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🚨 THE "NEVER SELL" BITCOIN GUY IS NOW UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR MISLEADING INVESTORS Rosen Law Firm opened a securities probe into Strategy focused on its STRC preferred shares. Sold near $100. Now in the $80s. The allegation: Investors were promised returns that didn't hold. Nothing's proven yet. But the...

37,564 次观看 • 2 个月前 •via X (Twitter)

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Saylor’s Bitcoin Machine Meets the Cash Reality The real story is not that Strategy may sell up to $1.25B of Bitcoin. The bigger story is that it has moved from a simple accumulation narrative into a complex capital markets machine. The old pitch was buy Bitcoin, never sell, increase Bitcoin per share. The new structure has preferred stock, convertible debt, reserves, buybacks, dividend obligations, and now a BTC monetization plan. That shift matters because Bitcoin does not produce cash flow. Preferred dividends and interest expense do. Strategy says it has about $2.55B in USD reserves and roughly $1.76B in annual preferred dividend and interest obligations. That sounds like about 17 months of coverage, but that number is static. It assumes no future dividend increases, no stress, no buybacks, no taxes, no transaction costs, and no deterioration in capital market access. If they keep raising the STRC dividend to defend the price near par, the cash burn rises and the runway gets shorter. The Digital Credit Problem STRC is marketed as digital credit, but economically it behaves like a high yield perpetual preferred stock tied to confidence in a Bitcoin balance sheet. It is not normal debt because there is no traditional maturity. It is not common equity because it sits ahead of common shareholders and carries a large cash distribution expectation. The design is clever but circular. STRC’s dividend can be adjusted to keep the security near $99 to $100. The dividend was raised to 12%, which may support the price, but it also raises cash burn. If STRC trades below par, Strategy may raise the dividend again. If the dividend rises, the reserve coverage shrinks. If cash gets tight, Strategy needs new issuance, reserves, or Bitcoin sales. The compounding issue makes the structure even more fragile. If dividends are paid on time, they do not compound against the company. But if payments are deferred or missed, unpaid dividends can accumulate and compound monthly until paid. That means a liquidity problem does not just sit there. It can grow on itself. Where The Fragility Lives Strategy owns a volatile, non cash flowing asset and has layered cash obligations on top of it. That works when Bitcoin rises, MSTR trades at a premium, and investors are hungry for yield. It gets harder when Bitcoin falls, spreads widen, or investors demand higher returns. Selling Bitcoin now changes the narrative. Bitcoin is no longer just the sacred reserve asset. It is now a liquidity backstop for dividends, reserves, interest, and buybacks. The $1.25B monetization program adds runway, but it also proves the point. Cash promises need cash sources. That creates the feedback loop. If Bitcoin falls, asset coverage weakens. If STRC trades lower, required yields rise. If yields rise, Strategy may need to raise the dividend. If the dividend rises, cash burn accelerates. If issuance slows, reserves get used. If reserves fall, Bitcoin sales become more likely. If those sales look defensive, confidence weakens further. My Take Common shareholders own the upside, but they sit below debt and preferred claims. Preferred holders get high yield, but they rely on Strategy’s ability to maintain reserves, issue securities, monetize Bitcoin, and keep market confidence intact. This is no longer just a Bitcoin bet. It is a Bitcoin liquidity bet, a capital markets access bet, and a confidence bet. Strategy can survive if Bitcoin rises, MSTR keeps a premium, and yield investors keep funding the machine. If two fail at once, the model becomes fragile. The key red flags are STRC below par, dividend hikes that fail to restore the price, reserve coverage under 12 months, unpaid dividends compounding, visible Bitcoin sales, MSTR near or below NAV, and preferred yields widening. The structure can work, but not forever on narrative alone. Eventually, cash obligations meet cash sources. That is where the risk lives.

EndGame Macro

33,374 次观看 • 2 个月前

32 coins. $2.5 million. 0.0038% of the stack. That is the sale the market is now blaming for a $3 billion liquidation cascade and a Bitcoin price nearly halved from its peak. A $2.5 million sale cannot move a trillion-dollar asset. It is a rounding error. In the same week, Strategy raised $128.3 million selling its own stock, 50 times larger. It did not need to sell coins. It chose to. The crash has real drivers: a record 13-day run of ETF outflows, a rotation into AI, a Fed in no hurry to cut. But the accelerant the market keeps naming is 32 coins. The coins were never the point. The signal was. And the signal was deliberate. Michael Saylor told the Q1 call he would “probably sell some bitcoin to pay a dividend just to inoculate the market and send the message that we did it.” His logic was sound: prove the Bitcoin is usable capital, not a vault that can never be opened, and show he is not a prisoner of his own vow. His “never sell” always meant be a net accumulator. He is up more than 170,000 coins this year against the 32 he sold, and he scores himself on one number, Bitcoin per share. By that math, defending the dividend with a sliver was discipline, not distress. The market read it as the opposite. The dose became the catalyst now blamed for the crash. The inoculation became the infection. Because what changed was never Strategy’s solvency. It was its identity. The market has stopped pricing a permanent holder and started pricing what the filings always described: a state-contingent allocator now funding its own preferred dividends, at the margin, from the Bitcoin beneath them. And the buffer is thinning. The cash reserve behind those dividends has fallen from $2.25 billion to $900 million. Against a preferred bill near $1.7 billion a year, that is roughly 6 months of runway. Be precise. This is not a death spiral. Strategy still holds 843,706 Bitcoin, worth more than $50 billion even now, and has more funding levers than almost any company alive. A real rally makes this a footnote, and the sell-side calling the reaction overdone is not wrong on the fundamentals. But the regime has changed. The question is no longer Bitcoin’s price on any given day. It is the cadence of the dividend declarations and the path of that reserve. Bitcoin did not acquire a yield. The wrapper acquired liabilities. This week the market learned that difference costs far more than 32 coins.

Shanaka Anslem Perera ⚡

165,572 次观看 • 2 个月前

Sold 32 coins. Bought 1,550. 48 times more, at a 15% discount, into the crash the market blamed on the sale. Strategy disclosed today that while everyone panicked over its $2.5 million Bitcoin sale, it was quietly buying the dip that panic created. 1,550 Bitcoin for $101 million, at $65,332 a coin, far below the $77,135 it sold for and below its own cost basis. The bears called the sale the first crack, a forced liquidation, the start of the death spiral. The answer was a buy 48 times the size of the sale that scared them. This is the machine we described: a state-contingent allocator. Above its funding line, it turns market access into Bitcoin. The sale was the exception. The buy is the rule. It also closed the question the sale opened. The cash reserve behind the preferred dividends had thinned to $900 million, about six months of cover. He rebuilt it to $1 billion in the same week. But watch how, because that is the real story. He funded none of it with coins. He funded it with $181 million of freshly issued stock, then spent it on Bitcoin and the reserve. The coins were never the funding source. The equity is. That is the flywheel working exactly as built, and the cost of it surfacing at the same time. Every turn now runs on issuing shares, and the premium that once made each share buy more Bitcoin than it diluted has compressed hard. He bought low. He sold his own stock low to do it. So the question quietly turns. It was never whether Saylor sells his Bitcoin. He just proved again that he buys far more than he sells. It is what each turn of the engine now costs in dilution, and how long the market keeps paying a premium worth that cost. He bought the dip. The dip was partly his own making. And he paid for it in equity, not coins.

Shanaka Anslem Perera ⚡

142,587 次观看 • 2 个月前

🔥STRATEGY WILL BE THE WORLD'S MOST VALUABLE COMPANY🔥 Strategy bought OVER 56,000 Bitcoin in April. That number is so absurd people are psychologically incapable of processing it. Post-halving miners produce roughly 13,500 BTC per month. Strategy just bought about 4.1x an entire month of new miner supply in one month. Now run the simple monster math: Today: Strategy BTC stack: 818,334 BTC Bitcoin price: $76,196 Bitcoin NAV: $62.35B Assume Strategy keeps buying 56,000 BTC per month for 5 years. That is: ASSUMING STRC GROWTH TOTALLY STOPS (LOL) ~672,000 BTC per year ~3,360,000 BTC over 5 years Their stack goes from: 818,334 BTC to 4,178,334 BTC Now assume Bitcoin compounds at 25% CAGR. Bitcoin goes from: $76,196 to roughly: $232,532 So the Bitcoin NAV becomes: 4,178,334 BTC × $232,532 = roughly $971.5 BILLION Almost $1 TRILLION in Bitcoin NAV. And the funniest part? This model assumes no mNAV expansion. No premium insanity. No additional acceleration. No credit flywheel getting stronger. No market panic as everyone realizes Strategy is vacuuming Bitcoin off the planet like a publicly traded monetary black hole. Just: 56,000 BTC per month. 25% Bitcoin CAGR. 5 years. That’s it. Don't think they can accumulate that much Bitcoin at that low of a CAGR? Think the Bitcoin CAGR has to go higher? Cool. That only helps Strategy buy more Bitcoin. The bear case is basically: “Sure, they are absorbing multiples of new supply, building the largest corporate Bitcoin balance sheet in history, converting fiat capital markets into Bitcoin ownership, and compounding NAV at escape velocity, but have you considered that I am emotionally upset?” MSTR is becoming the most aggressive Bitcoin accumulation machine ever built. The fiat world is still modeling it like a tech stock with a weird treasury policy. GOOD LUCK.

Adam Livingston

61,569 次观看 • 4 个月前

🚀ASST TO $700 PER SHARE?!?🚀 YOU THINK I'M JOKING? THINK AGAIN, BUCKO. Current ASST snapshot: BTC holdings: 15,000.5 BTC BTC price: $80,593 Bitcoin NAV: $1.21B Total debt: $10M Preferred outstanding: $495.95M Debt + preferred: $505.95M Amplification ratio: 41.9% Current stock price: $15.85 Now here’s the model, and this isn't MOONBOY NONSENSE, kids. This is with Bitcoin at $750k in 2036, not $1 million in 2034. ASST maintains their current 41.9% amplification ratio for 10 years. Translation for normal people: For every $1.00 of Bitcoin NAV, ASST keeps roughly $0.419 of senior claims through debt/preferred financing. The bears hear that and immediately start sweating through a Men’s Wearhouse suit. But this is the actual machine. As Bitcoin rises, the Bitcoin NAV rises. When the NAV rises, the old preferred stack becomes smaller relative to the treasury. So ASST issues more SATA to keep amplification at 41.9%. That new SATA capital buys more Bitcoin. Then Bitcoin goes up again. Then the NAV goes up again. Then the amplification ratio drops again. Then they issue more SATA again. Then they buy more Bitcoin again. This is how you turn a balance sheet into a legally registered orange crocodile. Now we add the funding mix: 75% of new Bitcoin accumulation comes from SATA. 25% comes from issuing common stock. And the common stock is issued at 1.2x EV mNAV. Meaning they are selling equity at a 20% premium to the enterprise value of the Bitcoin stack. That matters. Because issuing common below NAV is financial self-harm. Issuing common above NAV is accretive treasury sorcery. Now assume Bitcoin compounds at 25% per year for 10 years. BTC price goes from: $80,593 today to roughly: $750,579 in year 10 That is a 9.3x move in Bitcoin. Now what happens to ASST? Starting BTC stack: 15,000.5 BTC Projected year 10 BTC stack: 143,425 BTC That is 9.6x more Bitcoin. Starting Bitcoin NAV: $1.21B Projected year 10 Bitcoin NAV: $107.65B That is 89x larger. Now the bears will say: “BUT THE PREFERREDS!” Yes, Carl. The preferreds are the point. Senior claims rise from $505.95M to $45.11B because the model intentionally keeps amplification at 41.9%. That sounds terrifying until you remember the Bitcoin NAV grew to $107.65B. The stack got bigger. The senior claims got bigger. The common equity claim got bigger too. This is where CEBE comes in. CEBE = Common Equity Bitcoin Exposure. It answers the only question that matters: After debt and preferred holders get their claim, how much Bitcoin exposure does the common shareholder really own? Today: Gross BPS: 20,222 sats CEBE/share: 11,759 sats Year 10: Gross BPS: 95,380 sats CEBE/share: 55,416 sats That means common-equity Bitcoin exposure per share rises about 4.7x. Even after common issuance. Even after maintaining the preferred stack. Even after the bears finish their sacred ritual of screaming “DILUTION” into a spreadsheet they opened sideways. Now the share count. Current implied diluted shares: 74.2M Projected year 10 shares: 150.4M So yes, the share count roughly doubles in this model. But the Bitcoin stack goes 9.6x. This is the entire game. If Bitcoin holdings grow much faster than shares outstanding, the common shareholder’s Bitcoin exposure goes up. The bears think all issuance is bad because they learned finance from a Yahoo message board during a divorce. The actual question is: Does issuance increase Bitcoin per share after senior claims? In this model, yes. Now the stock price. Strict 1.2x EV mNAV model gets ASST to about: $559/share But if we anchor the model to today’s actual ASST price of $15.85, the same growth path gets you to roughly: $696/share Call it $700. There it is. ASST to $700 per share is not “vibes.” It is a model. BTC compounds at 25%. SATA funds 75% of accumulation. Common funds 25% at 1.2x EV mNAV. Amplification stays at 41.9%. BTC stack grows from 15,000 BTC to 143,425 BTC. Bitcoin NAV goes from $1.21B to $107.65B. CEBE/share goes from 11,759 sats to 55,416 sats. The stock goes from $15.85 to roughly $700. This is why small Bitcoin treasury companies are so insane. Strategy is the Death Star. ASST is the weird little orange lab experiment in the basement where someone accidentally discovers corporate finance methamphetamine. Tiny denominator. Preferred financing. Bitcoin accumulation. Premium equity issuance. CEBE expansion. A compounding treasury loop. The bear case is that dilution kills the common. The bull case is that accretive dilution plus preferred financing creates a Bitcoin-per-share machine that eats capital markets and leaves behind a pile of traumatized short sellers asking why their model still says “book value.” ASST to $700? If the machine works, yes. If Bitcoin does 25% CAGR, absolutely possible. If SATA scales and common gets issued above NAV, the goblin gets fed. And once the goblin gets fed, the spreadsheet starts looking like it was written by Saylor, Dylan LeClair, and a sleep-deprived Austrian economist locked inside a treasury dashboard with three Celsius energy drinks. This is not financial advice. This is FINANCIAL ENTERTAINMENT:

Adam Livingston

66,707 次观看 • 3 个月前

HOW BADLY DO WE NEED $STRC BACK AT PAR? Turning the STRC machine back on would juice MSTR’s return by as much as 11.55 percentage points on the exact same move to $100,000 Bitcoin... with zero mNAV expansion. Bitcoin goes from $64,846 to $100,000: +54.21%. With no new STRC, MSTR goes from $97.91 to $172.66: +76.35%, beating Bitcoin by 22.13 points. Then we restart the preferred trebuchet: $500M/month → MSTR +79.26% → beats BTC by 25.05 points $1B/month → MSTR +82.16% → beats BTC by 27.95 points $1.5B/month → MSTR +85.04% → beats BTC by 30.83 points $2B/month → MSTR +87.90% → beats BTC by 33.69 points The incremental return created specifically by new STRC is 2.92%, 5.81%, 8.69% and 11.55%, respectively. At $2B per month, STRC generates 13.14% of MSTR’s entire return and 34.29% of its outperformance over Bitcoin. Issuing $24B over the year buys 301,208 BTC at an average modeled price of $79,679. Those coins are worth $30.12B when Bitcoin reaches $100,000, while the additional preferred principal remains . That creates $6.12B of gross residual common equity before the associated dividend and dilution drag. After including that drag, CEBE still finishes 10,916 sats per share above the zero-issuance scenario, adding $11.31 to MSTR’s ending share price. Credit investors get a 12% coupon and a warm glass of milk. Common shareholders get whatever survives when $100,000 Bitcoin runs the fixed-dollar liability through an industrial meat grinder. The preferred stack is expensive capital when Bitcoin goes sideways. On an orderly climb, it becomes a machine for purchasing BTC below its destination price while the liability remains frozen in dollars. I love Strategy's model. It's simple. Continue to manufacture yield for the dollar economy, and then harvest the residual convexity for common shareholders:

Adam Livingston

33,368 次观看 • 1 个月前

Is Michael Saylor about to get a margin call? No. And the reason is more interesting than the rumor, because what he built instead may be harder to escape than one. A margin call needs a lender who can seize collateral when the price drops. Strategy has none. Its $6.7 billion in debt is convertible notes, the largest tranche due in 2029, with no loan-to-value trigger and no clause that lets anyone take a coin because Bitcoin fell. Saylor learned that in 2022, when he did have a collateralized loan and sweated a liquidation price, then rebuilt the structure so it could never happen again. On the literal question he is right, and the people calling for his liquidation this week do not understand what they see. But killing the fast death created a slow one almost nobody is pricing. To fund his buying, Saylor issued a mountain of perpetual preferred stock that pays a fixed dividend forever, near 11.5 percent, no matter where Bitcoin trades. That annual bill quadrupled from about $300 million in January to roughly $1.2 billion now, while the cash reserve that pays it fell 38 percent this year to near $1.4 billion, after the company spent $1.5 billion in May retiring debt. Put those two numbers together and you get the figure that actually matters, and it is not a Bitcoin price. It is a countdown. Dividend coverage, the time the cash can keep paying that bill, has collapsed from more than seven years in early 2026 to between ten and fourteen months, depending on whose math you use. Months, not years. The market is already pricing it, just not where the rumor is looking. That preferred stock is engineered to sit at $100. Last week it cracked to $82.50, a record 17.5 percent below par. That discount is investors quietly clocking the strain while the timeline screams about a margin call that cannot happen. There is a clean way out, and it is the one door the structure was built to keep shut. Restoring a safe two years of coverage takes about $2.8 billion, roughly double what Strategy holds, and the fastest path there is to sell Bitcoin. But selling crystallizes a $10.6 billion loss, breaks the never-sell promise that gives the stock its premium, and bleeds the very asset the machine exists to hoard. The exit and the wound are the same cut. He already brushed it, selling 32 coins on June 1 to cover a payment. Thirty-two against more than 847,000 is a rounding error in size and an earthquake in meaning, because the company that swore it would never sell, sold, to pay a dividend. And there is a second trigger almost no one has read, buried in the fine print. If Saylor ever simply skips a preferred payment to save cash, the missed amount compounds, the senior layer can ratchet its rate higher, a senior miss freezes payments to every junior layer beneath it, and after enough missed quarters those preferred holders can start taking board seats. No one seizes a coin. But control begins migrating to the people he owes. The clock does not just run down. It hands away the keys at the end. So the honest verdict is the one neither side is shouting. There is no margin call and no imminent bankruptcy. The structure protects him exactly as designed. What it cannot protect him from is a fixed bill that grows while the cash shrinks, where every exit deepens the hole. Sell Bitcoin and break the story. Issue stock into a price near its lowest since 2024 and punish your holders. Skip the dividend and start losing the company by the boardroom. Saylor did not escape the margin call. He traded a cliff for a clock. A cliff takes you in an afternoon and a stranger pulls the trigger. This clock takes months, and at the end the trigger is pulled by the only two forces he swore would never touch it, his own hand, or the people he owes. The rumor asks whether someone is about to call his loan. The real question is how many months he can keep paying before he has to sell the dream, dilute the believers, or hand over the board to keep the lights on.

Shanaka Anslem Perera ⚡

58,558 次观看 • 2 个月前