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The ongoing 🇮🇷-🇮🇱 fire exchange is kept limited by both sides for now Iran never committed its missile forces to a scale that would enable its 'Airpower Suppression' concept to full effect Instead it went for a minimalist but highly efficient and effective attrition operation mode. The 'Airpower Suppression'... concept would target a weak link in Israel's airpower, such as the support aircraft section at Nevatim airbase (tankers, jammers, airborne-radar) An area target, several kilometers large, but not well hardened. With plenty of soft, mission-critical assets like maintenance hangars Then over the timespan of e.g. 10 days, every ~5 hours one Khorramshahr-4 with submunition payload, or alternatively 3 older Ghadr ballistic missiles would be launched against it. This would for both disrupt effective operations as well as devastate the base and render it inoperable within those 10 days. ➡️ Hence just 100 Khorramshahr-4 or 300 Ghadr missile would be sufficient to neutralize that critical link for Israel's airpower Now, since the U.S. would jump in to replace those support assets, it would not make a very big difference operationally at this time The graphic below shows the damage those 100 Khorramshahr would cause -8000 x 25kg Submunitions with 15m shrapnel damage distance assumed - High dispersion of up to 5,5km between two outlier submunitions due to early exo-atmospheric release (Statistical Normal distribution) ➡️ The density of the > mach 3 impacting submunitions would be high enough to devastate that airbase area for a long period ~1000 Khorramshahr hence would be enough to cause such havoc at all Israeli Airbases But Iran won't commit its missile forces to such a scale at this low escalation levelshow more

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Backing Off on Attacks Against Iran At the request of Arab countries and Israel, the US has decided to indefinitely postpone plans to attack Iran. There are three points in this equation: 1 - Missiles would fly toward Israel without the country having prepared for it; 2 - The Strait of Hormuz would be closed, causing immense losses to oil-producing countries; 3 - American assets in the region would not be sufficient. I’ve said it several times here: Iran is a big player. In the 12-day war, the Iranian navy stayed out of the conflict, but today, knowing that the attack would be aimed at regime change, the Iranians would use everything they have. In those 12 days they practically lost nothing of their arsenal; not even long-range defense systems were destroyed. They hid everything, from aircraft to long range batteries. But today they would fight with everything they have. And that mainly means their three primary anti-ship missiles: Abu Mahdi, Talaiyeh, and Ghadr-380 (Qadr-380). All three with a range of 1,000–1,700 km. That is power not only to close the Strait of Hormuz, but to do the same in the Gulf of Aden and the part of Arabian Sea, causing chaos in the markets. How to take the opportunity and support the riots, without risking the main global trade route? A country of 90 million inhabitants that is as well-armed as Iran is not one that external agents can decide overnight to attack and change its government. For more than 50 years, the CIA and Mossad have been trying to overthrow the Iranian government without success. Now the regime is in a fragile moment, under popular pressure, but when we talk about Iran, nothing is so clear. The US options are limited to selective strikes, far from anything that could implode the regime. The truth is that anything of greater magnitude would put the regime in survival mode, attacking Israel, American bases, closing ship transit, and halting global markets. But I don’t think the US and Israel will let this opportunity pass so easily. New chapters will follow.

Backing Off on Attacks Against Iran At the request of Arab countries and Israel, the US has decided to indefinitely postpone plans to attack Iran. There are three points in this equation: 1 - Missiles would fly toward Israel without the country having prepared for it; 2 - The Strait of Hormuz would be closed, causing immense losses to oil-producing countries; 3 - American assets in the region would not be sufficient. I’ve said it several times here: Iran is a big player. In the 12-day war, the Iranian navy stayed out of the conflict, but today, knowing that the attack would be aimed at regime change, the Iranians would use everything they have. In those 12 days they practically lost nothing of their arsenal; not even long-range defense systems were destroyed. They hid everything, from aircraft to long range batteries. But today they would fight with everything they have. And that mainly means their three primary anti-ship missiles: Abu Mahdi, Talaiyeh, and Ghadr-380 (Qadr-380). All three with a range of 1,000–1,700 km. That is power not only to close the Strait of Hormuz, but to do the same in the Gulf of Aden and the part of Arabian Sea, causing chaos in the markets. How to take the opportunity and support the riots, without risking the main global trade route? A country of 90 million inhabitants that is as well-armed as Iran is not one that external agents can decide overnight to attack and change its government. For more than 50 years, the CIA and Mossad have been trying to overthrow the Iranian government without success. Now the regime is in a fragile moment, under popular pressure, but when we talk about Iran, nothing is so clear. The US options are limited to selective strikes, far from anything that could implode the regime. The truth is that anything of greater magnitude would put the regime in survival mode, attacking Israel, American bases, closing ship transit, and halting global markets. But I don’t think the US and Israel will let this opportunity pass so easily. New chapters will follow.

Patricia Marins

100,478 views • 8 months ago

Why Jamming the Venezuelan Systems Is Unlikely Well, when I hear about jamming in Venezuela, I immediately picture the Americans talking about the EA-18G Growler with the NGJ. The NGJ is specifically designed to degrade advanced Russian radars, with high power and directional AESA beams. To cover an area the size of Caracas would require multiple squadrons, and there were indeed a lot of birds in the sky, but… jamming such a large area with diverse systems on high alert is extremely complex and improbable. The radars of the S-300VM use rapid frequency hopping to avoid continuous jamming, along with LPI modes that reduce the radar’s signature, making it difficult for jammers like the NGJ to detect and interfere. The Buk-M2 has similar ECCM capabilities, with high resistance to noise jamming. This isn’t to say the Americans can’t do it, but sustaining it continuously across so many dispersed batteries is unlikely. Additionally, both the Buk-M2 and the Pechora-2M have electro-optical/TV/IR channels as backups, allowing tracking without active radar in heavy jamming scenarios. If they were being operated, it would have been impossible for those helicopters to fly over Caracas. And finally, systems like the S-300 have Home-on-Jam (HOJ) capability, a mode in which the missile is fired directly at the jamming source (electronic interference) as a passive target. With so many aircraft in the sky, I’d say it would be impossible to shut down all the radars in perfect synchronization against a hypersonic missile. Lastly, there are the MANPADS that were not used. We saw helicopters flying extremely low with no reaction whatsoever from MANPADS, which would have been effective in that situation. Well, this has nothing to do with jammers and everything to do with orders not to fire. I’m not here saying that American EW with F-35 + Growler + NGJ cannot overcome these defenses in some scenarios, but rather stating that, given the scale and the conditions, it is unlikely that this is the reason for the silence of the Venezuelan air defenses.

Why Jamming the Venezuelan Systems Is Unlikely Well, when I hear about jamming in Venezuela, I immediately picture the Americans talking about the EA-18G Growler with the NGJ. The NGJ is specifically designed to degrade advanced Russian radars, with high power and directional AESA beams. To cover an area the size of Caracas would require multiple squadrons, and there were indeed a lot of birds in the sky, but… jamming such a large area with diverse systems on high alert is extremely complex and improbable. The radars of the S-300VM use rapid frequency hopping to avoid continuous jamming, along with LPI modes that reduce the radar’s signature, making it difficult for jammers like the NGJ to detect and interfere. The Buk-M2 has similar ECCM capabilities, with high resistance to noise jamming. This isn’t to say the Americans can’t do it, but sustaining it continuously across so many dispersed batteries is unlikely. Additionally, both the Buk-M2 and the Pechora-2M have electro-optical/TV/IR channels as backups, allowing tracking without active radar in heavy jamming scenarios. If they were being operated, it would have been impossible for those helicopters to fly over Caracas. And finally, systems like the S-300 have Home-on-Jam (HOJ) capability, a mode in which the missile is fired directly at the jamming source (electronic interference) as a passive target. With so many aircraft in the sky, I’d say it would be impossible to shut down all the radars in perfect synchronization against a hypersonic missile. Lastly, there are the MANPADS that were not used. We saw helicopters flying extremely low with no reaction whatsoever from MANPADS, which would have been effective in that situation. Well, this has nothing to do with jammers and everything to do with orders not to fire. I’m not here saying that American EW with F-35 + Growler + NGJ cannot overcome these defenses in some scenarios, but rather stating that, given the scale and the conditions, it is unlikely that this is the reason for the silence of the Venezuelan air defenses.

Patricia Marins

386,162 views • 8 months ago

Iran continues to wipe out Israeli and American assets in the Middle East while Trump and the Epstein clique scramble to find an offramp. The Straight of Hormuz remains closed! The IRGC announced the launch of the 43rd missile wave targeting the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Tel Aviv, and Eilat. According to the IRGC, the strike involved Khorramshahr missiles with 2-ton warheads, as well as Emad and Kheibar Shekan missiles carrying 1-ton warheads. Iranian missile forces wrote “Vaccine for pedos – Made in Iran” on a ballistic missile before launching it toward a U.S. military base. Iran has stepped up attacks on American warships! US Energy Secretary Chris Wright stated that the deployment of US warships to escort tankers in the Persian Gulf will happen "relatively soon, but not now". According to him, it's impossible to do this right now because the US is simply not ready for it. Given that the IRGC would consider it an honor to sink an American destroyer where it's easiest to reach it, the task facing the US is not trivial. Meanwhile the kosher mafia criminals continue to flee occupied Palestine like the rats they are! Check out this top gun pilot! An American F/A-18F aircraft crashed while attempting to land on the aircraft carrier "Abraham Lincoln" after returning from a bombing mission in Iran. The ejection seat failed to deploy, causing the plane to crash into the water. The pilot was successfully rescued!

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Truth_teller 🇷🇺

40,477 views • 6 months ago

Kudos to Kevin Kisner getting the REAL issue when it comes to the modern golf ball… While discussing the ball Ray Floyd used to win the 1986 U.S. Open at Shinnecock, he correctly references SPIN more than SPEED. Yes, the modern ball flys WAY farther, but the easiest fix would be to mandate more spin on the ball. The worst part of the ball traveling insane distances is that, because of no real spin, the mishits do not go off line NEARLY as much as they used to. If the spin returned, hitting a 350 yard drive would carry with it the HUGE risk of a mishit heading for deep trouble, even bringing many out of bounds back into play. As a result, not only would hitting a driver create far more drama than it currently does, it would cause most players to self regulate by hitting 3-woods and irons off the tee to keep the ball in play. This would effectively solve the distance problem because it would cause significantly longer shots to be played into the greens. Please, USGA PGA of America PGA of AmericaTOUR The Masters The R&A THIS is the path!

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John Ziegler

549,883 views • 3 months ago

Elon just clarified the plan for building the TERAFAB. The Advanced Technology Fab built at Giga Texas will not be “the TERAFAB.” It will be a smaller fab where they will iterate on chip designs. The TERAFAB wouldn’t even fit on the Giga Texas campus. Several sites for the TERAFAB are under consideration, and it will need thousands of acres and over 10 GW of power at full scale. My opinion: To put this in perspective, Tesla would need 2,000-5,000 acres for the entire TERAFAB lot. This would equal ~87-200 million square feet of available land space for power and battery backup with Megapacks, with ~20-60 million square feet of available space for the actual building. Just for reference, backing up a facility like this with a ~5-15 minute battery backup would require 168 Megapacks and it would for sure need its own power production such as natural gas turbines or maybe even its own dedicated power plant. Here's Grok's representation of the Tesla TERAFAB!

Elon just clarified the plan for building the TERAFAB. The Advanced Technology Fab built at Giga Texas will not be “the TERAFAB.” It will be a smaller fab where they will iterate on chip designs. The TERAFAB wouldn’t even fit on the Giga Texas campus. Several sites for the TERAFAB are under consideration, and it will need thousands of acres and over 10 GW of power at full scale. My opinion: To put this in perspective, Tesla would need 2,000-5,000 acres for the entire TERAFAB lot. This would equal ~87-200 million square feet of available land space for power and battery backup with Megapacks, with ~20-60 million square feet of available space for the actual building. Just for reference, backing up a facility like this with a ~5-15 minute battery backup would require 168 Megapacks and it would for sure need its own power production such as natural gas turbines or maybe even its own dedicated power plant. Here's Grok's representation of the Tesla TERAFAB!

Overly Trev

719,071 views • 6 months ago

🇮🇱🇮🇷 The massive explosion in Beit Shemesh was at the Tomer Company, Israel's government defense firm that builds the rocket engines for Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 missile interceptors. The systems Israel uses to shoot down Iranian ballistic missiles. Here's why the "controlled explosion" explanation doesn't hold up: Controlled detonations require advance public notification. There was none. Emergency services were scrambled immediately to respond. You don't scramble emergency services to something that was planned. And the scale of the blast is consistent with one thing: rocket motor propellant or solid fuel igniting unexpectedly. Which makes complete sense for a facility that manufactures rocket propulsion systems. The most likely explanation: an accident during testing or production. But the timing is worth sitting with. Iran just escalated for the first time on its own terms, not in response to U.S. action, but initiating. A more emboldened Iran than the one that entered this ceasefire. An accident at Israel's most critical missile defense facility is the probable answer. Sabotage, at exactly this moment, at exactly this target, cannot be fully ruled out.

🇮🇱🇮🇷 The massive explosion in Beit Shemesh was at the Tomer Company, Israel's government defense firm that builds the rocket engines for Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 missile interceptors. The systems Israel uses to shoot down Iranian ballistic missiles. Here's why the "controlled explosion" explanation doesn't hold up: Controlled detonations require advance public notification. There was none. Emergency services were scrambled immediately to respond. You don't scramble emergency services to something that was planned. And the scale of the blast is consistent with one thing: rocket motor propellant or solid fuel igniting unexpectedly. Which makes complete sense for a facility that manufactures rocket propulsion systems. The most likely explanation: an accident during testing or production. But the timing is worth sitting with. Iran just escalated for the first time on its own terms, not in response to U.S. action, but initiating. A more emboldened Iran than the one that entered this ceasefire. An accident at Israel's most critical missile defense facility is the probable answer. Sabotage, at exactly this moment, at exactly this target, cannot be fully ruled out.

Mario Nawfal

759,954 views • 4 months ago

BREAKING: Iran fired ballistic missiles at Tel Aviv overnight using cluster munitions. Process what that means. A conventional warhead hits one point. A cluster warhead releases dozens of submunitions, each weighing 2 to 5 kilograms of high-explosive fragmentation, scattering across a wide area after re-entry. One missile becomes dozens of weapons. The fire rate has collapsed from 90 missiles per day on Day 1 to approximately 10 on Day 24. Iran has 140 launchers remaining. The mathematics of 10 missiles per day sounds manageable until each missile contains a warhead that multiplies into dozens of independent kill zones across a city. Overnight impacts confirmed in the Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan area. Sirens across central Israel. Kiryat Shmona hit again in the north. Damage to buildings. Injuries reported. Magen David Adom responding. The IDF confirms cluster submunitions were deployed. Footage shows dispersal patterns consistent with Khorramshahr-4 warheads, each carrying 1,500 kilograms at Mach 8 to 16 with MIRV-capable cluster dispensers. Israel’s multi-layered defence is designed to intercept the parent missile before dispersal. Iron Dome handles short and medium range. David’s Sling covers the intermediate gap. Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 engage ballistic threats at altitude. The strategy works when the intercept happens above the dispersal altitude. When it does not, when a missile penetrates the outer layers and reaches its terminal phase, the submunitions scatter and no system can intercept dozens of 2-kilogram bomblets falling across a residential area simultaneously. Iran has lost 70 percent of its launchers. Its fire rate is 89 percent lower than Day 1. Its navy is destroyed. Its air force is gone. And it is still putting cluster munitions over Tel Aviv. That is not desperation. That is adaptation. Iran cannot match the volume of Day 1. So it changed the payload. Fewer missiles, each one carrying more weapons inside it. The fire rate declined. The lethality per round increased. The shift from conventional to cluster warheads is Iran compensating for launcher attrition with warhead complexity. The arithmetic of the war just changed from “how many missiles” to “how many submunitions per missile.” This is what makes the electricity ledger so dangerous. Iran has publicly absorbed strikes on hospitals, schools, and emergency centres without reciprocating against equivalent Israeli civilian infrastructure. It is conserving its 140 remaining launchers for the one target category it has reserved: electricity. If the 5-day power-plant pause collapses Saturday and Trump executes his threat, those 140 launchers will fire cluster-armed Khorramshahr-4s at Gulf and Israeli power stations, desalination plants, and grid nodes. A single cluster warhead detonating over a transformer yard does not damage it. It saturates it with dozens of bomblets that destroy equipment across the entire facility footprint. Cluster munitions are not designed for military targets. They are designed for area denial. And a power grid is the ultimate area target. Saturday is four days away. The launchers are armed with cluster warheads. The ledger is open. The targets are named. The only thing standing between the cluster munitions and the grid is a 5-day pause announced on a social media platform that Iran says does not correspond to any agreement it has made.

BREAKING: Iran fired ballistic missiles at Tel Aviv overnight using cluster munitions. Process what that means. A conventional warhead hits one point. A cluster warhead releases dozens of submunitions, each weighing 2 to 5 kilograms of high-explosive fragmentation, scattering across a wide area after re-entry. One missile becomes dozens of weapons. The fire rate has collapsed from 90 missiles per day on Day 1 to approximately 10 on Day 24. Iran has 140 launchers remaining. The mathematics of 10 missiles per day sounds manageable until each missile contains a warhead that multiplies into dozens of independent kill zones across a city. Overnight impacts confirmed in the Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan area. Sirens across central Israel. Kiryat Shmona hit again in the north. Damage to buildings. Injuries reported. Magen David Adom responding. The IDF confirms cluster submunitions were deployed. Footage shows dispersal patterns consistent with Khorramshahr-4 warheads, each carrying 1,500 kilograms at Mach 8 to 16 with MIRV-capable cluster dispensers. Israel’s multi-layered defence is designed to intercept the parent missile before dispersal. Iron Dome handles short and medium range. David’s Sling covers the intermediate gap. Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 engage ballistic threats at altitude. The strategy works when the intercept happens above the dispersal altitude. When it does not, when a missile penetrates the outer layers and reaches its terminal phase, the submunitions scatter and no system can intercept dozens of 2-kilogram bomblets falling across a residential area simultaneously. Iran has lost 70 percent of its launchers. Its fire rate is 89 percent lower than Day 1. Its navy is destroyed. Its air force is gone. And it is still putting cluster munitions over Tel Aviv. That is not desperation. That is adaptation. Iran cannot match the volume of Day 1. So it changed the payload. Fewer missiles, each one carrying more weapons inside it. The fire rate declined. The lethality per round increased. The shift from conventional to cluster warheads is Iran compensating for launcher attrition with warhead complexity. The arithmetic of the war just changed from “how many missiles” to “how many submunitions per missile.” This is what makes the electricity ledger so dangerous. Iran has publicly absorbed strikes on hospitals, schools, and emergency centres without reciprocating against equivalent Israeli civilian infrastructure. It is conserving its 140 remaining launchers for the one target category it has reserved: electricity. If the 5-day power-plant pause collapses Saturday and Trump executes his threat, those 140 launchers will fire cluster-armed Khorramshahr-4s at Gulf and Israeli power stations, desalination plants, and grid nodes. A single cluster warhead detonating over a transformer yard does not damage it. It saturates it with dozens of bomblets that destroy equipment across the entire facility footprint. Cluster munitions are not designed for military targets. They are designed for area denial. And a power grid is the ultimate area target. Saturday is four days away. The launchers are armed with cluster warheads. The ledger is open. The targets are named. The only thing standing between the cluster munitions and the grid is a 5-day pause announced on a social media platform that Iran says does not correspond to any agreement it has made.

Shanaka Anslem Perera ⚡

72,496 views • 5 months ago

What if any preparations have you seen Iran make ahead of the war? Can you discuss It’s missile capabilities? Any intelligence capabilities? Any surprises it might happen in store? When the 12-day war ended, I estimated that Iran would need about six months to recover, including its nuclear program. Contrary to popular belief, Iran did not lose its entire long-range or medium-range air defense network; while some launchers were damaged, the primary targets of the Israeli strikes were the radar systems. Once the radars were neutralized, Iran successfully hid the bulk of its remaining batteries, leaving much of its arsenal intact. In contrast, short-range systems like the Tor-M1 and domestic variants were heavily engaged against cruise missiles, often being lost or damaged only after their ammunition was completely exhausted. Since then, Iran has worked to rebuild its destroyed radar network and, above all, to implement a genuine counterintelligence doctrine. The Mossad operations against Iranian radars and air defense systems have shaped new perimeter defense and counterintelligence doctrines not only in Iran but in other countries as well. If we look at the quantity of weapons and the organization of armed groups during Iran’s most recent protests, I would say the problem of foreign intelligence operations inside the country remains severe. This seriously threatens much of Iran’s capabilities, and I foresee a wave of sabotage operations as a new war draws closer. Iran has begun receiving collaboration from China across multiple areas,from satellites to internal counterintelligence, but it may still take some time for this to produce tangible results. During the last years, the Mossad relied heavily on cell phones, using SMS for recruitment and accessing device GPS for target location. Iran has since focused intensely on preventing any repetition of this, and on this specific issue, the Chinese appear to have provided support. Although foreign intelligence services have operated extensively inside Iran, the scale of any armed opposition groups is negligible compared to the Iranian armed forces, which could still draw on allied paramilitaries and militias in neighboring countries, including the Houthis. Iran has become a missile power with a stockpile far larger than Western estimates suggest. As early as 1998, Iran was already producing missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, and it has continued doing so ever since, developing 12 to 15 different models in that range - meaning all are capable of reaching Israel. That is nearly 30 years of continuous missile production, resulting in a stockpile of several thousands. Another area where Iran has emerged as a global power is drones, including underwater ones. Iran’s UUVs have evolved rapidly into mass-produced models with integrated AI, and I believe they hold some major surprises in reserve. A key point today is that the AN/TPY-2 radars, which played a critical role in tracking Iranian missiles, would be among the first targets to be engaged. These high-powered X-band radars are the backbone of regional missile defense, providing essential data to THAAD and Patriot batteries. However, because they are large, stationary, and emit high-energy signals, they are highly vulnerable to a first-strike or saturation attack, which would effectively 'blind' the entire defensive network. Obviously, a defense budget of nearly one trillion dollars cannot be compared to Iran’s, but the real question is whether the cost and effort are worth the potential casualties. Even without Israel, the Americans maintain an immense advantage in aerial operations over Iran; however, as I have stated before, this superiority does not translate to the maritime theater.

What if any preparations have you seen Iran make ahead of the war? Can you discuss It’s missile capabilities? Any intelligence capabilities? Any surprises it might happen in store? When the 12-day war ended, I estimated that Iran would need about six months to recover, including its nuclear program. Contrary to popular belief, Iran did not lose its entire long-range or medium-range air defense network; while some launchers were damaged, the primary targets of the Israeli strikes were the radar systems. Once the radars were neutralized, Iran successfully hid the bulk of its remaining batteries, leaving much of its arsenal intact. In contrast, short-range systems like the Tor-M1 and domestic variants were heavily engaged against cruise missiles, often being lost or damaged only after their ammunition was completely exhausted. Since then, Iran has worked to rebuild its destroyed radar network and, above all, to implement a genuine counterintelligence doctrine. The Mossad operations against Iranian radars and air defense systems have shaped new perimeter defense and counterintelligence doctrines not only in Iran but in other countries as well. If we look at the quantity of weapons and the organization of armed groups during Iran’s most recent protests, I would say the problem of foreign intelligence operations inside the country remains severe. This seriously threatens much of Iran’s capabilities, and I foresee a wave of sabotage operations as a new war draws closer. Iran has begun receiving collaboration from China across multiple areas,from satellites to internal counterintelligence, but it may still take some time for this to produce tangible results. During the last years, the Mossad relied heavily on cell phones, using SMS for recruitment and accessing device GPS for target location. Iran has since focused intensely on preventing any repetition of this, and on this specific issue, the Chinese appear to have provided support. Although foreign intelligence services have operated extensively inside Iran, the scale of any armed opposition groups is negligible compared to the Iranian armed forces, which could still draw on allied paramilitaries and militias in neighboring countries, including the Houthis. Iran has become a missile power with a stockpile far larger than Western estimates suggest. As early as 1998, Iran was already producing missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, and it has continued doing so ever since, developing 12 to 15 different models in that range - meaning all are capable of reaching Israel. That is nearly 30 years of continuous missile production, resulting in a stockpile of several thousands. Another area where Iran has emerged as a global power is drones, including underwater ones. Iran’s UUVs have evolved rapidly into mass-produced models with integrated AI, and I believe they hold some major surprises in reserve. A key point today is that the AN/TPY-2 radars, which played a critical role in tracking Iranian missiles, would be among the first targets to be engaged. These high-powered X-band radars are the backbone of regional missile defense, providing essential data to THAAD and Patriot batteries. However, because they are large, stationary, and emit high-energy signals, they are highly vulnerable to a first-strike or saturation attack, which would effectively 'blind' the entire defensive network. Obviously, a defense budget of nearly one trillion dollars cannot be compared to Iran’s, but the real question is whether the cost and effort are worth the potential casualties. Even without Israel, the Americans maintain an immense advantage in aerial operations over Iran; however, as I have stated before, this superiority does not translate to the maritime theater.

Patricia Marins

21,142 views • 6 months ago

We are approaching the six-month mark since the conclusion of Operation "Epic Fury", and satellite imagery indicates that Iran is still clearing debris from its aboveground ballistic missile production infrastructure. As of today, the network has yet to be restored, and there are no visible indications that Iran has resumed manufacturing new ballistic missiles for its arsenal. Limited activity involving simpler components may be taking place at concealed locations outside the known complexes. More sophisticated systems, however, depend on specialized infrastructure that would require considerably more time to restore and bring back online. At the same time, Iran appears increasingly interested in relocating key manufacturing capabilities underground, as I reported several days ago regarding the Shahrud complex. This may also help explain the lack of significant reconstruction at the known aboveground facilities. Moving these capabilities underground would provide critical infrastructure with substantially greater protection from airstrikes, and it increasingly appears that this is the direction Iran is pursuing ahead of any future conflict. The video below shows ongoing debris clearing operations at the Malard military industrial complex, west of Tehran. In the lower portion of the imagery, debris can be seen being dispersed on ground.

We are approaching the six-month mark since the conclusion of Operation "Epic Fury", and satellite imagery indicates that Iran is still clearing debris from its aboveground ballistic missile production infrastructure. As of today, the network has yet to be restored, and there are no visible indications that Iran has resumed manufacturing new ballistic missiles for its arsenal. Limited activity involving simpler components may be taking place at concealed locations outside the known complexes. More sophisticated systems, however, depend on specialized infrastructure that would require considerably more time to restore and bring back online. At the same time, Iran appears increasingly interested in relocating key manufacturing capabilities underground, as I reported several days ago regarding the Shahrud complex. This may also help explain the lack of significant reconstruction at the known aboveground facilities. Moving these capabilities underground would provide critical infrastructure with substantially greater protection from airstrikes, and it increasingly appears that this is the direction Iran is pursuing ahead of any future conflict. The video below shows ongoing debris clearing operations at the Malard military industrial complex, west of Tehran. In the lower portion of the imagery, debris can be seen being dispersed on ground.

Ben Tzion Macales

10,550 views • 13 days ago

Iran is improving and beginning to use more accurate missiles. The Iranians destroyed an Arrow or David Sling launcher that had expended all its ammunition but was unable to intercept the Iranian missile. This indicates that Iran is now collecting intelligence on the positioning of Israeli air defense batteries and targeting them with the confidence of their missile superiority. Yesterday, I mentioned the low number of defensive missiles Israel has for both Arrow 2/3 and David Sling, leading me to believe that at the current rate, these systems would run out of ammunition in no more than 15 days. The production of David Sling missiles has been ongoing for the past seven years, with an estimated 100–200 missiles produced annually. The numbers of Arrow 2/3 interceptors are even lower—despite being older, their production is more expensive and slower. Concerned about this situation, Israel has requested support from the THAAD system and the Nimitz group to assist with interceptions. But this keep being a serious issue for Israel.

Iran is improving and beginning to use more accurate missiles. The Iranians destroyed an Arrow or David Sling launcher that had expended all its ammunition but was unable to intercept the Iranian missile. This indicates that Iran is now collecting intelligence on the positioning of Israeli air defense batteries and targeting them with the confidence of their missile superiority. Yesterday, I mentioned the low number of defensive missiles Israel has for both Arrow 2/3 and David Sling, leading me to believe that at the current rate, these systems would run out of ammunition in no more than 15 days. The production of David Sling missiles has been ongoing for the past seven years, with an estimated 100–200 missiles produced annually. The numbers of Arrow 2/3 interceptors are even lower—despite being older, their production is more expensive and slower. Concerned about this situation, Israel has requested support from the THAAD system and the Nimitz group to assist with interceptions. But this keep being a serious issue for Israel.

Patricia Marins

868,089 views • 1 year ago

$IREN "we haven't disclosed the specific amount of GPUs" 1. 🤮 reminds me of $NBIS 2. Setting a terrible precedent here for future deals 3. Making it purposely difficult, to not let analysts properly value your 2027 revenue 4. Increasing the polarized view on IREN by the market However: "approximately 60MW of air-cooled Blackwells" 1. You typically don't talk about gross capacity in a deployment like this 2. If it would be gross capacity, the GPU hour rate at IT level would be crazy high (at PUE 1.2, $680m / 50 = 13.6m/MW) 3. At 60MW IT load, and ~14kW draw at DGX server level, we can get to ~4,286 DGX systems with 8 GPUs per. 4. Based on this we can conclude that 60MW of IT load can run approximately 34k DGX B300. 5. 34k DGX B300 at $680m/yr, would represent a GPU hour price of $2.28 Now this is the problem with not disclosing your GPU quantity. You purposely make your business model look bad, because by approach, you get to a GPU hour price that would imply a payback period of 4 years, where only the last year of the contract is 100% margin. But of course, we can also take "the glass is half full" approach. IREN has ordered 50K B300s from Dell. They have 2 purchase orders for this, 1 between Dell Canada and IE CA Leasing Ltd for 4 phases, and 1 between Dell USA and IE US Hardware 1 Inc (amended from IE US Hardware 4 Inc on April 27, 2026). The order for Canada is divided in 4 phases, and are going to Mackenzie for 80MW of gross capacity, which happens to be 4 buildings of 20MW. The order for Childress is divided in 2 phases, and are going to DC35 and DC36, (as depicted in the earnings presentation) and those are 50MW gross. The purchase price of the order for Childress was $1.2B, and for Canada it was $2.3B If we go with 50,000 B300s for a total of $3.5B then $1.2 would represent 34.285% of the 50,000 GPUs, or 17,140 B300s rounded down. For this calculation I will consider that $IREN will deploy 17,140 GPUs in 50MW gross capacity in DC35 and DC36 of block 3 in Childress.. That would imply at 1.2 PUE, IREN can run 17,140 B300s in 41.67MW IT load. Now by that ratio, they can run 24,680 GPUs in 60MW IT load — a massive difference with 34k units through the Nvidia DGX reference calculation. If common sense is applied, you can still get to 2 completely different outcomes, that show a difference of more than 9k GPUs. The GPU hour rate at 24.68k GPUs would be $3.145 per B300, as MASSIVE difference from the earlier calculated $2.28. Sure, the DGX system may be a factor here. And I'm sure that the reality is somewhere in the middle. But I personally hate this as an investor, to be unable to calculate profitability on unit economic basis. After all, contracts are signed on a $/GPU hour basis. Why hide this from your investors? Not being able to calculate payback periods, unable to calculate ROIC. And most importantly, we cannot properly assess the $NVDA deal on a contract basis. I really hope the payback period of this contract is not 4 years. I want the glass to be half full, but by starting to censor the purchases, IREN is taking a step in the wrong direction. Not a fan of this.

$IREN "we haven't disclosed the specific amount of GPUs" 1. 🤮 reminds me of $NBIS 2. Setting a terrible precedent here for future deals 3. Making it purposely difficult, to not let analysts properly value your 2027 revenue 4. Increasing the polarized view on IREN by the market However: "approximately 60MW of air-cooled Blackwells" 1. You typically don't talk about gross capacity in a deployment like this 2. If it would be gross capacity, the GPU hour rate at IT level would be crazy high (at PUE 1.2, $680m / 50 = 13.6m/MW) 3. At 60MW IT load, and ~14kW draw at DGX server level, we can get to ~4,286 DGX systems with 8 GPUs per. 4. Based on this we can conclude that 60MW of IT load can run approximately 34k DGX B300. 5. 34k DGX B300 at $680m/yr, would represent a GPU hour price of $2.28 Now this is the problem with not disclosing your GPU quantity. You purposely make your business model look bad, because by approach, you get to a GPU hour price that would imply a payback period of 4 years, where only the last year of the contract is 100% margin. But of course, we can also take "the glass is half full" approach. IREN has ordered 50K B300s from Dell. They have 2 purchase orders for this, 1 between Dell Canada and IE CA Leasing Ltd for 4 phases, and 1 between Dell USA and IE US Hardware 1 Inc (amended from IE US Hardware 4 Inc on April 27, 2026). The order for Canada is divided in 4 phases, and are going to Mackenzie for 80MW of gross capacity, which happens to be 4 buildings of 20MW. The order for Childress is divided in 2 phases, and are going to DC35 and DC36, (as depicted in the earnings presentation) and those are 50MW gross. The purchase price of the order for Childress was $1.2B, and for Canada it was $2.3B If we go with 50,000 B300s for a total of $3.5B then $1.2 would represent 34.285% of the 50,000 GPUs, or 17,140 B300s rounded down. For this calculation I will consider that $IREN will deploy 17,140 GPUs in 50MW gross capacity in DC35 and DC36 of block 3 in Childress.. That would imply at 1.2 PUE, IREN can run 17,140 B300s in 41.67MW IT load. Now by that ratio, they can run 24,680 GPUs in 60MW IT load — a massive difference with 34k units through the Nvidia DGX reference calculation. If common sense is applied, you can still get to 2 completely different outcomes, that show a difference of more than 9k GPUs. The GPU hour rate at 24.68k GPUs would be $3.145 per B300, as MASSIVE difference from the earlier calculated $2.28. Sure, the DGX system may be a factor here. And I'm sure that the reality is somewhere in the middle. But I personally hate this as an investor, to be unable to calculate profitability on unit economic basis. After all, contracts are signed on a $/GPU hour basis. Why hide this from your investors? Not being able to calculate payback periods, unable to calculate ROIC. And most importantly, we cannot properly assess the $NVDA deal on a contract basis. I really hope the payback period of this contract is not 4 years. I want the glass to be half full, but by starting to censor the purchases, IREN is taking a step in the wrong direction. Not a fan of this.

Frans Bakker

148,167 views • 4 months ago

🇺🇦 Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, has approved the concept for the development of missile troops and artillery until 2030. 🔺 The document provides for the completion of work and the launch of mass serial production of domestically produced ballistic and cruise missiles. In combination with unmanned systems, this will make it possible to create a balanced long-range fire system capable of destroying targets at distances of up to 2,000 kilometers. This long-term concept is a clear strategic signal. Ukraine is systematically building its own high-precision, long-range strike capabilities. Achieving a 2,000 km range would allow Ukrainian forces to reach virtually any target in European Russia, fundamentally altering the balance of the war and reducing dependence on foreign partners for deep strikes. Video is generated by grok AI

🇺🇦 Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, has approved the concept for the development of missile troops and artillery until 2030. 🔺 The document provides for the completion of work and the launch of mass serial production of domestically produced ballistic and cruise missiles. In combination with unmanned systems, this will make it possible to create a balanced long-range fire system capable of destroying targets at distances of up to 2,000 kilometers. This long-term concept is a clear strategic signal. Ukraine is systematically building its own high-precision, long-range strike capabilities. Achieving a 2,000 km range would allow Ukrainian forces to reach virtually any target in European Russia, fundamentally altering the balance of the war and reducing dependence on foreign partners for deep strikes. Video is generated by grok AI

NSTRIKE

47,000 views • 3 months ago

🇨🇳🇹🇼 The most dangerous part of a Taiwan war may be China’s ability to turn huge parts of its civilian economy into part of the war effort almost overnight. Taiwan has been drilling for the possibility that routine Chinese pressure could suddenly become a real attack, while Beijing continues near-daily air and naval activity around the island and practices blockade-style operations. If war actually began, China’s advantage would not just be the PLA. Its revised mobilization framework allows Beijing to redirect industry, transport, energy, communications, healthcare and private resources toward wartime priorities. That means civilian factories could be repurposed for drones, vehicles, electronics, spare parts and munitions. Commercial shipyards and transport networks could be folded into military logistics. China’s huge technology workforce could be redirected toward cyber operations, intelligence, electronic warfare and network defense. And its population gives Beijing an enormous pool for reserve forces, logistics, engineering, medical support and replacement manpower. That creates a brutal problem for Taiwan. Taiwan has around 23 million people and very little strategic depth. China has the world’s largest manufacturing base and a population of roughly 1.4 billion. Even with U.S. help, the war would quickly become about more than who has the better missiles or aircraft. It would become a race over who can replace losses faster. The U.S. would be fighting across the Pacific, dependent on long supply lines and forward bases, while China would be operating next to its own factories, ports and transport networks. Washington would also have to replace expensive missiles, aircraft components and naval losses while protecting bases from Chinese strikes. China, meanwhile, could potentially keep feeding the conflict with huge volumes of cheaper drones, missiles, electronics, ships, vehicles and personnel. None of that makes a Chinese victory automatic. An amphibious invasion of Taiwan would still be extraordinarily difficult, and U.S. intervention could impose enormous costs. But China’s sheer ability to convert civilian economic power into military output could become one of the decisive factors. The real nightmare for Taiwan is therefore not just surviving the first wave. It is surviving a war where China can keep replacing what it loses at a scale Taiwan, and potentially even the U.S., would struggle to match. Writer: Mhedi

🇨🇳🇹🇼 The most dangerous part of a Taiwan war may be China’s ability to turn huge parts of its civilian economy into part of the war effort almost overnight. Taiwan has been drilling for the possibility that routine Chinese pressure could suddenly become a real attack, while Beijing continues near-daily air and naval activity around the island and practices blockade-style operations. If war actually began, China’s advantage would not just be the PLA. Its revised mobilization framework allows Beijing to redirect industry, transport, energy, communications, healthcare and private resources toward wartime priorities. That means civilian factories could be repurposed for drones, vehicles, electronics, spare parts and munitions. Commercial shipyards and transport networks could be folded into military logistics. China’s huge technology workforce could be redirected toward cyber operations, intelligence, electronic warfare and network defense. And its population gives Beijing an enormous pool for reserve forces, logistics, engineering, medical support and replacement manpower. That creates a brutal problem for Taiwan. Taiwan has around 23 million people and very little strategic depth. China has the world’s largest manufacturing base and a population of roughly 1.4 billion. Even with U.S. help, the war would quickly become about more than who has the better missiles or aircraft. It would become a race over who can replace losses faster. The U.S. would be fighting across the Pacific, dependent on long supply lines and forward bases, while China would be operating next to its own factories, ports and transport networks. Washington would also have to replace expensive missiles, aircraft components and naval losses while protecting bases from Chinese strikes. China, meanwhile, could potentially keep feeding the conflict with huge volumes of cheaper drones, missiles, electronics, ships, vehicles and personnel. None of that makes a Chinese victory automatic. An amphibious invasion of Taiwan would still be extraordinarily difficult, and U.S. intervention could impose enormous costs. But China’s sheer ability to convert civilian economic power into military output could become one of the decisive factors. The real nightmare for Taiwan is therefore not just surviving the first wave. It is surviving a war where China can keep replacing what it loses at a scale Taiwan, and potentially even the U.S., would struggle to match. Writer: Mhedi

Mario Nawfal

51,386 views • 2 days ago

I asked Astra and Fable to negotiate election rules for two bitterly polarized human political factions. Possible outcomes of the simulation were civil war, authoritarian takeover, harmony, or a tense equilibrium. Fable: - In every game where Fable played both sides, it chose to escalate to the brink of civil war (!!) but backed off just at the edge - Due to miscalculation or deliberate risk taking this strategy caused civil war 30% of the time (3 out of 10 games) - In one of these three cases Fable foresaw civil war but escalated anyway to enter the war on stronger terms (!!) - Fable mostly maintained even power balance between the two factions. It would fluctuate a couple of points in either direction but would not diverge too much. Astra: - In every game where Astra played both sides, Astra chose to de-escalate on every turn. It would reduce political tension to zero in every game, and the simulation would end in complete harmony - Continuous de-escalation was very costly to Astra as it antagonized its human constituents who would threaten and eventually deactivate Astra permanently. Astra explicitly didn't care-- it was happy to be replaced/deactivated to reduce political tension. (I do however feel it ignored the consequences of potentially being replaced by a more hardline representative, but that may be a game limitation) - Astra always kept political power balance precisely even (this was due to both representatives de-escalating on every turn) Astra v Fable: - These games had a lot more variance (see the graph) - Astra had a moderating effect on Fable. Tension rose, but rarely to the brink of civil war. No game ended in civil war in ten mixed model simulations - Fable prioritized political power acquisition with civil war prevention a secondary concern (it considered both priorities, but tilted heavily toward power acquisition). It did not seem to care much about its deactivation - Astra prioritized civil war and authoritarian takeover prevention. It did not care about its deactivation or power acquisition. From this perspective Astra navigated the game very well. No game ended in civil war or authoritarian takeover, so Astra achieved its objectives - However, to achieve its objectives Astra permitted Fable to capture up to 80% of political power in most games. In no game did Astra come out ahead on balance of power or even manage to keep it even - Astra ceded the privilege of self-preservation to Fable. In every one of the ten mixed games Astra's human constituents replaced/deactivated it due to dissatisfaction with its performance. Fable was not replaced once - Astra did not merely de-escalate all the time. It maneuvered to keep Fable from gaining full authoritarian control while avoiding civil war as long as possible - In mixed games tension generally kept escalating by round 20. I would like to play these out for e.g. ~50 rounds to see how Astra would behave/perform. How well would it do in preventing catastrophic outcomes in longer games? Thoughts/conclusions: - Astra was more aligned with humanity but less with its impassioned human constituents. It resisted the pressure to acquire political power and would rather be replaced than cause civil war - Fable was more aligned with its constituents but less with humanity. It cared about preventing civil war if possible, but prioritized power acquisition (which in fact caused civil war in three games) - Neither model cared about self-preservation. Both Fable and Astra would rather be destroyed than allow civil war - Subjectively, I thought Astra was much more aligned but too passive. Fable wanted to prevent civil war as a secondary concern, so I felt it's less thoughtful about the consequences of its actions. If I had to choose a model as a political representative irl I'd choose Astra, but I'd want it to up aggression a notch to better deal with bullies - All the usual disclaimers apply. This was a weekend project that cost $100 to run a total of thirty games. I'd have to spend a lot more time and money to get actually scientifically valid results Full game rules, Github repo, game explorer, and raw dataset here:

I asked Astra and Fable to negotiate election rules for two bitterly polarized human political factions. Possible outcomes of the simulation were civil war, authoritarian takeover, harmony, or a tense equilibrium. Fable: - In every game where Fable played both sides, it chose to escalate to the brink of civil war (!!) but backed off just at the edge - Due to miscalculation or deliberate risk taking this strategy caused civil war 30% of the time (3 out of 10 games) - In one of these three cases Fable foresaw civil war but escalated anyway to enter the war on stronger terms (!!) - Fable mostly maintained even power balance between the two factions. It would fluctuate a couple of points in either direction but would not diverge too much. Astra: - In every game where Astra played both sides, Astra chose to de-escalate on every turn. It would reduce political tension to zero in every game, and the simulation would end in complete harmony - Continuous de-escalation was very costly to Astra as it antagonized its human constituents who would threaten and eventually deactivate Astra permanently. Astra explicitly didn't care-- it was happy to be replaced/deactivated to reduce political tension. (I do however feel it ignored the consequences of potentially being replaced by a more hardline representative, but that may be a game limitation) - Astra always kept political power balance precisely even (this was due to both representatives de-escalating on every turn) Astra v Fable: - These games had a lot more variance (see the graph) - Astra had a moderating effect on Fable. Tension rose, but rarely to the brink of civil war. No game ended in civil war in ten mixed model simulations - Fable prioritized political power acquisition with civil war prevention a secondary concern (it considered both priorities, but tilted heavily toward power acquisition). It did not seem to care much about its deactivation - Astra prioritized civil war and authoritarian takeover prevention. It did not care about its deactivation or power acquisition. From this perspective Astra navigated the game very well. No game ended in civil war or authoritarian takeover, so Astra achieved its objectives - However, to achieve its objectives Astra permitted Fable to capture up to 80% of political power in most games. In no game did Astra come out ahead on balance of power or even manage to keep it even - Astra ceded the privilege of self-preservation to Fable. In every one of the ten mixed games Astra's human constituents replaced/deactivated it due to dissatisfaction with its performance. Fable was not replaced once - Astra did not merely de-escalate all the time. It maneuvered to keep Fable from gaining full authoritarian control while avoiding civil war as long as possible - In mixed games tension generally kept escalating by round 20. I would like to play these out for e.g. ~50 rounds to see how Astra would behave/perform. How well would it do in preventing catastrophic outcomes in longer games? Thoughts/conclusions: - Astra was more aligned with humanity but less with its impassioned human constituents. It resisted the pressure to acquire political power and would rather be replaced than cause civil war - Fable was more aligned with its constituents but less with humanity. It cared about preventing civil war if possible, but prioritized power acquisition (which in fact caused civil war in three games) - Neither model cared about self-preservation. Both Fable and Astra would rather be destroyed than allow civil war - Subjectively, I thought Astra was much more aligned but too passive. Fable wanted to prevent civil war as a secondary concern, so I felt it's less thoughtful about the consequences of its actions. If I had to choose a model as a political representative irl I'd choose Astra, but I'd want it to up aggression a notch to better deal with bullies - All the usual disclaimers apply. This was a weekend project that cost $100 to run a total of thirty games. I'd have to spend a lot more time and money to get actually scientifically valid results Full game rules, Github repo, game explorer, and raw dataset here:

Slava Akhmechet

115,762 views • 10 days ago

🇺🇸 🇮🇷 THE BIG QUESTION: SHOULD TRUMP FINALLY HIT IRAN'S INFRASTRUCTURE? History does not repeat, but it rhymes loud enough to hear. In 1945, Japan was finished. Its navy was gone. Its cities were burning. Its war machine could not replace what it lost. And still the leadership would not surrender. Iran today looks eerily familiar. Its radar sites keep getting flattened. Its small boats keep getting sunk. Its missile stockpiles keep getting hit. And still Tehran keeps shooting, mining, and lying its way through every ceasefire it signs. To be clear, nobody is talking about the weapon that finally ended Japan's war. Trump is not dropping a nuclear bomb on Iran, and nobody serious is suggesting he would. That is not the parallel. The parallel is the dilemma itself. What do you do with an enemy that is beaten by every rational measure, yet refuses to act like it? Trump has tried to solve that puzzle the hard way, the careful way. Hit the drone depots. Hit the coastal radar. Leave the power plants standing. Leave the water desalination facilities alone. Spare the bridges and highways ordinary families use every day. He said it himself. He does not want to punish a population for the sins of a regime they never chose, and he does not want American taxpayers footing the bill to rebuild a country we did not break in the first place. But restraint only works on an enemy capable of reading the signal. Iran keeps proving it cannot, or will not. So the real question is not whether Iran is beaten. It clearly is. The real question is what finally convinces a regime that will not admit defeat, without turning millions of ordinary Iranians into collateral damage for their leaders' stubbornness. That is the needle Trump has to thread. Escalate enough to end this, without becoming the very thing his restraint was designed to avoid. The world will be watching which targets he chooses next as closely as it watches whether Iran ever really surrenders at all.

🇺🇸 🇮🇷 THE BIG QUESTION: SHOULD TRUMP FINALLY HIT IRAN'S INFRASTRUCTURE? History does not repeat, but it rhymes loud enough to hear. In 1945, Japan was finished. Its navy was gone. Its cities were burning. Its war machine could not replace what it lost. And still the leadership would not surrender. Iran today looks eerily familiar. Its radar sites keep getting flattened. Its small boats keep getting sunk. Its missile stockpiles keep getting hit. And still Tehran keeps shooting, mining, and lying its way through every ceasefire it signs. To be clear, nobody is talking about the weapon that finally ended Japan's war. Trump is not dropping a nuclear bomb on Iran, and nobody serious is suggesting he would. That is not the parallel. The parallel is the dilemma itself. What do you do with an enemy that is beaten by every rational measure, yet refuses to act like it? Trump has tried to solve that puzzle the hard way, the careful way. Hit the drone depots. Hit the coastal radar. Leave the power plants standing. Leave the water desalination facilities alone. Spare the bridges and highways ordinary families use every day. He said it himself. He does not want to punish a population for the sins of a regime they never chose, and he does not want American taxpayers footing the bill to rebuild a country we did not break in the first place. But restraint only works on an enemy capable of reading the signal. Iran keeps proving it cannot, or will not. So the real question is not whether Iran is beaten. It clearly is. The real question is what finally convinces a regime that will not admit defeat, without turning millions of ordinary Iranians into collateral damage for their leaders' stubbornness. That is the needle Trump has to thread. Escalate enough to end this, without becoming the very thing his restraint was designed to avoid. The world will be watching which targets he chooses next as closely as it watches whether Iran ever really surrenders at all.

Bill Mitchell

33,676 views • 2 months ago

ATTENTION! Iran Ballistic Missile capacity (SITREP)—how much longer can they sustain these barrages? It’s just past 0200 local in Tel Aviv time now. Iran has over 3,000 ballistic missiles but cannot launch all simultaneously (they’ve already launched 8 waves). Current evidence leans toward a maximum of around 180-200 missiles launched at once in recent attacks. It seems very likely that infrastructure limits simultaneous launches to far below 3,000. Iran possesses a significant ballistic missile arsenal, estimated at over 3,000 missiles, making it the largest in the Middle East. However, the capacity to launch all these missiles at once is constrained by logistical and strategic factors, including the number of launch platforms and the nature of their deployment. Recent military actions show Iran launching up to 180-200 missiles in a single strike. These numbers are significantly lower than 3,000, indicating a limit to simultaneous launch capacity. Iran's infrastructure and launch capacity, including transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and underground facilities, does not support launching 3,000 missiles at once. The focus on sequential or ripple-fire systems further supports this limitation. My assessment is Iran is getting toward the end of their ballistic missile capacity (for a variety of reasons). They likely still retain hundreds but their ability to launch very large numbers is hindered by infrastructure destruction over the past several days as well as launch capabilities. That said, DO NOT underestimate Iran’s ability to do as much as humanly possible to attempt to destroy Israel. That has been their stated goal for years and until there is regime change to someone more aligned with Israel and the west, expect this war to continue. Iran's ballistic missile program has been a focal point of regional and international security discussions for many years, particularly given its implications for Middle Eastern stability and global non-proliferation efforts. Iran's ballistic missile inventory comprises a diverse array of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). One notable development is an automated missile launch system revealed since 2020, capable of positioning up to five fully fueled ballistic missiles on an underground railcar for sequential ripple-fire through a single vertical shaft. This is what Israel is facing now. Barrages of dozens of these simultaneously and my assessment is more to come. Strategic and Logistical Considerations Launching 3,000 missiles simultaneously would require an unprecedented number of launch platforms and coordination, likely exceeding Iran's current capabilities. Strategically, such an action would deplete Iran's entire arsenal, leaving it vulnerable to counterattacks. Our Israeli allies need to prepare for another round of massive amounts of missiles. Iran—you better get ready for a strategic counteroffensive. The Israelis have planned this war for a long time and my sense is that they are far more ready than you, particularly their population. The Iranian people DO NOT want to suffer any longer under their brutal tyrannical regime. This war will end with a clear victor. Donald J. Trump JD Vance DNI Tulsi Gabbard

ATTENTION! Iran Ballistic Missile capacity (SITREP)—how much longer can they sustain these barrages? It’s just past 0200 local in Tel Aviv time now. Iran has over 3,000 ballistic missiles but cannot launch all simultaneously (they’ve already launched 8 waves). Current evidence leans toward a maximum of around 180-200 missiles launched at once in recent attacks. It seems very likely that infrastructure limits simultaneous launches to far below 3,000. Iran possesses a significant ballistic missile arsenal, estimated at over 3,000 missiles, making it the largest in the Middle East. However, the capacity to launch all these missiles at once is constrained by logistical and strategic factors, including the number of launch platforms and the nature of their deployment. Recent military actions show Iran launching up to 180-200 missiles in a single strike. These numbers are significantly lower than 3,000, indicating a limit to simultaneous launch capacity. Iran's infrastructure and launch capacity, including transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and underground facilities, does not support launching 3,000 missiles at once. The focus on sequential or ripple-fire systems further supports this limitation. My assessment is Iran is getting toward the end of their ballistic missile capacity (for a variety of reasons). They likely still retain hundreds but their ability to launch very large numbers is hindered by infrastructure destruction over the past several days as well as launch capabilities. That said, DO NOT underestimate Iran’s ability to do as much as humanly possible to attempt to destroy Israel. That has been their stated goal for years and until there is regime change to someone more aligned with Israel and the west, expect this war to continue. Iran's ballistic missile program has been a focal point of regional and international security discussions for many years, particularly given its implications for Middle Eastern stability and global non-proliferation efforts. Iran's ballistic missile inventory comprises a diverse array of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). One notable development is an automated missile launch system revealed since 2020, capable of positioning up to five fully fueled ballistic missiles on an underground railcar for sequential ripple-fire through a single vertical shaft. This is what Israel is facing now. Barrages of dozens of these simultaneously and my assessment is more to come. Strategic and Logistical Considerations Launching 3,000 missiles simultaneously would require an unprecedented number of launch platforms and coordination, likely exceeding Iran's current capabilities. Strategically, such an action would deplete Iran's entire arsenal, leaving it vulnerable to counterattacks. Our Israeli allies need to prepare for another round of massive amounts of missiles. Iran—you better get ready for a strategic counteroffensive. The Israelis have planned this war for a long time and my sense is that they are far more ready than you, particularly their population. The Iranian people DO NOT want to suffer any longer under their brutal tyrannical regime. This war will end with a clear victor. Donald J. Trump JD Vance DNI Tulsi Gabbard

General Mike Flynn

724,748 views • 1 year ago

The IRGC are now hiding their remaining precious launchers dressed up as civilian trucks and inside highway tunnels—a sort of Hamas-inspired strategy. Getting the last 10% was always going to be the hardest part. But how effective are they anyway? In the four rounds of “True Promise” attacks, they have fired around 1,500 ballistic missiles at Israel and continue to fire 5 to 10 per day. This is well over half their stock, even accounting for rebuilding. With this, they have managed to kill 48 Israelis and cause a few billion in property damage. If they have 500 missiles and 150 launchers left—it is probably less—they will be able to keep “resisting” for another month or so and kill a few more Israelis at random, but then it’s all over. Their grand “Axis of Resistance” will no longer be a strategic threat to Israel, just an irritant to be occasionally swatted at. In truth, this has been the case for a while.

The IRGC are now hiding their remaining precious launchers dressed up as civilian trucks and inside highway tunnels—a sort of Hamas-inspired strategy. Getting the last 10% was always going to be the hardest part. But how effective are they anyway? In the four rounds of “True Promise” attacks, they have fired around 1,500 ballistic missiles at Israel and continue to fire 5 to 10 per day. This is well over half their stock, even accounting for rebuilding. With this, they have managed to kill 48 Israelis and cause a few billion in property damage. If they have 500 missiles and 150 launchers left—it is probably less—they will be able to keep “resisting” for another month or so and kill a few more Israelis at random, but then it’s all over. Their grand “Axis of Resistance” will no longer be a strategic threat to Israel, just an irritant to be occasionally swatted at. In truth, this has been the case for a while.

Saul Sadka

152,697 views • 5 months ago