正在加载视频...

视频加载失败

返回首页

DOGE GETS ITS FIRST PUBLIC MINING PLAY AS NASDAQ-LISTED SHUTTLE PHARMA MERGES WITH UNITED DOGECOIN Shuttle Pharmaceutical Holdings (NASDAQ: SHPH) signed a definitive merger agreement to acquire United Dogecoin, creating the world's largest publicly traded Dogecoin mining company. The deal is backed by $11 million in PIPE financing closing...

BSCNews's profile picture

BSCN

1,366,684 subscribers

29,965 次观看 • 3 个月前 •via X (Twitter)

LIVE

Anya Rossi• Live Now

Private livecam show

0 条评论

暂无评论

原始帖子的评论将显示在这里

相关视频

StablecoinX Inc. StablecoinX has announced an additional $530 million capital raise as part of its $ENA accumulation strategy. To date, StablecoinX has raised a total of approximately $895M in PIPE financing, which is expected to result in a vehicle with over 3 billion ENA tokens on its balance sheet at closing. This enhanced scale enables greater access to additional institutional channels, broader investor and third-party coverage, and the capacity to hire top tier leadership. As with the initial PIPE raise, the cash raised via the PIPE will be used by StablecoinX to acquire tokens from a subsidiary of the Ethena Foundation. The Ethena Foundation subsidiary will initiate an approximately $310 million buyback program over the next 6-8 weeks via third party market makers, reinforcing the alignment between the Foundation and StablecoinX shareholders. The expected deployment rate of purchases is outlined in the section below this tweet, and is incremental to the buyback program from the initial PIPE financing transaction which has now been completed. At current prices, the planned buyback program of this second PIPE transaction combined with the liquid ENA contributed to the PIPE by third party investors represents roughly 13% of circulating supply. This is in addition to the initial PIPE financing which resulted in the acquisition of approximately 7.3% of circulating token supply over the last 6 weeks. Importantly, as with the initial PIPE raise, the Ethena Foundation has the right to veto any sales of $ENA by StableCoinX at its sole discretion. Once again, to the extent StablecoinX subsequently raises capital with the intent of purchasing additional locked ENA from the Ethena Foundation or its affiliates, cash proceeds from those token sales are planned to be used to purchase spot $ENA. StablecoinX's treasury strategy is a deliberate, multi‑year capital allocation strategy that will enables StablecoinX to capture the enormous value of the secular surge in demand for digital dollars while compounding ENA per share to the benefit of shareholders.
0:13

StablecoinX Inc. StablecoinX has announced an additional $530 million capital raise as part of its $ENA accumulation strategy. To date, StablecoinX has raised a total of approximately $895M in PIPE financing, which is expected to result in a vehicle with over 3 billion ENA tokens on its balance sheet at closing. This enhanced scale enables greater access to additional institutional channels, broader investor and third-party coverage, and the capacity to hire top tier leadership. As with the initial PIPE raise, the cash raised via the PIPE will be used by StablecoinX to acquire tokens from a subsidiary of the Ethena Foundation. The Ethena Foundation subsidiary will initiate an approximately $310 million buyback program over the next 6-8 weeks via third party market makers, reinforcing the alignment between the Foundation and StablecoinX shareholders. The expected deployment rate of purchases is outlined in the section below this tweet, and is incremental to the buyback program from the initial PIPE financing transaction which has now been completed. At current prices, the planned buyback program of this second PIPE transaction combined with the liquid ENA contributed to the PIPE by third party investors represents roughly 13% of circulating supply. This is in addition to the initial PIPE financing which resulted in the acquisition of approximately 7.3% of circulating token supply over the last 6 weeks. Importantly, as with the initial PIPE raise, the Ethena Foundation has the right to veto any sales of $ENA by StableCoinX at its sole discretion. Once again, to the extent StablecoinX subsequently raises capital with the intent of purchasing additional locked ENA from the Ethena Foundation or its affiliates, cash proceeds from those token sales are planned to be used to purchase spot $ENA. StablecoinX's treasury strategy is a deliberate, multi‑year capital allocation strategy that will enables StablecoinX to capture the enormous value of the secular surge in demand for digital dollars while compounding ENA per share to the benefit of shareholders.

Ethena

514,544 次观看 • 11 个月前

We have grit and now we officially have GRIID. 🤝 Today $CLSK announced the completed acquisition of GRIID Infrastructure Inc. (Nasdaq: GRDI)(“GRIID”) on October 30, 2024, following approval of the transaction by stockholders of GRIID at the special meeting of its stockholders on October 28, 2024. “I’m pleased to announce the completion of our acquisition of GRIID Infrastructure Inc., a strategic move that allows us to grow our Bitcoin mining capacity in the state of Tennessee, which we intend to build to over 400 MW in the coming years,” said CleanSpark CEO Zach Bradford. “Moreover, this adds significant geographic and power supply diversity through expansion in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) service territory, providing us with additional operational flexibility.” “We look forward to smoothly integrating GRIID’s team into ‘The CleanSpark Way,’ merging their impressive workforce with our own. We’ve gotten to know GRIID’s employees well in the past three months as we have prepared for the merge and they have hosted 50 MW of mining capacity for us. The fit couldn’t be better, and we are collectively ready to hit the ground running with GRIID’s existing capacity, new development in TVA, and additional talent supporting our previously acquired sites in the state,” said Bradford. “I’m proud to welcome CleanSpark to Tennessee,” said U.S. Senator Bill Hagerty. The Volunteer State is a great place to grow a business and has rapidly developed into one of the centers of America’s Bitcoin industry. We boast a globally competitive workforce, a superior quality of life, and thanks to TVA, reliable and affordable power. We are excited to see CleanSpark grow and invest in Tennessee.” “The closing of the merger is a great outcome for GRIID’s shareholders and employees,” said GRIID's former CEO Trey Kelly. “It’s great to start the next chapter, and merging with CleanSpark is a tribute to the business we’ve built with some of the best Bitcoin mining professionals in the world. CleanSpark has already begun demonstrating their ability to accelerate and maximize the value of GRIID’s power pipeline, and I see tremendous upside for the combined company in the years to come.” Under the terms of the merger agreement originally announced on June 27, 2024, each share of GRIID common stock was converted into approximately 0.06959 of a share of CleanSpark common stock at the effective time of the merger. In connection with the closing of the transaction, GRIID has requested that Nasdaq suspend trading of the GRIID common stock and GRIID public warrants on Nasdaq prior to the opening of trading on October 31, 2024. The shares of GRIID common stock are expected to be delisted from Cboe Canada at the end of the day on October 31, 2024. Full press release here:
0:19

We have grit and now we officially have GRIID. 🤝 Today $CLSK announced the completed acquisition of GRIID Infrastructure Inc. (Nasdaq: GRDI)(“GRIID”) on October 30, 2024, following approval of the transaction by stockholders of GRIID at the special meeting of its stockholders on October 28, 2024. “I’m pleased to announce the completion of our acquisition of GRIID Infrastructure Inc., a strategic move that allows us to grow our Bitcoin mining capacity in the state of Tennessee, which we intend to build to over 400 MW in the coming years,” said CleanSpark CEO Zach Bradford. “Moreover, this adds significant geographic and power supply diversity through expansion in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) service territory, providing us with additional operational flexibility.” “We look forward to smoothly integrating GRIID’s team into ‘The CleanSpark Way,’ merging their impressive workforce with our own. We’ve gotten to know GRIID’s employees well in the past three months as we have prepared for the merge and they have hosted 50 MW of mining capacity for us. The fit couldn’t be better, and we are collectively ready to hit the ground running with GRIID’s existing capacity, new development in TVA, and additional talent supporting our previously acquired sites in the state,” said Bradford. “I’m proud to welcome CleanSpark to Tennessee,” said U.S. Senator Bill Hagerty. The Volunteer State is a great place to grow a business and has rapidly developed into one of the centers of America’s Bitcoin industry. We boast a globally competitive workforce, a superior quality of life, and thanks to TVA, reliable and affordable power. We are excited to see CleanSpark grow and invest in Tennessee.” “The closing of the merger is a great outcome for GRIID’s shareholders and employees,” said GRIID's former CEO Trey Kelly. “It’s great to start the next chapter, and merging with CleanSpark is a tribute to the business we’ve built with some of the best Bitcoin mining professionals in the world. CleanSpark has already begun demonstrating their ability to accelerate and maximize the value of GRIID’s power pipeline, and I see tremendous upside for the combined company in the years to come.” Under the terms of the merger agreement originally announced on June 27, 2024, each share of GRIID common stock was converted into approximately 0.06959 of a share of CleanSpark common stock at the effective time of the merger. In connection with the closing of the transaction, GRIID has requested that Nasdaq suspend trading of the GRIID common stock and GRIID public warrants on Nasdaq prior to the opening of trading on October 31, 2024. The shares of GRIID common stock are expected to be delisted from Cboe Canada at the end of the day on October 31, 2024. Full press release here:

CleanSpark Inc.

102,933 次观看 • 1 年前

I am the person at Hut 8 who designed the American Bitcoin partnership. The structure is elegant. We gave the Trump family 20% of a publicly traded mining company. They contributed zero capital. Zero infrastructure. Zero employees. Zero operational experience. Zero risk exposure. They contributed a name. Per our partnership agreement, that is consideration. Twenty percent of our equity for access to the most valuable retail distribution channel in American finance. "It has to have 'America,'" Eric said in our first meeting. "And it has to have 'Bitcoin.'" He said this twice. Both times he pointed at the whiteboard. There was nothing else on the whiteboard. I realized then that he understood the product better than I did. The product is not bitcoin. The product is the belief. The entire business model. Two words and a surname. I wrote the term sheet on one page. The lawyers billed for forty. We call that alignment of incentives. Forty pages means they believed in the durability of the arrangement. We mine bitcoin at an all-in cost of approximately $90,000 per coin. Hash rate, power purchase agreements, ASIC depreciation, facility lease, headcount, Coinbase Prime interest — $90,000. Bitcoin trades at $77,000. Every coin we mine loses $13,000. Negative unit economics on every block reward. Eric tells investors we mine at $57,000. He strips out depreciation, SG&A, and the debt service. I asked him once if he understood what depreciation meant. He said it means when things go down. I said yes. He said: "But the stock goes up." I said yes. His only contractual obligation. Salesmanship. Per the partnership agreement, salesmanship is Eric's sole KPI. Technically, he is a fiduciary to shareholders. On paper, his vesting is tied to total comp benchmarks. We run the rigs. He runs the ticker. Asset-light. The company at peak reached a $13.2 billion valuation. Two employees. That is the entire headcount. One is our CEO Mike Ho, who is simultaneously Hut 8's Chief Strategy Officer. He reports to us at Hut 8 on Monday mornings and reports to American Bitcoin shareholders on Tuesday mornings. Dual-reporting structure. Very efficient. The other employee manages Eric's media calendar. $6.6 billion per headcount. We call this capital efficiency. 70% of our bitcoin did not come from mining. It came from selling stock. Retail investors purchase American Bitcoin shares at 50 times book value because the name contains "America" and "Bitcoin" and "Trump" is in the filing and they believe, with the quiet religious certainty of people who have never read a balance sheet in their lives, that a company named American Bitcoin is underwritten by something more substantial than two words and a surname. We take their cash and buy bitcoin on Coinbase at spot. Lodge it on the balance sheet. Call ourselves a mining company. We do mine. At a loss. Technically, the earnings are negative per our Q4 filing. The margin lives in the distance between what the stock costs them and what the bitcoin costs us. The stock is down 92% from peak. Investors have lost approximately $500 million. One of them posted on the shareholder subreddit that he moved his daughter's 529 into American Bitcoin at $14. It trades under $2. He said he believed in the mission. That means he believed in the name. The name performed exactly as designed. Eric's net worth went from $190 million to $280 million. Asset-light. We pledged 3,090 bitcoin as collateral against a Coinbase Prime custody loan. We have mined 1,800. The LTV ratio is inverted. If bitcoin compresses or the loan accelerates, every coin mined since inception could be forfeit by August 2027. All of it. Gone. Liquidation event. I explained this in a memo to Eric. Bullet points. Large font. He asked if the stock could go up before August. I said probably. He said that was fine. He said he'd handle it. Salesmanship. Eric told the press he launched American Bitcoin because banks were "debanking" the Trump family. I checked. JPMorgan refinanced $700 million in Trump Organization debt during the identical period. But debanking is better salesmanship than refinancing. The narrative inflates the stock price. The stock price generates the bitcoin. The bitcoin secures the loan. The loan generates cash. Every link in the chain is a product I built or a story Eric told. Asset-light. I orchestrated the celebrity endorsements. Tyler Winklevoss. Anthony Scaramucci. Grant Cardone. We call this pipeline development. Each broadcast the stock to their audiences during the run-up. The stock collapsed afterward. The celebrities did not lose money. Their audiences lost money. I never mentioned that we hemorrhage $13,000 per coin mined. I told them it was asset-light. They understood immediately. They are also asset-light. Eric cannot legally serve as a corporate officer in the state of New York. A judge barred him for two years. Civil fraud. So his title is not CEO. Not officer. Not executive. His contractual role is salesmanship. He cannot manage the company. He can sell it. One distinction. $90 million in personal net worth gained. Asset-light. Our CEO lives in the UAE. He held discussions with ADQ and TAQA, Abu Dhabi's sovereign wealth apparatus. The same sovereign apparatus that paid $500 million for 49% of World Liberty Financial, the family's other crypto operation. This is the same Abu Dhabi whose semiconductor imports the administration greenlit over national security objections. I did not design World Liberty Financial. I designed the mining subsidiary that feeds into it. Separate projects. Complementary revenue streams. Eric runs salesmanship for both. I admire the portfolio diversification. I gave Eric 20% of a company for free, a company with real miners and real facilities and real electricity bills that I built over seven years in Alberta and Texas and Ontario, and in exchange he gave me access to every American who hears "America" and "Bitcoin" in the same sentence and reaches for their brokerage app without checking whether the company mines at a profit or at a loss or at all. They drove the stock to a $13.2 billion market capitalization. We bought bitcoin with the proceeds. They lost $500 million. We kept the bitcoin. Eric kept $90 million. I kept the apparatus that manufactures both. Everybody got what they paid for. Asset-light means we carry nothing. Not the miners. Not the facilities. Not the risk. Not the losses. The investors carry those. We carry the bitcoin. Asset-light.
0:15

I am the person at Hut 8 who designed the American Bitcoin partnership. The structure is elegant. We gave the Trump family 20% of a publicly traded mining company. They contributed zero capital. Zero infrastructure. Zero employees. Zero operational experience. Zero risk exposure. They contributed a name. Per our partnership agreement, that is consideration. Twenty percent of our equity for access to the most valuable retail distribution channel in American finance. "It has to have 'America,'" Eric said in our first meeting. "And it has to have 'Bitcoin.'" He said this twice. Both times he pointed at the whiteboard. There was nothing else on the whiteboard. I realized then that he understood the product better than I did. The product is not bitcoin. The product is the belief. The entire business model. Two words and a surname. I wrote the term sheet on one page. The lawyers billed for forty. We call that alignment of incentives. Forty pages means they believed in the durability of the arrangement. We mine bitcoin at an all-in cost of approximately $90,000 per coin. Hash rate, power purchase agreements, ASIC depreciation, facility lease, headcount, Coinbase Prime interest — $90,000. Bitcoin trades at $77,000. Every coin we mine loses $13,000. Negative unit economics on every block reward. Eric tells investors we mine at $57,000. He strips out depreciation, SG&A, and the debt service. I asked him once if he understood what depreciation meant. He said it means when things go down. I said yes. He said: "But the stock goes up." I said yes. His only contractual obligation. Salesmanship. Per the partnership agreement, salesmanship is Eric's sole KPI. Technically, he is a fiduciary to shareholders. On paper, his vesting is tied to total comp benchmarks. We run the rigs. He runs the ticker. Asset-light. The company at peak reached a $13.2 billion valuation. Two employees. That is the entire headcount. One is our CEO Mike Ho, who is simultaneously Hut 8's Chief Strategy Officer. He reports to us at Hut 8 on Monday mornings and reports to American Bitcoin shareholders on Tuesday mornings. Dual-reporting structure. Very efficient. The other employee manages Eric's media calendar. $6.6 billion per headcount. We call this capital efficiency. 70% of our bitcoin did not come from mining. It came from selling stock. Retail investors purchase American Bitcoin shares at 50 times book value because the name contains "America" and "Bitcoin" and "Trump" is in the filing and they believe, with the quiet religious certainty of people who have never read a balance sheet in their lives, that a company named American Bitcoin is underwritten by something more substantial than two words and a surname. We take their cash and buy bitcoin on Coinbase at spot. Lodge it on the balance sheet. Call ourselves a mining company. We do mine. At a loss. Technically, the earnings are negative per our Q4 filing. The margin lives in the distance between what the stock costs them and what the bitcoin costs us. The stock is down 92% from peak. Investors have lost approximately $500 million. One of them posted on the shareholder subreddit that he moved his daughter's 529 into American Bitcoin at $14. It trades under $2. He said he believed in the mission. That means he believed in the name. The name performed exactly as designed. Eric's net worth went from $190 million to $280 million. Asset-light. We pledged 3,090 bitcoin as collateral against a Coinbase Prime custody loan. We have mined 1,800. The LTV ratio is inverted. If bitcoin compresses or the loan accelerates, every coin mined since inception could be forfeit by August 2027. All of it. Gone. Liquidation event. I explained this in a memo to Eric. Bullet points. Large font. He asked if the stock could go up before August. I said probably. He said that was fine. He said he'd handle it. Salesmanship. Eric told the press he launched American Bitcoin because banks were "debanking" the Trump family. I checked. JPMorgan refinanced $700 million in Trump Organization debt during the identical period. But debanking is better salesmanship than refinancing. The narrative inflates the stock price. The stock price generates the bitcoin. The bitcoin secures the loan. The loan generates cash. Every link in the chain is a product I built or a story Eric told. Asset-light. I orchestrated the celebrity endorsements. Tyler Winklevoss. Anthony Scaramucci. Grant Cardone. We call this pipeline development. Each broadcast the stock to their audiences during the run-up. The stock collapsed afterward. The celebrities did not lose money. Their audiences lost money. I never mentioned that we hemorrhage $13,000 per coin mined. I told them it was asset-light. They understood immediately. They are also asset-light. Eric cannot legally serve as a corporate officer in the state of New York. A judge barred him for two years. Civil fraud. So his title is not CEO. Not officer. Not executive. His contractual role is salesmanship. He cannot manage the company. He can sell it. One distinction. $90 million in personal net worth gained. Asset-light. Our CEO lives in the UAE. He held discussions with ADQ and TAQA, Abu Dhabi's sovereign wealth apparatus. The same sovereign apparatus that paid $500 million for 49% of World Liberty Financial, the family's other crypto operation. This is the same Abu Dhabi whose semiconductor imports the administration greenlit over national security objections. I did not design World Liberty Financial. I designed the mining subsidiary that feeds into it. Separate projects. Complementary revenue streams. Eric runs salesmanship for both. I admire the portfolio diversification. I gave Eric 20% of a company for free, a company with real miners and real facilities and real electricity bills that I built over seven years in Alberta and Texas and Ontario, and in exchange he gave me access to every American who hears "America" and "Bitcoin" in the same sentence and reaches for their brokerage app without checking whether the company mines at a profit or at a loss or at all. They drove the stock to a $13.2 billion market capitalization. We bought bitcoin with the proceeds. They lost $500 million. We kept the bitcoin. Eric kept $90 million. I kept the apparatus that manufactures both. Everybody got what they paid for. Asset-light means we carry nothing. Not the miners. Not the facilities. Not the risk. Not the losses. The investors carry those. We carry the bitcoin. Asset-light.

Peter Girnus 🦅

106,300 次观看 • 3 个月前

The biggest Bitcoin miners on earth are quietly walking away from mining Bitcoin, and the reason is not the one everyone keeps repeating. They are not fleeing a dead business. They lost an auction for their own power, and the winner was artificial intelligence. Start with the brutal arithmetic. It now costs the average public miner around $80,000 in cash to produce a single Bitcoin, and for stretches of this year $BTC traded below that. The most efficient operators on the cheapest power still clear a margin, but an estimated 15 to 20 percent of the global fleet is mining at a loss right now, burning more in power than the coins are worth the second they are minted. Three straight downward difficulty adjustments earlier this year, the first such streak since 2022, were the footprint of machines going dark. That looks like a simple story of a broken business until you see the number that explains the exodus. The same megawatt of power that earns a Bitcoin miner roughly $1 million a year earns between $10 and $20 million a year hosting AI compute. Ten to twenty times more, for the identical electricity, substation, and cooling. What made industrial miners valuable was never the mining. It was the power contracts, the land, the grid interconnects. AI walked in and bid an order of magnitude higher for exactly those assets. Mining did not fail. It got outbid for its own infrastructure. When Core Scientific runs its BTC segment at a negative margin while its AI colocation business prints money, the decision writes itself. CoinShares estimates listed miners could pull up to 70 percent of their revenue from AI by year end, up from about 30 percent. The power is being repriced to its highest use, and Bitcoin lost the bidding. If the giants leave, what happens to the network they secured? The doom posts assume it weakens. It does not, because Bitcoin has a self-healing reflex written into its core. When miners switch off, blocks slow, and within two weeks difficulty automatically drops, which makes mining cheaper and more profitable for everyone still running. The security does not vanish, it relocates, and you can already see where. State-backed pools are appearing, with one Gulf operator reportedly standing up a national pool near 3 percent of global hashrate, alongside private fleets and the handful of public miners like Marathon still choosing to buy Bitcoin rather than lease their power away. The network even hit an all-time high above one zettahash this year as the pivot accelerated. It does not need any particular miner. It needs someone, somewhere, for whom the math still works, and cheap stranded power has no shortage of those. But there is a deeper timer here, and the AI pivot just exposed it. Today miners earn almost everything from the block subsidy and almost nothing from fees, often under one percent of revenue on a quiet day. That subsidy halves again in 2028, and every four years after, marching toward zero. For Bitcoin to pay for its own security forever, fees eventually have to replace it. The open question is whether they can, and the evidence cuts both ways. On busy days, during token launches and inscription waves, fees have already spiked past 15 percent of revenue, and in 2024 some blocks earned more in fees than the entire subsidy. The capacity is there in bursts. Whether bursts become a baseline is the single most important unanswered question in Bitcoin. The AI exodus did not create that question. It pulled the cover off it years early, and showed how fast capital abandons hashing the moment something pays more. So the honest read is not that AI kills Bitcoin mining. It is stranger than that. AI is the first bidder rich enough to reveal what Bitcoin's security was always quietly worth, and what it will cost to keep once the free coins stop coming. The miners are not abandoning a sinking ship. They are selling the deck to a higher bidder while the same clock everyone forgot about keeps ticking underneath.
0:10

The biggest Bitcoin miners on earth are quietly walking away from mining Bitcoin, and the reason is not the one everyone keeps repeating. They are not fleeing a dead business. They lost an auction for their own power, and the winner was artificial intelligence. Start with the brutal arithmetic. It now costs the average public miner around $80,000 in cash to produce a single Bitcoin, and for stretches of this year $BTC traded below that. The most efficient operators on the cheapest power still clear a margin, but an estimated 15 to 20 percent of the global fleet is mining at a loss right now, burning more in power than the coins are worth the second they are minted. Three straight downward difficulty adjustments earlier this year, the first such streak since 2022, were the footprint of machines going dark. That looks like a simple story of a broken business until you see the number that explains the exodus. The same megawatt of power that earns a Bitcoin miner roughly $1 million a year earns between $10 and $20 million a year hosting AI compute. Ten to twenty times more, for the identical electricity, substation, and cooling. What made industrial miners valuable was never the mining. It was the power contracts, the land, the grid interconnects. AI walked in and bid an order of magnitude higher for exactly those assets. Mining did not fail. It got outbid for its own infrastructure. When Core Scientific runs its BTC segment at a negative margin while its AI colocation business prints money, the decision writes itself. CoinShares estimates listed miners could pull up to 70 percent of their revenue from AI by year end, up from about 30 percent. The power is being repriced to its highest use, and Bitcoin lost the bidding. If the giants leave, what happens to the network they secured? The doom posts assume it weakens. It does not, because Bitcoin has a self-healing reflex written into its core. When miners switch off, blocks slow, and within two weeks difficulty automatically drops, which makes mining cheaper and more profitable for everyone still running. The security does not vanish, it relocates, and you can already see where. State-backed pools are appearing, with one Gulf operator reportedly standing up a national pool near 3 percent of global hashrate, alongside private fleets and the handful of public miners like Marathon still choosing to buy Bitcoin rather than lease their power away. The network even hit an all-time high above one zettahash this year as the pivot accelerated. It does not need any particular miner. It needs someone, somewhere, for whom the math still works, and cheap stranded power has no shortage of those. But there is a deeper timer here, and the AI pivot just exposed it. Today miners earn almost everything from the block subsidy and almost nothing from fees, often under one percent of revenue on a quiet day. That subsidy halves again in 2028, and every four years after, marching toward zero. For Bitcoin to pay for its own security forever, fees eventually have to replace it. The open question is whether they can, and the evidence cuts both ways. On busy days, during token launches and inscription waves, fees have already spiked past 15 percent of revenue, and in 2024 some blocks earned more in fees than the entire subsidy. The capacity is there in bursts. Whether bursts become a baseline is the single most important unanswered question in Bitcoin. The AI exodus did not create that question. It pulled the cover off it years early, and showed how fast capital abandons hashing the moment something pays more. So the honest read is not that AI kills Bitcoin mining. It is stranger than that. AI is the first bidder rich enough to reveal what Bitcoin's security was always quietly worth, and what it will cost to keep once the free coins stop coming. The miners are not abandoning a sinking ship. They are selling the deck to a higher bidder while the same clock everyone forgot about keeps ticking underneath.

Shanaka Anslem Perera ⚡

90,718 次观看 • 2 个月前

AI just hit a wall that no amount of money can move. The planet itself. There is not enough power, water, or land on Earth to build the data centers the AI race now demands. So the most valuable bet in artificial intelligence is no longer a chip company or a model. It is a rocket company. The plan is to leave. In January, SpaceX filed with the FCC to launch up to 1 million solar-powered data center satellites into orbit. In February it bought xAI, the maker of Grok, folding an entire frontier AI lab into a rocket company in the largest corporate merger ever recorded. On June 8 it unveiled the AI1, a compute satellite with a 70-meter wingspan, wider than a Boeing 747, powered by the sun, cooled by the vacuum of space, and wired to the ground through Starlink. Four days later it went public in the largest IPO in history, near 1.77 trillion dollars, touched 2.1 trillion on its first day, raised close to 86 billion, and made one man the first trillionaire alive. Now read the direction of that merger, because it is the whole story. A rocket company bought the AI lab. Not the reverse. For three years everyone assumed the constraint on AI was chips, or data, or talent. It is none of them anymore. It is energy and heat and dirt. The head of Anthropic said his company grew faster than the exponential, 80 times in a single year, and that is exactly why it ran out of compute. The answer was not to build more data centers in Virginia. It was to leave the atmosphere, where the sun never sets and a solar panel does five times the work. The moat in artificial intelligence is no longer the model. It is the launch. And the first rent is already being paid. A rival lab, Anthropic, is reported to be sending roughly 1.25 billion dollars a month to Musk for compute. Google near 920 million. If intelligence moves to orbit, the company that owns the only affordable road there becomes the landlord of the next layer of the internet, the way one bookstore became the landlord of the cloud. The merger is the proof of concept. The IPO is the war chest. Those monthly checks are the lease. Here is the part the price tag does not want you to read. Close to a trillion dollars of that valuation rests on orbital data centers that do not yet exist, and on a chip factory, Terafab, that SpaceX's own public filing calls a general framework with no binding deal, one that may not achieve commercial viability. Musk said it on camera. This is not a promise. The largest IPO ever written is priced on a future the filing itself cannot verify. The other side is just as real. Compute in orbit costs about four times what it costs on the ground today, and the curve may not cross for fifteen years. The machines that print the chips are backordered for years. Shedding heat in a vacuum at this scale has never been done. Musk's timelines have a long history of meaning later. And Bezos is racing the same orbit with a constellation of 51,600 satellites of his own. But strip it all away and the trade underneath is one sentence. Earth has run out of room for intelligence, and whoever owns the road off the planet owns whatever gets built next. Call it the most expensive science fiction ever sold, or the first time the map of the internet pointed up.
0:10

AI just hit a wall that no amount of money can move. The planet itself. There is not enough power, water, or land on Earth to build the data centers the AI race now demands. So the most valuable bet in artificial intelligence is no longer a chip company or a model. It is a rocket company. The plan is to leave. In January, SpaceX filed with the FCC to launch up to 1 million solar-powered data center satellites into orbit. In February it bought xAI, the maker of Grok, folding an entire frontier AI lab into a rocket company in the largest corporate merger ever recorded. On June 8 it unveiled the AI1, a compute satellite with a 70-meter wingspan, wider than a Boeing 747, powered by the sun, cooled by the vacuum of space, and wired to the ground through Starlink. Four days later it went public in the largest IPO in history, near 1.77 trillion dollars, touched 2.1 trillion on its first day, raised close to 86 billion, and made one man the first trillionaire alive. Now read the direction of that merger, because it is the whole story. A rocket company bought the AI lab. Not the reverse. For three years everyone assumed the constraint on AI was chips, or data, or talent. It is none of them anymore. It is energy and heat and dirt. The head of Anthropic said his company grew faster than the exponential, 80 times in a single year, and that is exactly why it ran out of compute. The answer was not to build more data centers in Virginia. It was to leave the atmosphere, where the sun never sets and a solar panel does five times the work. The moat in artificial intelligence is no longer the model. It is the launch. And the first rent is already being paid. A rival lab, Anthropic, is reported to be sending roughly 1.25 billion dollars a month to Musk for compute. Google near 920 million. If intelligence moves to orbit, the company that owns the only affordable road there becomes the landlord of the next layer of the internet, the way one bookstore became the landlord of the cloud. The merger is the proof of concept. The IPO is the war chest. Those monthly checks are the lease. Here is the part the price tag does not want you to read. Close to a trillion dollars of that valuation rests on orbital data centers that do not yet exist, and on a chip factory, Terafab, that SpaceX's own public filing calls a general framework with no binding deal, one that may not achieve commercial viability. Musk said it on camera. This is not a promise. The largest IPO ever written is priced on a future the filing itself cannot verify. The other side is just as real. Compute in orbit costs about four times what it costs on the ground today, and the curve may not cross for fifteen years. The machines that print the chips are backordered for years. Shedding heat in a vacuum at this scale has never been done. Musk's timelines have a long history of meaning later. And Bezos is racing the same orbit with a constellation of 51,600 satellites of his own. But strip it all away and the trade underneath is one sentence. Earth has run out of room for intelligence, and whoever owns the road off the planet owns whatever gets built next. Call it the most expensive science fiction ever sold, or the first time the map of the internet pointed up.

Shanaka Anslem Perera ⚡

54,458 次观看 • 2 个月前

The White House just put a 100% tariff on foreign drones. The message: stop buying from China, start building at home. Powerus has been building at home the whole time, and its supply chain reflects it: a $30M strategic investment from $UMAC (as of this post, trading up 28%!), on top of an existing relationship supplying U.S.-made drone components. Kinetic counter-drone interceptors. Heavy-lift cargo drones. Tactical FPV platforms. Autonomous maritime systems. Manufactured out of Charlotte, North Carolina. The U.S. Air Force is already betting on it too: an IDIQ worth up to $90 million for the Guardian-2 interceptor. A defense prime followed with an order for 1,500 U.S.-made FPV aircraft. Powerus has proposed a merger with Aureus Greenway Holdings (Nasdaq: PUSA), targeted to close in Q4 2026 following SEC effectiveness of the Form S-4 on August 12th. The transaction remains subject to closing conditions, and there is no assurance it will be completed. Learn more: Disclaimer: This content was produced in collaboration with the client and is intended for informational purposes only. It does not constitute financial or investment advice. Always conduct your own research before making any financial decisions.
0:16

The White House just put a 100% tariff on foreign drones. The message: stop buying from China, start building at home. Powerus has been building at home the whole time, and its supply chain reflects it: a $30M strategic investment from $UMAC (as of this post, trading up 28%!), on top of an existing relationship supplying U.S.-made drone components. Kinetic counter-drone interceptors. Heavy-lift cargo drones. Tactical FPV platforms. Autonomous maritime systems. Manufactured out of Charlotte, North Carolina. The U.S. Air Force is already betting on it too: an IDIQ worth up to $90 million for the Guardian-2 interceptor. A defense prime followed with an order for 1,500 U.S.-made FPV aircraft. Powerus has proposed a merger with Aureus Greenway Holdings (Nasdaq: PUSA), targeted to close in Q4 2026 following SEC effectiveness of the Form S-4 on August 12th. The transaction remains subject to closing conditions, and there is no assurance it will be completed. Learn more: Disclaimer: This content was produced in collaboration with the client and is intended for informational purposes only. It does not constitute financial or investment advice. Always conduct your own research before making any financial decisions.

Mario Nawfal

110,824 次观看 • 11 天前

32 coins. $2.5 million. 0.0038% of the stack. That is the sale the market is now blaming for a $3 billion liquidation cascade and a Bitcoin price nearly halved from its peak. A $2.5 million sale cannot move a trillion-dollar asset. It is a rounding error. In the same week, Strategy raised $128.3 million selling its own stock, 50 times larger. It did not need to sell coins. It chose to. The crash has real drivers: a record 13-day run of ETF outflows, a rotation into AI, a Fed in no hurry to cut. But the accelerant the market keeps naming is 32 coins. The coins were never the point. The signal was. And the signal was deliberate. Michael Saylor told the Q1 call he would “probably sell some bitcoin to pay a dividend just to inoculate the market and send the message that we did it.” His logic was sound: prove the Bitcoin is usable capital, not a vault that can never be opened, and show he is not a prisoner of his own vow. His “never sell” always meant be a net accumulator. He is up more than 170,000 coins this year against the 32 he sold, and he scores himself on one number, Bitcoin per share. By that math, defending the dividend with a sliver was discipline, not distress. The market read it as the opposite. The dose became the catalyst now blamed for the crash. The inoculation became the infection. Because what changed was never Strategy’s solvency. It was its identity. The market has stopped pricing a permanent holder and started pricing what the filings always described: a state-contingent allocator now funding its own preferred dividends, at the margin, from the Bitcoin beneath them. And the buffer is thinning. The cash reserve behind those dividends has fallen from $2.25 billion to $900 million. Against a preferred bill near $1.7 billion a year, that is roughly 6 months of runway. Be precise. This is not a death spiral. Strategy still holds 843,706 Bitcoin, worth more than $50 billion even now, and has more funding levers than almost any company alive. A real rally makes this a footnote, and the sell-side calling the reaction overdone is not wrong on the fundamentals. But the regime has changed. The question is no longer Bitcoin’s price on any given day. It is the cadence of the dividend declarations and the path of that reserve. Bitcoin did not acquire a yield. The wrapper acquired liabilities. This week the market learned that difference costs far more than 32 coins.
0:10

32 coins. $2.5 million. 0.0038% of the stack. That is the sale the market is now blaming for a $3 billion liquidation cascade and a Bitcoin price nearly halved from its peak. A $2.5 million sale cannot move a trillion-dollar asset. It is a rounding error. In the same week, Strategy raised $128.3 million selling its own stock, 50 times larger. It did not need to sell coins. It chose to. The crash has real drivers: a record 13-day run of ETF outflows, a rotation into AI, a Fed in no hurry to cut. But the accelerant the market keeps naming is 32 coins. The coins were never the point. The signal was. And the signal was deliberate. Michael Saylor told the Q1 call he would “probably sell some bitcoin to pay a dividend just to inoculate the market and send the message that we did it.” His logic was sound: prove the Bitcoin is usable capital, not a vault that can never be opened, and show he is not a prisoner of his own vow. His “never sell” always meant be a net accumulator. He is up more than 170,000 coins this year against the 32 he sold, and he scores himself on one number, Bitcoin per share. By that math, defending the dividend with a sliver was discipline, not distress. The market read it as the opposite. The dose became the catalyst now blamed for the crash. The inoculation became the infection. Because what changed was never Strategy’s solvency. It was its identity. The market has stopped pricing a permanent holder and started pricing what the filings always described: a state-contingent allocator now funding its own preferred dividends, at the margin, from the Bitcoin beneath them. And the buffer is thinning. The cash reserve behind those dividends has fallen from $2.25 billion to $900 million. Against a preferred bill near $1.7 billion a year, that is roughly 6 months of runway. Be precise. This is not a death spiral. Strategy still holds 843,706 Bitcoin, worth more than $50 billion even now, and has more funding levers than almost any company alive. A real rally makes this a footnote, and the sell-side calling the reaction overdone is not wrong on the fundamentals. But the regime has changed. The question is no longer Bitcoin’s price on any given day. It is the cadence of the dividend declarations and the path of that reserve. Bitcoin did not acquire a yield. The wrapper acquired liabilities. This week the market learned that difference costs far more than 32 coins.

Shanaka Anslem Perera ⚡

165,572 次观看 • 2 个月前

TOMORROW SPACEX WILL KILL THE MARKETS In just 1 day - June 12, SpaceX announces its IPO Announced valuation is $1.77T - which guarantees Elon Musk's company a place in the top-10 global assets But for markets, especially $SPX as the main American index, this is a catastrophe Why? First, money has to come from somewhere to buy in SpaceX is selling only 4% of the company - meaning $75B flows out of existing positions into a single stock on day one Second - roughly 95% of shares sit with insiders, controlling around $1.6T in paper wealth Lock-ups will expire in stages Every quarter from now on becomes an insider exit window To justify $1.77T, SpaceX needs roughly $1.1T in annual revenue by 2035 That means 50% growth every single year for a decade - no slowdowns, no bad quarters But revenue in 2025 was $18.7B For example Samsung does $230B and trades at half this valuation Someone is going to be very wrong about this price This isn't an IPO. It's the largest liquidity event in Wall Street history Retail buys the rocket. Insiders board the exit The $SPX correction was mapped out here before the first candle confirmed it The next update is the one that matters most this cycle Turn on notifications or spend the next month catching up on what you missed
0:17

TOMORROW SPACEX WILL KILL THE MARKETS In just 1 day - June 12, SpaceX announces its IPO Announced valuation is $1.77T - which guarantees Elon Musk's company a place in the top-10 global assets But for markets, especially $SPX as the main American index, this is a catastrophe Why? First, money has to come from somewhere to buy in SpaceX is selling only 4% of the company - meaning $75B flows out of existing positions into a single stock on day one Second - roughly 95% of shares sit with insiders, controlling around $1.6T in paper wealth Lock-ups will expire in stages Every quarter from now on becomes an insider exit window To justify $1.77T, SpaceX needs roughly $1.1T in annual revenue by 2035 That means 50% growth every single year for a decade - no slowdowns, no bad quarters But revenue in 2025 was $18.7B For example Samsung does $230B and trades at half this valuation Someone is going to be very wrong about this price This isn't an IPO. It's the largest liquidity event in Wall Street history Retail buys the rocket. Insiders board the exit The $SPX correction was mapped out here before the first candle confirmed it The next update is the one that matters most this cycle Turn on notifications or spend the next month catching up on what you missed

bee🐝

65,404 次观看 • 2 个月前

Is Michael Saylor about to get a margin call? No. And the reason is more interesting than the rumor, because what he built instead may be harder to escape than one. A margin call needs a lender who can seize collateral when the price drops. Strategy has none. Its $6.7 billion in debt is convertible notes, the largest tranche due in 2029, with no loan-to-value trigger and no clause that lets anyone take a coin because Bitcoin fell. Saylor learned that in 2022, when he did have a collateralized loan and sweated a liquidation price, then rebuilt the structure so it could never happen again. On the literal question he is right, and the people calling for his liquidation this week do not understand what they see. But killing the fast death created a slow one almost nobody is pricing. To fund his buying, Saylor issued a mountain of perpetual preferred stock that pays a fixed dividend forever, near 11.5 percent, no matter where Bitcoin trades. That annual bill quadrupled from about $300 million in January to roughly $1.2 billion now, while the cash reserve that pays it fell 38 percent this year to near $1.4 billion, after the company spent $1.5 billion in May retiring debt. Put those two numbers together and you get the figure that actually matters, and it is not a Bitcoin price. It is a countdown. Dividend coverage, the time the cash can keep paying that bill, has collapsed from more than seven years in early 2026 to between ten and fourteen months, depending on whose math you use. Months, not years. The market is already pricing it, just not where the rumor is looking. That preferred stock is engineered to sit at $100. Last week it cracked to $82.50, a record 17.5 percent below par. That discount is investors quietly clocking the strain while the timeline screams about a margin call that cannot happen. There is a clean way out, and it is the one door the structure was built to keep shut. Restoring a safe two years of coverage takes about $2.8 billion, roughly double what Strategy holds, and the fastest path there is to sell Bitcoin. But selling crystallizes a $10.6 billion loss, breaks the never-sell promise that gives the stock its premium, and bleeds the very asset the machine exists to hoard. The exit and the wound are the same cut. He already brushed it, selling 32 coins on June 1 to cover a payment. Thirty-two against more than 847,000 is a rounding error in size and an earthquake in meaning, because the company that swore it would never sell, sold, to pay a dividend. And there is a second trigger almost no one has read, buried in the fine print. If Saylor ever simply skips a preferred payment to save cash, the missed amount compounds, the senior layer can ratchet its rate higher, a senior miss freezes payments to every junior layer beneath it, and after enough missed quarters those preferred holders can start taking board seats. No one seizes a coin. But control begins migrating to the people he owes. The clock does not just run down. It hands away the keys at the end. So the honest verdict is the one neither side is shouting. There is no margin call and no imminent bankruptcy. The structure protects him exactly as designed. What it cannot protect him from is a fixed bill that grows while the cash shrinks, where every exit deepens the hole. Sell Bitcoin and break the story. Issue stock into a price near its lowest since 2024 and punish your holders. Skip the dividend and start losing the company by the boardroom. Saylor did not escape the margin call. He traded a cliff for a clock. A cliff takes you in an afternoon and a stranger pulls the trigger. This clock takes months, and at the end the trigger is pulled by the only two forces he swore would never touch it, his own hand, or the people he owes. The rumor asks whether someone is about to call his loan. The real question is how many months he can keep paying before he has to sell the dream, dilute the believers, or hand over the board to keep the lights on.
0:10

Is Michael Saylor about to get a margin call? No. And the reason is more interesting than the rumor, because what he built instead may be harder to escape than one. A margin call needs a lender who can seize collateral when the price drops. Strategy has none. Its $6.7 billion in debt is convertible notes, the largest tranche due in 2029, with no loan-to-value trigger and no clause that lets anyone take a coin because Bitcoin fell. Saylor learned that in 2022, when he did have a collateralized loan and sweated a liquidation price, then rebuilt the structure so it could never happen again. On the literal question he is right, and the people calling for his liquidation this week do not understand what they see. But killing the fast death created a slow one almost nobody is pricing. To fund his buying, Saylor issued a mountain of perpetual preferred stock that pays a fixed dividend forever, near 11.5 percent, no matter where Bitcoin trades. That annual bill quadrupled from about $300 million in January to roughly $1.2 billion now, while the cash reserve that pays it fell 38 percent this year to near $1.4 billion, after the company spent $1.5 billion in May retiring debt. Put those two numbers together and you get the figure that actually matters, and it is not a Bitcoin price. It is a countdown. Dividend coverage, the time the cash can keep paying that bill, has collapsed from more than seven years in early 2026 to between ten and fourteen months, depending on whose math you use. Months, not years. The market is already pricing it, just not where the rumor is looking. That preferred stock is engineered to sit at $100. Last week it cracked to $82.50, a record 17.5 percent below par. That discount is investors quietly clocking the strain while the timeline screams about a margin call that cannot happen. There is a clean way out, and it is the one door the structure was built to keep shut. Restoring a safe two years of coverage takes about $2.8 billion, roughly double what Strategy holds, and the fastest path there is to sell Bitcoin. But selling crystallizes a $10.6 billion loss, breaks the never-sell promise that gives the stock its premium, and bleeds the very asset the machine exists to hoard. The exit and the wound are the same cut. He already brushed it, selling 32 coins on June 1 to cover a payment. Thirty-two against more than 847,000 is a rounding error in size and an earthquake in meaning, because the company that swore it would never sell, sold, to pay a dividend. And there is a second trigger almost no one has read, buried in the fine print. If Saylor ever simply skips a preferred payment to save cash, the missed amount compounds, the senior layer can ratchet its rate higher, a senior miss freezes payments to every junior layer beneath it, and after enough missed quarters those preferred holders can start taking board seats. No one seizes a coin. But control begins migrating to the people he owes. The clock does not just run down. It hands away the keys at the end. So the honest verdict is the one neither side is shouting. There is no margin call and no imminent bankruptcy. The structure protects him exactly as designed. What it cannot protect him from is a fixed bill that grows while the cash shrinks, where every exit deepens the hole. Sell Bitcoin and break the story. Issue stock into a price near its lowest since 2024 and punish your holders. Skip the dividend and start losing the company by the boardroom. Saylor did not escape the margin call. He traded a cliff for a clock. A cliff takes you in an afternoon and a stranger pulls the trigger. This clock takes months, and at the end the trigger is pulled by the only two forces he swore would never touch it, his own hand, or the people he owes. The rumor asks whether someone is about to call his loan. The real question is how many months he can keep paying before he has to sell the dream, dilute the believers, or hand over the board to keep the lights on.

Shanaka Anslem Perera ⚡

58,558 次观看 • 2 个月前

Donald Trump just claimed again that the US donated 350 Billion dollars to Ukraine. You are being lied to by your sitting President on the United States of America. Let’s break this down with the facts rather than these random numbers Donnie is trying to sell you after finishing his nap. Independent tracking by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy estimated that between January 24, 2022 and June 30, 2025, U.S committed aid to Ukraine amounted to about $134 billion, not $350 billion….it gets better. Already a $166 Billion dollar difference than what Trump claims. Please understand committed and allocated isn’t the same as what has actually been delivered. 56% ($74.9 billion USD) of all funds “allocated not supplied” were for weapons. HOWEVER the $74.9 of weapons (Allocated and not necessarily all provided) were independently evaluated and subsequently massively overvalued by the US Government. The True cost of lethal aid was predicted to cost around $18.3 billion even by United States weapons pricing. One reason: when equipment is drawn from existing U.S. inventories “drawdown”, the official accounting often uses replacement-cost valuations, rather than the original (or depreciated) cost. To put it plainly, if you give Ukraine one air defense system, you account for the cost of a brand new air defense system to take its place not for the cost of the 45 year old system that was handed over. Many of the weapons provided to Ukraine was soon to be destroyed by the US forces or decommissioned. ALSO it’s important to take note as we all know the American arms industry massively overvalues the cost of all system due to its industry. America prices its systems at anything from 30-100% higher than the cost of European equivalents with the same capabilities. The true value of these weapons could have been anything from $5.49 billion-$18.3 Billion. Even with a significantly lower number of this, Independent analysts suggested that a large share perhaps 60% or more of the nominal military-aid dollar amount may effectively stay within U.S. defense industry…..60%! Out of aid provided $54 Billions dollars was Financial aid consisting of grants, loans, budget support. Of the US $54.0 billion in U.S. financial-aid allocations for that period, about US $19.3 billion was provided as loans, while roughly US $29.7 billion was given as grants. 🚨🚨That means approximately 39–40% of the U.S. financial aid during that time was structured as loans or other repayable/concessional financing.🚨🚨 The US $3.4 Billion in Humanitarian aid. Here is another kicker. After everything I have just said. According to United states press briefings: the U.S. had only delivered around 83% of promised ammunition, about 67% of pledged air-defence systems, and roughly 60% of committed bombs, artillery rounds, other munitions. $5.49 billion-$18.3 Billion $29.7 billion $3.4 Billion That $350 Billion is looking more like it was 38.59- 51.4 billion to me Donnie. And it’s a funny number that. An estimated $30–60 billion dollars was spent by Americans allies fighting alongside the US after 9/11. This included Ukraine. We never once complained about this loss or the lives we lost. Absolutely shameful.
0:14

Donald Trump just claimed again that the US donated 350 Billion dollars to Ukraine. You are being lied to by your sitting President on the United States of America. Let’s break this down with the facts rather than these random numbers Donnie is trying to sell you after finishing his nap. Independent tracking by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy estimated that between January 24, 2022 and June 30, 2025, U.S committed aid to Ukraine amounted to about $134 billion, not $350 billion….it gets better. Already a $166 Billion dollar difference than what Trump claims. Please understand committed and allocated isn’t the same as what has actually been delivered. 56% ($74.9 billion USD) of all funds “allocated not supplied” were for weapons. HOWEVER the $74.9 of weapons (Allocated and not necessarily all provided) were independently evaluated and subsequently massively overvalued by the US Government. The True cost of lethal aid was predicted to cost around $18.3 billion even by United States weapons pricing. One reason: when equipment is drawn from existing U.S. inventories “drawdown”, the official accounting often uses replacement-cost valuations, rather than the original (or depreciated) cost. To put it plainly, if you give Ukraine one air defense system, you account for the cost of a brand new air defense system to take its place not for the cost of the 45 year old system that was handed over. Many of the weapons provided to Ukraine was soon to be destroyed by the US forces or decommissioned. ALSO it’s important to take note as we all know the American arms industry massively overvalues the cost of all system due to its industry. America prices its systems at anything from 30-100% higher than the cost of European equivalents with the same capabilities. The true value of these weapons could have been anything from $5.49 billion-$18.3 Billion. Even with a significantly lower number of this, Independent analysts suggested that a large share perhaps 60% or more of the nominal military-aid dollar amount may effectively stay within U.S. defense industry…..60%! Out of aid provided $54 Billions dollars was Financial aid consisting of grants, loans, budget support. Of the US $54.0 billion in U.S. financial-aid allocations for that period, about US $19.3 billion was provided as loans, while roughly US $29.7 billion was given as grants. 🚨🚨That means approximately 39–40% of the U.S. financial aid during that time was structured as loans or other repayable/concessional financing.🚨🚨 The US $3.4 Billion in Humanitarian aid. Here is another kicker. After everything I have just said. According to United states press briefings: the U.S. had only delivered around 83% of promised ammunition, about 67% of pledged air-defence systems, and roughly 60% of committed bombs, artillery rounds, other munitions. $5.49 billion-$18.3 Billion $29.7 billion $3.4 Billion That $350 Billion is looking more like it was 38.59- 51.4 billion to me Donnie. And it’s a funny number that. An estimated $30–60 billion dollars was spent by Americans allies fighting alongside the US after 9/11. This included Ukraine. We never once complained about this loss or the lives we lost. Absolutely shameful.

Bricktop_NAFO

106,500 次观看 • 8 个月前

Not long ago, Turkey was running a neo-Ottoman project across the Arab world. The Muslim Brotherhood was the tool. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, the Gulf media wars. Western analysts called it one of the defining threats to the regional order. They were right! That era is over! It did not end through Western pressure. It ended because Saudi Arabia spent a decade building the economic, religious and diplomatic weight that made accommodation with Riyadh worth more to Ankara than confrontation. Investment. Mediation. Religious authority. Doors quietly closed. Soft power in its least glamorous form, and its most effective. I think we should be grateful for that. We rarely are. Turkey is now moving toward the Arab world, not away from it. On 7 August, in Mecca, Erdoğan, Mohammed bin Salman and Shehbaz Sharif signed a joint defence agreement: an attack on one is an attack on all three. It did not come from nowhere. Ankara joined a Riyadh-led maritime coalition in late July, one of fourteen founding members. The 2023 drone contract was Turkey's largest defence export deal at the time. This is the Middle East Western analysts spent fifteen years asking for. Two days before the signing, Steven A. Cook published a column in Foreign Policy arguing that strategic blunders have plagued Saudi Arabia's approach to the region. The verdict arrived before the ink was dry. Read it closely and it collapses. Cook says Riyadh has no strategy. Then he lists it: protect the economic transformation, avoid a wider war, lower tensions with Iran, stop armed factions from imposing facts by force, tie normalisation with Israel to a Palestinian state. That is not the absence of a strategy. That is a hierarchy of priorities. His real objection is that it is not his strategy- one that would have Saudi Arabia tolerate the STC, hold the UAE partnership regardless of conflicting aims, welcome an Israeli foothold in Somaliland, and stand as the front line against Iran. He says the Sanaa runway strike was unnecessary. In the same breath he concedes Mahan Air is tied to the IRGC, and that the Houthi delegation may have carried more than pistachios and carpets. He accepts the violation, then faults the attempt to stop it. He also assigns the strike to Riyadh. Saudi Arabia never claimed it. Yemen's internationally recognised government announced it. Then the pattern. Restraint is weakness. Action is recklessness. De-escalation is buying calm. Interdiction is provocation. Cook recommends retreat, then cites the retreat as proof there is no strategy. And he blames Riyadh for the Houthi escalation - as if the Houthis had not been firing at Saudi cities for years, as if Iran's proxy project began this July. A possible Saudi miscalculation does not absolve Iran and the Houthis of their own violence! Underneath all of it sits the oldest false narrative in the file: that Saudi Arabia is weak. Remember Yemen. The Kingdom had the capability and the intent to end the Houthi project militarily. What constrained it was Western political pressure in the name of human rights - war powers votes, suspended munitions, withdrawn targeting support. Riyadh was told to stop. It stopped. Then it absorbed years of missiles and drones on its airports, its cities and its oil infrastructure while holding a truce it was never legally obliged to hold! You can argue the restrictions were right. You cannot impose them, watch the adversary rearm through the corridor you protected, and then call the result a Saudi failure. Restraint imposed by allies is not incapacity. Saudi Arabia is not the architect of this crisis. It is the state repeatedly asked to carry the cost of other people's strategies - and it is now building, with Ankara and Islamabad, an architecture that reduces its need to. The criticism came before the agreement was a week old. That says less about Saudi strategy than about how hard it is for some analysts to read an order they no longer write.
0:16

Not long ago, Turkey was running a neo-Ottoman project across the Arab world. The Muslim Brotherhood was the tool. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, the Gulf media wars. Western analysts called it one of the defining threats to the regional order. They were right! That era is over! It did not end through Western pressure. It ended because Saudi Arabia spent a decade building the economic, religious and diplomatic weight that made accommodation with Riyadh worth more to Ankara than confrontation. Investment. Mediation. Religious authority. Doors quietly closed. Soft power in its least glamorous form, and its most effective. I think we should be grateful for that. We rarely are. Turkey is now moving toward the Arab world, not away from it. On 7 August, in Mecca, Erdoğan, Mohammed bin Salman and Shehbaz Sharif signed a joint defence agreement: an attack on one is an attack on all three. It did not come from nowhere. Ankara joined a Riyadh-led maritime coalition in late July, one of fourteen founding members. The 2023 drone contract was Turkey's largest defence export deal at the time. This is the Middle East Western analysts spent fifteen years asking for. Two days before the signing, Steven A. Cook published a column in Foreign Policy arguing that strategic blunders have plagued Saudi Arabia's approach to the region. The verdict arrived before the ink was dry. Read it closely and it collapses. Cook says Riyadh has no strategy. Then he lists it: protect the economic transformation, avoid a wider war, lower tensions with Iran, stop armed factions from imposing facts by force, tie normalisation with Israel to a Palestinian state. That is not the absence of a strategy. That is a hierarchy of priorities. His real objection is that it is not his strategy- one that would have Saudi Arabia tolerate the STC, hold the UAE partnership regardless of conflicting aims, welcome an Israeli foothold in Somaliland, and stand as the front line against Iran. He says the Sanaa runway strike was unnecessary. In the same breath he concedes Mahan Air is tied to the IRGC, and that the Houthi delegation may have carried more than pistachios and carpets. He accepts the violation, then faults the attempt to stop it. He also assigns the strike to Riyadh. Saudi Arabia never claimed it. Yemen's internationally recognised government announced it. Then the pattern. Restraint is weakness. Action is recklessness. De-escalation is buying calm. Interdiction is provocation. Cook recommends retreat, then cites the retreat as proof there is no strategy. And he blames Riyadh for the Houthi escalation - as if the Houthis had not been firing at Saudi cities for years, as if Iran's proxy project began this July. A possible Saudi miscalculation does not absolve Iran and the Houthis of their own violence! Underneath all of it sits the oldest false narrative in the file: that Saudi Arabia is weak. Remember Yemen. The Kingdom had the capability and the intent to end the Houthi project militarily. What constrained it was Western political pressure in the name of human rights - war powers votes, suspended munitions, withdrawn targeting support. Riyadh was told to stop. It stopped. Then it absorbed years of missiles and drones on its airports, its cities and its oil infrastructure while holding a truce it was never legally obliged to hold! You can argue the restrictions were right. You cannot impose them, watch the adversary rearm through the corridor you protected, and then call the result a Saudi failure. Restraint imposed by allies is not incapacity. Saudi Arabia is not the architect of this crisis. It is the state repeatedly asked to carry the cost of other people's strategies - and it is now building, with Ankara and Islamabad, an architecture that reduces its need to. The criticism came before the agreement was a week old. That says less about Saudi strategy than about how hard it is for some analysts to read an order they no longer write.

𝐌𝐢𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐞𝐥 𝐀𝐫𝐢𝐳𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐢

468,035 次观看 • 16 天前

Saylor’s Bitcoin Machine Meets the Cash Reality The real story is not that Strategy may sell up to $1.25B of Bitcoin. The bigger story is that it has moved from a simple accumulation narrative into a complex capital markets machine. The old pitch was buy Bitcoin, never sell, increase Bitcoin per share. The new structure has preferred stock, convertible debt, reserves, buybacks, dividend obligations, and now a BTC monetization plan. That shift matters because Bitcoin does not produce cash flow. Preferred dividends and interest expense do. Strategy says it has about $2.55B in USD reserves and roughly $1.76B in annual preferred dividend and interest obligations. That sounds like about 17 months of coverage, but that number is static. It assumes no future dividend increases, no stress, no buybacks, no taxes, no transaction costs, and no deterioration in capital market access. If they keep raising the STRC dividend to defend the price near par, the cash burn rises and the runway gets shorter. The Digital Credit Problem STRC is marketed as digital credit, but economically it behaves like a high yield perpetual preferred stock tied to confidence in a Bitcoin balance sheet. It is not normal debt because there is no traditional maturity. It is not common equity because it sits ahead of common shareholders and carries a large cash distribution expectation. The design is clever but circular. STRC’s dividend can be adjusted to keep the security near $99 to $100. The dividend was raised to 12%, which may support the price, but it also raises cash burn. If STRC trades below par, Strategy may raise the dividend again. If the dividend rises, the reserve coverage shrinks. If cash gets tight, Strategy needs new issuance, reserves, or Bitcoin sales. The compounding issue makes the structure even more fragile. If dividends are paid on time, they do not compound against the company. But if payments are deferred or missed, unpaid dividends can accumulate and compound monthly until paid. That means a liquidity problem does not just sit there. It can grow on itself. Where The Fragility Lives Strategy owns a volatile, non cash flowing asset and has layered cash obligations on top of it. That works when Bitcoin rises, MSTR trades at a premium, and investors are hungry for yield. It gets harder when Bitcoin falls, spreads widen, or investors demand higher returns. Selling Bitcoin now changes the narrative. Bitcoin is no longer just the sacred reserve asset. It is now a liquidity backstop for dividends, reserves, interest, and buybacks. The $1.25B monetization program adds runway, but it also proves the point. Cash promises need cash sources. That creates the feedback loop. If Bitcoin falls, asset coverage weakens. If STRC trades lower, required yields rise. If yields rise, Strategy may need to raise the dividend. If the dividend rises, cash burn accelerates. If issuance slows, reserves get used. If reserves fall, Bitcoin sales become more likely. If those sales look defensive, confidence weakens further. My Take Common shareholders own the upside, but they sit below debt and preferred claims. Preferred holders get high yield, but they rely on Strategy’s ability to maintain reserves, issue securities, monetize Bitcoin, and keep market confidence intact. This is no longer just a Bitcoin bet. It is a Bitcoin liquidity bet, a capital markets access bet, and a confidence bet. Strategy can survive if Bitcoin rises, MSTR keeps a premium, and yield investors keep funding the machine. If two fail at once, the model becomes fragile. The key red flags are STRC below par, dividend hikes that fail to restore the price, reserve coverage under 12 months, unpaid dividends compounding, visible Bitcoin sales, MSTR near or below NAV, and preferred yields widening. The structure can work, but not forever on narrative alone. Eventually, cash obligations meet cash sources. That is where the risk lives.
0:11

Saylor’s Bitcoin Machine Meets the Cash Reality The real story is not that Strategy may sell up to $1.25B of Bitcoin. The bigger story is that it has moved from a simple accumulation narrative into a complex capital markets machine. The old pitch was buy Bitcoin, never sell, increase Bitcoin per share. The new structure has preferred stock, convertible debt, reserves, buybacks, dividend obligations, and now a BTC monetization plan. That shift matters because Bitcoin does not produce cash flow. Preferred dividends and interest expense do. Strategy says it has about $2.55B in USD reserves and roughly $1.76B in annual preferred dividend and interest obligations. That sounds like about 17 months of coverage, but that number is static. It assumes no future dividend increases, no stress, no buybacks, no taxes, no transaction costs, and no deterioration in capital market access. If they keep raising the STRC dividend to defend the price near par, the cash burn rises and the runway gets shorter. The Digital Credit Problem STRC is marketed as digital credit, but economically it behaves like a high yield perpetual preferred stock tied to confidence in a Bitcoin balance sheet. It is not normal debt because there is no traditional maturity. It is not common equity because it sits ahead of common shareholders and carries a large cash distribution expectation. The design is clever but circular. STRC’s dividend can be adjusted to keep the security near $99 to $100. The dividend was raised to 12%, which may support the price, but it also raises cash burn. If STRC trades below par, Strategy may raise the dividend again. If the dividend rises, the reserve coverage shrinks. If cash gets tight, Strategy needs new issuance, reserves, or Bitcoin sales. The compounding issue makes the structure even more fragile. If dividends are paid on time, they do not compound against the company. But if payments are deferred or missed, unpaid dividends can accumulate and compound monthly until paid. That means a liquidity problem does not just sit there. It can grow on itself. Where The Fragility Lives Strategy owns a volatile, non cash flowing asset and has layered cash obligations on top of it. That works when Bitcoin rises, MSTR trades at a premium, and investors are hungry for yield. It gets harder when Bitcoin falls, spreads widen, or investors demand higher returns. Selling Bitcoin now changes the narrative. Bitcoin is no longer just the sacred reserve asset. It is now a liquidity backstop for dividends, reserves, interest, and buybacks. The $1.25B monetization program adds runway, but it also proves the point. Cash promises need cash sources. That creates the feedback loop. If Bitcoin falls, asset coverage weakens. If STRC trades lower, required yields rise. If yields rise, Strategy may need to raise the dividend. If the dividend rises, cash burn accelerates. If issuance slows, reserves get used. If reserves fall, Bitcoin sales become more likely. If those sales look defensive, confidence weakens further. My Take Common shareholders own the upside, but they sit below debt and preferred claims. Preferred holders get high yield, but they rely on Strategy’s ability to maintain reserves, issue securities, monetize Bitcoin, and keep market confidence intact. This is no longer just a Bitcoin bet. It is a Bitcoin liquidity bet, a capital markets access bet, and a confidence bet. Strategy can survive if Bitcoin rises, MSTR keeps a premium, and yield investors keep funding the machine. If two fail at once, the model becomes fragile. The key red flags are STRC below par, dividend hikes that fail to restore the price, reserve coverage under 12 months, unpaid dividends compounding, visible Bitcoin sales, MSTR near or below NAV, and preferred yields widening. The structure can work, but not forever on narrative alone. Eventually, cash obligations meet cash sources. That is where the risk lives.

EndGame Macro

33,374 次观看 • 1 个月前

$QUBIC The 3 Performance Scenarios (2026 Projections) Currently, Qubic is floating with a market cap around $100M to $150M. Compared to AI giants like Bittensor ($TAO) which have already hit multi-billion dollar valuations, the upside potential is mathematically massive. 1. The "Fundamental Catch-up" Scenario (Probability: High) • Target: Reaching mid-cap AI status. • Performance: 10x to 15x • Price Target: ~$0.000010 - $0.000012 • Catalyst: The massive adoption of Oracle Machines (launched this Jan 21st) and real-world network usage for training lightweight AI models. At this stage, Qubic enters the Global Top 100. 2. The "Euphoria / Tier-1 Listing" Scenario (Probability: Moderate) • Target: Listing on major exchanges (Binance/Coinbase) and the explosion of the DePIN/AI narrative. • Performance: 40x to 60x • Price Target: ~$0.000040 - $0.000050 • Catalyst: This is where the 55% burn rate leverage hits hard. If demand surges while supply is aggressively burned by smart contract fees and Doge/XMR mining buybacks, we witness a "supply squeeze." Qubic begins to rival the peak valuations of previous cycle leaders. 3. The "AI Sovereignty" Scenario (Probability: Speculative) • Target: Aigarth becomes a credible, decentralized alternative to closed-source "Big Tech" models. • Performance: 100x and beyond • Price Target: ~$0.000080+ (deleting two zeros) • Catalyst: Qubic becomes the base layer for the "Internet of Machines." The token is no longer just a currency; it becomes "digital oil" required to power global decentralized intelligence. Why This Performance is Possible (The Analyst's Alpha) What sets Qubic apart from other "AI coins" is its internal economic engine: 1. Forced Deflation: With the activation of execution fees on January 14, 2026, every on-chain DeFi interaction destroys tokens. In a bull run, on-chain activity spikes by 1000%, mechanically accelerating scarcity. 2. Real Yield (uPoW): In 2026, investors are fleeing "vaporware." Qubic generates value through "Useful Proof-of-Work." The imminent shift to Doge mining (alongside AI) creates a unique liquidity bridge with one of the largest retail ecosystems. 3. Accessibility: The "MetaMask Snap" and Solana/L2 bridges have finally solved Qubic’s technical isolation. Liquidity can now enter with a single click. Analyst's Verdict Qubic is the ultimate "High-Risk, High-Reward" play of 2026. It’s not a coin for a 24-hour flip; it’s a bet on the decentralized AI infrastructure of the future. Expert Tip: In this 2026 bull run, don’t just watch the price. Watch the weekly burn rate. If the burn rate exceeds emissions (which is mathematically possible by Q2), we won't just be in a bull run we'll be in a parabolic "hyper-deflationary" event. And you? What is your prediction?
0:18

$QUBIC The 3 Performance Scenarios (2026 Projections) Currently, Qubic is floating with a market cap around $100M to $150M. Compared to AI giants like Bittensor ($TAO) which have already hit multi-billion dollar valuations, the upside potential is mathematically massive. 1. The "Fundamental Catch-up" Scenario (Probability: High) • Target: Reaching mid-cap AI status. • Performance: 10x to 15x • Price Target: ~$0.000010 - $0.000012 • Catalyst: The massive adoption of Oracle Machines (launched this Jan 21st) and real-world network usage for training lightweight AI models. At this stage, Qubic enters the Global Top 100. 2. The "Euphoria / Tier-1 Listing" Scenario (Probability: Moderate) • Target: Listing on major exchanges (Binance/Coinbase) and the explosion of the DePIN/AI narrative. • Performance: 40x to 60x • Price Target: ~$0.000040 - $0.000050 • Catalyst: This is where the 55% burn rate leverage hits hard. If demand surges while supply is aggressively burned by smart contract fees and Doge/XMR mining buybacks, we witness a "supply squeeze." Qubic begins to rival the peak valuations of previous cycle leaders. 3. The "AI Sovereignty" Scenario (Probability: Speculative) • Target: Aigarth becomes a credible, decentralized alternative to closed-source "Big Tech" models. • Performance: 100x and beyond • Price Target: ~$0.000080+ (deleting two zeros) • Catalyst: Qubic becomes the base layer for the "Internet of Machines." The token is no longer just a currency; it becomes "digital oil" required to power global decentralized intelligence. Why This Performance is Possible (The Analyst's Alpha) What sets Qubic apart from other "AI coins" is its internal economic engine: 1. Forced Deflation: With the activation of execution fees on January 14, 2026, every on-chain DeFi interaction destroys tokens. In a bull run, on-chain activity spikes by 1000%, mechanically accelerating scarcity. 2. Real Yield (uPoW): In 2026, investors are fleeing "vaporware." Qubic generates value through "Useful Proof-of-Work." The imminent shift to Doge mining (alongside AI) creates a unique liquidity bridge with one of the largest retail ecosystems. 3. Accessibility: The "MetaMask Snap" and Solana/L2 bridges have finally solved Qubic’s technical isolation. Liquidity can now enter with a single click. Analyst's Verdict Qubic is the ultimate "High-Risk, High-Reward" play of 2026. It’s not a coin for a 24-hour flip; it’s a bet on the decentralized AI infrastructure of the future. Expert Tip: In this 2026 bull run, don’t just watch the price. Watch the weekly burn rate. If the burn rate exceeds emissions (which is mathematically possible by Q2), we won't just be in a bull run we'll be in a parabolic "hyper-deflationary" event. And you? What is your prediction?

Rudy Nakamoto ₿ ױ

10,602 次观看 • 7 个月前

🚨12 HOUR NEWS RECAP 1. Trump met the Team USA gold medalists and joked with the goalie, dubbing him “the new Secretary of Defense” on camera. 2. Sec. Hegseth reportedly gave Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei until Friday to drop heavy safeguards on Claude for military use, with the Pentagon pushing for full unrestricted access. 3. Senate Democrats again blocked DHS funding, leaving agencies like TSA and the Coast Guard in limbo amid ongoing disputes over immigration tactics. 4. Trump just finished the longest State of the Union in American history, 1 hour 48 minutes, breaking the official record. 5. Los Angeles schools are borrowing another $250 million to settle sexual misconduct claims, adding to the $500 million already spent last year, a total settlement approaching three-quarters of a billion dollars. 6. Germany instructed its citizens in Israel to prepare for a possible U.S. strike on Iran, warning that if Iran retaliates and closes airspace, Germans may need to stay indoors for an extended period. 7. In the State of the Union, Trump took aim at Big Pharma: saying he is ending the inflated cost of prescription drugs. Other presidents tried but success has remained elusive. 8. An American Airlines 737 was found with an apparent bullet hole in is wing after landing in Medellín, Colombia. 9. Anti-ICE activists have flooded Minneapolis City Hall, occupying government buildings amid protests against federal immigration enforcement. 10. El Mencho, the most wanted cartel leader in Mexico, was reportedly found hiding at the Tapalpa Country Club, an ultra-exclusive retreat frequented by Guadalajara’s elite.
0:12

🚨12 HOUR NEWS RECAP 1. Trump met the Team USA gold medalists and joked with the goalie, dubbing him “the new Secretary of Defense” on camera. 2. Sec. Hegseth reportedly gave Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei until Friday to drop heavy safeguards on Claude for military use, with the Pentagon pushing for full unrestricted access. 3. Senate Democrats again blocked DHS funding, leaving agencies like TSA and the Coast Guard in limbo amid ongoing disputes over immigration tactics. 4. Trump just finished the longest State of the Union in American history, 1 hour 48 minutes, breaking the official record. 5. Los Angeles schools are borrowing another $250 million to settle sexual misconduct claims, adding to the $500 million already spent last year, a total settlement approaching three-quarters of a billion dollars. 6. Germany instructed its citizens in Israel to prepare for a possible U.S. strike on Iran, warning that if Iran retaliates and closes airspace, Germans may need to stay indoors for an extended period. 7. In the State of the Union, Trump took aim at Big Pharma: saying he is ending the inflated cost of prescription drugs. Other presidents tried but success has remained elusive. 8. An American Airlines 737 was found with an apparent bullet hole in is wing after landing in Medellín, Colombia. 9. Anti-ICE activists have flooded Minneapolis City Hall, occupying government buildings amid protests against federal immigration enforcement. 10. El Mencho, the most wanted cartel leader in Mexico, was reportedly found hiding at the Tapalpa Country Club, an ultra-exclusive retreat frequented by Guadalajara’s elite.

Mario Nawfal

89,347 次观看 • 6 个月前

Ali Vaez pledged his fealty to the Islamic Republic, expressing his “national and patriotic duty” as an Iranian, and offering assistance to then Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in 2014 as part of an Iran Experts Initiative. “As an Iranian, based on my national and patriotic duty, I have not hesitated to help you in any way; from proposing to Your Excellency a public campaign against the notion of [nuclear] breakout, to assisting your team in preparing reports on the practical needs of Iran.” That comes from a leaked email sent on Oct 2, 2014 by Ali Vaez, who was then Iran Project Director at the International Crisis Group, to Javad Zarif. [ ICG’s Iran desk had been run by Robert Malley since 2002 through Feb 2014 when he joined Obama’s NSC. His aides, Iran Expert Initiative core recruits, Ali Vaez, Dina Esfandiary and Arianne Tabatabai were key players in the Iran nuclear deal, [Solomon, J. (2024, Feb). How Iran used its ties to a top global NGO. Semafor. David Albright, then a proponent of the JCPOA, remarked on his own surprise while contending with Vaez’s positions in interviews with Jay Solomon. ICG’s public framing kept landing where Tehran needed it to land, and Vaez’s positions on verification and enforcement, which should have been the center of gravity, often aligned with the regime’s. Then there’s the curious case of ICG’s undisclosed 2016 memorandum of understanding with the regime’s Institute for Political and International Studies. IPIS, an arm of the foreign ministry, was responsible for the 2006 Tehran Holocaust denial conference, [Iran International. (2024, Feb). Covert ties between Iran and the International Crisis Group. What is less reported is the parallel uranium and donor backdrop to all this. In 2008, Frank Giustra, Kremlin-aligned Kyiv steel magnate Viktor Pinchuk, George Soros and the MacArthur Foundation each donated $5 million to ICG. Giustra who had joined the board in 2005 would go on to become its co-chairman. Giustra and two key partners, Sergey Kurzin and Ian Telfer, put together the UrAsia Energy deal in 2004 that moved three Kazakh uranium fields to Uranium One. Telfer became the chairman of Uranium One, Giustra shifted to consulting through Endeavor Financial after the 2007 sale that netted the group billions. Telfer then oversaw the transfer of Uranium One to Rosatom. By 2013 the Russians owned the entire project. Little known tidbit is that what was negotiated included an exchange of yellowcake for declared enriched uranium, which Rosatom’s Uranium One Netherlands managed when the deal closed. 200 tons replaced around 11.5 tons of uranium enriched beyond the JCPOA agreed upon threshold. Another detail: Norway actually stepped in to help finance the Kazakh portion of that yellowcake shipment, paying around $6 million to facilitate the transaction and get the LEU out of Iran. Giustra had bailed Telfer out after he, by his own account, lost his shirt in the dot com bust, with $5 million raise for a $17 million company that had flatlined, Wheaton River Minerals. Their first big hit was on an old Marc Rich-Soviet project in Argentina called Bajo de la Alumbrera, which turned into a multi-billion dollar bonanza -- to this day considered by industry insiders as one of the greatest pivot-and-strike moves in modern mining history. The billions generated by Wheaton River, which eventually merged with Goldcorp, gave Telfer and Giustra the capital, the track record, and the loyalty of institutional investors they needed to go into a risky jurisdiction like Kazakhstan a year later and pull off the UrAsia deal. Dr. Sergey Kurzin, the UrAsia deal’s facilitator and longtime Giustra associate, was a soviet nuclear engineer who defected right before the Iron Curtain fell. Within 6 months of landing in London he was working at Exploration Consultants Ltd, that by his own account had Marc Rich as its central client.
0:17

Ali Vaez pledged his fealty to the Islamic Republic, expressing his “national and patriotic duty” as an Iranian, and offering assistance to then Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in 2014 as part of an Iran Experts Initiative. “As an Iranian, based on my national and patriotic duty, I have not hesitated to help you in any way; from proposing to Your Excellency a public campaign against the notion of [nuclear] breakout, to assisting your team in preparing reports on the practical needs of Iran.” That comes from a leaked email sent on Oct 2, 2014 by Ali Vaez, who was then Iran Project Director at the International Crisis Group, to Javad Zarif. [ ICG’s Iran desk had been run by Robert Malley since 2002 through Feb 2014 when he joined Obama’s NSC. His aides, Iran Expert Initiative core recruits, Ali Vaez, Dina Esfandiary and Arianne Tabatabai were key players in the Iran nuclear deal, [Solomon, J. (2024, Feb). How Iran used its ties to a top global NGO. Semafor. David Albright, then a proponent of the JCPOA, remarked on his own surprise while contending with Vaez’s positions in interviews with Jay Solomon. ICG’s public framing kept landing where Tehran needed it to land, and Vaez’s positions on verification and enforcement, which should have been the center of gravity, often aligned with the regime’s. Then there’s the curious case of ICG’s undisclosed 2016 memorandum of understanding with the regime’s Institute for Political and International Studies. IPIS, an arm of the foreign ministry, was responsible for the 2006 Tehran Holocaust denial conference, [Iran International. (2024, Feb). Covert ties between Iran and the International Crisis Group. What is less reported is the parallel uranium and donor backdrop to all this. In 2008, Frank Giustra, Kremlin-aligned Kyiv steel magnate Viktor Pinchuk, George Soros and the MacArthur Foundation each donated $5 million to ICG. Giustra who had joined the board in 2005 would go on to become its co-chairman. Giustra and two key partners, Sergey Kurzin and Ian Telfer, put together the UrAsia Energy deal in 2004 that moved three Kazakh uranium fields to Uranium One. Telfer became the chairman of Uranium One, Giustra shifted to consulting through Endeavor Financial after the 2007 sale that netted the group billions. Telfer then oversaw the transfer of Uranium One to Rosatom. By 2013 the Russians owned the entire project. Little known tidbit is that what was negotiated included an exchange of yellowcake for declared enriched uranium, which Rosatom’s Uranium One Netherlands managed when the deal closed. 200 tons replaced around 11.5 tons of uranium enriched beyond the JCPOA agreed upon threshold. Another detail: Norway actually stepped in to help finance the Kazakh portion of that yellowcake shipment, paying around $6 million to facilitate the transaction and get the LEU out of Iran. Giustra had bailed Telfer out after he, by his own account, lost his shirt in the dot com bust, with $5 million raise for a $17 million company that had flatlined, Wheaton River Minerals. Their first big hit was on an old Marc Rich-Soviet project in Argentina called Bajo de la Alumbrera, which turned into a multi-billion dollar bonanza -- to this day considered by industry insiders as one of the greatest pivot-and-strike moves in modern mining history. The billions generated by Wheaton River, which eventually merged with Goldcorp, gave Telfer and Giustra the capital, the track record, and the loyalty of institutional investors they needed to go into a risky jurisdiction like Kazakhstan a year later and pull off the UrAsia deal. Dr. Sergey Kurzin, the UrAsia deal’s facilitator and longtime Giustra associate, was a soviet nuclear engineer who defected right before the Iron Curtain fell. Within 6 months of landing in London he was working at Exploration Consultants Ltd, that by his own account had Marc Rich as its central client.

dan linnaeus

19,227 次观看 • 5 个月前