French officials to discuss developments in Syria and the continuing integration process between the SDF and Damascus. • The tour caused controversy in pro-government Syrian media. Some outlets cited Syrian diplomatic sources as saying that Abdi travelled without prior consultation with or approval from Damascus, describing the visit as a violation of the integration agreement. • The SDF has not been formally dissolved, and Abdi remains its commander during the transitional integration period. Damascus continues to deal with him in that capacity, with Syrian officials and government-linked media still referring to him as the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces. His foreign travel therefore does not clearly violate the agreement. The SDF and its civilian institutions continue to exist while their gradual incorporation into Syrian state structures proceeds, and Abdi retains a distinct political and military position throughout. • The visits carry symbolic importance, but France has no physical leverage in northern Syria. With US forces withdrawn, there is no allied military framework within which French engagement could be anchored. France cannot deploy forces, secure supply lines or meaningfully deter pressure from Damascus or Turkey. • France's domestic constraints compound its external weakness. Economic deterioration, internal political pressures and the migration debate make European governments more inclined to seek workable arrangements with Damascus than to confront it. • Turkey holds the strongest immediate external position by a considerable margin. Geographic proximity, deep intelligence penetration, established local networks, military reach and a demonstrated willingness to act give Ankara tools that no European state can match in northern Syria. • The remaining SDF pocket is geographically incoherent and demographically vulnerable. Most Kurdish-majority cities lie within a few kilometres of the Turkish border. Hasakah, the only city with some distance from Turkey, has considerable Arab depth. The area cannot be held against sustained indirect pressure. • Direct military action may not be required. Turkey and Damascus may be able to achieve their objectives through intelligence operations, recruitment of local informants and defectors, sabotage and selective drone strikes, eroding SDF cohesion below the threshold of overt provocation and hollowing out its organisational capacity through the integration process itself. Recent reporting of sleeper cells near Qamishli illustrates how exposed the SDF's position already is. • Israel's influence does not reach the north. Whatever leverage Tel Aviv holds over Damascus is concentrated in the south and tied to its campaign against Iranian entrenchment. In northern Syria, Israeli influence is wholly overshadowed by Turkey's. • European engagement may produce limited influence over specific details: representation arrangements, treatment of former SDF personnel, administrative appointments, cultural rights and the pace of institutional transfers. This is the realistic ceiling. • The SDF retains agency. Its internal cohesion, negotiating strategy, political manoeuvring and capacity to exploit divisions among its opponents will shape the pace and final form of integration. The prolonged process also leaves room for regional developments to alter the balance. Growing discussion of possible US pressure on Damascus to move against Hezbollah in Lebanon could place further strain on Ahmed al-Sharaa's still-consolidating government. A wider confrontation or internal crisis could distract Damascus, weaken its centralising momentum and allow the SDF to recover some negotiating leverage, preserving elements of de facto autonomy through locally concentrated security forces, administrative continuity and political representation. Whether that materialises will depend on disciplined leadership, internal cohesion and a more effective political strategy than Damascus can easily contain. • Any durable SDF role in Syria requires accommodation with Turkey. No amount of European diplomatic support can substitute for that. More:

The National Context

24,477 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад

Some history: The Democratic Union Party (PYD), founded in 2003 as the Syrian arm of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), emerged in defiance of Ba’athist laws prohibiting political parties. Syrian intelligence, perceiving the PYD as a thinly veiled extension of the PKK under local leadership, not only tolerated but actively bolstered its operations. This tacit support aligned with the Assad regime’s strategic interests. In a 2015 interview, Bashar al-Assad openly acknowledged arming the PYD, declaring: “The Kurds are fighting alongside the Syrian army… We sent them armaments because they are Syrian citizens, and they want to fight terrorism.” This statement belies a complex history of manipulation. The PKK’s roots in Syria run deep, cultivated by a regime that simultaneously oppressed its Kurdish population while channeling their grievances into a controllable outlet. By funneling Kurdish recruits into the PKK, Damascus aimed to stifle local nationalist aspirations. Estimates suggest that as many as 10,000 Syrian Kurds swelled the PKK’s ranks over the decades. The Assad government further enabled the group’s activities, granting it operational freedom—including offices in Damascus and training camps in Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley, an area under Syrian hegemony. According to the Washington Institute, over one-third of PKK fighters hail from Syria, underscoring the group’s entrenched presence. In 2012, the PKK tightened its grip on Syrian Kurdistan, establishing the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan and the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM). These entities, touted as grassroots governance structures, function as little more than PYD fronts—cogs in a calculated machine designed to obscure the PKK’s overarching control. The facade of autonomy serves a broader agenda: to entrench PKK dominance under the guise of local empowerment. Even U.S. policymakers concede the blurred lines between the PYD, its armed wing the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the PKK. The distinction, they admit, is largely semantic. Yet, wary of the political fallout from openly backing a group tied to the PKK—designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. and NATO—the Pentagon engineered a rebrand. Enter the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition unveiled in 2015 that conveniently cloaks the PKK’s identity beneath a veneer of inclusivity. This sleight of hand, critics argue, is a deliberate deception to sanitize an unpalatable alliance.

𝐌𝐢𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐞𝐥 𝐀𝐫𝐢𝐳𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐢

22,838 просмотров • 1 год назад

The latest on the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state: Just hours after SDF commander Mazloum Abdi’s meeting with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, the full US withdrawal from Syria was announced as complete. One notable detail is that Qasrak airbase, the site vacated by the final American forces, lies on the strategic M4 highway and inside the Hasakah zone that remained under SDF control after the final integration agreement was sealed. Yet based on videos that emerged after the US withdrawal, the base appears to have been handed over to HTS-led elements of the Syrian Army’s 60th Division, which the SDF is set to join. The footage shows dozens of Turkish-made BMC vehicles entering the base to deploy there. More importantly, when the US left, the SDF’s anti-terror unit, known as YAT, appeared to be waiting to hand the base over to the Syrian Army, indicating clear coordination and suggesting that implementation of the integration deal is progressing relatively smoothly. It is also notable that both Qasrak and, a month earlier, Rmelan airbase appear to have been handed over to HTS-led brigades known to operate Turkish-made weaponry. These two bases matter because Qasrak overlooks the M4, while Rmelan sits beside the strategically important Rmelan oilfields. Both are located inside the zone that remained under SDF control after the cessation of hostilities at the end of January. The Syrian government is also set to take over all prisons in Hasakah, while the courts are to be transferred to Damascus-linked institutions. Damascus-linked officials involved in the integration process have said this could happen as soon as next week. At the same time, the SDF appears to be receiving more positions within the Syrian government than initially expected, with the SDF bloc emerging as an important pillar of governance. Its role is set to extend beyond the defence and interior ministries to the foreign ministry, justice ministry, and other state institutions. Meanwhile, the SDF is transitioning into politics following its formal dissolution as a separate armed entity, with strong indications that Mazloum Abdi himself may move into a political role. This also appears to fit into the PKK’s broader rebranding across the Middle East and its effort to better align its political entities across the region, from Turkey to Syria and beyond. That process now appears to include a push for new cross-border media platforms aimed at strengthening coordination as these movements become more embedded in governance in Syria and, potentially, Turkey, while also aligning more closely with the PUK sphere in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. The broader direction points toward a reconfigured cross-border political force emerging from the PKK’s transition in Turkey, where it has moved toward laying down arms and repositioning itself as a political actor. More:

The National Context

26,879 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад