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🇬🇭 “Poor maintenance, repeated engine overheating, and the pilot’s attempt to cool the engine with water caused the Tema microlight crash that killed two brothers. No flight permits had also been issued.” — AIB Ghana final report reveals.

97,877 views • 3 months ago •via X (Twitter)

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A car owner used to service his own car to save money on service costs. After some time, his car’s engine started overheating again and again. Even after driving the car a short distance, the engine would become extremely hot and problems started developing in the engine, even though he was also putting coolant in his car. When the engine finally got damaged, he took his car to a mechanic. When the mechanic checked the car, he found that the owner had filled the engine coolant into the wrong tank instead of the coolant tank. He had filled it into the tank where the water for cleaning the car’s front windshield is kept. Then, when he turned on the wipers, all the coolant was sprayed onto the car’s front windshield through the pressure of the water motor. This was the reason his car kept overheating and the engine got damaged, because the coolant had been sitting in the windshield-washer tank instead of the coolant tank. When the mechanic checked the engine, he found that it had been completely damaged due to repeatedly overheating. Now, the car owner will have to spend a huge amount of money to get the engine repaired. The car owner wanted to save a little money by servicing his car himself, but because of that, he ended up damaging the entire engine of his car. That is why you should never do something without knowledge. You should not try to become an expert at everything you have never done before, because it can lead to a huge loss.

Saffron Chargers

23,884 views • 8 days ago

The name on one of the crew might ring a bell... June 19 1947: Pan Am Flight 121, a Constellation, crash-lands in Mayadine (Syria). 14 of 36 aboard die. In flight, the #1 engine failed due to a mechanical issue. Attempting to divert to an alternate airport, the #2 engine also failed. The crew made a belly landing in the desert, where the aircraft caught fire. Among the survivors was a dead heading 3rd officer named Gene Roddenberry, who would go on to create the iconic science fiction television series “Star Trek”. This was Roddenbery´s 2nd major plane crash, having survived another major accident during his service in the Pacific Theatre, during WW2 Accident description from ASN (One of many period accidents where an engine failure led to a fatal crash. Nowadays, an engine fail is nearly routine and at worst it causes a diversion...) "The Constellation, named "Clipper Eclipse", was cruising at FL185 when the no. 1 prop had to be feathered due to engine problems. The remaining three engines overheated, forcing the crew to reduced power. This resulted in a gradual descent. The crew elected to continue to Istanbul instead of landing at the nearby Habbaniya RAF Station in Iraq. While descending through FL100 a fire broke out in the engine no. 2 nacelle. A rapid descent was started during which the no. 2 engine separated from the wing. With the left wing on fire a belly landing was carried out in the desert. It appeared the no. 1 engine failure was due to a broken exhaust rocker arm on the no.18 cylinder. The no. 2 engine failure was due to a failure of the thrust bearing which in turn resulted in blocking the passage of oil from the propeller feathering motor to the propeller dome. PROBABLE CAUSE: "The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a fire which resulted from an attempt to feather the No. 2 propeller after the failure of the No. 2 engine thrust bearing."

Francisco Cunha

56,655 views • 2 months ago

As the CFM LEAP engine shuts down, you can hear the distinctive “whoosh” sound followed by a gush of air. That is the Reverse Bleed System (RBS) at work. During normal operation, a significant amount of fuel remains unpurged in the system after engine shutdown. This residual fuel, located near or within the hot section, vaporizes due to high temperatures and deposits carbon (coke) on the fuel nozzles. Over time, nozzle coking leads to several operational and maintenance issues, including loss of thrust, reduced engine efficiency due to incomplete combustion, accelerated deterioration of hot-section components (combustor and High-Pressure Turbine), engine start failures, potential engine stalls, and increased unscheduled engine removals. The Reverse Bleed System (RBS) prevents fuel nozzle coking by automatically introducing cool air from the core compartment into the engine core flowpath after shutdown. This effectively lowers the fuel nozzle temperature below the coking threshold. RBS can operate for a maximum of 1 hour, and its effectiveness depends on ambient conditions (especially ambient temperature) and the total duration it runs. The last flight of the day contributes the most to fuel nozzle coke accumulation because of the extended dwell time at the gate. By actively managing post-shutdown thermal conditions, RBS significantly reduces coking-related problems, improves engine reliability, and lowers long-term maintenance costs. Now, also coming soon to the CFM56

Arjun Singh

53,598 views • 3 months ago

As a Member State of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), India is obligated to comply with the provisions of ICAO Annex 13, which governs aircraft accident and incident investigations. Under Annex 13, the investigating authority—in this case, India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB)—must: 1. Submit a Preliminary Report within 30 days of the occurrence. 2. Make the Final Report publicly available as soon as possible and, where feasible, within 12 months of the accident. 3. If the Final Report cannot be completed within 12 months, publish an Interim Statement on each anniversary of the occurrence, outlining the progress of the investigation and any safety issues identified. Importantly, ICAO emphasizes that preliminary reports are not substitutes for final reports. Preliminary reports provide only factual information available at an early stage and do not contain a comprehensive analysis of the systemic, operational, technical, or human factors that may have contributed to an accident. The AAIB complied with the first requirement by releasing its preliminary report on 12 July 2025, exactly one month after the accident. As the first anniversary of the crash approaches on 12 June 2026, attention is now focused on whether the AAIB will publish the Final Report or issue an Interim Statement in accordance with the requirements of Annex 13. On 12 June 2025, Air India Flight AI171, operated by a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner registered VT-ANB, departed Ahmedabad, India, bound for London Gatwick. The aircraft was carrying 230 passengers, 10 cabin crew members, and 2 pilots. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft suffered a catastrophic loss of thrust and crashed outside the airport boundary. Of the 242 people onboard, only one passenger survived, making it one of the deadliest aviation accidents involving a Boeing 787 and one of India's worst air disasters. According to the AAIB's preliminary findings, the aircraft reached a maximum recorded airspeed of approximately 180 knots indicated airspeed (IAS) at 08:08:42 UTC during its initial climb. Immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF one second apart. As fuel flow to both engines ceased, engine parameters began decreasing from their takeoff values. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data captured a brief exchange between the pilots. One pilot was heard asking the other why he had cut off the fuel. The other pilot replied that he had not done so. Airport CCTV footage showed the deployment of the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) shortly after liftoff, indicating a significant loss of electrical and hydraulic power consistent with the dual-engine power loss. Investigators also reported no significant bird activity in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft began losing altitude before crossing the airport perimeter wall. Flight recorder data subsequently showed attempts to recover engine power. At approximately 08:08:52 UTC, Engine 1's fuel cutoff switch moved back from CUTOFF to RUN. Two seconds later, the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) inlet door began opening, consistent with the aircraft's automatic emergency restart logic. At 08:08:56 UTC, Engine 2's fuel cutoff switch also returned to RUN. The Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) systems on both engines initiated automatic relight sequences. Engine 1 showed signs of recovery as exhaust gas temperatures increased and core speed stabilized. Engine 2 also relit but was unable to recover sufficient core speed before impact despite repeated fuel reintroductions. At approximately 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted a distress call: "MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY." Air Traffic Control acknowledged the transmission and requested confirmation of the callsign. No further response was received. Controllers then observed the aircraft crash beyond the airport boundary and immediately initiated emergency response procedures. The preliminary report established a sequence of events but stopped short of determining why both engine fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF during the critical initial climb phase. It also did not assign blame, determine probable cause, or provide a complete analysis of the human, technical, operational, and systemic factors involved. We now await either the AAIB's Final Report or an Interim Statement.

Turbine Traveller

64,463 views • 2 months ago