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😿I didn't make this up. In June 2023, CCP authorities released data showing a record-high youth unemployment rate of 21.3%. They then suspended publication of the figure until they changed the calculation method. However, Peking University Associate Professor Zhang Dandan estimated that if the roughly 16 million young people...

651,924 görüntüleme • 7 ay önce •via X (Twitter)

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“#DEI is terrible”, 1st of the young man did even know over 300,000 black men lost their jobs. Here are the most recent numbers. Reports indicate a sharp spike with over 567,000 #BLACKMEN losing jobs in a four-month window between November 2025 and February 2026. As of April 2026, the number of unemployed #BLACKWOMEN reached 718,000. But shout out to these strong black brothers having the conversation with the young brothers that grew up in privileged situations. We need more conversations like this instead of pro black impostor spreading #misinformation and #disinformation to their own people! 718,000 + 567,000 = 1,285,000 #blackjob lost Oh as of April 2026, the U.S. #Blackunemployment rate (7.3%) is significantly higher than the overall national #unemployment rate (4.3%). Black workers disproportionately face higher unemployment, often experiencing rates roughly double that of white counterparts, with a 2-to-1 ratio commonly persisting due to, in part, "first-fired, last-hired" dynamics. Key Differences and Data (April 2026) under trump •Overall National Unemployment: 4.3% •Black Unemployment Rate: 7.3% •White Unemployment Rate: 3.7% •Hispanic Unemployment Rate: 5.0% •Asian Unemployment Rate: 3.3% As memory serves me right the lowest recorded unemployment rate for Black or #AfricanAmerican individuals in the United States was 4.7%, achieved in April 2023 and who was in the #WhiteHouse, I think it was #JoeBiden and #KamalaHarris. With #trump blacks have net LOST of 1.2 million black jobs SO FAR, under #Biden blacks had a net GAIN of 2.7 million black jobs! Click the link to their YouTube channel:

BMB Empower Network

14,098 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce

🚨 China's unemployment crisis in 2026 — by the numbers, and by the faces behind them. The CCP calls it "seasonal fluctuation." The people living it call it despair. 📊 THE OFFICIAL NUMBERS — AND WHY THEY'RE WORSE THAN THEY LOOK In March 2026, China's official youth unemployment rate (ages 16–24, excluding students) rose to 16.9% — a 4-month high, reversing six consecutive months of decline. That's nearly 1 in 6 young people with no job. But here's the catch: China counts anyone who works even ONE hour per week as "employed." The US threshold is 15 hours. France is 20 hours. By any international standard, the real number is far higher. In fact, Peking University economist Zhang Dandan calculated that China's true youth unemployment rate in early 2023 was up to 46.5% — more than double the official figure. There is no reason to believe conditions have improved since. And it's not just the young: — Ages 25–29: 7.7% unemployed (highest since March 2025) — Ages 30–59: 4.3% unemployed (rising) — Overall urban unemployment: 5.4% — a 13-month high as of March 2026 This year, 12.7 million university graduates will enter the job market — 480,000 more than last year. A record high. Into an economy that is shrinking, not growing. 👤 THE FACES BEHIND THE NUMBERS These are not statistics. These are people. A young man sits on a curb in Sichuan, crying. "I genuinely have no money left. Not a single yuan." He has been looking for work for months. He is not in any government database as "unemployed" — because he gave up registering. A migrant worker in his 40s, who spent 20 years building China's cities, returns to his village. The construction site closed. The factory moved. The restaurant shut down. He has no pension. No safety net. Nothing. A fresh graduate, armed with a degree that cost her family years of savings, applies to hundreds of positions. She receives form rejections — or silence. She moves back home. Her parents tell her to "keep trying." She stops telling them how many rejections she has collected. A street vendor in Guangzhou sets up his stall at 6am. By noon, he has sold almost nothing. Foot traffic has collapsed. Everyone around him is cutting spending. He is, technically, "self-employed" — and therefore invisible in the unemployment statistics. 🏭 WHY IS THIS HAPPENING? The CCP's answer: seasonal factors. Global headwinds. Trade friction. The reality: 1. Fixed asset investment — the engine of China's growth for decades — grew only 1.7% in Q1 2026, down from 4.2% in Q1 2025. Investment is collapsing. 2. The property sector, which once drove nearly 30% of economic activity, remains in freefall. Construction has stopped on millions of homes. The workers who built them have nowhere to go. 3. China's major tech companies — Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance, JD·com — have been cutting headcount for years, under government pressure that made private enterprise feel like a liability, not an asset. 4. Foreign companies are leaving or reducing exposure. The market that once promised unlimited growth now promises unpredictability. 5. Deflation has taken hold. When prices fall, businesses earn less. When businesses earn less, they hire less — or fire more. When people fear job loss, they spend less. The cycle feeds itself. The result: a generation of educated, capable, ambitious young Chinese people — doing nothing. Not because they won't work. Because there is no work. 🔇 WHAT THE CCP DOES INSTEAD OF SOLVING IT When youth unemployment hit a record 21.3% in June 2023, the government didn't fix it. They stopped publishing the data. For months, the numbers disappeared from official releases entirely. When they returned, the methodology had been changed — students were excluded, age brackets were redefined — making direct comparisons harder and the figures look cleaner. In May 2026, authorities began officially renaming homeless people "dispersed persons" (流散人员). Not to help them. To make them statistically disappear. This is the CCP's answer to suffering: rename it. Redefine it. Delete it from the dataset. 📉 THE COST OF "LYING FLAT" A generation of Chinese youth have embraced 躺平 (tǎng píng) — "lying flat." Not as laziness. As rational surrender. Why work 996 hours (9am to 9pm, 6 days a week) for a company that will downsize you anyway? Why compete for jobs that don't exist? Why take on a mortgage for an apartment in a building that may never be completed? The state tells them to be patriotic, to sacrifice, to trust the Party's vision. They've watched that vision fail them. So they lie flat. And the CCP — which created the conditions for this — blames them for lacking ambition. ——— The people in these videos are not failures. They are not lazy. They are not "seasonal fluctuations." They are the cost of a political system that prioritizes control over people, data management over truth, and the Party's image over the lives of 1.4 billion human beings. Share this. The numbers will be deleted again. The faces should not be forgotten. Sources: China National Bureau of Statistics (April 2026) · CNA (April 21, 2026) · World Journal (April 2026) · Peking University / Zhang Dandan (2023 analysis) · Epoch Times (April 21, 2026)· Original post by Aric Chen, views are my own. #ChinaUnemployment #YouthUnemployment #ChinaEconomy #躺平 #LyingFlat #CCP #HumanRightsChina #China2026 #China #RealChina

Aric Chen

53,709 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce

China's labor market in 2026 presents Beijing with a problem it cannot solve through messaging, and the leadership's reliance on statistical concealment rather than structural reform suggests it already knows that. The headline numbers are bad enough on their own terms. Urban youth unemployment for those 16 to 24, excluding students, climbed to 16.9 percent in March, a four-month high that reversed six months of declines the state had pointed to as evidence of stabilization. The 25-to-29 cohort hit 7.7 percent, its highest reading since March 2025. Overall urban unemployment reached 5.4 percent, a 13-month peak. A record 12.7 million university graduates, roughly half a million more than the prior year, are entering this market, into an economy whose nominal growth has been depressed by a year of falling prices and whose private sector hiring appetite has shrunk in lockstep. The official figures, in any case, understate the condition of the labor market by design. China classifies anyone working one hour per week as employed; the United States uses fifteen hours, France twenty. Peking University economist Zhang Dandan calculated in 2023 that the true youth unemployment rate, once discouraged workers who had exited the labor force were counted, was as high as 46.5 percent, more than double the official figure at the time. Nothing in the structural picture since has plausibly improved that ratio. The drivers are not cyclical. Fixed asset investment grew only 1.7 percent in the first quarter, down from 4.2 percent a year earlier. The property sector, which at its peak accounted for roughly thirty percent of economic activity, remains in a multi-year contraction that has stranded construction workers and the supply chains built around them, and with them the cohort of migrant laborers in their forties and fifties who carry no pension, no portable benefits, and no obvious second act. The major platform companies, Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance, JD, have spent years trimming headcount in the aftermath of the 2020 to 2022 regulatory campaign that left private capital feeling politically exposed. Deflation, now entrenched, completes the feedback loop: weaker pricing power compresses margins, hiring slows, household precautionary saving rises, demand softens further. Each link reinforces the next, and none is the kind of problem stimulus alone can resolve. The state's response has been instructive. When the youth unemployment rate hit a record 21.3 percent in June 2023, the National Bureau of Statistics suspended publication of the series entirely. When the figures returned months later, the methodology had been quietly revised, students excluded and age brackets adjusted, in ways that produced a lower headline and broke comparability with what came before. The pattern is consistent across other indicators: where the data embarrasses the leadership, the data is changed, delayed, or removed. This is not a communications strategy in any conventional sense. It is the substitute for one. Three things follow. First, the tang ping (躺平) or "lying flat" disposition that Beijing has spent years denouncing is a rational response to a labor market in which effort and credentials no longer reliably convert into stable employment or affordable housing, and the leadership's framing of it as a cultural failure rather than a market failure tells against any near-term policy correction. Second, the credibility cost of statistical opacity compounds. Foreign investors, domestic households, and even mid-level cadres are now operating without reliable employment data in the world's second-largest economy, which raises the risk of misallocated capital and miscalibrated policy at every level of decision-making. Third, the political economy is shifting in a direction the Party has not yet acknowledged. The cohort entering the workforce in 2026 has no memory of double-digit growth and no expectation of upward mobility. Whatever social contract underwrote the reform era is being renegotiated, quietly, by people who have stopped registering as unemployed because they have stopped expecting the system to find them work. Aric Chen | Insights

Aric Chen

51,262 görüntüleme • 23 gün önce