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Warren Buffett was asked what he means when he says he doesn’t understand a business. His answer: “It’s not a question of understanding the product. It’s the predictability of the economics of the situation 10 years out — and that’s our problem.” _ Buffett isn’t saying he can’t understand... what a business does. He understands steel. He understands homebuilding. The product, the distribution, the customers — that’s the easy part. What he’s asking is something far more demanding: can I predict the economics of this business with reasonable confidence a decade from now? That’s an entirely different question and why most businesses fall under the “too-hard” pile for Buffett. Here’s an exercise worth trying the next time you’re reviewing a stock: Take a blank piece of paper. No spreadsheet. No model. Just write out your best estimates of what revenues, free cash flow, and earnings will look like over the next five years. Then calculate what you’re paying for the entire business today — and ask yourself honestly whether you’re being well compensated for that ownership. Your estimates will likely be off. That’s fine. That’s not the point. The point is to notice which businesses you can make confident assumptions about five years out — and which ones leave you staring at a “confused page”. That gap in confidence is exactly what Buffett is talking about. You can see an example of how to do this in Rose Celine Investments 🌹 post on $DLO _ 🎙️ Berkshire 2000 Annual Meeting | CNBC Warren Buffett Archive (04/29/2000)show more

Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capital®

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Warren Buffett on how he looks at stocks: “When we buy a stock, we would be happy with that stock if they told us the market was going to close for a couple of years… Quotes would have nothing to do with it… That’s exactly the way we look at stocks. We look at them as businesses.” The lesson is simple yet most investors never internalize it. A stock price is not the business. The quote is noise. The business is signal. If your judgment about the business is correct, the price takes care of itself — eventually, on its own timeline. ___ 🎙️ CNBC Warren Buffett Archive (2008)

Warren Buffett on how he looks at stocks: “When we buy a stock, we would be happy with that stock if they told us the market was going to close for a couple of years… Quotes would have nothing to do with it… That’s exactly the way we look at stocks. We look at them as businesses.” The lesson is simple yet most investors never internalize it. A stock price is not the business. The quote is noise. The business is signal. If your judgment about the business is correct, the price takes care of itself — eventually, on its own timeline. ___ 🎙️ CNBC Warren Buffett Archive (2008)

Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capital®

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Warren Buffett was asked if Berkshire’s purchase of $AMZN (2019 at $89) was a departure from value investing. His answer cuts straight to the heart of what value investing actually means: “The idea that value is somehow connected to book value or low price to earnings ratios or anything, as Charlie has said all investing is value investing. You’re putting out money now to get more later — and making a calculation on the probability of getting it, and when.” ___ Buffett dismantles one of the most common misconceptions in investing. Value investing was never about low price-to-book ratios or cheap multiples. That’s a methodology — not a definition. The definition is simple: you’re paying a price today for a stream of future cash flows, and you’re asking whether you’re being adequately compensated. The label “value” vs. “growth” has always been a false dichotomy. All intelligent investing is value investing. ___ 🎙️ Berkshire 2019 Annual Meeting | CNBC Warren Buffett Archive (05/04/2019)

Warren Buffett was asked if Berkshire’s purchase of $AMZN (2019 at $89) was a departure from value investing. His answer cuts straight to the heart of what value investing actually means: “The idea that value is somehow connected to book value or low price to earnings ratios or anything, as Charlie has said all investing is value investing. You’re putting out money now to get more later — and making a calculation on the probability of getting it, and when.” _ Buffett dismantles one of the most common misconceptions in investing. Value investing was never about low price-to-book ratios or cheap multiples. That’s a methodology — not a definition. The definition is simple: you’re paying a price today for a stream of future cash flows, and you’re asking whether you’re being adequately compensated. The label “value” vs. “growth” has always been a false dichotomy. All intelligent investing is value investing. _ 🎙️ Berkshire 2019 Annual Meeting | CNBC Warren Buffett Archive (05/04/2019)

Dimitry Nakhla | Babylon Capital®

78,928 görüntüleme • 3 ay önce

Warren Buffett just warned that some of the biggest names in AI might collapse soon. And he said it while revealing he had personally put $31 billion into one of them... Google, Microsoft, and Amazon are now laying out hundreds of billions in capex to stay in the AI race. Buffett called that real money, the kind that was never required back when software was cheap to run. He said these companies have no choice but to keep spending at this scale, because none of them can afford to be the one that blinks. In his own words, they are "playing a game they don't want to play." But the one AI company Buffett actually bought is Google. Berkshire now holds a stake worth more than $31 billion, and for weeks Wall Street assumed the credit belonged to Greg Abel, who took over as CEO in January and ran the position up on his watch. But Buffett admitted he "initiated" the investment. He usually never reveals who makes a call. The Google position already sits behind only Apple and American Express in Berkshire's stock portfolio, and last month Berkshire bought $10 billion of it directly from the company in a private placement. Then he undercut his own trade. When asked why he chose Alphabet over the rest of the Mag 7, Buffett said he does not even like it as much as four or five other businesses Berkshire already owns. He bought it the way he buys anything, as a good company available at a fair price. For years he waved off the Apple question by calling it a consumer company. This time he let the AI label on Google stand, and bought it anyway. Buffett also said the vast majority of what Wall Street pushes, on the order of 90 to 95%, is merchandising, because Wall Street only cares whether it can sell you something. He said he cannot remember the last research report that dug into the actual returns a business earns. Everyone fixates on next quarter instead. He also brought up IBM, which owned its market for decades until a rival offered its customers a better deal and its best business cracked. He brought up A&P, the biggest retailer in America in the 1930s, a company he said held a commanding position that later vanished completely. Buffett was describing the AI leaders as much as anyone: The most dominant company on Earth today is not promised to be dominant in ten years. So the most famous technology skeptic in investing put $31 billion into the AI trade and at the same time warned that the companies leading it are stuck in a war with no exit. What does Buffett see coming that the rest of the market doesn't?

Warren Buffett just warned that some of the biggest names in AI might collapse soon. And he said it while revealing he had personally put $31 billion into one of them... Google, Microsoft, and Amazon are now laying out hundreds of billions in capex to stay in the AI race. Buffett called that real money, the kind that was never required back when software was cheap to run. He said these companies have no choice but to keep spending at this scale, because none of them can afford to be the one that blinks. In his own words, they are "playing a game they don't want to play." But the one AI company Buffett actually bought is Google. Berkshire now holds a stake worth more than $31 billion, and for weeks Wall Street assumed the credit belonged to Greg Abel, who took over as CEO in January and ran the position up on his watch. But Buffett admitted he "initiated" the investment. He usually never reveals who makes a call. The Google position already sits behind only Apple and American Express in Berkshire's stock portfolio, and last month Berkshire bought $10 billion of it directly from the company in a private placement. Then he undercut his own trade. When asked why he chose Alphabet over the rest of the Mag 7, Buffett said he does not even like it as much as four or five other businesses Berkshire already owns. He bought it the way he buys anything, as a good company available at a fair price. For years he waved off the Apple question by calling it a consumer company. This time he let the AI label on Google stand, and bought it anyway. Buffett also said the vast majority of what Wall Street pushes, on the order of 90 to 95%, is merchandising, because Wall Street only cares whether it can sell you something. He said he cannot remember the last research report that dug into the actual returns a business earns. Everyone fixates on next quarter instead. He also brought up IBM, which owned its market for decades until a rival offered its customers a better deal and its best business cracked. He brought up A&P, the biggest retailer in America in the 1930s, a company he said held a commanding position that later vanished completely. Buffett was describing the AI leaders as much as anyone: The most dominant company on Earth today is not promised to be dominant in ten years. So the most famous technology skeptic in investing put $31 billion into the AI trade and at the same time warned that the companies leading it are stuck in a war with no exit. What does Buffett see coming that the rest of the market doesn't?

Ricardo

230,317 görüntüleme • 27 gün önce

Twenty-five years ago I wrote a letter to Warren Buffett. He was just turning 70. His friend Don Keough, the president of Coca-Cola, wrote back on his behalf. He said, Mr. Buffett is only 70 and he’s going to be working for at least another 70 years. Get it out of your head that 70 is old. When you turn 70 you should be thinking about the next several decades being your best decades. Buffett is 95 now. Still working. That letter stayed with me for 25 years. Think young. Act young. The best decades might still be ahead of you.

Twenty-five years ago I wrote a letter to Warren Buffett. He was just turning 70. His friend Don Keough, the president of Coca-Cola, wrote back on his behalf. He said, Mr. Buffett is only 70 and he’s going to be working for at least another 70 years. Get it out of your head that 70 is old. When you turn 70 you should be thinking about the next several decades being your best decades. Buffett is 95 now. Still working. That letter stayed with me for 25 years. Think young. Act young. The best decades might still be ahead of you.

Anthony Scaramucci

173,723 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce

Warren Buffett on why he buys "terrible" businesses: A shareholder asked Buffett about Berkshire's exposure to the housing market through businesses like Shaw, Acme Brick, Johns Manville, and HomeServices, and what he sees coming over the next decade. Buffett didn't sugarcoat the present: "Well, the immediate situation is it's terrible. It's been flatlined now for a long time and it affects Shaw. It affects Acme Brick. It affects Johns Manville. Affects our home services operation and there has been no bounce at all." But then he revealed why that doesn't bother him. Berkshire had just bought the largest brick operation in Alabama, a state Buffett notes "uses more brick per capita than any state in the union," right in the middle of a market with virtually no buyers. "We wrote a check for cash and we like improving our position." His reasoning comes down to a simple long-term view: "This country over time will build houses at a rate that overall in total commensurate with household growth. And I think we're going to see plenty of household growth in future decades. And I think that our companies are well positioned to make significant money when we get to a normalized level of home building." Buffett admitted he had no idea when the turn would come. He thought it might happen by year end, but added: "I don't think anybody knows the answer on that." That uncertainty wasn't the point. The point was the price he paid for what the business would earn over decades. Charlie Munger cut to the heart of it: "Well, one advantage of buying these very cyclical businesses is a lot of people don't like them. And what difference does it make to us if the earnings average say 300 million a year, if it comes in in a very lumpy fashion? In the big scheme of things, what do we care if it's lumpy? As long as it's a good business and we have an advantage on that stuff. Nobody else was bidding for a brick plant in Alabama with no customers." Buffett then offered a comparison that reframes how to think about lumpy earnings entirely. See's Candy, he pointed out, loses money roughly eight months of the year: "Now it just so happens we know the seasonal pattern. So we don't worry in July that somehow Christmas won't come. We've got a couple thousand years on our side." His conclusion on cyclical businesses: "If you take the next 20 years, there will be three or four terrible years for residential housing and there'll be a lot of them that are pretty good and there'll be a few that are terrific. And I don't know the order in which they're going to appear, but I know if I can buy the assets cheap enough to participate in those 20 years that we'll do okay over that time."

Warren Buffett on why he buys "terrible" businesses: A shareholder asked Buffett about Berkshire's exposure to the housing market through businesses like Shaw, Acme Brick, Johns Manville, and HomeServices, and what he sees coming over the next decade. Buffett didn't sugarcoat the present: "Well, the immediate situation is it's terrible. It's been flatlined now for a long time and it affects Shaw. It affects Acme Brick. It affects Johns Manville. Affects our home services operation and there has been no bounce at all." But then he revealed why that doesn't bother him. Berkshire had just bought the largest brick operation in Alabama, a state Buffett notes "uses more brick per capita than any state in the union," right in the middle of a market with virtually no buyers. "We wrote a check for cash and we like improving our position." His reasoning comes down to a simple long-term view: "This country over time will build houses at a rate that overall in total commensurate with household growth. And I think we're going to see plenty of household growth in future decades. And I think that our companies are well positioned to make significant money when we get to a normalized level of home building." Buffett admitted he had no idea when the turn would come. He thought it might happen by year end, but added: "I don't think anybody knows the answer on that." That uncertainty wasn't the point. The point was the price he paid for what the business would earn over decades. Charlie Munger cut to the heart of it: "Well, one advantage of buying these very cyclical businesses is a lot of people don't like them. And what difference does it make to us if the earnings average say 300 million a year, if it comes in in a very lumpy fashion? In the big scheme of things, what do we care if it's lumpy? As long as it's a good business and we have an advantage on that stuff. Nobody else was bidding for a brick plant in Alabama with no customers." Buffett then offered a comparison that reframes how to think about lumpy earnings entirely. See's Candy, he pointed out, loses money roughly eight months of the year: "Now it just so happens we know the seasonal pattern. So we don't worry in July that somehow Christmas won't come. We've got a couple thousand years on our side." His conclusion on cyclical businesses: "If you take the next 20 years, there will be three or four terrible years for residential housing and there'll be a lot of them that are pretty good and there'll be a few that are terrific. And I don't know the order in which they're going to appear, but I know if I can buy the assets cheap enough to participate in those 20 years that we'll do okay over that time."

Black Edge

10,628 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce

Warren Buffett on why he buys "terrible" businesses: A shareholder asked Buffett about Berkshire's exposure to the housing market through businesses like Shaw, Acme Brick, Johns Manville, and HomeServices, and what he sees coming over the next decade. Buffett didn't sugarcoat the present: "Well, the immediate situation is it's terrible. It's been flatlined now for a long time and it affects Shaw. It affects Acme Brick. It affects Johns Manville. Affects our home services operation and there has been no bounce at all." But then he revealed why that doesn't bother him. Berkshire had just bought the largest brick operation in Alabama, a state Buffett notes "uses more brick per capita than any state in the union," right in the middle of a market with virtually no buyers. "We wrote a check for cash and we like improving our position." His reasoning comes down to a simple long-term view: "This country over time will build houses at a rate that overall in total commensurate with household growth. And I think we're going to see plenty of household growth in future decades. And I think that our companies are well positioned to make significant money when we get to a normalized level of home building." Buffett admitted he had no idea when the turn would come. He thought it might happen by year end, but added: "I don't think anybody knows the answer on that." That uncertainty wasn't the point. The point was the price he paid for what the business would earn over decades. Charlie Munger cut to the heart of it: "Well, one advantage of buying these very cyclical businesses is a lot of people don't like them. And what difference does it make to us if the earnings average say 300 million a year, if it comes in in a very lumpy fashion? In the big scheme of things, what do we care if it's lumpy? As long as it's a good business and we have an advantage on that stuff. Nobody else was bidding for a brick plant in Alabama with no customers." Buffett then offered a comparison that reframes how to think about lumpy earnings entirely. See's Candy, he pointed out, loses money roughly eight months of the year: "Now it just so happens we know the seasonal pattern. So we don't worry in July that somehow Christmas won't come. We've got a couple thousand years on our side." His conclusion on cyclical businesses: "If you take the next 20 years, there will be three or four terrible years for residential housing and there'll be a lot of them that are pretty good and there'll be a few that are terrific. And I don't know the order in which they're going to appear, but I know if I can buy the assets cheap enough to participate in those 20 years that we'll do okay over that time."

Warren Buffett on why he buys "terrible" businesses: A shareholder asked Buffett about Berkshire's exposure to the housing market through businesses like Shaw, Acme Brick, Johns Manville, and HomeServices, and what he sees coming over the next decade. Buffett didn't sugarcoat the present: "Well, the immediate situation is it's terrible. It's been flatlined now for a long time and it affects Shaw. It affects Acme Brick. It affects Johns Manville. Affects our home services operation and there has been no bounce at all." But then he revealed why that doesn't bother him. Berkshire had just bought the largest brick operation in Alabama, a state Buffett notes "uses more brick per capita than any state in the union," right in the middle of a market with virtually no buyers. "We wrote a check for cash and we like improving our position." His reasoning comes down to a simple long-term view: "This country over time will build houses at a rate that overall in total commensurate with household growth. And I think we're going to see plenty of household growth in future decades. And I think that our companies are well positioned to make significant money when we get to a normalized level of home building." Buffett admitted he had no idea when the turn would come. He thought it might happen by year end, but added: "I don't think anybody knows the answer on that." That uncertainty wasn't the point. The point was the price he paid for what the business would earn over decades. Charlie Munger cut to the heart of it: "Well, one advantage of buying these very cyclical businesses is a lot of people don't like them. And what difference does it make to us if the earnings average say 300 million a year, if it comes in in a very lumpy fashion? In the big scheme of things, what do we care if it's lumpy? As long as it's a good business and we have an advantage on that stuff. Nobody else was bidding for a brick plant in Alabama with no customers." Buffett then offered a comparison that reframes how to think about lumpy earnings entirely. See's Candy, he pointed out, loses money roughly eight months of the year: "Now it just so happens we know the seasonal pattern. So we don't worry in July that somehow Christmas won't come. We've got a couple thousand years on our side." His conclusion on cyclical businesses: "If you take the next 20 years, there will be three or four terrible years for residential housing and there'll be a lot of them that are pretty good and there'll be a few that are terrific. And I don't know the order in which they're going to appear, but I know if I can buy the assets cheap enough to participate in those 20 years that we'll do okay over that time."

Black Edge

15,393 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce

Warren Buffett literally gave a 9-minute masterclass on what makes a business worth owning, inside the interview where he explains why he broke his own rule on technology. Eight things he teaches: 1. A good business is not one that grows. It is one that earns high returns on capital for a long time. His words: "something that you can expect to earn high returns on capital over a long period of time." Growth without returns on capital is just a bigger version of the same problem. 2. Measure it against doing nothing. Buffett points out he can put huge amounts of money into government bonds and collect payments every year with no risk. So a good business has to earn a lot more than treasuries, and be expected to keep doing it. If your business does not clear the riskless rate by a wide margin, the capital has a better home. 3. The gap between similar-looking businesses is enormous. Most banks earn 13 or 14 percent on capital. Ask anyone to guess American Express and they say something similar. It earns 30 percent plus, and Buffett is clear it "does not incur more risk in doing so than the banks that earn 13 or 14 percent." Same industry, more than double the return, no extra risk taken. 4. Charlie Munger's test: the cash has to be real. Munger pounded the idea that a business was not good just because it was doing sexy things. It had to be earning real cash, be able to pay that cash out if it wanted, and better yet be able to put it back to work inside the business. A company that earns high returns but cannot redeploy the money is worth less than one that can. 5. Time is the multiplier, so duration is the thing to protect. Buffett says a long period of time "gets to be very important because it doubles later on to the very big numbers." One great year is noise. The rate is what compounds. 6. When the facts change, retire the rule. Buffett spent decades known for not buying technology, and said so himself. His explanation for buying now is that the business changed: Google and its competitors are "laying out hundreds of billions," they are big capital spenders, and that is real money. When they were asset-light he passed and the market loved them. Now that they spend heavily, shareholders like them less and he thinks they are more likely to win. He did not change his test. He noticed the business had moved into the category his test rewards. 7. Nobody is measuring the thing that matters. Buffett says he cannot recall a report on Wall Street that gets into the internal rates of return a business is actually earning, and calls the fixation on next quarter ridiculous. He rates Alphabet ahead of 90 or 95 percent of what gets merchandised through Wall Street, on the record rather than the story. If your own reporting tracks growth and headcount but not return on capital, you are measuring what is easy. 8. Every wonderful business gets attacked, so ask how long it stays wonderful. In 1958 he helped start Data Documents, after IBM was forced by an antitrust settlement to divest half the capacity of its best business. That advantage ran out after 10 or 15 years, and he knew some of the people who caused it to run out. His closing line is the whole lesson: "It's not a question of whether it was wonderful yesterday. The question is, how long is it going to be wonderful?" The move for an operator: run the test on your own business this quarter. What return are you earning on the capital in it, how does that compare to doing nothing, and what would have to be true for that return to survive the next ten years. Warren Buffett with Becky Quick, CNBC Squawk Box, July 2026.

Warren Buffett literally gave a 9-minute masterclass on what makes a business worth owning, inside the interview where he explains why he broke his own rule on technology. Eight things he teaches: 1. A good business is not one that grows. It is one that earns high returns on capital for a long time. His words: "something that you can expect to earn high returns on capital over a long period of time." Growth without returns on capital is just a bigger version of the same problem. 2. Measure it against doing nothing. Buffett points out he can put huge amounts of money into government bonds and collect payments every year with no risk. So a good business has to earn a lot more than treasuries, and be expected to keep doing it. If your business does not clear the riskless rate by a wide margin, the capital has a better home. 3. The gap between similar-looking businesses is enormous. Most banks earn 13 or 14 percent on capital. Ask anyone to guess American Express and they say something similar. It earns 30 percent plus, and Buffett is clear it "does not incur more risk in doing so than the banks that earn 13 or 14 percent." Same industry, more than double the return, no extra risk taken. 4. Charlie Munger's test: the cash has to be real. Munger pounded the idea that a business was not good just because it was doing sexy things. It had to be earning real cash, be able to pay that cash out if it wanted, and better yet be able to put it back to work inside the business. A company that earns high returns but cannot redeploy the money is worth less than one that can. 5. Time is the multiplier, so duration is the thing to protect. Buffett says a long period of time "gets to be very important because it doubles later on to the very big numbers." One great year is noise. The rate is what compounds. 6. When the facts change, retire the rule. Buffett spent decades known for not buying technology, and said so himself. His explanation for buying now is that the business changed: Google and its competitors are "laying out hundreds of billions," they are big capital spenders, and that is real money. When they were asset-light he passed and the market loved them. Now that they spend heavily, shareholders like them less and he thinks they are more likely to win. He did not change his test. He noticed the business had moved into the category his test rewards. 7. Nobody is measuring the thing that matters. Buffett says he cannot recall a report on Wall Street that gets into the internal rates of return a business is actually earning, and calls the fixation on next quarter ridiculous. He rates Alphabet ahead of 90 or 95 percent of what gets merchandised through Wall Street, on the record rather than the story. If your own reporting tracks growth and headcount but not return on capital, you are measuring what is easy. 8. Every wonderful business gets attacked, so ask how long it stays wonderful. In 1958 he helped start Data Documents, after IBM was forced by an antitrust settlement to divest half the capacity of its best business. That advantage ran out after 10 or 15 years, and he knew some of the people who caused it to run out. His closing line is the whole lesson: "It's not a question of whether it was wonderful yesterday. The question is, how long is it going to be wonderful?" The move for an operator: run the test on your own business this quarter. What return are you earning on the capital in it, how does that compare to doing nothing, and what would have to be true for that return to survive the next ten years. Warren Buffett with Becky Quick, CNBC Squawk Box, July 2026.

Andrej Drats

31,298 görüntüleme • 17 gün önce

Warren Buffett just warned that the US dollar could collapse and admitted he doesn't understand most of the stock market anymore. 95 years old, sitting on $380 billion in cash, and the first time watching from the sidelines instead of actively investing. And what he revealed at this weekend's Berkshire shareholder meeting is genuinely concerning: On the market, Buffett didn't hold back. He compared it to "a church with a casino attached" and said the casino has never been more packed. On one-day options: "That is not investing. It's not speculating. It's gambling. Totally." He pointed to the Avis short squeeze THIS WEEK. A rental car company that's been around for 50 years getting meme-squeezed in 2026. The same behavior that blew up retail traders with GameStop is back, except now it's hitting boring legacy companies with zero business being volatile. "We have lots more regulation now, but people spend their time figuring out how to get around the rules rather than follow the rules." That one sentence explains more about the current market than every CNBC segment combined. When asked why he's hoarding $380 billion instead of investing it, Buffett said something no one expected: "I understand fewer of the businesses as a percentage of the whole than I did 10 years ago. I have not learned new industries for some years. I'm not going to have an edge on a whole bunch of younger people that have actually grown up with it." Think about what he's actually saying... This is a man who made $140 billion by understanding businesses better than anyone alive. And he's telling you the current market is so detached from reality that even HE can't make sense of what's being valued and why. He quoted IBM's Tom Watson Sr.: "I'm smart in spots and I stay around those spots." In 60 years of managing money, he said MAYBE five were "really juicy." Five out of sixty. That means 92% of his career was spent WAITING while everyone else gambled. And he still ended up richer than all of them. Then the conversation turned to inflation and that's where it gets really interesting: Buffett said America is "not immune" from runaway inflation. He brought up countries that went bankrupt "six or seven times" in his lifetime. Compared today to right before Volcker had to rescue the dollar, when Americans were borrowing at 12% to buy farmland earning 6% because they believed the dollar would disappear. "Cash is trash" was the mentality. Nebraska farmers collapsed because of it. Entire communities wiped out not by a recession but by a BELIEF that the currency was dying. And Buffett sees that same energy building again. Then someone asked the question everyone wanted answered: Do you see a crash coming? "If you saw it coming, it wouldn't happen. The things people are talking about and thinking about? It's not going to happen. But there are things that can come out of the blue." He compared it to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 that triggered World War I. Nobody was discussing or anticipating it. But it changed the world overnight. "That's particularly true now because of the things that can come out of the sky." A 95yo man who has survived every crash, every war, every crisis of the last six decades just told you the market is a casino, the dollar isn't safe, and the real collapse will be something nobody sees coming. $380 billion in cash is his answer because he believes things are about to get much worse.

Warren Buffett just warned that the US dollar could collapse and admitted he doesn't understand most of the stock market anymore. 95 years old, sitting on $380 billion in cash, and the first time watching from the sidelines instead of actively investing. And what he revealed at this weekend's Berkshire shareholder meeting is genuinely concerning: On the market, Buffett didn't hold back. He compared it to "a church with a casino attached" and said the casino has never been more packed. On one-day options: "That is not investing. It's not speculating. It's gambling. Totally." He pointed to the Avis short squeeze THIS WEEK. A rental car company that's been around for 50 years getting meme-squeezed in 2026. The same behavior that blew up retail traders with GameStop is back, except now it's hitting boring legacy companies with zero business being volatile. "We have lots more regulation now, but people spend their time figuring out how to get around the rules rather than follow the rules." That one sentence explains more about the current market than every CNBC segment combined. When asked why he's hoarding $380 billion instead of investing it, Buffett said something no one expected: "I understand fewer of the businesses as a percentage of the whole than I did 10 years ago. I have not learned new industries for some years. I'm not going to have an edge on a whole bunch of younger people that have actually grown up with it." Think about what he's actually saying... This is a man who made $140 billion by understanding businesses better than anyone alive. And he's telling you the current market is so detached from reality that even HE can't make sense of what's being valued and why. He quoted IBM's Tom Watson Sr.: "I'm smart in spots and I stay around those spots." In 60 years of managing money, he said MAYBE five were "really juicy." Five out of sixty. That means 92% of his career was spent WAITING while everyone else gambled. And he still ended up richer than all of them. Then the conversation turned to inflation and that's where it gets really interesting: Buffett said America is "not immune" from runaway inflation. He brought up countries that went bankrupt "six or seven times" in his lifetime. Compared today to right before Volcker had to rescue the dollar, when Americans were borrowing at 12% to buy farmland earning 6% because they believed the dollar would disappear. "Cash is trash" was the mentality. Nebraska farmers collapsed because of it. Entire communities wiped out not by a recession but by a BELIEF that the currency was dying. And Buffett sees that same energy building again. Then someone asked the question everyone wanted answered: Do you see a crash coming? "If you saw it coming, it wouldn't happen. The things people are talking about and thinking about? It's not going to happen. But there are things that can come out of the blue." He compared it to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 that triggered World War I. Nobody was discussing or anticipating it. But it changed the world overnight. "That's particularly true now because of the things that can come out of the sky." A 95yo man who has survived every crash, every war, every crisis of the last six decades just told you the market is a casino, the dollar isn't safe, and the real collapse will be something nobody sees coming. $380 billion in cash is his answer because he believes things are about to get much worse.

Ricardo

1,645,662 görüntüleme • 3 ay önce

Warren Buffett on the Benjamin Franklin thought exercise anyone can use to be successful Warren Buffett offers the following advice to the students at the Terry College of Business: “Pretend I’ve made you a great offer: You can pick any one of your classmates and you get 10% of their earnings for the rest of their lives. What goes through your mind in determining who you would pick?” He continues: “You probably wouldn’t pick the person who gets the highest grades in the class. There’s nothing wrong with getting the highest grades, but that’s not going to be the quality that sets apart a big winner from the rest of the pack… I think you’ll find that it gets down to a bunch of qualities that, interestingly enough, are self-made… It’s integrity, it’s honesty, it’s generosity, it’s being willing to do more than your share.” Then he asks the class to pick a classmate to sell short: “Who do you think is going to do the worst in the class? It isn’t the person with the lowest grades, or anything of the sort. It’s the person who just doesn’t shape up in the character department.” When Berkshire Hathaway hires people, they look for three things: 1. Intelligence 2. Initiative or Energy 3. Integrity Buffett explains: “If they don’t have the latter, the first two will kill you. If you’re going to hire somebody without integrity, you want them lazy and dumb. You don’t want them smart and energetic.” Importantly, he points out that these are habit patterns: “The person who always claims credit for things they didn’t do, cuts corners, and who you can’t count on — in the end, those are habit patterns. And the time to form the right habits is when you’re your age… Someone once said that the chains of habit are too light to be felt until they’re too heavy to be broken. And I see that all the time.” Buffett concludes: “When you write down the habits of that person you’d like to buy 10% of, look at that list and ask yourself, ‘Is there anything on that list that I couldn’t do?’ And the answer is that there won’t be. And when you look at the person you sell short and you look at the qualities you don’t like — if you see any of those in yourself (egotism, selfishness), you can get rid of that. That is not ordained.” This is an exercise that Benjamin Franklin did, as well as Warren Buffett’s old boss: “Ben Graham looked around and said, ‘Who do I admire?’ He wanted to be admired himself, and he asked why he admired these other people. Then he said, ‘If I admire them for these reasons, maybe other people will admire me if I behave in a similar manner.’ And he decided what kind of a person he wanted to be.” Video source: UGA (2001)

Warren Buffett on the Benjamin Franklin thought exercise anyone can use to be successful Warren Buffett offers the following advice to the students at the Terry College of Business: “Pretend I’ve made you a great offer: You can pick any one of your classmates and you get 10% of their earnings for the rest of their lives. What goes through your mind in determining who you would pick?” He continues: “You probably wouldn’t pick the person who gets the highest grades in the class. There’s nothing wrong with getting the highest grades, but that’s not going to be the quality that sets apart a big winner from the rest of the pack… I think you’ll find that it gets down to a bunch of qualities that, interestingly enough, are self-made… It’s integrity, it’s honesty, it’s generosity, it’s being willing to do more than your share.” Then he asks the class to pick a classmate to sell short: “Who do you think is going to do the worst in the class? It isn’t the person with the lowest grades, or anything of the sort. It’s the person who just doesn’t shape up in the character department.” When Berkshire Hathaway hires people, they look for three things: 1. Intelligence 2. Initiative or Energy 3. Integrity Buffett explains: “If they don’t have the latter, the first two will kill you. If you’re going to hire somebody without integrity, you want them lazy and dumb. You don’t want them smart and energetic.” Importantly, he points out that these are habit patterns: “The person who always claims credit for things they didn’t do, cuts corners, and who you can’t count on — in the end, those are habit patterns. And the time to form the right habits is when you’re your age… Someone once said that the chains of habit are too light to be felt until they’re too heavy to be broken. And I see that all the time.” Buffett concludes: “When you write down the habits of that person you’d like to buy 10% of, look at that list and ask yourself, ‘Is there anything on that list that I couldn’t do?’ And the answer is that there won’t be. And when you look at the person you sell short and you look at the qualities you don’t like — if you see any of those in yourself (egotism, selfishness), you can get rid of that. That is not ordained.” This is an exercise that Benjamin Franklin did, as well as Warren Buffett’s old boss: “Ben Graham looked around and said, ‘Who do I admire?’ He wanted to be admired himself, and he asked why he admired these other people. Then he said, ‘If I admire them for these reasons, maybe other people will admire me if I behave in a similar manner.’ And he decided what kind of a person he wanted to be.” Video source: UGA (2001)

Startup Archive

100,825 görüntüleme • 7 ay önce

Jeff Bezos: “Focus on the controllable inputs to your business instead of the outputs” Jeff gives the example of companies trying to drive up their stock price by actually going out and trying to sell their stock: “[A higher stock price] is the final output…. That’s not going to be sustainable. It’s a silly approach.” Jeff recommends working backwards from a higher stock price to its controllable inputs instead: “What are the inputs to a higher stock price? Okay, well, free cash flow and return on invested capital are inputs to a higher stock price. Let’s keep working backwards. What are the inputs to free cash flow? And you keep working backwards until you get to something that’s controllable.” He points out that a controllable input to free cash flow would be something like a lower cost structure: “If we can improve our picking efficiency in our fulfillment centers and reduce defects - reducing defects at the root is one of the best ways to lower cost structure - that starts to be a job you would accept. If you’re a reasonable person, you would say, I have no idea how to drive up the stock price - I can’t manage that directly. It’s not a controllable input. But I can make your picking algorithms more efficient, and that will reduce cost structure. And then you follow that chain all along the way. That’s what you do in all of these businesses.” Video source: Business Insider (2014)

Jeff Bezos: “Focus on the controllable inputs to your business instead of the outputs” Jeff gives the example of companies trying to drive up their stock price by actually going out and trying to sell their stock: “[A higher stock price] is the final output…. That’s not going to be sustainable. It’s a silly approach.” Jeff recommends working backwards from a higher stock price to its controllable inputs instead: “What are the inputs to a higher stock price? Okay, well, free cash flow and return on invested capital are inputs to a higher stock price. Let’s keep working backwards. What are the inputs to free cash flow? And you keep working backwards until you get to something that’s controllable.” He points out that a controllable input to free cash flow would be something like a lower cost structure: “If we can improve our picking efficiency in our fulfillment centers and reduce defects - reducing defects at the root is one of the best ways to lower cost structure - that starts to be a job you would accept. If you’re a reasonable person, you would say, I have no idea how to drive up the stock price - I can’t manage that directly. It’s not a controllable input. But I can make your picking algorithms more efficient, and that will reduce cost structure. And then you follow that chain all along the way. That’s what you do in all of these businesses.” Video source: Business Insider (2014)

Startup Archive

18,881 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce

Change your time horizon. The king of all investing is Warren Buffett. And what did he actually do? He bet a generational trend in American growth, opportunity, and innovation. Then he managed the compound table appropriately and let time do the work. That’s it. That’s the whole strategy. I try to adhere to that to the best of my capability. Because the math of compounding over long periods of time is the closest thing to a cheat code that exists in investing. Change your time horizon. Everything else follows from that. Thanks for having me on the show Phil Rosen

Change your time horizon. The king of all investing is Warren Buffett. And what did he actually do? He bet a generational trend in American growth, opportunity, and innovation. Then he managed the compound table appropriately and let time do the work. That’s it. That’s the whole strategy. I try to adhere to that to the best of my capability. Because the math of compounding over long periods of time is the closest thing to a cheat code that exists in investing. Change your time horizon. Everything else follows from that. Thanks for having me on the show Phil Rosen

Anthony Scaramucci

23,325 görüntüleme • 27 gün önce

Warren Buffett on the biggest investing mistake of his career: Buffett explains that early in his career, he was taught by Ben Graham to buy stocks on a purely quantitative basis, hunting for things that were dirt cheap. He calls this the "cigar butt" approach: "The cigar butt approach to buying stocks is that you walk down the street and you're looking around for cigar butts and you find this terrible looking soggy ugly looking cigar one puff left in it but you pick it up and you get your one puff disgusting it's thrown away but it's free. I mean it's cheap and then you look around for another soggy you know one puff cigarette." That's exactly how he bought Berkshire Hathaway. The stock was selling below its working capital. He got the plants, the machinery, the inventory, and the receivables all at a discount. It was cheap. So he bought it. The problem? Twenty years later, he was still running a lousy business, and the money didn't compound. Buffett reflects on what he learned: "You really want to be in a wonderful business because there the time is the friend of the wonderful business; you keep compounding it keeps doing more business and you keep making more money. Time is the enemy of the lousy business." This led to one of his most famous investing principles: "I would rather buy a wonderful business at a fair price than a fair business at a wonderful price." Looking back, Buffett admits he could have liquidated Berkshire for a quick profit, taken his "one puff," and started fresh. Instead, he used a struggling textile business as the platform for everything that came after: the insurance business, See's Candy, the Buffalo News. "I would have been way better off doing that with a brand new little entity that I'd set up rather than using Berkshire at the platform."

Black Edge

19,375 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce

Jony Ive explains the Steve Jobs product philosophy that saved Apple from bankruptcy in 1998 “Our job isn’t to make money for Apple. Our job is to try and make the very best products we can.” Jony is aware that this sounds simplistic and easy to say given that Apple is one of the most valuable companies in the world today. But he points out that Steve Jobs stuck to this philosophy when Apple was on the verge of bankruptcy in 1998: “When Steve came back, that’s how he articulated what the goals of the company needed to be… It takes a tremendous courage when you’re losing fabulously large amounts of money to say ‘Our goal isn’t turnaround. Our goal is to make a great product.’ That’s not a natural reflex to that situation. The reflex is: let’s not spend this money and let’s try to get a little bit more because we’re about to go out of business.”

Jony Ive explains the Steve Jobs product philosophy that saved Apple from bankruptcy in 1998 “Our job isn’t to make money for Apple. Our job is to try and make the very best products we can.” Jony is aware that this sounds simplistic and easy to say given that Apple is one of the most valuable companies in the world today. But he points out that Steve Jobs stuck to this philosophy when Apple was on the verge of bankruptcy in 1998: “When Steve came back, that’s how he articulated what the goals of the company needed to be… It takes a tremendous courage when you’re losing fabulously large amounts of money to say ‘Our goal isn’t turnaround. Our goal is to make a great product.’ That’s not a natural reflex to that situation. The reflex is: let’s not spend this money and let’s try to get a little bit more because we’re about to go out of business.”

Startup Archive

199,935 görüntüleme • 8 ay önce

Benchmark founder Andy Rachleff on what most founders get wrong about product/market fit “When you’re starting a company, you need to develop a value hypothesis and then a growth hypothesis. The value hypothesis consists of the what, the who, and the how. What are you going to build? For whom is it relevant? And what’s the business model? That’s the how.” Andy believes the core of product market fit is proving the value hypothesis. And the mistake most founders make is iterating on the “what” variable, which he defines as the inflection point in technology you’re building on: “Great technology companies are created by virtue of an entrepreneur recognizing an inflection point in technology that allows them to build a new product.” When Andy was building Wealthfront, this inflection point was brokerage APIs and ETFs. It’s only once you’ve identified an inflection point in technology (the “what”), Andy argues, that you should begin to focus on the “who” (e.g. what’s the market?) and the “how” (e.g. what’s the business model?). “You don’t start with a market and look for problems to which you can find a solution because that’s consensus, leads to mundane outcomes, and certainly doesn’t support venture capital. The great returns in venture capital have all come from people who have tried to do something non-consensus.” The other product/market fit mistake Andy often sees founders make is spending too much money on advertising: “The way that you really know you’ve found [product/market fit] is if you have exponential organic growth - if you have word of mouth. People only recommend things that they love… I’ve seen many entrepreneurs fall in love with the growth they’ve gotten from their advertising and not realized they’re not getting word of mouth.” Video source: Fintech Nexus (2018)

Benchmark founder Andy Rachleff on what most founders get wrong about product/market fit “When you’re starting a company, you need to develop a value hypothesis and then a growth hypothesis. The value hypothesis consists of the what, the who, and the how. What are you going to build? For whom is it relevant? And what’s the business model? That’s the how.” Andy believes the core of product market fit is proving the value hypothesis. And the mistake most founders make is iterating on the “what” variable, which he defines as the inflection point in technology you’re building on: “Great technology companies are created by virtue of an entrepreneur recognizing an inflection point in technology that allows them to build a new product.” When Andy was building Wealthfront, this inflection point was brokerage APIs and ETFs. It’s only once you’ve identified an inflection point in technology (the “what”), Andy argues, that you should begin to focus on the “who” (e.g. what’s the market?) and the “how” (e.g. what’s the business model?). “You don’t start with a market and look for problems to which you can find a solution because that’s consensus, leads to mundane outcomes, and certainly doesn’t support venture capital. The great returns in venture capital have all come from people who have tried to do something non-consensus.” The other product/market fit mistake Andy often sees founders make is spending too much money on advertising: “The way that you really know you’ve found [product/market fit] is if you have exponential organic growth - if you have word of mouth. People only recommend things that they love… I’ve seen many entrepreneurs fall in love with the growth they’ve gotten from their advertising and not realized they’re not getting word of mouth.” Video source: Fintech Nexus (2018)

Startup Archive

16,595 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce

Warren Buffett on the single best thing an investor could have done in 1942: At a recent shareholder meeting, Buffett explains that he normally goes straight into questions and answers. But this time he opened differently, because he felt the usual format was teaching the wrong lesson. As he puts it, "all the questions would naturally tend toward current events." So he went back to 1942, the year he bought his first stock, to make a point about everything that has happened since. "We've had 14 presidents, seven Republicans, seven Democrats. We've had world wars. We had 911. We had the Cuban missile crisis. We have all kinds of things." His lesson? None of it should have changed what you did with your money. "The best single thing you could have done on March 11th, 1942 when I bought my first stock was just buy an index fund and never look at a headline, never think about stocks anymore. Just like you would do if you bought a farm. You just buy the farm and let the tenant farmer run it for you." Then he gives the number. Buffett describes putting $10,000 into an index fund that reinvested dividends, and he pauses to let the audience guess what it would be worth. The answer: "it would come to $51 million now." The only belief required back then was simple: "The only thing you had to really believe in then is that America would win the war and that America would progress as it has ever since 1776. And that American business, if America moved forward, American business would move forward." Notice what he says you did NOT need: "You didn't have to worry about what stock to buy. You didn't have to worry what day to get in and out. You didn't know the Federal Reserve would exist."

Warren Buffett on the single best thing an investor could have done in 1942: At a recent shareholder meeting, Buffett explains that he normally goes straight into questions and answers. But this time he opened differently, because he felt the usual format was teaching the wrong lesson. As he puts it, "all the questions would naturally tend toward current events." So he went back to 1942, the year he bought his first stock, to make a point about everything that has happened since. "We've had 14 presidents, seven Republicans, seven Democrats. We've had world wars. We had 911. We had the Cuban missile crisis. We have all kinds of things." His lesson? None of it should have changed what you did with your money. "The best single thing you could have done on March 11th, 1942 when I bought my first stock was just buy an index fund and never look at a headline, never think about stocks anymore. Just like you would do if you bought a farm. You just buy the farm and let the tenant farmer run it for you." Then he gives the number. Buffett describes putting $10,000 into an index fund that reinvested dividends, and he pauses to let the audience guess what it would be worth. The answer: "it would come to $51 million now." The only belief required back then was simple: "The only thing you had to really believe in then is that America would win the war and that America would progress as it has ever since 1776. And that American business, if America moved forward, American business would move forward." Notice what he says you did NOT need: "You didn't have to worry about what stock to buy. You didn't have to worry what day to get in and out. You didn't know the Federal Reserve would exist."

Black Edge

16,436 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce

🚨 WARREN BUFFETT IS WARNING US AGAIN Berkshire is now sitting on $397.4B in cash. Do you understand what it means? The last times Buffett did this, a generation of investors got wiped out: 1999 → Nasdaq crashed 79% 2008 → S&P 500 crashed 57% 2020 → S&P 500 crashed 34% Now he is saying it again: “We’ve never had people in a more gambling mood than now.” See? The man who called the Dot-com bubble is not buying a single thing. He is hiding in cash. Reminder: I’ve called all the market tops and bottoms for the last 15 years, including the Bitcoin bottom at $16,000 and the top at $126,000. The next call will be even more important. When I exit markets completely, I’ll post it here publicly like I always do. Turn notifications on. If you’re not following yet, you’ll understand why that was a mistake later.

🚨 WARREN BUFFETT IS WARNING US AGAIN Berkshire is now sitting on $397.4B in cash. Do you understand what it means? The last times Buffett did this, a generation of investors got wiped out: 1999 → Nasdaq crashed 79% 2008 → S&P 500 crashed 57% 2020 → S&P 500 crashed 34% Now he is saying it again: “We’ve never had people in a more gambling mood than now.” See? The man who called the Dot-com bubble is not buying a single thing. He is hiding in cash. Reminder: I’ve called all the market tops and bottoms for the last 15 years, including the Bitcoin bottom at $16,000 and the top at $126,000. The next call will be even more important. When I exit markets completely, I’ll post it here publicly like I always do. Turn notifications on. If you’re not following yet, you’ll understand why that was a mistake later.

Alex Mason 👁△

97,970 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce

Let me explain the sinister nature of what Trump actually does to people. He asks: are you loyal to me? Yes. Good. No forever wars. Are you with me? Yes. No forever wars. Then he starts the wars. And now he needs you to be with him on the wars too. And then the Epstein files come out. Allegations involving children. And he needs you to look the other way on that too. That’s the mechanism. That’s how it works. He moves the goalposts incrementally. Each ask is slightly more compromising than the last. And by the time you realize how far you’ve traveled from your own principles you are so deep in that you can’t find your way back. Loyalty to Trump doesn’t mean loyalty to an idea or a policy or a vision for the country. It means asymmetric, unconditional, no-questions-asked loyalty to whatever he decides is true today. You have to understand the sinister nature of that to understand what is really happening in Washington right now. This isn’t politics. This is a loyalty trap.

Let me explain the sinister nature of what Trump actually does to people. He asks: are you loyal to me? Yes. Good. No forever wars. Are you with me? Yes. No forever wars. Then he starts the wars. And now he needs you to be with him on the wars too. And then the Epstein files come out. Allegations involving children. And he needs you to look the other way on that too. That’s the mechanism. That’s how it works. He moves the goalposts incrementally. Each ask is slightly more compromising than the last. And by the time you realize how far you’ve traveled from your own principles you are so deep in that you can’t find your way back. Loyalty to Trump doesn’t mean loyalty to an idea or a policy or a vision for the country. It means asymmetric, unconditional, no-questions-asked loyalty to whatever he decides is true today. You have to understand the sinister nature of that to understand what is really happening in Washington right now. This isn’t politics. This is a loyalty trap.

Anthony Scaramucci

350,996 görüntüleme • 4 ay önce

WARREN BUFFETT ON WHY HE BOUGHT APPLE $AAPL DESPITE NOT KNOWING HOW TO USE A PHONE “I wouldn’t be any good at it. I’m so late to the game. I don’t know what to do with the phone.” “But I just recognize the fact that you’re gonna have one, and your kids are gonna want one, and it is incredibly useful.” “All I had to do was go to Nebraska Furniture Mart and talk to the customers. That’s what I did 60 years ago with American Express.” In the 1960s, when everyone thought AmEx was done, Buffett went to banks and asked if they were still getting a premium for American Express travelers checks. They were. He bought the stock. Same playbook with Apple. He didn’t understand the tech. He understood the customer.

WARREN BUFFETT ON WHY HE BOUGHT APPLE $AAPL DESPITE NOT KNOWING HOW TO USE A PHONE “I wouldn’t be any good at it. I’m so late to the game. I don’t know what to do with the phone.” “But I just recognize the fact that you’re gonna have one, and your kids are gonna want one, and it is incredibly useful.” “All I had to do was go to Nebraska Furniture Mart and talk to the customers. That’s what I did 60 years ago with American Express.” In the 1960s, when everyone thought AmEx was done, Buffett went to banks and asked if they were still getting a premium for American Express travelers checks. They were. He bought the stock. Same playbook with Apple. He didn’t understand the tech. He understood the customer.

WOLF

53,255 görüntüleme • 4 ay önce

A man who has made 19% a year for forty-five years spent most of them telling people Warren Buffett was just lucky. Then he listened to a podcast and apologised on air. "Wow, this guy is a genius, and I've been the biggest fool all along." That is Paul Tudor Jones. His original argument was never stupid, which is the part worth staying for. Buffett, he thought, was in the right place at the right time, riding the longest bull market in history. Put the same man in Japan starting in 1989 and see how well the genius holds up. It is a real objection. The Nikkei peaked in December 1989 and did not get back there until February 2024. Thirty-four years underwater. Buy and hold would have ruined you. He changed his mind anyway. He now calls Buffett the OG of compound interest, and then he says the line that should stop you. "He understood the power of compound interest at age nine, while I brilliantly avoided it throughout my entire career." That is not a man who failed at anything. So what exactly did he avoid? Selling. Run the same 19% two ways. Hold everything and pay capital gains once at the end, and forty years turns a dollar into 842. Realise your gains every year and pay tax as you go, and the same 19% turns a dollar into 287. Identical returns. Roughly three times the money, purely from not touching it. That is the price of being right often instead of being right once and then waiting. And here is what makes this honest rather than a lecture. Jones knows all of it now and still cannot do it. He says plainly he could not sit through a 50% drawdown, that his own wiring will not permit it. He wondered aloud why he couldn't just believe in America and ride it out. He can't. Fifty years of reflexes do not get argued away by arithmetic. So the lesson is not to go and be Buffett. It is to work out which one you actually are before the market tells you, because the two strategies are not interchangeable and neither are the people who run them. He is 71. He apologised to a man he had doubted for decades, and then admitted he would probably do it the same way again.

A man who has made 19% a year for forty-five years spent most of them telling people Warren Buffett was just lucky. Then he listened to a podcast and apologised on air. "Wow, this guy is a genius, and I've been the biggest fool all along." That is Paul Tudor Jones. His original argument was never stupid, which is the part worth staying for. Buffett, he thought, was in the right place at the right time, riding the longest bull market in history. Put the same man in Japan starting in 1989 and see how well the genius holds up. It is a real objection. The Nikkei peaked in December 1989 and did not get back there until February 2024. Thirty-four years underwater. Buy and hold would have ruined you. He changed his mind anyway. He now calls Buffett the OG of compound interest, and then he says the line that should stop you. "He understood the power of compound interest at age nine, while I brilliantly avoided it throughout my entire career." That is not a man who failed at anything. So what exactly did he avoid? Selling. Run the same 19% two ways. Hold everything and pay capital gains once at the end, and forty years turns a dollar into 842. Realise your gains every year and pay tax as you go, and the same 19% turns a dollar into 287. Identical returns. Roughly three times the money, purely from not touching it. That is the price of being right often instead of being right once and then waiting. And here is what makes this honest rather than a lecture. Jones knows all of it now and still cannot do it. He says plainly he could not sit through a 50% drawdown, that his own wiring will not permit it. He wondered aloud why he couldn't just believe in America and ride it out. He can't. Fifty years of reflexes do not get argued away by arithmetic. So the lesson is not to go and be Buffett. It is to work out which one you actually are before the market tells you, because the two strategies are not interchangeable and neither are the people who run them. He is 71. He apologised to a man he had doubted for decades, and then admitted he would probably do it the same way again.

Veles

48,073 görüntüleme • 10 gün önce