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E25: Testing first, implementation after complete technical approval. E25 fuel is currently undergoing detailed research, vehicle-compatibility checks and long-term technical evaluation. Automobile manufacturers are assessing its performance across different engines, fuel systems and vehicle models. A nationwide timeline will be considered only after experts and manufacturers complete these evaluations... show more
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![A preventable tragedy On This Day in 1967: Stockport air disaster (England). A British Midland C-4 [G-ALHG] crashes in Stockport, 72 of 84 aboard die. On a go-around, crew lost control after 2 engines failed. Investigation traced the issues to a known - but never addressed - design issue in the fuel system. More details here by ASN (video is from British Pathé) PROBABLE CAUSE: "The immediate cause of the accident was loss of power of both engines on the starboard side, resulting in control problems which prevented the pilot from maintaining height on the available power with one propeller windmilling. The loss of power of the first engine was due to fuel starvation due to inadvertent fuel transfer in flight. The loss of power of the second engine was due either to fuel starvation resulting from inadvertent fuel transfer in flight or to misidentification by the crew of which engine had failed followed by failure to restore power in time to the engine misidentified as having failed. Contributory causes of the accident were: (a) The design of the fuel valves and location in the cockpit of their actuating levers, so that a failure by the pilot correctly to position the lever by an amount so small as to be easy to do and difficult to recognize would result in inadvertent fuel transfer on a scale sufficient to involve the risk after a long flight of a tank expected to contain sufficient fuel being in fact empty. (b) Failure of those responsible for the design of the fuel system or the fuel valves to warn users that failure by a small amount to place the actuating levers in the proper position would result in inadvertent fuel transfer on a scale involving this risk after a long flight. (c) Failure of British Midland's air crew or engineers to recognize the possibility of inadvertent fuel transfer in the air from the evidence available in previous incidents in flight and contained in the fuel logs. (d) Failure of other operators of Argonauts who had learned by experience of the possibility of inadvertent fuel transfer in flight to inform the Air Registration Board, the Directorate of Flight Safety of the Board of Trade or its predecessors, or the United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee of the facts which they had learned so that these might be communicated to other operators of Argonauts and other aircraft equipped with similar systems and fuel cocks."](https://image.24vids.com/tw-2062414198571753810/ext_tw_video_thumb/2062414179756044288/pu/img/r5FK9y-e8pi1UUFi.jpg)
![🚨 NEW: IAEA chief Grossi’s ‘20%’ framing helped build the case for Trump’s regime-change war In early March, Steve Witkoff, key U.S. negotiator and Trump envoy, stated that Iran’s claim of using the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) for “doing good for the Iranian people” (specifically for medical purposes) was a “complete and false pretense” to hide the fact that they were covertly stockpiling uranium there. “The [International Atomic Energy Agency] had evidence that they were stockpiling there and they had enough fuel to run TRR for the next seven or eight years without any additional fuel being delivered,” Witkoff said on The Mark Levin Show. “They were stockpiling again at the 20% level.” Witkoff alleged that IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi – who was part of the final round of talks – told Iran it had stopped “burning anything” at the reactor and that “all of the fuel is stockpiled,” calling it their “‘Perry Mason’ moment.” 👉 This claim was used as a primary justification for the U.S. and Israeli military strikes that began in late February 2026. In an interview today on CBS Face the Nation, Grossi — whose agency’s reporting was cited by the White House — leaned into the same rhetoric, stating that 20% enrichment is “a lot” and far beyond what would be expected under a zero-enrichment framework, reinforcing the premise behind U.S. claims about stockpiling. He also gave weight to the underlying argument presented by Witkoff, even as he added that the reactor “potentially could be used for radioisotope production” and that the IAEA does not assess intent, saying: “we don’t discuss honesty or dishonesty.” He again pressed the lack of access and “many unanswered questions,” leaving open the ambiguity that helped drive the case for escalation. But as reported by MS NOW, that framing omits key technical context: the Tehran Research Reactor requires 20% fuel by design, and under the JCPOA such fuel was permitted under strict limits and monitoring. Experts cited in the report say research reactors cannot enrich uranium and are not suited for weapons production, undercutting the way the 20% issue has been presented. And despite the claims, the Trump administration has not provided public evidence or intelligence to Congress to support the assertion that the reactor was being used for weapon development or illicit stockpiling. Nuclear experts and organizations like the Arms Control Association and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation have called these claims “confusing and misleading” and riddled with technical errors, as cited by MS NOW. And still, contrary to White House rhetoric about an “imminent threat,” Grossi once again repeated today that there is “no indication” that Iran has or has a systematic nuclear weapons program.](https://image.24vids.com/tw-2035847096784281925/amplify_video_thumb/2035846620722630658/img/TrrB6qwpUNrDbBGj.jpg)
