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Paul Moore - Security Consultant 

@Paul_Reviews • 14,741 subscribers

Laugh when you can, apologise when you should and let go of things you can't control.

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You can't steal data with #CSS alone, right? Wrong. If your #CSS is on a compromised CDN, or you can import a remote CSS via #XSS, you can grab all #data from form fields. Names, addresses, phone numbers & card data. Please, deploy #CSP and don't assume stylesheets aren't dangerous. #contentSecurityPolicy #CSSiphon

You can't steal data with #CSS alone, right? Wrong. If your #CSS is on a compromised CDN, or you can import a remote CSS via #XSS, you can grab all #data from form fields. Names, addresses, phone numbers & card data. Please, deploy #CSP and don't assume stylesheets aren't dangerous. #contentSecurityPolicy #CSSiphon

24,356 Aufrufe

Bypassing the "world-leading, accurate & robust" #onlineSafetyAct age verification system with 3 blurry static pictures of #PeterKyle If you truly believe the #OSA protects children - or was intended to - I have a bridge to sell you. #farce

Bypassing the "world-leading, accurate & robust" #onlineSafetyAct age verification system with 3 blurry static pictures of #PeterKyle If you truly believe the #OSA protects children - or was intended to - I have a bridge to sell you. #farce

17,441 Aufrufe

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Hacking the #EU #AgeVerification app in under 2 minutes. During setup, the app asks you to create a PIN. After entry, the app *encrypts* it and saves it in the shared_prefs directory. 1. It shouldn't be encrypted at all - that's a really poor design. 2. It's not cryptographically tied to the vault which contains the identity data. So, an attacker can simply remove the PinEnc/PinIV values from the shared_prefs file and restart the app. After choosing a different PIN, the app presents credentials created under the old profile and let's the attacker present them as valid. Other issues: 1. Rate limiting is an incrementing number in the same config file. Just reset it to 0 and keep trying. 2. "UseBiometricAuth" is a boolean, also in the same file. Set it to false and it just skips that step. Seriously Ursula von der Leyen - this product will be the catalyst for an enormous breach at some point. It's just a matter of time.
2:13
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Hacking the #EU #AgeVerification app in under 2 minutes. During setup, the app asks you to create a PIN. After entry, the app *encrypts* it and saves it in the shared_prefs directory. 1. It shouldn't be encrypted at all - that's a really poor design. 2. It's not cryptographically tied to the vault which contains the identity data. So, an attacker can simply remove the PinEnc/PinIV values from the shared_prefs file and restart the app. After choosing a different PIN, the app presents credentials created under the old profile and let's the attacker present them as valid. Other issues: 1. Rate limiting is an incrementing number in the same config file. Just reset it to 0 and keep trying. 2. "UseBiometricAuth" is a boolean, also in the same file. Set it to false and it just skips that step. Seriously Ursula von der Leyen - this product will be the catalyst for an enormous breach at some point. It's just a matter of time.

Paul Moore - Security Consultant 

3,386,036 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat

Bypassing #EU #AgeVerification using their own infrastructure. I've ported the Android app logic to a Chrome extension - stripping out the pesky step of handing over biometric data which they can leak... and pass verification instantly. Step 1: Install the extension Step 2: Register an identity (just once) Step 3: Continue using the web as normal The extension detects the QR code, generates a cryptographically identical payload and tells the verifier I'm over 18, which it "fully trusts". This isn't a bug... it's a fundamental design flaw they can't solve without irrevocably tying a key to you personally; which then allows tracking/monitoring. Of course, I could skip the enrolment process entirely and hard-code the credentials into the extension... and the verifier would never know.
1:14
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Bypassing #EU #AgeVerification using their own infrastructure. I've ported the Android app logic to a Chrome extension - stripping out the pesky step of handing over biometric data which they can leak... and pass verification instantly. Step 1: Install the extension Step 2: Register an identity (just once) Step 3: Continue using the web as normal The extension detects the QR code, generates a cryptographically identical payload and tells the verifier I'm over 18, which it "fully trusts". This isn't a bug... it's a fundamental design flaw they can't solve without irrevocably tying a key to you personally; which then allows tracking/monitoring. Of course, I could skip the enrolment process entirely and hard-code the credentials into the extension... and the verifier would never know.

Paul Moore - Security Consultant 

1,173,676 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat

Bypassing the #EU #ageVerification app - part 2. This time, it's v2026.04-2 - which won't run on rooted devices & has encrypted shared preferences. If we ignore the fact they've used a 6 year old deprecated library, they haven't actually solved the problem at all. An attacker can just as easily delete ciphertext as plain text. Ironically, they've tried to solve a problem they don't truly understand... much like the concept itself.
2:54
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Bypassing the #EU #ageVerification app - part 2. This time, it's v2026.04-2 - which won't run on rooted devices & has encrypted shared preferences. If we ignore the fact they've used a 6 year old deprecated library, they haven't actually solved the problem at all. An attacker can just as easily delete ciphertext as plain text. Ironically, they've tried to solve a problem they don't truly understand... much like the concept itself.

Paul Moore - Security Consultant 

70,022 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat

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