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The new administrative composition in post-SDF integration Kobani offers a clear picture of how Damascus is working to loosen the SDF’s long-standing grip on this symbolically important enclave, not by excluding it outright, but by diffusing power: At the district level, Damascus has appointed an ethnically Kurdish but Damascus-aligned... official, with an ethnically Arab official as his deputy. In Kobani city itself, which is largely Kurdish, Damascus has given the administrative director post to a Barzani-backed KDP-S member, while the municipality chief post has gone to the incumbent PYD, with her deputy being another Barzani-backed KDP-S/ENKS member. In Jallabiya, Kobani’s other predominantly Kurdish subdistrict, a municipal council made up of independent locals and tribal-affiliated figures has been appointed. In the district’s two predominantly Arab subdistricts, the appointed officials are Damascus-affiliated Arabs. While the arrangement in Hasakah province is more complex, Kobani offers a clearer and more legible example of the model Damascus appears to be pursuing: fragmenting local authority, balancing rivals against one another, and gradually eroding the SDF’s 15-year monopoly over governance in Kurdish-populated areas. More details:show more

The National Context

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$The Demographics That Doomed a Kurdish National Project in Syria A micro-level look at the demographics of northern Syria reveals how much Kurdish nationalist expectations have diverged from ground realities, and why the broader territorial collapse of the SDF polity was, in many respects, foreseeable. In the debate that has followed, Kurdish nationalists have largely moved to blame the SDF and its ideological backers in the PKK for what went wrong, while the SDF has found itself on the defensive. But this framing disregards the demographic complexity of northern Syria, which differs sharply from the contiguous and compact Kurdish populations in Turkey, Iraq, or Iran. In Syria, Kurds are distributed across three geographically disconnected pockets: Afrin, Kobani, and Hasakah. More Kurds likely live outside what became SDF territory than inside it. Any strategy that prioritised consolidating control over those zones at the expense of the broader Kurdish population in Syria would have been short-sighted. Hasakah, where the SDF's self-rule ambitions were most far-reaching, is also the most demographically complicated for a Kurdish nationalist agenda. The governorate contains a large Arab rural population, and its major cities are deeply mixed. In Hasakah city, Kurds are likely a sizable minority, with Arabs and Christians together forming a majority. In Qamishli, Kurds likely constitute either a plurality or slim majority within the city itself, but the surrounding villages, particularly to the south, are solidly Arab, making any exclusively Kurdish project in the pocket inherently unstable. Afrin, by contrast, has been consistently underweighted in Kurdish strategic thinking despite carrying arguably greater long-term importance. Its proximity to the Mediterranean gives it geopolitical weight that neither Kobani nor the demographically fractured Hasakah pocket can match, and trading a more balanced position there for the sake of self-rule in Hasakah would have been a poor bargain. The argument that a different Kurdish party might have achieved better outcomes is also unconvincing. A more overtly nationalist party would have pushed harder for an explicitly Kurdish project and collided even more directly with demographic realities. What the SDF achieved is unprecedented in the Syrian context; a more nationalist posture would likely have produced less, not more. None of this strips the SDF of responsibility for its governance failures, which were severe - basic service provision in key cities such as Hasakah remained chronically poor throughout its rule. But the core criticism levelled by Kurdish nationalists has not been over governance. It has been, ostensibly, that the SDF was too accommodating of Arabs and Christians: precisely the accommodation that the demographic reality demanded. The current integration framework reflects a realistic accommodation of these constraints. It preserves certain layers of local self-administration while transferring coercive authority over the judiciary and security sector to institutions with legitimacy across Kurdish, Arab, and Christian communities alike. In an environment this mixed, that division of competencies is a structural necessity rather than a retreat. It also explains the differential approach Damascus has taken across the three pockets. In Kobani, which is more ethnically homogenous, the Syrian government has moved more aggressively to dismantle SDF structures, appointing a mix of politically diverse Kurdish figures and pro-Damascus elements in their place. In Hasakah, it has adopted a more measured posture, aware that the demographic complexity limits the viability of any exclusionary project and reduces the urgency of forced dismantlement. The practical terms of the deal are now taking shape. Both sides have agreed that state courts will be reactivated in Hasakah city this week and in Qamishli the following week, resolving a deadlock that had persisted for several weeks. Under the agreed formula, former state judges will be reinstated alongside select SDF-appointed judicial figures: those holding recognised legal qualifications will be integrated directly, while others will be required to complete the necessary certification before being absorbed into state institutions. The parties have also agreed to further prisoner exchanges in preparation for the transfer of detention facilities to the Syrian Interior Ministry. Beyond the SDF's core military structure, auxiliary forces including self-defence fighters are reported to have agreed to integration into the Syrian Defence Ministry as border guards, serving as individuals within the state military chain of command rather than as a collective formation. More, and an interactive map to explore, at the full article:$

The Demographics That Doomed a Kurdish National Project in Syria A micro-level look at the demographics of northern Syria reveals how much Kurdish nationalist expectations have diverged from ground realities, and why the broader territorial collapse of the SDF polity was, in many respects, foreseeable. In the debate that has followed, Kurdish nationalists have largely moved to blame the SDF and its ideological backers in the PKK for what went wrong, while the SDF has found itself on the defensive. But this framing disregards the demographic complexity of northern Syria, which differs sharply from the contiguous and compact Kurdish populations in Turkey, Iraq, or Iran. In Syria, Kurds are distributed across three geographically disconnected pockets: Afrin, Kobani, and Hasakah. More Kurds likely live outside what became SDF territory than inside it. Any strategy that prioritised consolidating control over those zones at the expense of the broader Kurdish population in Syria would have been short-sighted. Hasakah, where the SDF's self-rule ambitions were most far-reaching, is also the most demographically complicated for a Kurdish nationalist agenda. The governorate contains a large Arab rural population, and its major cities are deeply mixed. In Hasakah city, Kurds are likely a sizable minority, with Arabs and Christians together forming a majority. In Qamishli, Kurds likely constitute either a plurality or slim majority within the city itself, but the surrounding villages, particularly to the south, are solidly Arab, making any exclusively Kurdish project in the pocket inherently unstable. Afrin, by contrast, has been consistently underweighted in Kurdish strategic thinking despite carrying arguably greater long-term importance. Its proximity to the Mediterranean gives it geopolitical weight that neither Kobani nor the demographically fractured Hasakah pocket can match, and trading a more balanced position there for the sake of self-rule in Hasakah would have been a poor bargain. The argument that a different Kurdish party might have achieved better outcomes is also unconvincing. A more overtly nationalist party would have pushed harder for an explicitly Kurdish project and collided even more directly with demographic realities. What the SDF achieved is unprecedented in the Syrian context; a more nationalist posture would likely have produced less, not more. None of this strips the SDF of responsibility for its governance failures, which were severe - basic service provision in key cities such as Hasakah remained chronically poor throughout its rule. But the core criticism levelled by Kurdish nationalists has not been over governance. It has been, ostensibly, that the SDF was too accommodating of Arabs and Christians: precisely the accommodation that the demographic reality demanded. The current integration framework reflects a realistic accommodation of these constraints. It preserves certain layers of local self-administration while transferring coercive authority over the judiciary and security sector to institutions with legitimacy across Kurdish, Arab, and Christian communities alike. In an environment this mixed, that division of competencies is a structural necessity rather than a retreat. It also explains the differential approach Damascus has taken across the three pockets. In Kobani, which is more ethnically homogenous, the Syrian government has moved more aggressively to dismantle SDF structures, appointing a mix of politically diverse Kurdish figures and pro-Damascus elements in their place. In Hasakah, it has adopted a more measured posture, aware that the demographic complexity limits the viability of any exclusionary project and reduces the urgency of forced dismantlement. The practical terms of the deal are now taking shape. Both sides have agreed that state courts will be reactivated in Hasakah city this week and in Qamishli the following week, resolving a deadlock that had persisted for several weeks. Under the agreed formula, former state judges will be reinstated alongside select SDF-appointed judicial figures: those holding recognised legal qualifications will be integrated directly, while others will be required to complete the necessary certification before being absorbed into state institutions. The parties have also agreed to further prisoner exchanges in preparation for the transfer of detention facilities to the Syrian Interior Ministry. Beyond the SDF's core military structure, auxiliary forces including self-defence fighters are reported to have agreed to integration into the Syrian Defence Ministry as border guards, serving as individuals within the state military chain of command rather than as a collective formation. More, and an interactive map to explore, at the full article:

The National Context

46,126 views • 3 months ago

On the SDF-Damascus integration process: The Syrian government has announced a provisional executive office in Hasakah province with a roughly 6:4 ratio favouring SDF-linked appointees over Damascus appointees. This has provoked criticism from some Arab activists in Hasakah, but in Damascus's strategic calculus the arrangement is likely seen more favourably than the numbers suggest. – For Damascus, the restoration of formal state institutions in Hasakah matters more at this stage than the composition of those institutions. Manning is not irrelevant, but it is secondary to re-establishing the structural hierarchy of governance itself, which is the larger objective. The provisional framing reinforces this. Damascus is likely aiming to shift the composition of the executive office in its favour once it builds greater coercive and administrative capacity on the ground. The implied sequence: restore institutions first, build enforcement capacity, then hold elections under more favourable conditions, allowing it to claim the outcome was determined by democratic process rather than appointment. – That said, templates of vertical subordination and numerical representation should be applied cautiously to Syria's current context. In a post-Assad environment where state-building is still marred by weak institutions, the individuals who occupy positions often matter more than the formal architecture, because they can build patronage networks, entrench themselves, and accumulate informal power that outlasts any provisional arrangement. The manning question should not be dismissed as secondary to structure; both interact in ways specific to Syria's transitional conditions. – Damascus has also made several pointed moves in the sub-district appointments that signal a deliberate effort to de-ethnicise the integration. Hasakah district itself has been left without an appointee, but SDF-linked personnel have been appointed as district managers for al-Malikiyah (Direk) and the Qamishli area, both of which contain territory split between government and SDF control. Simultaneously, Damascus has appointed government-linked Arab officials to sub-district governorships in areas like Cil Agha (Jawadiyah), which largely sits within the SDF pocket, creating mixed governance that frames integration around territoriality and personnel rather than ethnic partition. The likely intent is to increase interaction between government and SDF-linked officials and normalise integrated administration, but the SDF may read these appointments as confirmation that it has regained institutional standing in these areas, creating an incentive to consolidate further rather than allow itself to be absorbed. The coercive trade – The concessions on the executive office appear linked to a parallel, and arguably more consequential, development: the gradual redeployment of Syrian Interior Ministry personnel into areas previously under exclusive SDF control. Several checkpoints at the southern entrance of Hasakah city, formerly under SDF control, have recently been handed to Interior Ministry personnel. These are substantive transfers, not cosmetic. Interior Ministry personnel have also been observed in areas east and west of Hasakah city that they never entered during the January offensive, representing a new penetration of the SDF's territorial envelope. – Furthermore, pro-government sources claim Interior Ministry personnel will also deploy inside Hasakah city itself f, not only at its perimeter checkpoints but the personnel would be Damascus-appoint locals from Hasakah city itself. At the entrance to Kobani city (not just the district area), a Syrian Interior Ministry checkpoint has also been established and staffed by government personnel, another notable milestone in the integration process. – It remains unclear whether a similar deployment will extend to Qamishli, which is psychologically more significant for Kurds than Hasakah, even though Hasakah holds greater strategic weight: it sits deeper inside Syria, further from the Turkish border, and serves as the provincial capital and seat of local government. – What appears to be unfolding is a deliberate trade: Damascus is conceding on the composition of civilian-facing institutions in exchange for incremental gains in coercive capacity, specifically policing, arrest powers, judiciary, and territorial presence. This explains why Damascus may have shown patience over incidents like the repeated attacks on the judicial palace signage by pro-SDF Kurdish elements as a protest against not including Kurdish. The government may have calculated that as its personnel gain ground, it will eventually be able to protect and enforce the restoration of the judicial palace on its own terms. The reactivation of the judicial palace appears postponed until Damascus has sufficient coercive presence in Hasakah city to sustain it. Shadow structures and the fiscal lever – The SDF, operating from a PKK organisational culture, is unlikely to treat the formal dismantling of its parallel institutions as a genuine surrender of power. Its probable strategy is to translate its institutional presence informally into a de facto autonomy sustained by shadow structures: maintaining parallel institutions beneath the formal apparatus, building patronage networks within the new governance structures to generate revenue, and retaining informal armed elements (operatives like those involved in the harassment campaigns and signage attacks) as instruments of pressure and territorial assertion. – In fact, the SDF is using every available method to preserve its informal power, including methods that sit uncomfortably with its own ideology, such as aggressively pushing to privatise sectors where it can steer tenders to affiliated companies, retaining both revenue streams and institutional leverage. – Each side is therefore reading the same arrangement through a different lens. Damascus sees the institutional appointments as the dismantling of a parallel structure and the beginning of fiscal absorption (payrolls now run through Damascus). The SDF reads its numerical advantage in the executive office as a foothold for consolidating power through the very institutions it has nominally conceded. – For Damascus, this is also the least costly model of absorbing the SDF. A new US Senate draft bill conditions continued support on a "fair" integration of SDF into the Syrian military, but this does not pose a strategic threat to Ahmad al-Sharaa's position and the draft is not final. If compliance proves too costly, he may simply disregard it, since Turkey, not the US, provides the bulk of direct military assistance to Syria. The US holds greater leverage over sanctions and diplomatic normalisation, but Trump appears committed to his current approach on sanctions relief, making a reversal unlikely. Maintaining the appearance of fair integration is therefore useful for preserving US military assistance as a supplementary channel, but one that is politically important. – Al-Sharaa also appears to recognise that limited power-sharing with Kurds in the northeast sets a precedent for managing the Druze question in Suwayda. The SDF arrangement is therefore not only about the Kurdish file but serves as a template for broader minority incorporation across Syria. More and a detailed interactive map:

On the SDF-Damascus integration process: The Syrian government has announced a provisional executive office in Hasakah province with a roughly 6:4 ratio favouring SDF-linked appointees over Damascus appointees. This has provoked criticism from some Arab activists in Hasakah, but in Damascus's strategic calculus the arrangement is likely seen more favourably than the numbers suggest. – For Damascus, the restoration of formal state institutions in Hasakah matters more at this stage than the composition of those institutions. Manning is not irrelevant, but it is secondary to re-establishing the structural hierarchy of governance itself, which is the larger objective. The provisional framing reinforces this. Damascus is likely aiming to shift the composition of the executive office in its favour once it builds greater coercive and administrative capacity on the ground. The implied sequence: restore institutions first, build enforcement capacity, then hold elections under more favourable conditions, allowing it to claim the outcome was determined by democratic process rather than appointment. – That said, templates of vertical subordination and numerical representation should be applied cautiously to Syria's current context. In a post-Assad environment where state-building is still marred by weak institutions, the individuals who occupy positions often matter more than the formal architecture, because they can build patronage networks, entrench themselves, and accumulate informal power that outlasts any provisional arrangement. The manning question should not be dismissed as secondary to structure; both interact in ways specific to Syria's transitional conditions. – Damascus has also made several pointed moves in the sub-district appointments that signal a deliberate effort to de-ethnicise the integration. Hasakah district itself has been left without an appointee, but SDF-linked personnel have been appointed as district managers for al-Malikiyah (Direk) and the Qamishli area, both of which contain territory split between government and SDF control. Simultaneously, Damascus has appointed government-linked Arab officials to sub-district governorships in areas like Cil Agha (Jawadiyah), which largely sits within the SDF pocket, creating mixed governance that frames integration around territoriality and personnel rather than ethnic partition. The likely intent is to increase interaction between government and SDF-linked officials and normalise integrated administration, but the SDF may read these appointments as confirmation that it has regained institutional standing in these areas, creating an incentive to consolidate further rather than allow itself to be absorbed. The coercive trade – The concessions on the executive office appear linked to a parallel, and arguably more consequential, development: the gradual redeployment of Syrian Interior Ministry personnel into areas previously under exclusive SDF control. Several checkpoints at the southern entrance of Hasakah city, formerly under SDF control, have recently been handed to Interior Ministry personnel. These are substantive transfers, not cosmetic. Interior Ministry personnel have also been observed in areas east and west of Hasakah city that they never entered during the January offensive, representing a new penetration of the SDF's territorial envelope. – Furthermore, pro-government sources claim Interior Ministry personnel will also deploy inside Hasakah city itself f, not only at its perimeter checkpoints but the personnel would be Damascus-appoint locals from Hasakah city itself. At the entrance to Kobani city (not just the district area), a Syrian Interior Ministry checkpoint has also been established and staffed by government personnel, another notable milestone in the integration process. – It remains unclear whether a similar deployment will extend to Qamishli, which is psychologically more significant for Kurds than Hasakah, even though Hasakah holds greater strategic weight: it sits deeper inside Syria, further from the Turkish border, and serves as the provincial capital and seat of local government. – What appears to be unfolding is a deliberate trade: Damascus is conceding on the composition of civilian-facing institutions in exchange for incremental gains in coercive capacity, specifically policing, arrest powers, judiciary, and territorial presence. This explains why Damascus may have shown patience over incidents like the repeated attacks on the judicial palace signage by pro-SDF Kurdish elements as a protest against not including Kurdish. The government may have calculated that as its personnel gain ground, it will eventually be able to protect and enforce the restoration of the judicial palace on its own terms. The reactivation of the judicial palace appears postponed until Damascus has sufficient coercive presence in Hasakah city to sustain it. Shadow structures and the fiscal lever – The SDF, operating from a PKK organisational culture, is unlikely to treat the formal dismantling of its parallel institutions as a genuine surrender of power. Its probable strategy is to translate its institutional presence informally into a de facto autonomy sustained by shadow structures: maintaining parallel institutions beneath the formal apparatus, building patronage networks within the new governance structures to generate revenue, and retaining informal armed elements (operatives like those involved in the harassment campaigns and signage attacks) as instruments of pressure and territorial assertion. – In fact, the SDF is using every available method to preserve its informal power, including methods that sit uncomfortably with its own ideology, such as aggressively pushing to privatise sectors where it can steer tenders to affiliated companies, retaining both revenue streams and institutional leverage. – Each side is therefore reading the same arrangement through a different lens. Damascus sees the institutional appointments as the dismantling of a parallel structure and the beginning of fiscal absorption (payrolls now run through Damascus). The SDF reads its numerical advantage in the executive office as a foothold for consolidating power through the very institutions it has nominally conceded. – For Damascus, this is also the least costly model of absorbing the SDF. A new US Senate draft bill conditions continued support on a "fair" integration of SDF into the Syrian military, but this does not pose a strategic threat to Ahmad al-Sharaa's position and the draft is not final. If compliance proves too costly, he may simply disregard it, since Turkey, not the US, provides the bulk of direct military assistance to Syria. The US holds greater leverage over sanctions and diplomatic normalisation, but Trump appears committed to his current approach on sanctions relief, making a reversal unlikely. Maintaining the appearance of fair integration is therefore useful for preserving US military assistance as a supplementary channel, but one that is politically important. – Al-Sharaa also appears to recognise that limited power-sharing with Kurds in the northeast sets a precedent for managing the Druze question in Suwayda. The SDF arrangement is therefore not only about the Kurdish file but serves as a template for broader minority incorporation across Syria. More and a detailed interactive map:

The National Context

34,966 views • 25 days ago

The appointment of Nour al-Din Issa on 1 February as governor of Hasakah is an important milestone for the Kurds in Syria. Not because of the appointment of Kurdish governors, which already existed under the previous Syrian political regime, but because of the current situation, where, following the agreement between the STG and the SDF, the Kurds have a kind of autonomy in Hasakah, with a token presence from Damascus there while the YPG maintains its armed forces in full, with future integration that will only be a political facelift without dissolving their forces. A massacre of the Kurdish population has been avoided thanks to the intervention of regional actors, which may set a precedent that could be applied to the Druze in Suwayda (following an agreement with Israel) and even to the Alawites (although this is more unlikely due to the lack of armed organisations on the coast similar to the YPG or the National Guard). However, this decision has not satisfied the tribal forces and the more radical groups of the STG, who see this agreement as a kind of surrender by Damascus ‘to the Kurdish separatists’, especially by the SNA, an umbrella organisation of openly anti-Kurdish terrorist groups that have seen their area of control in Ras al-Ayn being managed by the latter. These disputes could lead to sabotage of the agreement in the coming weeks, as is being seen in Kobani, where militants are refusing to withdraw from their positions south of the M-4.

The appointment of Nour al-Din Issa on 1 February as governor of Hasakah is an important milestone for the Kurds in Syria. Not because of the appointment of Kurdish governors, which already existed under the previous Syrian political regime, but because of the current situation, where, following the agreement between the STG and the SDF, the Kurds have a kind of autonomy in Hasakah, with a token presence from Damascus there while the YPG maintains its armed forces in full, with future integration that will only be a political facelift without dissolving their forces. A massacre of the Kurdish population has been avoided thanks to the intervention of regional actors, which may set a precedent that could be applied to the Druze in Suwayda (following an agreement with Israel) and even to the Alawites (although this is more unlikely due to the lack of armed organisations on the coast similar to the YPG or the National Guard). However, this decision has not satisfied the tribal forces and the more radical groups of the STG, who see this agreement as a kind of surrender by Damascus ‘to the Kurdish separatists’, especially by the SNA, an umbrella organisation of openly anti-Kurdish terrorist groups that have seen their area of control in Ras al-Ayn being managed by the latter. These disputes could lead to sabotage of the agreement in the coming weeks, as is being seen in Kobani, where militants are refusing to withdraw from their positions south of the M-4.

@Suriyak

23,601 views • 6 months ago

#Syria: lack of transparency in implementing some steps of the Damascus–SDF agreement is fueling fear and tensions in Arab-majority areas of #Hasakah province. Over the past 2 days, residents protested against the possible entry of the SDF's Asayish into their communities. While key steps of the agreement between Damascus and SDF were implemented, many issues - such as the governance of Hasakah province - remain unclear. The lack of official details and transparency has created space for rumors, heightening fear in Arab-majority areas. Yesterday, a number of tribal fighters also warned that they would take up arms if the Asayish are deployed in their areas. Video below from Yarubiyah shows residents calling on the Government for clarifications.

#Syria: lack of transparency in implementing some steps of the Damascus–SDF agreement is fueling fear and tensions in Arab-majority areas of #Hasakah province. Over the past 2 days, residents protested against the possible entry of the SDF's Asayish into their communities. While key steps of the agreement between Damascus and SDF were implemented, many issues - such as the governance of Hasakah province - remain unclear. The lack of official details and transparency has created space for rumors, heightening fear in Arab-majority areas. Yesterday, a number of tribal fighters also warned that they would take up arms if the Asayish are deployed in their areas. Video below from Yarubiyah shows residents calling on the Government for clarifications.

Qalaat Al Mudiq

13,202 views • 6 months ago

$🇸🇾 Post-Assad Syria Fragments as Regional Movements Reject Damascus Syria is fracturing as more regions refuse to recognize the Islamist-backed government in Damascus. 🔹 In southern Syria, the newly formed Suwayda Provincial Military Council has declared itself the civil and military authority over the Suwayda region. The council consists of Druze militia groups numbering up to 10,000 fighters, with support from Israeli Druze military personnel. 🔹 Meanwhile, the underground “Ugarit Region Committee” in the coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartus has announced the formation of an alternative government, further weakening Damascus’ grip. Both groups are demanding democratic reforms and the expulsion of foreign militants, while asserting their right to armed resistance against the central government. Wow so you mean they're Balkanizing it?! Shocker!!$

🇸🇾 Post-Assad Syria Fragments as Regional Movements Reject Damascus Syria is fracturing as more regions refuse to recognize the Islamist-backed government in Damascus. 🔹 In southern Syria, the newly formed Suwayda Provincial Military Council has declared itself the civil and military authority over the Suwayda region. The council consists of Druze militia groups numbering up to 10,000 fighters, with support from Israeli Druze military personnel. 🔹 Meanwhile, the underground “Ugarit Region Committee” in the coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartus has announced the formation of an alternative government, further weakening Damascus’ grip. Both groups are demanding democratic reforms and the expulsion of foreign militants, while asserting their right to armed resistance against the central government. Wow so you mean they're Balkanizing it?! Shocker!!

DD Geopolitics

45,840 views • 1 year ago

🇸🇾🇮🇶 Nechirvan Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region, is currently in Damascus, where he was welcomed by Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. It's the first official visit by the Kurdistan Region leadership to Syria since the fall of Assad's regime. The most critical aspect of this visit is advancing the implementation of the January 29 integration agreement between the new Syrian administration and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Barzani acts as a mediator here, ensuring the integration of SDF fighters into the national military while still maintaining local Kurdish autonomy. Writer: Michael

🇸🇾🇮🇶 Nechirvan Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region, is currently in Damascus, where he was welcomed by Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. It's the first official visit by the Kurdistan Region leadership to Syria since the fall of Assad's regime. The most critical aspect of this visit is advancing the implementation of the January 29 integration agreement between the new Syrian administration and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Barzani acts as a mediator here, ensuring the integration of SDF fighters into the national military while still maintaining local Kurdish autonomy. Writer: Michael

Mario Nawfal

43,654 views • 12 days ago

Almost all the videos circulating of men from the Kurdistan Region traveling to Syrian Kurdish areas to take up arms, saying they want to defend them against what they see as a Syrian government threat, appear to be people from the Sulaimani area. All the open-source videos circulating so far of people from the Kurdistan region show the men as being from the Sulaimani area, which means the publicly available evidence supports one clear pattern: almost all those going appear to be from Sulaimani, and to a lesser extent Kirkuk. The videos suggest they are being deployed to places such as Hasakah city, Tell Tamir, and other fronts including Rmelan. They also imply some level of organization, with individuals appearing to be arranged into small groups of roughly eight people, each assigned a specific task. This is notable, and it looks politically driven. Sulaimani is farther from Syrian territory than Duhok or Erbil, yet it is producing most of the visible mobilization. A likely explanation is politics: the KDP appears to be discouraging or preventing people from Erbil and Duhok from going, while the PUK, which has publicly sent elements of its anti-terror unit, may be more permissive or even quietly supportive. It is well known that the SDF’s military ties with the PUK are closer. But this also suggests the KDP and Barzani are acting more cautiously. Barzani appears to be playing a different game and is not aligned with a military confrontation at any price, especially given that his camp has its own Syrian Kurdish faction and does not want to burn bridges with Ahmad al-Sharaa and Damascus. Barzani also hinted yesterday that “protecting Kurdish rights” is his only red line. That implies they may not be fundamentally opposed to the SDF being absorbed into the Syrian army on an individual basis. It is also worth noting that, based on their latest statements in light of recent developments, Barzani’s position and Öcalan’s position now sound more similar than many would expect. Both emphasize Kurdish rights, but both also argue that Kurds should engage politically with Damascus.

Almost all the videos circulating of men from the Kurdistan Region traveling to Syrian Kurdish areas to take up arms, saying they want to defend them against what they see as a Syrian government threat, appear to be people from the Sulaimani area. All the open-source videos circulating so far of people from the Kurdistan region show the men as being from the Sulaimani area, which means the publicly available evidence supports one clear pattern: almost all those going appear to be from Sulaimani, and to a lesser extent Kirkuk. The videos suggest they are being deployed to places such as Hasakah city, Tell Tamir, and other fronts including Rmelan. They also imply some level of organization, with individuals appearing to be arranged into small groups of roughly eight people, each assigned a specific task. This is notable, and it looks politically driven. Sulaimani is farther from Syrian territory than Duhok or Erbil, yet it is producing most of the visible mobilization. A likely explanation is politics: the KDP appears to be discouraging or preventing people from Erbil and Duhok from going, while the PUK, which has publicly sent elements of its anti-terror unit, may be more permissive or even quietly supportive. It is well known that the SDF’s military ties with the PUK are closer. But this also suggests the KDP and Barzani are acting more cautiously. Barzani appears to be playing a different game and is not aligned with a military confrontation at any price, especially given that his camp has its own Syrian Kurdish faction and does not want to burn bridges with Ahmad al-Sharaa and Damascus. Barzani also hinted yesterday that “protecting Kurdish rights” is his only red line. That implies they may not be fundamentally opposed to the SDF being absorbed into the Syrian army on an individual basis. It is also worth noting that, based on their latest statements in light of recent developments, Barzani’s position and Öcalan’s position now sound more similar than many would expect. Both emphasize Kurdish rights, but both also argue that Kurds should engage politically with Damascus.

Kurdistan Watch

39,734 views • 6 months ago

Yesterday, KDP President Masoud Barzani attended a symposium in Şırnak (also spelled in Kurdish as Şirnax), a Kurdish city in southeast Turkey, and something quite revealing happened. One of the key speeches was delivered by Arslan Tatar, the ruling AKP MP from Şirnax, who tried to flatter Barzani with remarks such as: “You are the light of our eyes. We raise our children with your vision of Kurdâyetî in mind. You are the son of that great personage, the son of Mullah Mustafa Barzani…” He then added: “Mullah Mustafa Barzani told his Peshmerga: ‘When you see Turkish soldiers… even if they fire at you, do not fire at the Turkish soldiers.’ How can we ever forget this?” Which followed by a round of applauses. The speech quickly spread online: KDP supporters circulated the first part as praise, while critics of Barzani seized on the second part as yet another example of the KDP’s historical collaboration with Turkey. But what is more revealing is Tatar’s profile and the broader line-up seated alongside Barzani at the symposium. Arslan Tatar is among the most anti-PKK Kurdish figures in Turkey. His tribe, going back to his father’s generation, has been one of the main pillars of the village guard system - a local tribal formation that has backed the Turkish state against the PKK since the 1980s. The Tatar tribe and its broader tribal umbrella, which have long dominated Şirnax, in fact played a key role in the province becoming part of Turkey: they fiercely refused to work with the British in the 1920s, later cooperated closely with the Turkish state, and refused to join Kurdish rebellions, further cementing their position as a key pro-state tribe in the region. All of this took place at a symposium dedicated to Melayê Cizîrî, one of the greatest classical Kurdish poets and a foundational figure of written Kurdish literature. DEM Party representatives say they were blocked from attending, yet in the same row as Barzani sat Münir Karaloğlu, the Turkish Deputy Interior Minister and, until recently, the appointed trustee of Diyarbakır, and Şehzade Demir, a HÜDA-PAR MP from a Kurdish Islamist, staunchly anti-PKK party that recently voted “no” on the parliamentary commission to visit Öcalan and others. It is also noteworthy that the Tatar tribe is culturally and linguistically very close to the Bahdini Kurds of the Kurdistan Region, especially to the Zakho dialect. Of course, with the current peace process, the sharp edges between pro-PKK circles and the Turkish state have softened somewhat. But the deep hostility between pro-state Kurdish factions and the PKK-aligned camp clearly persists - and that line-up in Cizre captured it in a single frame.

Kurdistan Watch

21,058 views • 8 months ago

There is currently a protest outside the newly opened US consulate in Erbil, against the Syrian army’s advance toward Kurdish areas around Kobani and Hasakah in Syria. Some of the protesters appear to be Syrian Kurds, while others are from the Kurdistan Region. The protest is still fresh, and social media reports suggest more people are joining. As for the situation on the ground, two phone calls by the Syrian president point toward cultural rights and only limited, area-specific administrative self-rule. One was a call with Masoud Barzani yesterday, in which Barzani’s statement focused on protecting Kurdish rights. Today, al-Sharaa’s call with Trump appeared to centre on the same theme: protecting Kurdish rights within a unified Syria.

There is currently a protest outside the newly opened US consulate in Erbil, against the Syrian army’s advance toward Kurdish areas around Kobani and Hasakah in Syria. Some of the protesters appear to be Syrian Kurds, while others are from the Kurdistan Region. The protest is still fresh, and social media reports suggest more people are joining. As for the situation on the ground, two phone calls by the Syrian president point toward cultural rights and only limited, area-specific administrative self-rule. One was a call with Masoud Barzani yesterday, in which Barzani’s statement focused on protecting Kurdish rights. Today, al-Sharaa’s call with Trump appeared to centre on the same theme: protecting Kurdish rights within a unified Syria.

Kurdistan Watch

37,814 views • 6 months ago

Reports in several Turkish outlets (parroted by Kurdish media) claimed a lavish wedding between a Barzani woman and a man from the Izol, a prominent Kurdish tribe in Turkey’s Urfa. The problem? the woman is actually not a Barzani. The story appears to have spread mainly because of the wedding’s extravagance and the heavy gold showered on the bride, much of it seemingly from her family. But the bride’s father, reported as “Abdulkarim Barzani,” is not from the Barzani tribe — the surname is misleading. He is Masoud Barzani’s secretary, known in Kurdistan as Karim Juma’a, and he is from the Gargari tribe, a separate Kurdish tribe that has presence mostly in Nineveh but also Duhok. Still, the scale of the gold and diamonds coming from her side does raise questions, given that her father is publicly known only as Barzani’s secretary. The Izol, for their part, are a large Urfa-based Kurdish tribe that is generally state-friendly and mostly aligned with the AKP and MHP.

Reports in several Turkish outlets (parroted by Kurdish media) claimed a lavish wedding between a Barzani woman and a man from the Izol, a prominent Kurdish tribe in Turkey’s Urfa. The problem? the woman is actually not a Barzani. The story appears to have spread mainly because of the wedding’s extravagance and the heavy gold showered on the bride, much of it seemingly from her family. But the bride’s father, reported as “Abdulkarim Barzani,” is not from the Barzani tribe — the surname is misleading. He is Masoud Barzani’s secretary, known in Kurdistan as Karim Juma’a, and he is from the Gargari tribe, a separate Kurdish tribe that has presence mostly in Nineveh but also Duhok. Still, the scale of the gold and diamonds coming from her side does raise questions, given that her father is publicly known only as Barzani’s secretary. The Izol, for their part, are a large Urfa-based Kurdish tribe that is generally state-friendly and mostly aligned with the AKP and MHP.

Kurdistan Watch

36,366 views • 7 months ago

Breaking News video Turkish President Erdogan has signaled to the Turkish intelligence chief to organize jihadist groups in Syria (a mix of ISIS and al-Qaeda) to prepare for and take over the Kurdish city of Kobani in coming days. For this purpose, and to prepare for the attack, he ordered Abu Mohammed al-Jolani to keep the Kurds occupied with a ceasefire and gain their trust, so that the jihadists can launch a surprise attack while the Kurds believe they will not be attacked due to the agreement with Damascus. To prevent the besieged city of Kobani from receiving assistance from Kurds in Turkey, he ordered deep trenches to be dug along the border to stop Turkish Kurds from crossing to assist Syrian Kurds during the operation . All Turkish-backed jihadists and Syrian army jihadists are said to disguise themselves as ISIS and commit a massive crime against humanity in the city. To avoid legal responsibility, al-Jolani is expected to keep the Kurds occupied with the ceasefire while the Turkish army, Syrian army, and jihadists—disguised as ISIS—take over the city. The attack on Kobani is expected to be far worse than the attack on Kurdish neighbourhoods in Aleppo. Turkey continues to send reinforcements to the jihadists. Turkey has approximately 105,000 radical Islamist jihadists in Syria , all receiving orders from Turkey. Any decision al-Jolani makes in Syria can allegedly be revoked or cancelled at any time by Turkey, and any ceasefire he agrees to is meaningless if it does not pass through the Turkish filter. Note: The Kurdish city of Kobani has been under siege by the Syrian regime and Turkey-backed jihadists. Water, electricity, phone service, and internet access have been cut off for more than 15 days. Ground report, Syria — AM, 30 January 2026, "Save the Kurds Act" , "The Kurdish" " The Kurds " "Kurds in Syria "

Breaking News video Turkish President Erdogan has signaled to the Turkish intelligence chief to organize jihadist groups in Syria (a mix of ISIS and al-Qaeda) to prepare for and take over the Kurdish city of Kobani in coming days. For this purpose, and to prepare for the attack, he ordered Abu Mohammed al-Jolani to keep the Kurds occupied with a ceasefire and gain their trust, so that the jihadists can launch a surprise attack while the Kurds believe they will not be attacked due to the agreement with Damascus. To prevent the besieged city of Kobani from receiving assistance from Kurds in Turkey, he ordered deep trenches to be dug along the border to stop Turkish Kurds from crossing to assist Syrian Kurds during the operation . All Turkish-backed jihadists and Syrian army jihadists are said to disguise themselves as ISIS and commit a massive crime against humanity in the city. To avoid legal responsibility, al-Jolani is expected to keep the Kurds occupied with the ceasefire while the Turkish army, Syrian army, and jihadists—disguised as ISIS—take over the city. The attack on Kobani is expected to be far worse than the attack on Kurdish neighbourhoods in Aleppo. Turkey continues to send reinforcements to the jihadists. Turkey has approximately 105,000 radical Islamist jihadists in Syria , all receiving orders from Turkey. Any decision al-Jolani makes in Syria can allegedly be revoked or cancelled at any time by Turkey, and any ceasefire he agrees to is meaningless if it does not pass through the Turkish filter. Note: The Kurdish city of Kobani has been under siege by the Syrian regime and Turkey-backed jihadists. Water, electricity, phone service, and internet access have been cut off for more than 15 days. Ground report, Syria — AM, 30 January 2026, "Save the Kurds Act" , "The Kurdish" " The Kurds " "Kurds in Syria "

Botin Kurdistani

28,639 views • 6 months ago

A dramatic altercation erupted between Iraqi parliament speaker Haibat Halbousi and second deputy Farhad Atroushi, a KDP Kurd, and it nearly turned physical. Midway through today’s session, a new item was added to the agenda: a vote to confirm the Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, even though it had not been listed originally. As Halbousi moved to put the post to a vote, Atroushi shouted, “By God, I will not accept this from you,” and reached out to block the speaker from proceeding. Halbousi responded sharply: “Oi, don’t put your hand in. This is internal procedure, and I’m going to enforce it.” The dispute continued as the vote went ahead. Arab MPs, both Shia and Sunni, raised their hands in favor. Atroushi protested that they would not accept the vote and shouted, “This vote doesn’t count because the procedure is being violated.” The chaos then escalated as other MPs, mostly from the KDP, joined the confrontation. Unclear if the other non-KDP Kurdish MPs joined the protest. The Iraqi Army Chief of Staff position is widely treated as part of a Kurdish, specifically KDP, quota. However, since the retirement of Babakir Zebari in 2015, it has been held by Abdul Amir Yarallah, an Arab, and has not been returned to a Kurdish nominee, despite KDP efforts to reclaim it. Yarallah, a Shia Arab, is widely viewed as a career soldier rather than a sectarian militia figure. He has served in the Iraqi army since 1984, which also makes him more acceptable to Sunni Arab MPs.

A dramatic altercation erupted between Iraqi parliament speaker Haibat Halbousi and second deputy Farhad Atroushi, a KDP Kurd, and it nearly turned physical. Midway through today’s session, a new item was added to the agenda: a vote to confirm the Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, even though it had not been listed originally. As Halbousi moved to put the post to a vote, Atroushi shouted, “By God, I will not accept this from you,” and reached out to block the speaker from proceeding. Halbousi responded sharply: “Oi, don’t put your hand in. This is internal procedure, and I’m going to enforce it.” The dispute continued as the vote went ahead. Arab MPs, both Shia and Sunni, raised their hands in favor. Atroushi protested that they would not accept the vote and shouted, “This vote doesn’t count because the procedure is being violated.” The chaos then escalated as other MPs, mostly from the KDP, joined the confrontation. Unclear if the other non-KDP Kurdish MPs joined the protest. The Iraqi Army Chief of Staff position is widely treated as part of a Kurdish, specifically KDP, quota. However, since the retirement of Babakir Zebari in 2015, it has been held by Abdul Amir Yarallah, an Arab, and has not been returned to a Kurdish nominee, despite KDP efforts to reclaim it. Yarallah, a Shia Arab, is widely viewed as a career soldier rather than a sectarian militia figure. He has served in the Iraqi army since 1984, which also makes him more acceptable to Sunni Arab MPs.

Kurdistan Watch

16,452 views • 5 months ago

Watch: Turkey is blocking humanitarian aid from reaching the Kurds. Erdogan sheds crocodile tears for Gaza in front of cameras, Qur’an in hand, while he deliberately starves kurds in the city of Kobani in silence. Even they asked to urgently send baby formula, but they didn’t allow it. For more than 15 days, the Kurdish people of Kobane have been systematically denied water, food, electricity, medicine, and even the most basic connection to the outside world. This is not politics. This is the calculated use of suffering as a weapon cruelty enforced by power, and lives paid as the cost. While the city of Kobane is just a few kilometres away from Turkey, the barbaric Erdogan regime says that you have send it to Damascus, which is thousands of kilometres away, then you can collect it from there. Twenty-five more trucks were stopped by Turkish police at the entrance to the Suruç district. The trucks are not being allowed to pass vido: "Save the Kurds Act" "Kurds in Syria " " Kurdish "

Watch: Turkey is blocking humanitarian aid from reaching the Kurds. Erdogan sheds crocodile tears for Gaza in front of cameras, Qur’an in hand, while he deliberately starves kurds in the city of Kobani in silence. Even they asked to urgently send baby formula, but they didn’t allow it. For more than 15 days, the Kurdish people of Kobane have been systematically denied water, food, electricity, medicine, and even the most basic connection to the outside world. This is not politics. This is the calculated use of suffering as a weapon cruelty enforced by power, and lives paid as the cost. While the city of Kobane is just a few kilometres away from Turkey, the barbaric Erdogan regime says that you have send it to Damascus, which is thousands of kilometres away, then you can collect it from there. Twenty-five more trucks were stopped by Turkish police at the entrance to the Suruç district. The trucks are not being allowed to pass vido: "Save the Kurds Act" "Kurds in Syria " " Kurdish "

Botin Kurdistani

12,418 views • 6 months ago

Syrian forces have released dozens of children from the SDF run al-Aqtan prison in Raqqa after taking control of the facility, with footage showing malnourished boys running out of the gates and sprinting towards freedom. The children described being starved, placed in solitary confinement, doused with water, whipped and electrocuted, with one 15 year old sentenced to seven years in prison and a 9 year old also seen in the footage. The SDF was previously known as the YPG, which rebranded as the Syrian Democratic Forces under a US strategy amid scrutiny over its conduct and links to terrorism. The controversial group is widely regarded as the Syrian arm of the PKK, a group designated as terrorists by the US, UK, EU and Turkey. It consists predominantly of Kurdish and Armenian fighters, and has long been aligned with US and Israeli interests in Syria, including controlling oil rich regions in the country’s northeast. The US has now largely ended its backing of the SDF as its role in Syria is said to have “largely expired” and Washington shifts support toward Damascus under a new ceasefire and integration framework with the Syrian government.

Syrian forces have released dozens of children from the SDF run al-Aqtan prison in Raqqa after taking control of the facility, with footage showing malnourished boys running out of the gates and sprinting towards freedom. The children described being starved, placed in solitary confinement, doused with water, whipped and electrocuted, with one 15 year old sentenced to seven years in prison and a 9 year old also seen in the footage. The SDF was previously known as the YPG, which rebranded as the Syrian Democratic Forces under a US strategy amid scrutiny over its conduct and links to terrorism. The controversial group is widely regarded as the Syrian arm of the PKK, a group designated as terrorists by the US, UK, EU and Turkey. It consists predominantly of Kurdish and Armenian fighters, and has long been aligned with US and Israeli interests in Syria, including controlling oil rich regions in the country’s northeast. The US has now largely ended its backing of the SDF as its role in Syria is said to have “largely expired” and Washington shifts support toward Damascus under a new ceasefire and integration framework with the Syrian government.

Middle East Eye

19,040 views • 6 months ago

The SDF/YPG should thank their lucky stars for Al Sharaa. Once a jihadi, now a statesman, he’s done everything possible to solve the PKK problem peacefully- even blocking Turkish operations against them. But history matters. The PYD was born in 2003 as the PKK’s Syrian branch, openly backed by Assad to manipulate Kurdish grievances. Damascus armed them, trained them, and let them operate freely. Only a third of the PKK fighters back then were Syrian. By 2012, PKK fronts like TEV-DEM controlled Syrian Kurdistan. The U.S. then rebranded them as the “SDF” to hide their terrorist ties. Five months after the March deal, Damascus is losing patience. The SDF must integrate into the Syrian state- no more victim games, no more double-dealing. Damascus has already offered more than enough. Push your luck, and the next “negotiation” will be fought on the battlefield.

The SDF/YPG should thank their lucky stars for Al Sharaa. Once a jihadi, now a statesman, he’s done everything possible to solve the PKK problem peacefully- even blocking Turkish operations against them. But history matters. The PYD was born in 2003 as the PKK’s Syrian branch, openly backed by Assad to manipulate Kurdish grievances. Damascus armed them, trained them, and let them operate freely. Only a third of the PKK fighters back then were Syrian. By 2012, PKK fronts like TEV-DEM controlled Syrian Kurdistan. The U.S. then rebranded them as the “SDF” to hide their terrorist ties. Five months after the March deal, Damascus is losing patience. The SDF must integrate into the Syrian state- no more victim games, no more double-dealing. Damascus has already offered more than enough. Push your luck, and the next “negotiation” will be fought on the battlefield.

𝐌𝐢𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐞𝐥 𝐀𝐫𝐢𝐳𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐢

35,659 views • 1 year ago

While walking through one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world, Damascus, you will stumble upon many Christian traditions. One of them is this bakery, which has been serving the Church for over 100 years. For more than a century, St. Hanania Bakery, also known as Abu Suleiman Bakery, has carried on a unique mission. Founded around 1910 by Elias Salmoon, the tradition continues today through the families of the late Gries and Mousa Salmoon, preserving the sacred craft of baking bread for Holy Communion and passing this blessed heritage from one generation to the next. The bakery is also home to one of the first dough-kneading machines introduced in Syria. In the past, families from across Damascus would gather here before Christmas and Easter to prepare their festive breads and cakes. More than a century later, the same machine is still in use, standing as a reminder of a living tradition that continues to this day. #syria #Damascus #EasternChristians #ChristianityInTheMiddleEast #christianity

While walking through one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world, Damascus, you will stumble upon many Christian traditions. One of them is this bakery, which has been serving the Church for over 100 years. For more than a century, St. Hanania Bakery, also known as Abu Suleiman Bakery, has carried on a unique mission. Founded around 1910 by Elias Salmoon, the tradition continues today through the families of the late Gries and Mousa Salmoon, preserving the sacred craft of baking bread for Holy Communion and passing this blessed heritage from one generation to the next. The bakery is also home to one of the first dough-kneading machines introduced in Syria. In the past, families from across Damascus would gather here before Christmas and Easter to prepare their festive breads and cakes. More than a century later, the same machine is still in use, standing as a reminder of a living tradition that continues to this day. #syria #Damascus #EasternChristians #ChristianityInTheMiddleEast #christianity

Eastern christians

23,101 views • 2 months ago

Taj Kurdish, a founder of the SDF-linked North Press (NP) and a collaborator with FRANCE 24, is also closely connected to the CJTFOIR. He has been posting on Facebook to glorify the SDF/YPG terrorist responsible for the massacre in Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) against Arab civilians—a massacre he filmed himself committing. In one post, Taj wrote: "This person deserves all the respect, may God honor your roots. I will make a picture of him and hang it in my house." On his Facebook page, he also uses a notorious racist phrase, "The Arabs are the most severe in disbelief and hypocrisy," often used to justify atrocities against Arab tribal communities. Additionally, his bio states, "no integration with the Joulani," sending a divisive and hostile message. Meanwhile, France 24 recently published an investigation confirming the massacre and directly implicating the SDF/YPG. This public figure exemplifies the true face of SDF/YPG/PKK social media: vile, racist, and disgraceful in Arabic and Kurdish, while their English platforms fabricate stories of violations against Kurds that never occurred. On the ground, the reality is the opposite—they are committing mass killings and humiliating Arabs to provoke a civil war, only to exploit it later for their propaganda. #Syria

Taj Kurdish, a founder of the SDF-linked North Press (NP) and a collaborator with FRANCE 24, is also closely connected to the CJTFOIR. He has been posting on Facebook to glorify the SDF/YPG terrorist responsible for the massacre in Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) against Arab civilians—a massacre he filmed himself committing. In one post, Taj wrote: "This person deserves all the respect, may God honor your roots. I will make a picture of him and hang it in my house." On his Facebook page, he also uses a notorious racist phrase, "The Arabs are the most severe in disbelief and hypocrisy," often used to justify atrocities against Arab tribal communities. Additionally, his bio states, "no integration with the Joulani," sending a divisive and hostile message. Meanwhile, France 24 recently published an investigation confirming the massacre and directly implicating the SDF/YPG. This public figure exemplifies the true face of SDF/YPG/PKK social media: vile, racist, and disgraceful in Arabic and Kurdish, while their English platforms fabricate stories of violations against Kurds that never occurred. On the ground, the reality is the opposite—they are committing mass killings and humiliating Arabs to provoke a civil war, only to exploit it later for their propaganda. #Syria

Mzahem Alsaloum

77,970 views • 6 months ago