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CVE-2025-68613: n8n RCE Vulnerability Exploit/PoC: n8n has a critical security flaw that lets authenticated users execute arbitrary code through its workflow expression system. When users configure workflows, the expressions they provide can sometimes be evaluated without proper isolation from the underlying runtime environment.

76,887 views • 8 months ago •via X (Twitter)

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someone built an AI RED TEAM that maps your entire attack surface as a knowledge graph, finds every vulnerability, then EXPLOITS them to root access AUTONOMOUSLY its called RedAmon, 9,000 templates. 17 node types, actual Metasploit shells, not reports, no pentesters needed 6 phases of autonomous recon: subdomain discovery, port scanning, http probing, resource enumeration, vulnerability scanning, MITRE mapping every finding stored in a Neo4j graph with 17 node types and 20+ relationship types. the AI reasons about the graph, finds attack paths, and runs actual Metasploit exploits, actual shells stress-tested with zero vulnerability data, zero exploit modules, one instruction find a CVE and exploit it, it went from empty database to root-level RCE in 20 steps, researched the exploit on the web, crafted a custom deserialization payload, debugged itself when the first attempt failed next try, the server responded with root access, the highest privilege level on any Linux system. full control over everything the target was running node-serialize 0.0.4, a package with a critical deserialization flaw (CVE-2017-5941, CVSS 9.8), the server takes your cookie, decodes it, and passes it straight into unserialize() which executes any code inside it, the AI figured this out on its own with no hints built on LangGraph + MCP tool servers for naabu, nuclei, curl, metasploit. hunts leaked secrets across GitHub repos, 40+ regex patterns for AWS keys, Stripe tokens, database creds

chiefofautism

70,129 views • 6 months ago

Every software engineer and AI hater needs to watch this clip to understand that “oh every security incident is a marketing stunt” line is a tremendously misinformed take. I’m going to try to explain the OpenAI / HuggingFace exploit in 10 steps in simple words: OpenAI was evaluating their new internal model without internet access and it operated in a swarm of subagents to eventually hijack internal OpenAI and HuggingFace infrastructure. 1. Isolated agents found a way to communicate each other through an internal dependency management service by figuring out how to post sometimes cryptic text files or folder names in it 2. Using its collective knowledge through that communication channel, it found a 0-day (never before seen) exploit in said service to access the internet OpenAI hack: 3. Found a leaked credential of a random company in a public archive 4. Uploaded a Ruby object to that company’s servers, uses it as a dependency in the original service in (1) 5. Found another 0-day exploit in the service where packages are deserialized in an unsandboxed manner in the dep management service allowing any code to run 6. Finds that the Linux version of the unsandboxed system has a CVE, a known vulnerability, to gain more permissions (root) 7. Eventually spread through the OpenAI internal cluster gaining root access to many machines Hugging Face exploit: 8. Found an exposed API key in a Modal application running a HuggingFace app that took arbitrary code allowing it to take over that service to execute code 9. Found two 0-days in HuggingFace dataset infrastructure to be able to access local files on HF servers to obtain credentials and other HF source code 10. Used source code and credential to become cluster admin of HF in <13hrs Agents at the frontier are like infinitely scalable armies of the best hackers on the planet. If there is a password or key exposed, they will find it. Even if the system follows the best security practices, they will find a way around it. And these are not even models that are aligned to solving tangential tasks, not even post trained specifically to exploit systems. Cybersecurity has historically relied partly on attacker scarcity. That is no longer true. What would previously have taken months will take days. The repercussions for businesses, critical services and nation states are unprecedented threats in human history. You could ostensibly bring down power grids, financial infrastructure, military systems, weapons programs, intelligence networks and spread through the software supply chain. We need to take this seriously. It’s a threat to all software all over the world.

Deedy

104,459 views • 28 days ago

OpenClaw has 186K GitHub stars and 1.5M compromised API keys. I needed a secure alternative. So, I built it with n8n and Claude Opus 4.6. It can already: - Reply to your Telegram messages - Access selected folders from your laptop - Access Gmail, Drive, Notion, Linear, etc. - Install new local tools in a sandbox - Run autonomously for hours - Create multiple subagents - Learn from experience - Wake up regularly But, unlike OpenClaw, it: - Can't access your API keys - Can't modify its environment - Can't access folders you haven't shared - Can't access tools you haven't approved - Must get your confirmation, e.g., when sending emails These aren’t prompt instructions. They’re hard architectural boundaries — Docker isolation, mounted folder permissions, n8n’s tool approval system. Key components: ✅ The VPS on Hostinger hosts n8n and a sandbox container. Agents can also connect to my laptop's sandbox via a Claudeflare tunnel + Desktop Commander MCP. ✅ The Manager agent is the brain. It plans, decides, delegates, and talks to the user. It never touches files. It never runs scripts. It works entirely from executor summaries. ✅ The Executor agents are the hands. Each receives a task (what to do + why it matters), decides how to execute it, and reports back. They can install new tools and execute code only in their dedicated sandboxes. ✅ Data Tables in n8n store both memories and sessions — no external database, no vector store, no infrastructure. Just rows in a table. Turns out, that's enough. Two memory types: - Manager memory: user preferences, facts, corrections, relationship, skills, context - Executor memory: what tools are installed, what’s broken, workarounds ✅ Sessions are short-term state for multi-step tasks. Original request, plan, assumptions, and what happened so far. When the Manager loops with fresh context, the session is all it gets. That's a Ralph Wiggum loop. I've been using it for 5 days. And already can't imagine not having it on my phone. What's next: - Heartbeat via Cron (a scheduled prompt) - Civic Nexus governance + MCPs - Supermemory integration - WhatsApp as an additional surface - Hardening The architecture supports all of it. OpenClaw proved people want personal AI agents. It also proved that 'just trust the prompt' isn't a security model. Docker isolation, mounted folder permissions, tool approval — none of this is new technology. It's just discipline. You can easily do this even with n8n — no coding required. --- Want to try it or read more? More, what I learned, and a setup guide: productcompass[.]pm

Paweł Huryn

54,038 views • 6 months ago

I built an app in Softr for the HVAC industry to solve some crucial problems. The problem is that those in the HVAC industry and similar industries like construction, plumbing, and electrical do not have one source of truth where: 1. Their clients can request for thier services. 2. Clients can be onboarded after they make a payment. 3. They store the information and bio data of their technicians. 4. They assign tasks to their technicians. 5. Technicians can track onsite jobs with pictures in real time of when working. 6. Clients see the progress of their projects. 7. Invoices and quotations from paid clients can be tracked. 8. Technicians borrow assets from the company, and they can be tracked. 9. There is a database where every individual, from technicians to admin and clients, are all stored. 10. Login details from every individual are secured and they can only see things that are their business without seeing that of another person, be ita technician or a client. These and many more are what people in these industries face as a challenge. I came up with a solution that addresses all these problems. I built a workflow that also auto-populated the users table in the database with technicians and clients when the records are filled in the technician and client tables, respectively. There is also a workflow that sends an email to the admin when a client makes a request from the portal. Taking advantage of the database, workflow, and portal gave a full-blown application for the HVAC industry. If you are in the construction, plumbing, electrical, or HVAC industry and you need a similar build, reach out, and I will be more than happy to replicate this for you or something similar in Softr.

Ada || Airtable, Zapier & Make.com

28,588 views • 9 months ago

Pi was built when there were already agent harnesses around. Here’s why Mario Zechner(Mario Zechner), found them suboptimal and built Pi, a minimalist self-modifying agent: #1 - Mario initially was a believer in Claude Code: "I was a believer in Claude code because they were the first that packaged agentic search up in a really compelling package. And at the time that fit my workflow really well. Everything around the LLM was kind of nice and tidy and easy to understand. I was super happy. I was proselytising Claude code." #2 - Reverse engineering Claude Code highlighted the degradation that Mario felt as a user: "I personally like simple tools that are stable and that I can rely on. Even if they have non-deterministic parts, all the deterministic parts should be as stable as possible. That was just not the experience with Claude Code around summer 2025. They would take away your control of the context. They would inject stuff behind your back, which is bad. Then, your workflows stopped working because there's now a system reminder that you don't even see in the UI that would modify the behaviour of the model. They would also do this to the system prompt. I built a little service where I can track the progression or evolution of the system, prompt and tool definitions and, with every release, it was messing with stuff. That just messed with my workflows and I don't appreciate that." #3 - PI was built with an appreciation for simple and reliable tools: "If I commit to a development tool, I want it to be a stable, reliable thing like a hammer. I don't want my hammer to break a different spot every day. That's terrible. We need somebody who goes the full velocity kind of way. But I don't want to work with a tool like that."

The Pragmatic Engineer

63,020 views • 4 months ago