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THE #CAB3 ROADMAP 1. Collate feedback – Committee compiles public input into a written report for Parliament. 2. Bill introduced (week of May 18th) – Minister of Justice gives Second Reading speech explaining each clause. 3. Debate in National Assembly – Committee report is presented. 4. NO REFERENDUM –...

66,308 görüntüleme • 3 ay önce •via X (Twitter)

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Constitutional Amendment Bill (N0.3) unanimously passes to committee stage The contentious Constitutional Amendment Bill (N0.3) unanimously passed to the committee stage in the National Assembly earlier in the afternoon after the opposition neglected or failed to call for a critical division of the house for MPs opposed to the legislative changes to vote against it. About 30 MPs were opposed to the bill in its entirety after a record-breaking fierce debate. The failure by the opposition to call for division of the house let the bill, which has far-reaching political implications, pass to the committee stage unanimously, without formal opposition. In terms of process, the presiding officer first judges the will of the house using a voice vote ("Ayes" vs. "Nays"). If an MP challenges the presiding officer's ruling, they then can call for a division of the house. Bells are rung to summon all lawmakers to the chamber, the doors are locked, and MPs must physically move to opposite sides of the house (or have their names recorded) to provide an exact, verified tally of votes. A minimum simple majority was required to pass the bill to the committee stage. The committee stage of the bill is the third step in the legislative process. It is a detailed, clause-by-clause examination of the proposals that takes place after the second reading and general debate. During the committee stage, the house resolves into a committee of the whole house rather than meeting as the standard legislative body, allowing for more conversational and repeated speaking opportunities. Members meticulously scrutinise each section or clause of the bill. The committee goes through the bill clause-by-clause sequentially, voting on each clause or block of clauses. MPs and ministers can propose specific alterations, additions, or removals to individual clauses. Any proposed amendment is debated, and the committee votes on whether to accept or reject the change. Once the committee finishes reviewing all clauses and finalising amendments, the bill moves to the report stage, where the committee officially reports its work back to the house for final confirmation before the third reading. Because it is where the exact wording of the proposed law or amendment is finalised, this phase is often heavily debated. For example, this bill required intense, late-night debate in the National Assembly last night before advancing to the committee stage. After the amendments have been adopted, another vote is called in the house to pass the bill by a two-thirds majority before the same process is repeated in the upper house, senate. If senate makes some changes to the bill, it then goes back to the lower house, National Assembly, for voting before being to sent to the President for assent.

TheNewsHawks

17,671 görüntüleme • 29 gün önce

It must come on record that despite widespread protests & repeated demand from Opposition to send #TransgenderBill to a #Parliament Committee, Govt insisted on pushing it through by making unsubstantiated claims! See video👇 First, it's rare that debate on one Bill is stopped to take up another Bill. The debate on #Finance Bill was going on and Transgender Bill was listed AFTER it, but Parliamentary Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju asked for the Transgender Bill to be taken up & 'passed' today and for Finance Minister to reply to debate on Finance Bill tomorrow. It is only when a Minister is not available to respond to debate on a Bill, that it is postponed, but Finance Minister is sitting right there! What is the rush to pass #TransBill in #LokSabha today itself? Second, as Rijiju seeks sense of the House, several MPs from the Opposition, in fact, oppose and categorically demand that Bill be sent to a Select Committee to consult with stakeholders from Trans community. They even say that they raised this demand in Business Advisory Committee meeting as well and Rijiju concedes to this. Rijiju himself says that Congress, SP, AITC and NCP(SP) made a request for Bill to be sent to Committee. And then Rijiju makes several unsubstantiated claims: 1. It's not a major amendment Bill - amendments to exclude self-identification are not major? 2. Extensive debate have already happened on Bill - When? The Bill was never placed in public domain as Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy 2014 mandates. Where has this debate happened? Who participated in it? 3. The amendment has come after a year long debate in Standing Committee - When? Which Committee? In the last 1 year, the Standing Committee on Social Justice & Empowerment has not produced any specific report on any topic related to #Transgender persons. Even the Statement of Objects & Reasons of the Bill doesn't mention any recommendation from a Standing Committee report. 4. We are not going against any community - why are people from trans community protesting the Bill then? So, if the Bill is very good, very important, for the welfare of people from Transgender community, then why is the Govt not willing to send the Bill to a Committee? Rijiju keeps saying - Bill has to be passed today, let's not delay. An MP can be heard in the background asking - "itni jaldi kya hai"? Indeed, why the rush? Why does Govt keep taking short cuts for law making and avoid public consultations?

Maadhyam

31,352 görüntüleme • 3 ay önce

📌Closing all Doors for Chiwenga, LynneM 💕💝💎 and Cde Knox M Chivero could be right 🔸During the debate on the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 3) Bill (CAB3), the Minister of Justice, Hon. Ziyambi Ziyambi, explained that Clause 4 deletes Section 94(3) of the Constitution. That subsection used to require a Vice‑President who takes over as President after a vacancy to be sworn in with a new presidential oath. 🔸He pointed out that this requirement is no longer needed because Amendment No. 2 of 2021 already changed the rules: when the presidency becomes vacant, Parliament now elects a new President within 30 days. So the old oath requirement for a Vice‑President stepping up no longer applies. 🔸He stressed that removing this outdated provision simply brings the Constitution into line with the current law. Parliament has since passed the amendment. -—————————————————— ⭕️Key quotations from the Constitution and the amendment 1. The provision being repealed – Section 94(3) of the Constitution (still in force until Clause 4 of CAB3 takes effect): “A Vice‑President who becomes President on the death, resignation or removal from office of the President assumes office when he or she takes, before the Chief Justice or the next most senior judge available, the oath of President in the form set out in the Third Schedule, which oath he or she must take as soon as possible and in any event within forty‑eight hours after the office of President became vacant.” 2. The change made by Amendment No. 2 of 2021 – that Act removed the old system of elected Vice‑Presidents and introduced the current rules (including the 30‑day parliamentary election process for a new President). The amendment is cited as: “Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 2) Act, 2021” (The specific provisions that established the new vacancy‑filling procedure are found in the amendments to sections 92, 94 and 95 of the Constitution.) 3. Hon. Ziyambi Ziyambi’s explanation (as summarised from his statement in Parliament): “Clause 4 repeals Section 94(3), which had required a Vice‑President assuming the Presidency after a vacancy to take the oath of office. This provision became redundant after Amendment No. 2 of 2021, which established that Parliament elects a new President within 30 days of a vacancy. The repeal ensures the Constitution reflects current law.” ——————————————————- 📌🃏In short: The old oath rule for a Vice‑President who becomes President is being scrapped because it’s been overtaken by the 2021 change that gives Parliament the power to elect a new President within 30 days. Clause 4 of CAB3 clears away that obsolete requirement.

Chimbwa

101,625 görüntüleme • 16 gün önce

President Emmerson Mnangagwa's spokesman George Charamba, who is also the Deputy Chief Secretary, Presidential Communications in the Office of the President and Cabinet, has provoked a storm of controversy by claiming that parliament trumps a national referendum on constitutional amendment issues currently being debated through a legislative public consultation process. Mnangagwa and his party are using parliament to amend the constitution to extend his rule to 2030 and introduce a raft of other significant changes without going through a referendum, which civil society and opposition activists insist is a requirement in terms of the constitution. The 2013 constitution mandates that any extension of presidential term limits or removal of two five-year term limits must be approved by voters through a referendum. Critics say extending terms from five to seven years, or changing the electoral system constitutes a major subversion of this clause, requiring a referendum. However, Mnangagwa and his allies say a referendum is not needed as they are not removing term limits, but elongating the term lengths and changing the electoral cycle. Zanu PF says the amendment is not a change to the limit of two terms, but rather the length of each term (five to seven years), meaning a referendum is not constitutionally mandated. They say the amendments are meant to ensure political stability and remove "election mode toxicity," disrupting peace, governance and development. The debate centres over holding a referendum on the proposed amendments, specifically Constitution Amendment Bill No.3, which proposes extending Mnangagwa's tenure by two years andpresidential and parliamentary terms from five to seven years as well as changing the presidential election system from direct voting through popular franchise to indirect selection via parliament. The ruling Zanu PF party controls parliament, leading to calls for a popular referendum to approve these significant changes, which critics argue violate the 2013 constitution's democratic intent. Charamba said: “Those who were old enough to participate and follow proceedings of 2013 will know that even after the referendum, that outcome of the referendum still had to be processed through Parliament. What that means is that, a referendum does not usurp the power of Parliament. It simply provides a popular basis for legislative action. Otherwise, at law, the body which is recognized as responsible for any changes, be they at the level of the primary law or at the level of subsidiary laws, is Parliament. Right? So, really, you can't place the referendum in apposition to Parliament. You can't. You just cannot because the referendum does not give you a result that writes the constitution. It is parliament which is mandated to do so in terms of our law. So, really, there shouldn't be any argument at all in respect of that matter. Right?.”

TheNewsHawks

16,579 görüntüleme • 3 ay önce

The House of Reps has passed second reading of a constitutional amendment bill to remove immunity from the Vice President, the Governors, and their Deputies in order to curb corruption, eradicate impunity, and enhance accountability in public office, along with 41 other bills. The others bill are: A Bill for a Creating Additional Three States Oke - Ogun State, ljebu State and Ife - ljesa State. A Bill for the Creation of "Tiga State" from the Present Kano State with Headquarters in "Rano". A bill to Create a New State in the South Eastern Region of Nigeria Known as Orlu State. A bill to Create an Additional State in the South East Region of Nigeria, Carved from the Existing Five (5) States to be known as Etiti State with Capital at Okigwe. A Bill to Establish and Provide Roles for Traditional Rulers in Nigeria and Provide for the Recognition of the Advisory Role of Traditional Rulers in the Constitution. A bill to Grant Citizenship Rights to Spouses of Women from Nigeria, Specify the Minimum Number of Youths and Women that May be Appointed into Specific Offices. A bill to Guarantee Indigene Status to Persons by Reason of Birth or Continued Residence for a Period of Not Less than Ten Years or by Reason of Marriage. A bill to include Citizenship by Investment as one of the classes of Citizenship in Nigeria, provides for the Acquisition of Nigerian Citizenship by Qualified Foreign Investors who meet Specified Investment Thresholds. A bill to Separate the Offices of the Attorney-General of the Federation, Attorney-General of a State from the Offices of the Minister of Justice of the Federal Government and Commissioner for Justice of the Government of a State. A bill to Provide for the Establishment of the Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation and the Office of the Accountant-General of the Federal Government. A bill to Increase the Number of Members of the Federal Civil Service Commission to Provide for each State of the Federation and Federal Capital Territory, Abuja the Opportunity of One Person Representation. A bill to Mandate all Government Statutory Corporations, Commissions, Authorities, Agencies including all Persons and Bodies Established by Law to Submit Yearly Financial Statement to the Auditor General within a Specified Period. A bill to Specify the Period for the Laying of Annual Budget Estimates Before the National and State Houses of Assembly. A bill to Provide for the Public Disclosure of Reports of the Auditor-General of the Federation and for the Auditor-General of a State. And others constitutional amendments.

Imran Muhammad

116,014 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce

QUESTION: What is the relationship between section 91(2)—the term limit provision—and section 95(2)—the term length provision in the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013)? ANSWER: Section 91(2) is the term-limit provision. It regulates the President’s tenure by limiting the length of time that he or she may hold or occupy the Presidency as a public officer to a maximum of two terms—whether consecutive or not—where three or more years’ service is deemed a full term. By contrast, section 95(2) is the term-length provision. It regulates the electoral cycle of the Presidency as an office or institution by defining a single term as five years (now proposed to be seven years under Clause 4 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) H.B. 1 Bill, 2026). The relationship between sections 91(2) and 95(2) is therefore as clear and straightforward as that between a truck driver and a 500 km highway: section 91(2) limits the driver, while section 95(2) defines the length of the highway. Section 91(2) caps the time any individual may occupy the Presidency; section 95(2) sets the institutional length or duration of each presidential term or electoral cycle. This distinction matters because a persistent misconception claims that section 91(2) is not the presidential term-limit provision but merely a qualification rule for election as President, asserts that section 95(2) is the actual term-limit clause. Many who advance this incorrect view rely on one sentence in the obiter dictum by Patel JCC at paragraph 50 of the precedent-setting judgment in Marx Mupungu v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & 6 Ors (CCZ 7/21, 2021) [see: which includes section 95(2) among examples of term-limit provisions. That misconception overlooks a fundamental constitutional imperative: a presidential term-limit provision is, by definition, a disqualifier for election as President. Term limits on presidents are necessarily about elections. They limit qualification for election. Where there is no presidential term limit, re-election is unlimited. In a recent discussion with D. Tinashé Hofisi on 23 April 2026 [ on the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) Bill hosted by The Southern African Times, I explained the relationship between the two sections. Below is the verbatim text of the attached clip extracted from the discussion addressing the import of section 91(2) and its relationship with section 95(2): ME: “It’s a clear term limit provision; is similar to term limit provisions in other jurisdictions that are comparable to Zimbabwe. And when you say it doesn’t have time, it doesn’t make reference to time, I’m at a loss as to what that means, and where that is coming from, with respect to Dr Hofisi, because it says a person is disqualified for election as President or appointment as Vice President if he or she has already held office as President under this constitution for two terms. This is the only section which tells us how many terms a President is limited to. Section 95 doesn’t even tell us that he’s limited to one term. There’s no limit. This one limits the President to two terms. And the two terms, the last time I checked, was a reference to time. And in this case, the section doesn’t leave us doubting or not knowing what a term is or what sort of time a term is. Because it continues to say these two terms are counted whether they follow each other or not. But most significantly, for the purpose of the limit on the President, the term limit on the President, which is provided in this section: three or more years. That’s time. You said there’s no time here. Three years is time. The length of time is three years minimum, and the maximum is more. It’s not defined here. It’s three or more years. It’s more because that is subject to what the relevant law about electoral cycles says is the electoral cycle of the institution that the President occupies”. [verbatim text of clip from The 500 km Highway Metaphor: Distinguishing Sections 91(2) and 95(2) of the Constitution To clearly understand the relationship between sections 91(2) and 95(2), imagine the Presidency as a magnificent 500-kilometre highway built and maintained by section 95(2) of the Constitution. This provision creates the presidential highway itself: it defines the office of the President as a permanent public institution and sets the exact length of each single term — currently five years, now proposed under the Bill to be seven years. It establishes a structured, recurring electoral cycle that belongs to the people of Zimbabwe, ensuring regular, orderly renewal of leadership. Without section 95(2), there would be no defined road — only an open plain of indefinite power. Section 91(2) governs the individual truck driver on that highway. It imposes an absolute lifetime limit: no person may complete more than two full trips along this 500 km highway, whether those trips are taken back-to-back or years apart. Any segment of 300 kilometres or more — that is, three or more years in office — counts as one complete trip. There are no partial credits or exceptions. After two full trips, the driver is permanently disqualified from driving on that highway, again. The distinction is sharp and deliberate: Section 95(2) builds the highway and determines the length of each journey. Section 91(2) limits how many times any single individual is permitted to travel it. One structures the office; the other limits the person who occupies it. Together, they form the Constitution’s twin safeguards — working in perfect harmony to keep power temporary, accountable, and subordinate to the will of the people. To conflate their distinct roles is to weaken these vital safeguards and to invite the very tyranny the Constitution was written to prevent. The Profound and Protective Meaning of “Three or More Years” in Section 91(2) of the Constitution At the heart of section 91(2) lies one of the Constitution’s most brilliant safeguards: “for the purpose of this subsection, three or more years’ service is deemed to be a full term.” The word “more” is no mere drafting flourish—it is deliberate constitutional genius. It declares that section 91(2), as the personal lifetime term-limit provision, imposes no rigid numerical ceiling. Subject to what is reasonable and justifiable in a constitutional democracy under section 95(2), service of four years, five years, six years, seven years, or even longer—once it exceeds the three-year threshold—is unequivocally deemed a complete term for the purpose of lifetime disqualification. This flexibility is not a loophole; it is a wise design that refuses to let the term-limit clause under section 91(2) become brittle or easily evaded. This open-ended “more” is anchored in section 91(2)’s harmonious relationship with section 95(2)(b), which defines the official electoral cycle of the Presidency as a permanent public institution whose five-year lifespan is inextricably intertwined with that of Parliament. Section 91(2) places an iron-clad personal disqualification on the individual; section 95(2) defines the dimensions of the highway itself. Crucially, section 95(2) is not a term-limit provision under subsections (1) and (7) of section 328. Unlike the referendum-protected personal term limit in section 91(2), it may be amended by Parliament under section 328(5) without a national referendum. This distinction is no accident; it is constitutional wisdom. It allows the institutional framework of the Presidency to evolve with the nation’s needs while the unbreakable personal lifetime bar on any single individual remains forever sacrosanct. All told, sections 91(2) and 95(2) differ in character and purpose—one limits the President, the other structures the public office or institution of the Presidency—yet they stand together as the Constitution’s twin guardians. This elegant complementarity keeps presidential power temporary, accountable, and forever subordinate to the sovereign will of the people through the institution or office of the Presidency. To respect and defend this relationship is to honour the very soul of the Constitution: ensuring that no individual can ever turn the highway into their driveway—turning the public office into a personal fiefdom—and that the highway of governance remains open, regularly renewed, and eternally in faithful service to the people of Zimbabwe. This is the promise the Constitution makes!

Prof Jonathan Moyo

12,781 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce

2024: Conservative MP Penny Morduant has the audacity to write that Keir Starmer, the former director of public prosecutions, "would leave Britain terrifyingly vulnerable to Russia" 2020: Stewart Hosie, a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament said that Conservative Prime Ministers David Cameron, Theresa May, and Boris Johnson, "The UK government have actively avoided looking for evidence of Russia interfering.. We were told they haven't seen any evidence, but that is meaningless if they hadn't looked for it" "The Committee found it astonishing that no one in the Conservative government had sough beforehand to protect the (Brexit) referendum from such attempts, or investigate it afterwards, what attempts to influence it may there may have been" "The UK government did not take action to protect the UK in the 2016 (Brexit referendum)" "One would have thought that once the existence of that threat had been understood, seeing what had happened in the US, someone here would want to understand the nature and extent of the threat to the UK. We wanted to see the post referendum assessment, but there isn't one" "There has been no assessment of Russian interference in the EU referendum. This goes back to nobody wanting to touch this issue with a 10 foot barge pole" "This is in stark contrast to the US response to reports of interference in the 2016 Presidential elections" "No matter how politically awkward or embarassing, there should have been an assessment of Russian interference in the Eu referendum. And there must now be one. And the public must be told the results of that assessment"

Farrukh

381,928 görüntüleme • 2 yıl önce

The highly controversial Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 3, which seeks to extend President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s term of office by an extra two years and increase the presidential term from five to seven years, has now formally entered the parliamentary process in Zimbabwe. Speaking in Parliament today, its official main driver, Justice Minister Ziyambi Ziyambi, said all Members of Parliament would be given an opportunity to debate the Bill before it is eventually put to a vote. The Bill seeks to fundamentally alter key aspects of Zimbabwe’s governance system, including the structure of the executive, local government, and the composition of Parliament. The Bill will now be debated in Parliament and could either be passed or rejected. Those opposed to the proposed amendments within both ZANUPF and the country maintain that such far-reaching constitutional changes require a national referendum as provided for in the Constitution of Zimbabwe rather than being decided solely through Parliament. Retired military generals who met President Mnangagwa on two separate occasions say he rejected their pleas to either shelve the Bill or submit it to a referendum. According to the generals, the president dismissed their concerns by telling them, “Whoever wins, wins.” The retired generals have since declared that the Bill will never become law, setting the stage for what some fear could become a major bloody confrontation within ZANUPF between factions aligned to President Mnangagwa and Vice President General Constantino Chiwenga, involving the military. If the Bill becomes law and extends President Mnangagwa’s stay in office, it will effectively close General Chiwenga’s pathway to the presidency, deepening tensions within the ruling party over the question of succession, which in the past triggered the military coup that removed Robert Mugabe after thirty seven year in power. The battle over Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 3 is therefore not only about constitutional reform, but also about the future balance of power within Zimbabwe’s governing elite. According to Justice Minister Ziyambi Ziyambi, the vote on the Bill will not be conducted by secret ballot. Instead, Members of Parliament will vote openly, either by a show of hands or by physically moving to one side of the chamber to vote in favour and to the other side to vote against the Bill. The Zimbabwean Constitutional Court will ultimately have to decide whether the Bill should be subjected to a referendum or not. That decision is likely to have profound political and constitutional consequences. If the court rules against a referendum, it could trigger a constitutional crisis and become a flashpoint for future political struggles over the legitimacy of the constitutional amendment process and the exercise of state power. If President Mnangagwa prevails, he will become the first leader of ZANUPF not to be removed from power by the military. The party’s first leader, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, was removed through ZANLA military action during the liberation struggle, while its second leader, Robert Mugabe, was removed by the Zimbabwean military in November 2017. If Mnangagwa emerges triumphant from this process and serves out his political ambitions without military intervention, he will become the first leader of ZANUPF to leave or die in office without being removed by the military, breaking a pattern that has shaped the party’s leadership history for decades.

Hopewell Chin’ono

45,815 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce